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Abstract 
 
Given the prominence of international trade in the globalized economy, large 
undesirable costs arise due to uncertainties in international transactions. The United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, Vienna, 1980 
identifies some of these costs to be a product of separate legal rules on international 
trade, and recognizes the solution to lie in a unified statement of norms. Judicial 
experience with the Convention, however, has demonstrated that the existence of a 
unified statement of norms does not ensure uniform results. 
 
While the majority of the literature on the Convention takes a black letter law 
approach without examining the impact of varying interpretations on the end users 
of the Convention, this thesis argues that the provisions of the Convention, from the 
perspective of the parties, must operate to achieve the ends of efficiency. Absent the 
same, parties drafting a contract would opt out of the application of the default rules 
by including a provision in the contract governing the contingency. Such an 
outcome would in turn significantly increase transaction costs associated with 
contractual negotiating and drafting. 
 
This thesis concerns itself with six areas that have raised a great deal of disagreement 
amongst the scholarly and judicial community namely: The scope and role of the 
principle of good faith; the issues surrounding the inclusion of standard terms into 
the contracts of sale; the extent to which the Convention allows for the use of open-
price terms; the question of the period within which notice of non-conformity must 
be provided; the rate at which interest has to be paid on sums in arrears and; the 
guiding principles for the interpretation of the term ‘foreseeability’ as contained in 
article 74.  Each chapter of this thesis therefore deals with one of these issues and 
attempts to resolve it in line with the international character of the Convention - and 
one that promotes the efficiency of the agreement. For the purposes of this thesis, an 
efficient rule is defined as one that operates to minimize transaction costs, does not 
allow or de-incentivizes the potential of parties to act in an opportunistic manner and 
places liability on the best risk avoider. In reaching such an interpretation of the 
articles under examination, the thesis gives due regard to the travaux preparatoires, 
scholarly opinion and judicial pronunciations on the matter.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, 
Vienna, 1980 (hereafter referred to as ‘Convention’) was drafted with the aim of 
harmonizing the law on international sales. This harmonization was motivated by 
compelling political realities, the interconnectedness of domestic and international 
economies, and the need for certainty in international sales.1 Given the prominence 
of international trade in the globalized economy, large undesirable costs arise due to 
uncertainties in international transactions.2 The Convention identifies some of these 
costs to be a product of separate legal rules on international trade, and recognizes 
the solution to lie in a unified statement of norms.3 
 
Judicial experience with the Convention, however, has demonstrated that the 
existence of a unified statement of norms does not ensure uniform results.4 This may 
partly be attributable to the fact that unlike scientists, lawyers do not have the luxury 
to write laws in formulas and numbers.5 Rather the only tools available to lawyers 
are words – which have been characterized by Professor Honnold as “mushy, 
ambiguous things” that constitute “blunt (and) unreliable tools.”6 This problem is 
exacerbated when, in legal drafting, recourse is made to intrinsically vague terms 
such as foreseeability and good faith.7 
 
                                                     
1 Arthur Rosett, ‘Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods’ (1984) 45 Ohio State Law Journal 265 
2 ibid 
3 The UNCITRAL states that the purpose of the Convention “is to provide a modern, uniform and fair 
regime for contracts for the international sale of goods. Thus, the CISG contributes significantly to 
introducing certainty in commercial exchanges and decreasing transaction costs.” 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html> accessed: 2 
December 2012; The preamble to the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 
11 April 1980 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Convention’ states: “...that the adoption of uniform rules 
which govern contracts for the international sale of goods and take into account the different social, 
economic and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade 
and promote the development of international trade.” See also Kazuaki Sono, ‘Restoration of the Rule 
of Reason in Contract Formation: Has There Been Civil and Common Law Disparity?’ (1988) 21 
Cornell International Law Journal 477. 
4 Camilla Baasch Andersen, ‘The Uniform International Sales Law and the Global Jurisconsultorium’ 
(2005) 24 Journal of Law and Commerce 159.  
5 John Honnold, ‘The Sales Convention in Action – Uniform International Words: Uniform 
Application?’ (1988) 8 Journal of Law and Commerce 207. 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid. 
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Conceptual and linguistic problems are further intensified by the pre-disposition of 
courts and tribunals to interpret international instruments through a domestic lens.8 
In this regard Professor Honnold advocates the solution to lie in the use of scholarly 
writing and judicial pronunciations from other legal systems.9 An in-depth analysis 
of the Convention however, reveals the inherent incoherence of the instrument, 
which limits the possibility of any one legal tradition accepting the ruling of another 
legal system on certain provisions.10 One of the reasons for such incoherence, in the 
words of Professor Ziegel, lies in the fact that “where an acceptable compromise 
could not be reached the drafters unhappily had to seek refuge in vague or 
obfuscatory language.”11  
The Convention is a result of over 10 years of negotiations for the creation of a 
unified statement of international commercial law. In fact, it may be argued that the 
foundation stone of the Convention was actually laid at the Sixth Session of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law held in 1928. After a brief hiatus 
during the Second World War the project resumed in the early part of the 1950s, 
with delegates representing 20 states.12 As a result of this effort, the ULIS and the 
ULF were adopted at the Diplomatic Conference held at The Hague in 1964.13 Eric 
Bergsten notes that even at this stage there were concerns regarding the extent to 
which states would ratify the uniform law on sales.14 Indeed even four years after the 
                                                     
8 ibid; see also James E. Bailey, 'Facing the Truth: Seeing The Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International Sales' (1999) 32 Cornell 
International Law Journal 273. 
9  Honnold (n 5). 
10 There are however instances where courts belonging to one jurisdiction have made reference to 
judgments emanating from other jurisdictions. See for example District Court, Northern District of 
Georgia, United States, 17 December 2009; Rechtbank Rotterdam, Netherlands, 25 February 2009; 
Tribunale di Forlì, Italy, 16 February 2009; CLOUT case No. 867 [Tribunale di Forlì, Italy, 11 
December 2008]; Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, Germany, 31 March 2008; Supreme Court, Poland, 11 
May 2007; CLOUT case No. 774 [Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 2 March 2005]; CLOUT case No. 
889 [Handelsgericht Kanton Zürich, Switzerland, 24 October 2003].  
11 Jacob S Ziegel, ‘The Future of the International Sales Convention from a Common Law 
Perspective’ (2000) 6 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 336, 338. 
12 On the first of July 1964 the ULIS opened for signature. Reprinted in (1964) 13 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 453.   
13 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods 1 July 1964 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘ULIS’) reprinted in John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under The 
1980 United Nations Convention (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 1991) 667-91; Convention 
Relating to a Uniform Law on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, 1964 [hereinafter ULF], 
reprinted in Honnold at 659-66. 
14 Eric Cohen, ‘Methodological Problems in the Drafting of the CISG’ in André Janssen and Olaf 
Meyer (eds), CISG Methodology (Sellier European Law Publishers 2009) 11 
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adoption of the uniform law, it was noted at the First Session of the UNCITRAL that 
the ULIS had not reached the necessary five ratifications to bring it into force.15  
 
At the Second Session of the UNCITRAL it became clear that one of the significant 
barriers in the ratification of the uniform law lay in the fact that it did not adequately 
address the concerns of developing states. This is hardly surprising given that both 
the uniform laws were drafted almost exclusively by the representatives of 
industrialized Western European states.16 Nations with different legal, social and 
economic traditions therefore viewed them with a degree of skepticism, at least with 
regard to the extent to which the model laws represented an attempt at a global 
unification.17  As a result, the Session concluded with the decision to set up a 
Working Group to “ascertain which modification of the existing text might render 
them capable of wider acceptance by countries of different legal, social and 
economic systems.”18 The number of proposals for amendment were so numerous 
that it became clear that a new convention would have to be drafted.19   
 
It should be noted that the ULIS and the ULF were neither model laws nor 
standalone conventions. Rather they were uniform laws attached to conventions.20 
Any state that became a member of the convention to which the uniform law was 
attached automatically undertook the obligation to incorporate the uniform law into 
their domestic legislation.21  As a result, public international law viewed such 
incorporation as a fulfillment of treaty obligation; from the perspective of domestic 
law, however, the model laws were simply domestic law statutes once 
incorporated.22 
 
                                                     
15 By 1972, it had been ratified by a total of only eight nations. Michael P. Van Alstine, ‘Dynamic 
Treaty Interpretation’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 687, 696 
16 Elizabeth Hayes Patterson, ‘United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods: Unification and the Tension Between Compromise and Domination’ (1986) 22 Stanford 
Journal of International Law 263, 267  
17 ibid. See also Van Alstine (n 15).  
18 Commission Report Second Session (1969), A/7618 para 38. 
19  Van Alstine (n 15) 687. 
20 Bergsten (n 14) 13. 
21 See Article 1(1) of The Convention Relating to the Uniform Law on The International Sale of 
Goods (The Hague 1 July 1964); Article 1(1) of the Convention relating to The Uniform Law On The 
Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (The Hague 1 July 1964) 
22 Bergsten (n 14) 12. 
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In 1969, when the UNCITRAL restarted the process of unification of law on 
international sales, the drafting committee was composed of representatives 
belonging to fourteen countries which were “chosen to represent and ensure the 
involvement, feedback, and support from the distinct legal systems of this world.” 23  
Moreover, when the Convention was adopted at the UN Diplomatic Conference 
1980, representatives of sixty-two states participated – belonging to a multitude of 
legal, social and political traditions.24 The diversity of views that sought recognition 
during the drafting stages is itself testament to the momentous achievement reached 
by the UNCITRAL. It is also however testament to the fact that the provisions of the 
Convention, in various instances, represent diplomatic compromise on the part of the 
drafters. Unfortunately, such compromise often came at the expense of clarity.  
It is essential for the future success of the Convention that its end users – i.e. the 
mercantile community – are provided a degree of clarity vis-à-vis their respective 
rights and obligations. In the words of Professor Rosett: 
 Businesspersons do not place a high value on doctrinal purity nor do they 
especially value the political capacity to accommodate persistently 
conflicting views in an acceptable diplomatic text. They do need to set prices 
and undertake risks; hence, they need legal guidance in responding to 
particular situations.25  
1.1 Interpretative Philosophy Of The Convention 
 
During the drafting stages of the Convention, the subject of interpretation 
attracted intense interest, specifically with regards to the extent to which the 
Convention would displace national law.26 During this stage of deliberations, 
delegates can roughly be divided into two groups. One group completely rejected the 
idea or even the possibility of framing a comprehensive code of international legal 
                                                     
23 The UNCITRAL was established through Resolution 2205 (XXII) of the General Assembly. 
Susanne Cook, ‘The Need for Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (1988) 50 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 197, 
202  
24 Ziegel (n 11) 337. 
25 Before the creation of the UNCITRAL in 1966, the UNIDROIT was responsible for the unification 
of commercial law; Rosett (n 1) 269. 
26 Article 17 of the ULIS stated that all questions left unsettled were to be resolved in conformity with 
the general principles on which the Convention is based. Honnold (n 5). 
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standards and advocated for a skeleton of rules that would be devoid of any unifying 
principles.27 The other group, advocated for a Convention that would completely 
preempt and be independent of national laws.28 
 
After prolonged deliberations, Article 7 was incorporated into the text of the 
Convention.29 By virtue of this article, the Convention is to be interpreted with due 
regard to its international character, the need to promote uniformity in its application 
and the observance of good faith in international trade.”30 A perusal of Article 7(1) 
suggests that it merely specifies the goals an appropriate interpretation is to reach 
rather than framing a clear methodology of interpretation.31  Article 7(2) goes on to 
state that issues that lie within the scope of the Convention but have not been 
explicitly settled in it are to be resolved in conformity with the general principles on 
which it is based.32 Domestic law is only applicable for the resolution of an issue 
which falls within the scope of the Convention when the text is silent on the matter 
and no general principle capable of resolving the issue can be identified. 
 
1.1.1 International Character: 
 
According to Article 7, the Convention must be interpreted on the basis of its 
international character33 – i.e. independent of domestic legal concepts and 
interpretative techniques.34 The negative consequences of a nationalistic 
interpretation of the Convention have been recognized in various recent European 
judgments. For instance, in the case of Gerichtspräsident von Laufen, the court 
asserted that the independence of the Convention from national interpretative 
techniques is essential to its goal of uniform application, and concluded that 
unwarranted recourse to domestic law completely undermines the objectives of the 
                                                     
27 Van Alstine (n 15)793. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Convention, Article 7. 
30 ibid Article 7(1).  
31 Ulrich Magnus, ‘Tracing Methodology in the CISG: Dogmatic Foundations’ in André Janssen and 
Olaf Meyer (eds), CISG Methodology (Sellier European Law Publishers 2009) 40. 
32 Convention, Article 7(2). 
33 Convention, Article 7. 
34 See United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 
March-11 April 1980, Official Records, Documents of the Conference and Summary Records of the 
Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Main Committee, 1981, p. 17. 
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Convention.35 Great care should therefore be taken to avoid what is known as the 
homeward trend, i.e. the “temptation for judges and the parties settling disputes ... to 
look at what is familiar especially as it appears to be so at first glance.”36 The first 
element of the article therefore serves an elevating function in that the Convention is 
viewed to lie in the international dimension, distinct and independent of domestic 
legal regimes.37 
 
1.1.2 Uniformity in Application: 
 
Article 7 goes on to state that while interpreting the Convention, attention must be 
paid to promoting uniformity in its application. This part of the article seems to 
address the interpreters of the Convention, rather than focusing on substantive 
provisions.38 Furthermore, Article 7 uses the term ‘need,’ rather than a more elastic 
term such as ‘want’. What transpires then is the instruction to interpreters and 
adjudicators to give due regard to decisions by courts of other member states.39 Such 
recognition of foreign case law is so important in the interpretative methodology of 
the Convention that certain commentators have classified it as a legal duty.40  
 
It should however be noted that a court charged with interpreting a provision of the 
Convention is not bound by judgments delivered by a foreign court on the matter. 
Rather all that is required is that the court considers such judgments where they 
exist.41 Consequently, such judgments command persuasive authority only, and may 
be diverged from. 
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36 Marianne Roth and Richard Happ, ‘Interpretation of the CISG According to Principles of 
International Law’ (1999) 4 International Trade and Business Law Annual 1, 3 
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1.1.3 The Observance of Good Faith: 
 
The interpretation of what the requirement of observance of good faith entails has 
occupied scholars and tribunals alike since the formation of the Convention, and 
the issue is far from being resolved. In particular, there are two issues in this 
regard that have given rise to controversy. First, the Convention makes absolutely 
no attempt to define what the principle of good faith actually entails. As a result, 
academics and courts alike disagree on the definition of the principle. 
Unfortunately, most commentators simply equate the principle with other vague 
terms such as fairness and justice – therefore no concrete guidance is provided 
vis-à-vis what the principle actually means.  Second, it is questionable whether the 
principle amounts to a general principle upon which the Convention is based. 
These two issues, in part, form the subject matter of Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
 
1.1.4 General Principles: 
 
The second clause of Article 7 stresses the Convention’s independence from national 
legal systems by stating that even in cases where the Convention does not expressly 
answer a question which lies in its sphere, such issues should be resolved on the 
basis of the general principles on which the Convention is based. Certain 
commentators argue that for the application of the general principles, it is necessary 
that the gap be one that has unintentionally not been settled in the Convention.42 This 
thesis argues that this view is misguided. Indeed, there were instances during the 
drafting stages of the Convention where the drafters viewed the issue to fall within 
the scope of the Convention but were forced to intentionally leave certain gaps as a 
result of the difficulty faced in formulating a solution acceptable to the majority.43 
The fact that such issues fall within the scope of the Convention is reason enough to 
follow the interpretative methodology contained in Article 7(2) whereby recourse to 
domestic law for the resolution of issues that lie within the scope of the Convention 
is only allowed in cases where the general principles are unable to address the issue. 
                                                     
42 Magnus (n 31) 44. 
43 The issue of the rate at which interest is to be charged under Article 78 is an example of how such 
gaps have been intentionally left in the Convention.  
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The Convention therefore “imposes first an intro-interpretation with respect to 
interpretation issues or gaps”44 and the use of domestic law in the interpretation of 
the Convention is allowed only as a last resort.45 
 
Allowing recourse to domestic law as a last resort is understandable since, in certain 
instances, there was an absence of consensus in the UNICTRAL as to whether a 
particular rule or set of rules should be incorporated into the Convention.46 Since the 
absence of consensus could have very well resulted in the breakdown of the whole 
Convention, the drafters opted to promote uniformity as much as possible through the 
incorporation of as many rules on the international sales of goods as the delegates 
could agree upon.47  
 
Furthermore, the drafters of the Convention were often faced with situations where 
the participants disagreed on the basis of cultural and ideological norms rather than 
differing conventional rules. For instance, the use of custom and usage in the 
interpretation of contracts divided the delegates for a decade.48 While countries with a 
capitalist mode of production gave a very high value to custom and usage that had 
evolved over centuries,49 post-colonial states viewed them as remnants of imperialism 
that had to be broken out of.50 Countries with centrally planned economies had strong 
ideological concerns with unwritten contracts, the autonomy of parties in private 
contracts and trade customs that they viewed to be a product of Western trade.51 
Given the diverse nature of conflicting interests that sought recognition during the 
drafting stages of the Convention, the only course open to the drafters in various 
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instances was to frame rules in a manner that would achieve diplomatic 
compromise.52  
 
1.2 Do the Rules of the Convention Benefit the Parties? 
 
It should be noted that subject to the dictates of Article 12, parties are free to 
derogate via agreement from the provisions of the Convention. In turn, it is only 
when the contract is incomplete that the rules of the Convention, governing such a 
contingency, become operative. By way of example, while Article 78 specifically 
obliges a party to pay interest on sums in arrears, it would be inapplicable if the 
contract specifically states that the no interest is to be paid on the same. It is in this 
regard that the Convention operates as a set of default rules. 
 
Default rules, from the perspective of the parties, must operate to achieve the ends of 
efficiency. Absent the same, parties drafting a contract would opt out of the 
application of the default rules by including a provision in the contract governing the 
contingency. Such an outcome would in turn significantly increase transaction costs 
associated with contractual negotiating and drafting. It is in this context that the 
utility of the economic analysis of the law becomes apparent. 
 
The economic analysis of contract law generally starts from the admittedly false 
assumption that parties have made provisions for every possible contingency in their 
contracts.53 Consequently, there is no role for default rules and in instances of 
dispute courts should simply enforce the express intention of the parties as contained 
in the provisions of the contract concluded between them.54  
 
Contracts are however seldom, if ever, complete and various reasons have been 
advanced for the same. For instances, parties may not be able to foresee a 
                                                     
52 Volker Behr, ‘The Sales Convention in Europe: From Problems in Drafting to Problems in Practice’ 
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contingency ex-ante and therefore may omit to contract on it.55 Moreover, a cost-
benefit analysis may lead parties to conclude that the cost of agreeing upon the 
appropriate course of action upon the materialization of a remote contingency may 
outweigh the advantages of specificity.56 In certain instances, parties may 
intentionally leave the contract incomplete vis-à-vis certain contentious issues, 
insistence to negotiate upon which might well blow up the deal.57 It may simply be 
too costly to enforce or monitor certain terms ex-post and resultantly parties may opt 
not to include them in their contracts.58  
 
Concerns surrounding incompleteness of contract are remedied if default rules 
operate to keep the efficiency of the bargain intact on the materialization of 
unspecified contingencies.59 For the purposes of this thesis, a rule is considered 
efficient if it:  
 
1.2.1 Operates to minimize transaction costs: 
 
Traditionally economic theorists focused on gains of trade made possible by the 
division of labor and specialization.60 This analysis, however, did not take into 
account the costliness of the exchange process itself. In his famous article, “The 
Problem of Social Costs,” Coase argued that the neoclassical paradigm would only 
achieve the implied allocative results in the absence of transaction costs.61 In other 
words, an efficient allocation of resources will result where an agreement has been 
bargained for, regardless of the initial assignment of rights, so long as transaction 
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costs are kept at a minimum.62 As a result, in instances where the transaction costs 
are zero, the choice of legal rules does not have an impact on the efficiency of the 
agreement, whereas if transaction costs were positive, the choice of legal rules would 
have an impact on the efficiency of the outcome. 63 
 
It may therefore be stated that the economic function of contract law is to promote 
voluntary exchange by keeping transaction costs to a minimum. In the context of the 
Convention, this statement would simply mean that the rules of the Convention 
should be interpreted in a manner that minimizes transaction costs. This in in line 
with the purpose of the Convention, which attempts to limit transaction costs by 
providing a unified statement of commercial law.  
 
Indeed minimizing transaction costs is necessary since they act as a barrier in the 
conclusion of mutually beneficial agreements.64 Professor Mackaay identifies three 
types of transaction costs: 1) negotiating costs; 2) costs associated with performance 
and enforcement; and 3) costs associated with the opportunism of the other party.65 
Negotiating costs are not simply limited to costs associated with agreeing on the 
terms of the contract and drafting, but rather include costs associated with 
discovering the preferences and concerns of the other party. The greater the cost 
associated with procuring such information, the smaller the pie.66 
 
Performance and enforcement costs include costs associated with market 
uncertainties. Merchants would generally not wish to conclude contracts when they 
believe that changes in the market would foil their plans.67 In such a situation, it is 
necessary to reduce such uncertainty; where that is not possible, the law should 
attempt to reduce costs by placing risk on the best risk-avoider. 
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While transaction costs and opportunism are closely related, certain commentators 
argue that they should not be grouped together – they represent two different 
concepts.68 To address this, this chapter includes a separate section on the concept of 
opportunism. 
 
1.2.2 Does not allow or de-incentivizes the potential of parties to act in an 
opportunistic manner:  
 
According to Judge Posner, deterring opportunistic behavior is “the fundamental 
function of contract law.”69 Opportunism for the purposes of this thesis is defined as 
the policy of self-interest, whereby a party takes undue advantage of an asymmetry 
to change the ratio of return between the parties to its advantage, and to the detriment 
of the other.70 In the words of Oliver Williamson, it is the policy of “self-interest 
with guile.”71   
 
A party acting opportunistically does not necessary act in contravention of the literal 
interpretation of the provisions of the Convention but rather places self-interest 
before the interests of the other party when the opportunity arises.72 As such, creative 
compliance is but one aspect of opportunistic behavior. While there are no issues 
with a party acting in a self-interested manner; parties should not be allowed to 
operate contrary to the reasonable expectations of the other under the contract. As 
such a party acts opportunistically when it “capitalizes on the mistakes of others: 
utilizes opportunities created by the errors, weaknesses or distractions of opponents 
to one's own advantage.”73 
 
Opportunism is most evident during the performance stage of a contract. In instances 
where parties do not perform their contractual obligations simultaneously but rather 
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chilena de derecho privado 149, 162. 
71 Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the 
Economics of Internal Organization  (Free Press 1975) 26. 
72 ibid 
73 Donald L. Luskin, ‘Newt's Bain Opportunism Is Mitt's Opportunity’ Wall Street Journal (17 
January 2012) <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204409004577158741468922050> 
accessed 24 August 2014 
40 
 
sequentially, one invests in performance before the other. In various instances, this 
leads to a condition of asset specificity, which in Williamson’s words refers to 
“durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the 
opportunity cost of which investment is much lower in best alternative uses or by 
alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely terminated.”74 
Consequently the party that has begun its performance is at the mercy of the other. 
This means that the sequence of performance makes opportunism profitable from the 
perspective of the party who has to perform last. It should however be noted that 
opportunism is not limited to the performance stage of the contract but may occur at 
any stage. Moreover, while the condition of asset specificity is facilitative of 
opportunism on the part of the party that has not yet invested in performance, it is 
definitely not a requirement for it.75 
 
In its most simplified form opportunism is simply an un-agreed transfer of wealth 
that is in contravention of the other parties’ reasonable expectations under the 
contract.76 In this sense it also includes exploitation of an unspecified contingency by 
one party with the view of changing the division of gains from the contract in its 
favor. 
 
The potential of opportunistic behavior on the part of one of the parties to a contract 
reveals the importance of interpreting default rules in a manner that bars the same. In 
the words of Ayres and Gertner, “By changing the default rules of the game, law 
makers can importantly reduce opportunities for rent seeking, strategic behavior.”77  
 
Opportunism left unchecked carries great costs. Simply put, the easier it is for one 
party to affect the return from an asset to the other party without being completely 
liable for its actions, the lower is the value of the asset itself.78 Therefore, default 
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Review 521, 566. He states that “opportunistic behaviour provides a ground upon which to separate 
good from bad faith” 
77 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules’ (1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 87, 94 
78 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge 
University Press 1990) 31 
41 
 
rules that make parties liable for the costs incurred as a result of opportunistic 
behavior would operate to maximize the joint return of the parties.79 Moreover, if 
transaction costs did not exist, parties would be able to identify the potential of 
opportunism on the part of the other and would have forbidden it by expressly 
incorporating a clause to that effect in their contract.80  
 
 
1.2.3 Places liability on the best-risk avoider:  
 
The least-cost avoider or the best-risk avoider81 is a concept that initially took root in 
tort law.82 In a nutshell, the concept was employed to deter negligent behavior by 
punishing a party for not taking cost-justified precautions.83 In the realm of contract 
law, the best-risk avoider amongst the parties to a contract is identified as the one 
who is best able to evaluate, mitigate, prevent, and insure against the risk.84 It is 
argued that if default rules operate to provide an incentive to the best risk-avoider, 
through the imposition of liability or denial of recovery to take adequate precautions, 
the joint return of the parties is maximized. It should be noted that wealth 
maximization as used in this thesis does not concern itself with individual welfare.85 
Instead, it is simply concerned with the sum of participant utility excluding third 
party effects.86  
 
Applying the Coase theorem to the issue of the best-risk avoider it is argued that if 
transaction costs do not exist then all legal rules are efficient – provided, of course, 
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that neither party has an advantage comparative to the other in taking precautions.87 
In other words, in situations where there are no transaction costs, the function of the 
best-cost avoider principle becomes redundant.  In the world of international sale of 
goods however, transaction costs are ever present, thereby limiting the possibility of 
parties to contract around costly legal default settings. The way around this issue is 
for the law to provide default rules that place liability on the best-risk avoider. In the 
words of Professor Cohen, “efficient legal rules minimize the sum of all precaution 
costs,” thereby reducing the sum of transaction costs.88  
 
The party best able to evaluate the risk however, is not always the one best able to 
take precautions against it. For instance, if the seller is risk neutral while the buyer is 
risk averse, then attempts to impose an open price term on the buyer may well have a 
crowding out effect, regardless of the fact that the buyer may be best suited to 
evaluate the risk.  As a result, one must take into account the categories into which 
different parties can be grouped – for example, risk averse or risk neutral – when 
identifying the best risk-avoider.  
 
Moreover, the concept of the best-risk avoider can only achieve its intended goals if 
opportunistic behavior is constrained.89 For instance, if a party possesses private 
information about its circumstances, and does not reveal the same to the other party 
for strategic reasons it should be identified as the best risk-avoider in instances 
where precaution is dependent on information revelation.90 In such instances, the fact 
that the other party would be better able to insure against the risk (for instance due to 
a smaller premium on insurance) becomes irrelevant. This is because the 
strategically acting party could have enabled the other to take efficient precaution by 
revealing the information.91  
   
 
 
 
                                                     
87 ibid 
88 Cohen (n 106) 946. 
89 It is in this regard that the concept goes beyond deterring negligent behaviour.   
90 Ayres and Gertner (n 108) 94. 
91 Provided that the other party is best suited to take the precaution.  
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1.3 Issues Under Consideration 
 
In particular, this thesis concerns itself with six areas that have raised a great deal of 
disagreement amongst the scholarly and judicial community. While there are 
numerous other articles and issues within the Convention which require clarification, 
these six have been chosen because:  
 
1.3.1 The function of the principle of good faith:  
 
A proper interpretation of the Convention requires adherence to the interpretative 
methodology contained in Article 7. Unfortunately, the dictates of Article 7 have 
been interpreted inconsistently by the judicial and academic community. 
Specifically, there is a great degree of disagreement amongst academic community 
and judicial pronunciations alike, surrounding the definition and function of the 
principle of good faith. As such, any thesis attempting to interpret provisions of the 
Convention must begin by resolving this uncertainty.  
 
1.3.2 The issues surrounding the inclusion of standard terms into the 
contracts of sale:  
Given the prevalent use of standard forms in the context of sale of goods, it is hardly 
surprising that the issue of Battle of Forms (BOF) has been a subject of extensive 
debate amongst legal scholars around the world.92 Various commentators argue that 
they “raise some of the trickiest doctrinal issues.”93  Unfortunately the Convention 
does not expressly settle the question of the manner in which conflicting standard 
forms are to be incorporated into the agreement. As a result, reference has to be 
made to the dictates of Article 19, which is generally concerned with the question of 
what amounts to a valid acceptance. The travaux however reveal that the black letter 
wording of the article does not adequately remedy the concerns of the drafters on the 
issue. The resolution of the question is therefore unique in that one must derogate 
                                                     
92 Giesela Ruhl, ‘Battle of the Forms: Comparative and Economic Observations’, (2003) 24 
University of Pennsulvania Journal of International Economic Law 189. 
93 Jonathan Morgan, Great Debates in Contract Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 68; See for instance 
Oberlandesgericht Linz, Austria,  23 March 2005; Bundesgerichtshof, Germany,  9 January 2002; 
[Landgericht Kehl, Germany,  6 October 1995. 
44 
 
from the express wording of the Convention in order to reach a commercially 
reasonable interpretation which is in line with the intent of the drafters. 
 
1.3.3. The issue of open-price terms:  
 
The interplay between Articles 14 and 55 is unique in that a reading of the two seems 
to suggest that the two contradict one another. Since every article of the Convention is 
of equal value, it is impossible for the dictates of one article to take precedence over 
the other. A review of case law and scholarly opinion however demonstrates that at 
various instances the dictates of Article 14 have been held to be superior to that of 
Article 55. For example, Professor Garro argues that Article 55 only comes into 
operation when parties to the contract belong to a member state that has entered into a 
reservation vis-à-vis part II of the Convention.94   
 
The existence of such seemingly contradictory articles is attributed to a diplomatic 
compromise reached between delegates who advocated for the adoption rules on 
price terms that would operate to allow parties flexibility as required by prevailing 
commercial practice, and those who were concerned such provision of flexibility 
might operate to impose a price which was never intended by the parties.95 Indeed an 
analysis of the Convention’s travaux reveals that the interplay between Articles 14 
and 55 is one of the most difficult questions raised by the Convention.96    
 
1.3.4 The question of the period within which notice of non-conformity must 
be provided:  
 
                                                     
94 Alejandro M. Garro, ‘Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods’ (1989) 23 International Lawyer 443, 463; see also Professor 
Farnsworth’s view whereby contracts with open price terms cannot be recognized under the 
Convention since under Article 55, a price term may be implied “where a contract has been validly 
concluded” and under Article 14, a contract cannot be validly concluded without a sufficiently 
definite price term. Farnsworth (n 52); see also Pratt & Whitney v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 
Legfelsbb Biróság, Gf. I. 31, 349/1992/9 (Dr. László Szlávnits trans., 1992, reprinted in 13 J. L. 
& COM. 32 (1993). 
95 Compare, for example, the view of the delegate of Korea during the 8th meeting of the first 
committee with that of the delegate of France in Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference, Summary Records of Meetings of the First Committee, 8th Meeting, 17 March 1980 
(Vienna Diplomatic Conference) . 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting8.html> accessed: 4 January 2013. 
96 See Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 126). 
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Unfortunately, there existed a wide array of views amongst the drafters of the 
Convention vis-à-vis the importance and preferred impact of the non-provision of a 
notice of non-conformity.97 As a result, the text of the article was a result of an 
uneasy compromise.98 It is therefore hardly surprising that questions concerning the 
timeframe within which the notice is to be provided have constituted one of the most 
recurring issues that have been brought before courts for adjudication.99 
 
Uncertainty with regards to the timeframe with in which notice is to be provided is 
extremely detrimental to the parties of a contract of sale, since non-compliance with 
the timeframe operates to bar the invocation of any remedy by the buyer which is 
otherwise available to the buyer under the Convention. The issue has therefore been 
chosen as a result of its importance – or to put it the other way around, as a result of 
the disadvantages that accrue due to uncertainty in this regard.  
 
1.3.5 The rate at which interest has to be paid on sums in arrears:  
 
Unlike various lacunae in the Convention, the issue of ROI was extensively debated 
during the drafting stages of the Convention. As such, a great degree of guidance is 
contained in the travaux in the form of policy consideration behind the tabling of 
alternative approaches on the matter and the respective criticisms levied against the 
same. Various commentators and courts however completely ignore the travaux 
whilst discussing the appropriate methodology to be adopted in the ascertainment of 
                                                     
97According to Professor Schlechtriem, the article was “one of the Conference's most difficult 
problems”. See Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law: The UN-Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (Manz 1986) 70.  
98 Anselmo Martinez Canellas, ‘The Scope of Article 44 CISG’ (2005) 25 Journal of Law and 
Commerce 261, 263 
99 See Franco Ferrari, ‘Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial Application and Scholarly 
Writing (1995) 15 Journal of Law and Commerce 1, 99: “One of the most important issues of the 
CISG . . . appears to be . . . the notice to be given to the seller in case of non-conformity of the 
goods”. This is hardly surprising since around one-fifth of the cases arising from the predecessors of 
the Convention, namely ULIS, centered on this issue see Peter Birks (ed), The Frontiers of Liability 
(Vol. 2, Oxford University Press 1994) 43; The AC in Opinion Number 2 similarly notes: “The 
provisions regarding the notice that should be given by the buyer to the seller of goods in case of their 
alleged lack of conformity to the contract were among the most disputed matters in the preparation of 
the CISG. The proper interpretation of those provisions is in turn one of the most controversial 
matters in its implementation since it involves both fact and law.” CISG-AC Opinion no 2, 
Examination of the Goods and Notice of Non-Conformity: Articles 38 and 39, 7 June 2004. 
Rapporteur: Professor Eric E. Bergsten, Emeritus, Pace University School of Law, New York. 
46 
 
the appropriate ROI.100 As a result, numerous commentators have argued that the 
issue of ROI is outside the scope of the Convention.101 
 
The issue of ROI has been chosen because it represents an instance where the 
drafters clearly viewed an issue to fall within the scope of the Convention but despite 
great effort, were unable to agree on a formulation acceptable to all delegates.  
 
1.3.5 The guiding principles for the interpretation of the term ‘foreseeability’ 
as contained in Article 74:  
 
The reason for analyzing foreseeability as it is contained in Article 74 lies in the fact 
that unlike all other issues under analysis, the principle did not attract much debate 
during the drafting stages of the article and thus the travaux are not of much help in 
the identification of the philosophical underpinnings of the principle of 
foreseeability, which would provide the grounds for an efficiency based 
interpretative methodology. Resultantly, this issue represents an instance where 
recourse is made to the general principles upon which the Convention is based for 
the resolution of the issue.   
 
1.4 Approach: 
 
The requirements contained in Article 7 of the Convention – whereby “regard is to 
be had to the Convention’s international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application” – rules out the possibility of interpreting the same with 
reference to the dictates of domestic law. Cognizant of this fact, this thesis adopts the 
following approach to the resolution of issues under examination. 
 
                                                     
100 Professor Honnold is amongst those who believe that the travaux provide ‘little or no guidance’ on 
the issue. Honnold (n 12) 603. 
101 See for example, CLOUT case No. 4 [Landgericht Stuttgart, Germany, 31 August 1990]; CLOUT 
case No. 6 [Landgericht Frankfurt a.M., Germany, 16 September 1991]; See generally, Christian 
Thiele, ‘Interest on Damages and Rate of Interest Under Article 78 of the U.N. Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (1998) 2 Vindobona Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Arbitration 3. 
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First, in order to appreciate the issues faced during the drafting of the Convention, it 
is essential to recognize the tension between the stances adopted by different legal 
traditions on the matter. To this end each chapter carries out an analysis of the 
manner in which the relevant issue is governed under UK, US and German or French 
law.102 The reason for choosing these particular jurisdictions lies specifically in the 
divergence between them in the manner in which the issues under analysis are 
governed.  
 
The chapters then move on to identify the theoretical justifications provided by the 
delegates for the adoption of one methodology over others. To this end, the thesis 
shall provide a detailed analysis of the travaux of the Convention on the issue under 
consideration.103 Such an analysis shall provide a list of requirements that a 
methodology for the resolution of the issues must fulfil in order to be acceptable 
under the Convention.  At this stage, the efficiency based detailed above shall be 
utilized to concretely classify such considerations so that they may be applied in the 
resolution of the issues under examination. It must be noted that these concepts will 
only be utilized to the extent that they represent the concerns of the drafters. As a 
result, the use of the efficiency criterion in the interpretation of the Convention is 
limited to the extent that the same represents the actual intention of the drafters. 
 
Next, the chapters analyze the existing scholarly opinion and judicial pronunciations 
on the issue under examination. At this stage of the analysis, the diversity of and 
inconsistency between such opinions and pronunciations shall be highlighted.  
 
At different stages of the analysis, various chapters shall compare the default rule 
under analysis with the otherwise most commonly used alternate default in order to 
ascertain whether the rules of the Convention are capable of reaching the ends of 
                                                     
102 The chapter on ROI does not carry out such an analysis, since in this instance it would not provide 
any additional tools for a greater appreciation of the issues confronted during the drafting stages of the 
article. It does however state why certain delegates supported the inclusion of a fixed rate of interest 
while other supported the inclusion of a methodology of ROI calculation as opposed to a fixed rate.  
103 As explained above, the issue of what the term foreseeability means in the context of article 74 did 
not attract debate during the drafting stages of the Convention, resultantly the chapter on the issue 
does not carry out such an analysis. Rather the chapter makes reference to the general principles upon 
which the Convention is based for the identification of such justifications. 
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efficiency. This analysis shall provide a degree of insight into whether the parties 
would prefer to contract out of the application of the particular default.104  
 
Equipped with such analysis, each chapter shall move on to resolve the issue under 
examination in line with the international character of the Convention – and one that 
promotes the efficiency of the agreement.  
 
1.5 Limitations:  
 
Before moving into the details of the argument put forward by this thesis, it is 
important to lay out some of the limitations that inform this work. Three main 
limitations are listed below. 
 
1) Empirical research: While it is argued that the efficiency-based 
considerations will greatly aid tribunals in interpreting the provisions of the 
Convention in a manner that does promote efficiency and advances 
harmonization, this paper is limited by existing empirical research. In other 
words, there is great need for empirical analysis and the formulation of 
mathematical techniques to concretely ascertain whether a particular default 
would promote efficiency relative to other defaults.  
2) Choice of domestic law for an analysis: in order to highlight the tensions 
between stances adopted by different legal traditions on the matter, which 
resulted in the need for compromise solutions, this thesis has limited its 
analysis to UK, US and German (and or) French Law. While these stances 
only represent a fraction of the views that sought recognition during the 
drafting of the Convention, it is argued that the concerns of developing states 
were largely based upon the socio-economic conditions prevalent in those 
states rather than being a result of the stance adopted by their respective legal 
traditions. Moreover, this thesis does not evaluate the stance adopted by the 
national laws of communist states, as the same have greatly changed since 
                                                     
104 In Chapter Two (the chapter dedicated to discussing good faith), it is argued that the application of 
the principle is limited to the interpretation of the Convention and does not extend to that of the 
underlying contract. Therefore, the chapter will question whether parties should include an express 
term in their contract whereby the principle applies to it as well. In the case of the chapter on the 
notice requirement under Article 39, such an analysis is omitted.   
49 
 
the end of the Cold War. Given that the drafting process ended well before 
the fall of the Iron Curtain, such an analysis would be out of touch with 
current realities.  
3) Third party rights: while evaluating the efficiency of a particular rule, this 
thesis does not take into account the impact of the same on third parties. 
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Chapter 2 Good Faith 
 
Introduction 
“Notwithstanding the extensive literature on the subject, no consensus exists on 
precisely what the duty of good faith means.”1 
Article 17 of the ULIS, the predecessor of the Convention, defines the interpretative 
methodology to be adopted by tribunals, called upon to settle disputes that are 
governed by it but not expressly settled thereunder.2 When faced with such issues, 
the article excludes the use of national legal principles and norms.3 Instead, the 
resolution of such gaps is limited to the application of the general principles upon 
which the instrument was based. 
The provision, however, became extremely controversial in practice and opponents 
of this approach to gap-filling questioned the ability of tribunals to identify and 
apply such principles.4  Proponents of the provision, on the other hand, argued that 
recourse to domestic law would undermine the goal of uniformity. Indeed, the 
international nature of the instrument demanded that it be interpreted independent of 
domestic law. Thus, it made sense to subject its interpretation and gap filling to its 
own general principles.5 
During deliberation of what became Article 7 of the Convention, the issue of how 
the international instrument is to be interpreted and applied resurfaced. During this 
stage of the proceedings the delegates were roughly divided into two camps. The 
first camp believed that recourse to domestic law was a necessary evil.6 They argued 
                                                     
1 Daniel R. Fischel,‘The Economics of Lender Liability’ (1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 131, 140. 
2  Article 17 of the ULIS reads: “Questions concerning matters governed by the present Law which 
are not expressly settled therein shall be settled in conformity with the general principles on which the 
present Law is based.” 
3 Article 2 of the ULIS read: “Rules of private international law shall be excluded for the purpose of 
the application of the present Law, subject to any provision to the contrary in the said Law.”  
4 René David, ‘The International Unification of Private Law’, International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law: Legal Systems of the World, Their Comparison and Unification, Vol. II, Chapter 5 
(J. C. B. Mohr 1971) 138 
5 Ibid. 
6 Michael Joachim Bonell, ‘Article 7’ in C. Massimo Bianca and Michael Joachim Bonell, 
Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (Giuffrè 1987) 65; 
see also Alejandro M. Garro, ‘Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the UN Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods’ (1989) 23 The International Lawyer 443. 
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that experience with the methodology of interpretation prescribed by the ULIS had 
proved that such general principles could not be concretely identified. Thus the 
incorporation of such an approach under the Convention would rarely provide 
meaningful guidance in the resolution of issues governed by it but not expressly 
settled thereunder.7 They therefore advocated for the possibility of recourse to 
domestic law.8 In the other camp, and in the majority, were those who believed that 
allowing recourse to domestic law would severely undermine the ex-ante 
predictability of the impact of the rules of Convention and operate contrary to its 
international character.9 
The issue was resolved through the proposal of the delegate of the German 
Democratic Republic, which essentially entailed a compromise solution.10 The first 
part of Article 7(2) reflected the text of its counterpart in the ULIS and limited the 
resolution of issues, governed by the Convention but not expressly settled 
thereunder, to the general principles upon which the instrument is based. The second 
part, however, allowed for reference to the rules of domestic law as a last recourse.11   
While the issue of the methodology to be adopted in ‘gap filling’ was accepted and 
incorporated into the text, after a great deal of debate and deliberation, it remains far 
from clear. The most controversial ambiguity is whether the principle of good faith, 
as contained in Article 7(1), amounts to one of the general principles upon which the 
Convention is based.     
The inclusion of the concept of good faith in Article 7(1) of the Convention itself 
represented a compromise between delegates that advocated for the inclusion of the 
requirement of ‘good faith’ and those who opposed the inclusion of the principle in 
total.12 The compromise, which incorporated the principle in the provision dealing 
                                                     
7 Garro (n 6). 
8 UNCITRAL Yearbook I, Vol. I (1968-1970) Part II, Chapter II, Para 170; UNCITRAL Yearbook II 
(1971), 49 
9 ibid. See also Lisa Spagnolo, ‘Opening Pandora's Box: Good Faith and Precontractual Liability in 
the CISG’ (2007) 21 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 261. 
10UNCITRAL Yearbook IX (1978); see also Bonell (n 6) 70. 
11 For an analysis of when recourse can be had to domestic law see American Arbitration Association, 
United States, 23 October 2007 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071023a5.html> accessed: 11 June 
2013; Federal Arbitration Court for the Moscow Region, Russia, 25 June 2001 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010625r1.html> accessed: 11 June 2013. 
12 Michael F. Sturley, ‘International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic 
Law in Conflicts of Interpretation’, (1986) 27 Virginia Journal of International Law 729, 731. 
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with the interpretation of the Convention, coupled with the uncertainty surrounding 
the definition of the principle itself, has led to disagreement and uncertainty with 
regards to the concept’s exact function vis-à-vis the Convention. In the academic 
community, for instance, two schools of thought emerged on the issue. The first 
school includes Professor Farmsworth13, Eorsi14 and Winsip,15 who advocate that the 
function of the concept is simply to aid in the interpretation of the Convention by 
judges.  Various courts have adopted this narrow construction of the function of the 
principle under the Convention and have applied the same16.  
 
The other school of thought asserts that the duty to act in good faith is directed at the 
parties to a contract of international sale of goods as well.17 Various tribunals have 
adopted this view.18 For instance, a tribunal required a party to pay damages on the 
grounds that his actions were “contrary to the principle of good faith in international 
                                                     
13 E. Allan Farnsworth, ‘Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the UNIDROIT Principles, 
Relevant International Conventions and National Laws’ (1995) 3 Tulane Journal of International & 
Comparative Law 47, 56. 
14 Gyula Eorsi, ‘General Provisions’ in Galston & Smith (eds), International Sales: The United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Matthew Bender 1984). 
15 Peter Winship, ‘International Sales Contracts Under the 1980 Vienna Convention’, (1984) 17 
Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal 65, 67. 
16 See for instance ICC Court of Arbitration Case No. 8611 of 1997, where the court stated that “since 
the provisions of Art. 7(1) CISG concerns only the interpretation of the Convention, no collateral 
obligation may be derived from the 'promotion of good faith”. Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, ICC, 23 January 1997 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/978611i1.html> accessed: 11 June 2013. Note however, that the 
court proceeded to find an obligation of good faith elsewhere in the CISG. 
17 Peter Schlechtriem, ‘Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws’ in Bonell (ed), 
Centro di studi e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero (Saggi, Conferenze e Seminari, Rome, 
1997) No. 24; See for example Oberlandesgericht München, Germany, 14 January 2009 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090114g1.html> accessed: 13 June 2013;  Audiencia Provincial de 
Navarra, Spain, 27 December 2007 http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071227s4.html accessed: 13 
June 2013; Oberlandesgericht Köln, Germany,  21 December 2005 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051221g1.html accessed: 13 June 2013; Primer Tribunal Colegiado 
en Materia Civil del Primer Circuito, Mexico, 10 March 2005 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050310m1.html> accessed: 13 June 2013. 
18 See for example CLOUT case No. 154 [Cour d'appel de Grenoble, France, 22 February 1995] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950222f1.html> accessed: 13 June 2013; Audiencia Provincial de 
Navarra, Spain, 27 December 2007 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071227s4.html> accessed: 13 
June 2013. 
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trade laid down in Article 7 CISG”. 19 Prominent academics from this school of 
thought include Professors Maskow20 and Bonell.21  
This chapter is concerned with ascertaining the appropriate function of the principle 
of good faith vis-à-vis the Convention. The first part of this chapter is an analysis of 
the definition and functions attached to the concept in the UK, United States and 
Germany. This is in order to highlight the tensions that are created when one 
attempts to unify legal terms and redefine their functions, and to attain a better 
appreciation of the [varying] connotations attached to the concept by delegates of 
different countries at the UNCITRAL Working Group. The reason for choosing 
these particular jurisdictions lies specifically in the divergence between them on the 
importance and function attributed to the principle.  
 
The second part of this chapter then analyses the drafting history of the Convention 
and the interpretation and application of the principle by courts and tribunals. It 
concludes, that while the travaux clearly reveal that the intended application of the 
principle was limited to aid in the interpretation of the Convention, in fact, courts 
and tribunals have attributed other functions to the principle in addition; for instance, 
the imposition of substantive obligations on the parties to contract governed by the 
Convention.  
 
The third part of this chapter identifies the appropriate function to be attributed to the 
principle. It argues that the principle is intrinsically vague and, as a result, cannot 
provide meaningful guidance if used as a general principle, under Article 7(2) of the 
Convention. It recommends that gap filling should be conducted through the 
                                                     
19 Ibid CLOUT case No. 154. 
20 See also Fritz Enderlein and Dietrich Maskow, International Sales Law: United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Oceana 1992) 59. Professor 
Schlechtriem while noting that Article 7(1) limits the role of good faith to the interpretation of the 
Convention states “the principle that not only the interpretation of the Convention, but also the 
evaluation of the relations, rights and remedies of the parties, should be subject to the principle of 
good faith and fair dealing has found its way into the Convention, its understanding by the majority of 
legal writers and its application by the courts.” Schlechtriem (n 17) 3. 
21 Bonell takes this a step further by stating that usages and contractual agreements between the 
parties may also be disregarded if in the particular circumstances, they run contrary to the principle of 
good faith. The argument rests on the assertions that, since such usages and agreements are allowed 
by virtue of article 6 and article 9 of the Convention; the respective articles have to be interpreted 
subject to the requirement of good faith in order to ascertain the relevance and applicability of such 
usages/ agreements between the parties. Bonell (n 6). 
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ascertainment of general principles that underlie specific articles of the Convention 
rather than through reference to vague notions such as good faith.  
 
Since Article 7(1) does not limit recourse to other international instruments to 
ascertain the meaning of the principle, this chapter also draws support from the 
dictates of the UNIDROIT Principles (Principles). However, as the Principles, like 
the Convention, do not concretely define the principle of good faith, reference to 
provisions that contain specific manifestations of good faith is necessary. The 
exercise of defining the principle of good faith via recourse to the Principles would 
appear to add to the uncertainty, by simplifying a greater number of vague rules 
under the banner of good faith. Instead, attempt is made to define the principle via 
reference to specific articles of the Convention itself. The identification and analysis 
of such articles, arguably leads to the conclusion that their common core lies in 
barring opportunistic behavior.  
 
Finally, this chapter turns to analyze whether parties should opt to include an express 
term obligating good faith performance in their contracts. To this end the framework 
of efficiency discussed in chapter 1 is utilized.   
 
2.1 The differentiation between good faith as a tool of interpretation and good 
faith as a general principle:  
 
Given the ideological fault lines between legal traditions, deliberations about the text 
of Article 7(2) ended in a compromise and the final text of the article was drafted in 
general terms so that it would not pose a hindrance in the ratification of the 
Convention. 22 A consequence of this compromise has been uncertainty with regards 
to the definition and parameters of the general principles upon which the Convention 
is based. As courts and academics deliberated upon the Convention, many of its 
textual uncertainties were settled with the passage of time. In this regard Article 7(2) 
maybe said to provide one of the best examples of how the Convention is an 
instrument with a life of its own; an ever evolving being. This is not to say that the 
question of what exactly constitutes the general principles of the Convention has 
                                                     
22 John Honnold and Harry M. Flechtner, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United 
Nations Convention (Kluwer Law International 2009) 15. 
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been settled, rather it is simply recognition of the volume of scholarly opinion and 
case law that this article has generated.  
 
For any meaningful analysis of the role and scope of the doctrine of good faith vis-à-
vis the Convention, the distinction between Article 7(1) and 7(2) must be recognized. 
Article 7(1) is concerned with the interpretation of the Convention and specifically 
obligates the observance of good faith thereunder.  Article 7(2) on the other hand 
provides the procedure that is to be adopted in cases where the Convention is silent 
on matters that fall within its scope and does not make specific reference to the 
principle of good faith. Moreover Article 7(2) limits gap filling to the general 
principles upon which the Convention itself is based, whereas, Article 7(1) contains 
no such limitation and, as such, it does not limit the interpretation of the principle to 
the confines of the Convention. 23 Rather, unlike Article 7(2), Sub-Article1 allows 
the interpretation of the principle to be derived from external sources, as long as they 
belong to the international sphere.24  
 
Nevertheless, various courts and academics have interpreted the term ‘general 
principles’ to include the obligation to act in ‘good faith’ (including courts from 
Germany25, Spain26, United States27, Russia28, Greece29, France30, Mexico31 and 
                                                     
23 Recourse to domestic law is allowed only as a last resort. 
24 This is a consequence of the ‘international character’ of the Convention. See Article 7(1) of the 
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘Convention’). 
25 See Oberlandesgerecht Celle, Germany, 24 July 2009 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090724g1.html> accessed: 15 June 2014; Oberlandesgericht 
München, Germany, 14 January 2009 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090114g1.html> accessed: 
15 June 2014; Oberlandesgericht Brandenburg, Germany, 18 November 2008 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/081118g1.html> accessed: 15 June 2014. 
26 Audiencia Provincial de Navarra, Spain, 27 December 2007 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071227s4.html> accessed: 15 June 2014. 
27 International Centre for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association, United States, 
23 October 2007 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071023a5.html> accessed: 15 June 2014.  
28 Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, Russian Federation, 2 June 2005 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050602r1.html> 
accessed: 15 June 2014; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Russian Federation, 27 May 2005 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050527r1.html> accessed: 15 June 2014. 
29 Court of First Instance Larissa, Greece, 2005 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050165gr.html> 
accessed: 17 June 2014. 
30 Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, France, 2003 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031849i1.html> accessed: 17 June 2014. 
31 Primer Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Civil del Primer Circuito, Mexico, 10 March 2005 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050310m1.html> accessed: 17 June 2014. 
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Serbia32). As a result of such an interpretation, an adjudicator should refer to the 
principle of good faith when faced with a question which lies in the scope of the 
Convention but is not expressly settled in it33. Such a stance has generated a great 
deal of confusion with opponents arguing that such a position is in direct 
contradiction with the deliberations and final compromise achieved by the drafters of 
the Convention.34  
 
The greatest source of controversy attached to the principle of good faith thus lies in 
its substantive relationship with the provisions of the Convention, and the lack of a 
concrete definition of the principle.  This paper shall attempt to carry out an analysis 
of the roles/functions/definition attached to the concept in the UK, United States and 
Germany. This is in order to appreciate the tension(s) created when one attempts to 
unify legal terms and redefine their functions, as well as, to attain a better 
appreciation of the varying connotations attached to the concept by delegates of 
different countries at the UNCITRAL Working Group.  
 
2.2 Analysis of the definition and scope of the principle of Good Faith  
 
2.2.1 Good faith in English Law:  
 
“There is no general doctrine of good faith in English law of contract. The 
plaintiffs are free to act as they wish, provided that they do not act in breach 
of a term of the contract” 35 
                                                     
32 Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration attached to the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce, Serbia, 9 
December 2002 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021209sb.html> accessed: 17 June 2014. 
33 For instance, in the Rechtbank Rotterdam case, the court stated that in light of the general principle 
of good faith set forth in the Convention that “it is not sufficient for the applicability of general terms 
and conditions to refer to the general terms and conditions in the offer to conclude a contract, without 
providing the text of the general terms and conditions preceding or during the closing of the 
agreement”; thereby effectively filling in a gap in Convention. Rb Rotterdam, Netherlands, 25 
February 2009 http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090225n1.html accessed: 17 June 2014. 
34 According to Professor Farnsworth's “[it would be a] perversion of the compromise to let a general 
principle of good faith in by the back door.” E. Allan Farnsworth, 'The Eason-Weinmann Colloquium 
on International and Comparative Law: Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the UNIDROIT 
Principles, Relevant International Conventions and National Laws' (1995) 3 Tulane Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 47, 56. 
35 James Spencer & Co Ltd v. Tame Valley Padding Co Ltd, unreported, April 8, 1998 (CA) per Potter 
LJ. It should be noted that in the context of sale of goods this statement is qualified in 1994 see 
Section 4 of the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994, Section 15a of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
(SGA). 
57 
 
 
Until the mid-eighteenth century, English courts tended not to recognize the 
existence of contracts concluded as a result of a party’s bad faith.36  Certain 
commentators attribute this approach to the influence of the rules of the law 
merchant on English law at the time.37 As a result, it is not surprising to come by 
judgments delivered in the era that state “the general principle is applicable to all 
contracts and dealings. Good faith forbids either party from concealing what he 
privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and 
his believing the contrary”38 
 
By the early part of the nineteenth century the grounds for invalidation based upon 
bad faith were governed under the banner of fraud. At the time, however, the concept 
of fraud was defined in very broad terms.  In the words of Joseph Chitty: 
 
great weakness of understanding, although it does not amount to insanity, if 
coupled with circumstances of fraud, apparent either from the 
unconscientious bargain, from the exercise of undue influence, from want of 
adequate motive, or the like is grounds for setting aside an agreement 
especially in the court of equity.39 
 
A general principle of good faith does not exist in modern English contract or 
commercial law.40 This, however, should not be taken to mean that English contract 
law in its entirety does not incorporate particular manifestations of the principle of 
                                                     
36 Reinhard Zimmermann, and Simon Whittaker (eds), Good Faith in European Contract Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2000) 41. 
37 By the middle of the seventeenth century the law merchant was considered as a part of the law of 
the state and by the end of the century, common law courts had become so familiar with it that they 
no longer required evidence of the dictates of mercantile custom. See Edward Coke, The First Part of 
the Institutes of the Laws of England: Or A Commentary upon Littleton (7th edn) cited in Reinhard 
Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, Good Faith in European Contract Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2000). 
38 Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1910. 
39 Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Laws of Commerce and Manufactures, and the Contracts relating 
Thereto: With an Appendix of Treaties, Statutes, and Precedents (A. Strahan 1824) 159. Chitty 
similarly states “fraud appears from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself” at page 158. 
40 Ewan McKendrick, Sale of Goods (LLP 2000) 55. It however seems that aversion of English courts 
towards the principle is in decline see Timeload Ltd. v. British Telecommunications PLC [1995] 
EMLR 459; Philips Electronique Grand Public SA v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd. [1995] EMLR 
472. 
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good faith.41 In the case of Interfoto v Stiletto, Lord Bigham stated “English law has 
characteristically committed itself to no such overriding principle of [good faith] but 
has developed piece meal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of 
unfairness.”42 This stance had previously been adopted by Professor Bridge in 1984, 
who, while evaluating whether there is a need for the concept of good faith in 
common law, argued that common law reaches the same result as that which would 
have been reached, if the concept of good faith had been applied to the facts of the 
case, through a more detailed level of legal rules43. There are various examples of 
such rules, ranging from the maxims of equity that operate to strike down 
unconscionable agreements; the rules of common law on mistake, duress, penalty 
clauses and misrepresentation; and the exclusion of unfair terms through the use of 
legislative enactments such as the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977 (UCTA). 
 
Similarly, English law seems to be averse to the imposition of a general requirement 
to act in good faith during the pre-contractual stage.44  According to Professors 
Carter and Harland: 
 
The basic principles of contract law were laid down in an economic, social, 
political and intellectual context different from todays. They were developed 
under the influence of the forces of individualism, competitiveness, laissez-
faire, an intellectual climate characterized by a high regard for general 
principle, and economic dominance of a free market economy.45  
 
                                                     
41 James Holland and Julian Webb, Learning Legal Rules: A Students' Guide to Legal Method and 
Reasoning (Oxford University Press 2013) 356. 
42 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd  [1988] 1 All ER 352, 353. 
43 See Michael Bridge, ‘Does Anglo-Canadian Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?’ (1984) 9 
Canadian Business Law Journal 385. In 1992 this argument found support in the case of Interfoto 
Picture Library v Stilletto where Bingham LJ stated “English law has, characteristically, committed 
itself to no such overriding principle [of fair open dealing] but has developed piecemeal solutions in 
response to demonstrated problems of unfairness.” Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v. Stiletto Visual 
Programmes Ltd. [1989] QB 433. 
44 This is partially based upon the rigidity of contract law of the common law world, which has 
historically stemmed from the objective theory which constitutes one of the general 
principles/grundnorms of contract law. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Ohio State University 
Press, 1974) 101. 
45 John W. Carter, Contract Law in Australia (2 edn, Butterworths 1991) 7. 
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These ‘forces’ have led to the aversion in contract law to recognize notions that 
could unsettle the certainty of contractually agreed terms. In 1992 for instance, the 
House of Lords clearly and unequivocally stated that: 
 
The reason why an agreement to negotiate, like an agreement to agree, is 
unenforceable, is simply because it lacks the necessary certainty… The 
concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently 
repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in 
negotiations.46 Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) 
own interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations.47    
 
The aversion in the objective theory of contract law to anything that could risk 
unsettling the certainty of contractually agreed terms stems from the underlying 
concept of freedom to contract. This concept assumes “a paradigm situation of one-
to-one negotiation of all the terms of the agreement by parties of equal bargaining 
strength concerned to maximize their individual positions.”48 In the context of the 
Twenty First Century however, contracts are not always concluded between parties 
with equal bargaining strength - thereby creating a tension between the common law 
theory of contract and the reality of contract negotiation. This has led to the need to 
make qualifications and adjustments when applying the objective theory of contract 
law. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Caveat Emptor rule has been 
weakened in the context of sale of goods, through the evolution of common law 
rules.  
 
As such, while modern English law does not adopt a general concept of good faith, it 
has been able to qualify the classical theory of contract law by solving specific 
                                                     
46 Interestingly, in this case the parties had expressly included the requirement to deal in good faith in 
their contract. The impact of the judgment therefore was to over-ride the express agreement of the 
parties. In 2005 however, Lord Longmore while delivering the judgment in Lord Longmore in 
Petromec v Petroleo stated in obiter that if the parties have expressly inserted the obligation of good 
faith in their contract, it should be enforceable. Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras 
[2005] EWCA Civ 891. See Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (8th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 
214. 
47 Walford and Others v Miles and Another [1992] 2 AC 128. 
48 J.W. Carter, Contract Law in Australia (2 edn, Butterworths 1991) 7. 
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problems through the use of general ethical imperatives49. In particular, the problems 
of unfairness have been combated in four ways. 
 
2.2.2 Expectation of the parties:  
 
Lord Steyn once noted that “there is not a word of difference between the objective 
requirement of good faith and the reasonable expectation of the parties.”50 Indeed, 
English courts do make recourse to the intention of the parties in order to achieve 
similar results to those which would have been achieved if a general principle of 
good faith had been applied to the facts of the case. This is done for instance by 
analyzing express terms as understood by a reasonable bystander or through 
implication of terms such as the duty to deliver goods of satisfactory quality under s 
14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act.51    
2.2.3 Special rules for particular contracts:  
 
Legal rules governing certain ‘types’ of contracts, in certain instances, either 
specifically or via reference to the  implied intentions, require the observation of 
good faith. For instance, partnership contracts are classified as “contracts of good 
faith.”52 Similarly parties to a contract of insurance and mortgage require good faith 
performance.53 Moreover, contracts involving fiduciary relationships require that the 
fiduciary act in a manner that promotes the interest of the principal and must not 
                                                     
49 Examples include Timeload Ltd v British Telecommunications (n40); Philips Electronique Grand 
Public S.A. v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (n 40); Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering Ltd v Docklands 
Light Railway Ltd [1996] 78 Build LR 42, 58; Re Debtors (Nos 499 and 49950 of 1998) [1999] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 149, 157–158. See Michael G. Bridge, ‘Good Faith in Commercial Contracts’ in Roger 
Brownsword, Norma J. Hird and Geraint G. Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract: Concept and 
Context (Ashgate and Dartmouth 1999) 139. 
50 Lord Steyn, ‘Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men’ (1997) 113 
Law Quarterly Review 433, 450. 
51 Unless the buyer is made aware of the defect before the conclusion of the contract see Section 
14(2)(c) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
52 Per Lord Hoffman in O'Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1098 quoted in Joseph Chitty, Chitty 
on Contracts: General principles (Hugh Beale (ed), Vol. 1, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) Section 1-045. 
The impact of such a categorization is to impose on the parties the duty to disclose all material 
information of which the other party is unaware of. 
53 In the context of insurance contracts the requirement of good faith performance requires disclosure. 
In the words of the High Court of England and Wales, insurance contracts must be performed in the 
“utmost good faith” Fujitsu Services Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd [2014] EWHC 752 (TCC), 153 
Con LR 203, 133. 
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allow his interests to be in conflict with those of the principal.54 In the context of sale 
of goods, English courts have imposed an obligation on the seller to inform the buyer 
of the defects the goods suffered from in instances where he has been requested to 
cure the defect. In the case of J & H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd, for instance, the House 
of Lords stated that such information should be sufficient to allow the buyer to 
choose between rejecting the goods and accepting them.55 
 
2.2.4 Limitation on contractual freedom in certain instances:  
 
Certain legislative instruments have been enacted to combat unfair contractual terms.  
Of these instruments the UCTA 1977 and the UTCCR 1999 are of seminal 
importance for the purposes of this section.56  While the UCTA excludes terms from 
a contract on the basis of the reasonableness test contained in Article 11, the UTCCR 
applies the test of fairness that is based upon the requirement of fair dealing and 
good faith. It must be noted at this juncture that the UTCCR is simply the 
implementation of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive and, as such, 
the principle has been introduced into UK law through pressures from the EC.57 It is 
on these grounds that the express inclusion of the requirement of good faith in UK 
law on consumer transactions on standard terms has been labelled as a legal 
irritant.58 
While the utility of including the principle of good faith in UK law through the 
regulation has been greatly criticized, Leggatt J. believes that such an inclusion is not 
contrary to the structure of common law.59 After analyzing how various common law 
jurisdictions have incorporated the concept, he asserts that UK law has historically 
                                                     
54 Chitty (n 52) Section 1-045. 
55 J & H Ritchie Limited v. Lloyd Limited [2007] UKHL 9. 
56 It is important to note that the UTCCR applies only to consumer contracts and it is in this regard 
that it should not be compared with the Convention. The UCTA however governs business-to-
business transactions as well. 
57 Council Directive 2011/83/EU of 25 October 2011 on Consumer Rights, amending Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament. Several other examples 
of legislation implementing EU directives, which use the principle of good faith, have been mentioned 
in Chitty (n 52) Para 1-043. 
58 Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or how Unifying Law Ends Up in new 
Divergences’ (1998) 61 The Modern Law Review 11. 
59 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QBD) Paras 130-131. 
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implied the principle by law in certain categories of contract.60  While recognizing 
the fact that UK law does not imply such a duty in all commercial contracts, he states 
“there seems to me to be no difficulty, following the established methodology of 
English law for the implication of terms in fact, in implying such a duty in any 
ordinary commercial contract based on the presumed intention of the parties.”61 
Professor Beale notes that “the implication of an implied term applicable generally 
(or even widely) to commercial contracts would undermine to an unjustifiable extent 
English law’s general position rejecting a general legal requirement of good faith.”62 
It is therefore unsurprising that subsequent case law has treated this statement of 
Leggatt J. to be specific to the facts of that case rather than a principle of general 
application.63  
 
 
2.3 Good faith in US law: 
 
Unlike the piecemeal approach adopted by English courts with regards to the indirect 
application of the principle of good faith and the rejection of a general principle 
altogether, American law has been more receptive to the principle. According to 
Professor Farnsworth, American law has contained a generally accepted doctrine of 
good faith for centuries.64 The application of the doctrine of good faith was first 
recognized by the legislature in 1952 under Section 1-203 of the UCC, which 
provides that “Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good 
faith in its performance or enforcement.” Not only does the UCC explicitly make 
reference to the principle of good faith in over 50 sections, it also attempts to provide 
a definition of the same.  Under Section 1-201(19) good faith has been defined to 
mean “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.” Furthermore, 
Section 2-103 (1) (b), with reference to merchants, defines good faith as “honesty in 
                                                     
60 ibid Para 131. 
61 ibid. 
62 Chitty (n 52) Section1-050. 
63 Compass Group UK and Ireland Limited (t/a Medirest) v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust 
[2012] EWCH 781 (QB); TSG Building Services Plc v South Anglia Housing Limited [2013] EWHC 
1151 (TCC). 
64 E. Allan Farnsworth, ‘The Concept of `God Faith' in American Law’ in Bonell (ed), Centro di studi 
e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero (Saggi Conference e Seminari, Rome, 1993) Paper 10 
available at <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/farnsworth3.html>. 
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fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the 
trade.”  
 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement) similarly states, “Every 
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement.”65 It is interesting to note that neither the Code nor 
the Restatement extends the application of the principle to the negotiations stage, but 
rather, they limit its application solely to performance.66  Furthermore, the fact that 
the Code has provided a definition of the principle does not mean that the same is 
uniformly interpreted. Instead, three different competing views have emerged in 
scholarly debate.  
 
Firstly, according to Professor Farnsworth, the extension of the concept of good faith 
to performance serves to imply terms into the contract.67 This view has found 
support in various judicial decisions that have implied duties not specifically 
contained in contracts that provides grounds for a party’s dissatisfaction in the 
contract.68 
 
Professor Summers, on the other hand, argues that the principle of good faith acts to 
exclude certain behaviors that may be regarded as ‘bad faith performance.’69 As 
such, Professor Summers appear to define the concept in negative rather than 
positive terms.70 This seems to be in line with the definition of the concept provided 
in comments to Section 205 of the Restatement where “good faith performance … 
excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because 
they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.”71  
                                                     
65 Section 205. 
66 An exception to this, i.e. where a court imposed the duty to negotiate in good faith is found in 
Heyer Products Co. v. United States 135 Ct. Cl. 63, 140 F. Supp. 409 (1956). 
67 E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code’ (1963) 30 University of Chicago Law Review 666, 679. 
68 See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977). See 
also Tymshare Inc v. Covell 727 F.2d 1145 (D. C. Cir. 1982), per Scalia J. 
69 Robert S. Summers, ‘“Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code’ (1968) 54 Virginia Law Review 195. 
70 He argues “in cases of doubt, a lawyer will determine more accurately what the judge means by 
using the term 'good faith' if he does not ask what good faith itself means, but rather asks: 
What…does the judge intend to rule out by his use of this phrase?” Summers (n 69) 200. 
71 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 205. 
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According to this stance, the principle cannot be given a concrete positive meaning, 
but instead, can only be defined by reference to what it is not. To this end, Professor 
Summers has provided a list of situations that are excluded by the application of the 
principle of good faith to include: 
 
evasion of the spirit of the deal, lack of diligence and slacking off, wilful 
rendering of only substantial performance, abuse of power to specify terms, 
abuse of a power to determine compliance, and interference with or failure to 
cooperate in the other party's performance.72 
 
In response to the position adopted by Professor Summers, Professor Burton has 
argued that the ‘excluder’ interpretation of the good faith principle renders the terms 
agreed by the parties unenforceable and imposes obligations contrary to that which 
was intended by the parties.73 He adopts an interpretation of the principle whereby it 
is viewed only as limiting the discretion that a party may exercise in the performance 
of the contract.74 While the differences between the different perspectives have 
generated a debate between the two authors, in most instances, it seems to be more 
theoretical than practical.  
 
Take, for example, the assertion by Professor Burton that under his interpretation of 
the concept of good faith, it would amount to bad faith if a party tried to recapture 
opportunities that had been foregone in contracting75. In such a case, it would seem 
that a judge charged with the duty of ascertaining whether the principle of good faith 
in performance had been adhered to, would not be applying two different standards 
while using the two stances. In fact, this led Professor Summers to assert that 
Burton's ‘foregone opportunities’ stance is not any more focused than his excluder 
analyses in such situations.76  
                                                     
72 Summers (n 69) 232-233. 
73 Steven J. Burton, ‘More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers’ 
(1984) 69 Iowa Law Review 497, 499. 
74 Steven J. Burton, ‘Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith’ 
(1980) 94 Harvard Law Review 369, 372-373. 
75 ibid. 
76 Robert S. Summers, ‘The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and Conceptualisation’, 
(1982) 67 Cornell Law Review 810. 
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Regardless of the fine differences between the two approaches, it cannot be denied 
that Burton’s interpretation can potentially result in a narrower application of the 
principle of good faith than Summers’ broader and resultantly vaguer stance. In any 
event, the disagreement between scholars on the exact function and scope of the 
principle sheds light on the fact that even though at least two separate instruments 
have attempted to define the concept of good faith in contractual performance, it is 
still shrouded by uncertainty. 
 
Rather than clarifying the situation, courts have added to the confusion by upholding 
all three stances at the same time. Some courts have even used the three 
interpretations interchangeably or used one to support the other. For example, in the 
case titled Tymshare v. Covell, Justice Scalia upheld Professor Summers’ 
interpretation of good faith as an ‘excluder’ and applied the same stating: 
It [good faith] is a phrase without general meaning of its own and serves to 
exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith. In a particular 
context the phrase takes on specific meaning, but usually this is only by way 
of contrast with the specific form of bad faith actually or hypothetically ruled 
out.77  
However, he then goes on to agree with Professor Farnsworth’s implied terms 
stance. As such, the court seems to agree with two (at times) contradictory 
approaches to the definition of good faith. To make matters more complicated, the 
court reads the two positions together and asserts that:  
When these two insights are combined, it becomes clear that the doctrine of 
good faith performance is a means of finding within a contract an implied 
obligation not to engage in the particular form of conduct which, in the case 
at hand, constitutes bad faith.78   
Such judgments have subsequently led courts to endorse definitions that are 
extremely vague and, as a result, incapable of providing any proper standards. Take 
for instance Conoco v. Inman Oil Co, a case that was decided a year after the 
                                                     
77 Tymshare Inc v. Covell  (n 68) 
78 ibid. 
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Tymshare v. Covell decision.79 Here, the court, while defining the principle of good 
faith performance, stated that it operates to compel parties to a contract “to do 
nothing destructive of the other party's right to enjoy the fruits of the contract and to 
do everything that the contract presupposes they will do to accomplish its 
purpose.”80 As such, the court seems to have incorporated both the negative and 
positive definition into the same test, thereby adding further confusion to the exact 
parameters of the principle’s definition. The impact of such decisions has 
subsequently led courts to use different standards together (exclusive v. inclusive v. 
implied terms) as if they are completely consistent with one another.81  
In any case, experimentation by judges on the scope of the function of the principle 
reveals that American jurists would be far more receptive than their English 
counterparts to the creation and evolution of the principle in the international 
domain. This assertion, however, should be qualified with the observation that 
American jurists are not willing to extend the application of the principle beyond the 
confines of contractual performance. As such, any proposal for the development of 
the principle of good faith in international law, which extends to the pre-contractual 
phase, will be resisted by American jurists.   
2.4 Good Faith in German Law 
 
Unlike common law (with the qualified exception of the United States), civil law 
jurisdictions have been more hospitable to the principle of good faith.82 This, 
however, should not be read to mean that civil law jurisdictions have been able to 
adopt a standard definition of the principle, or, that the principle is treated similarly 
in civil law jurisdictions with regards to its scope. Take, for instance, the comparison 
of the treatment afforded to the principle in France and Germany. While both 
jurisdictions have adopted a general statutory provision that requires the observance 
of good faith, the treatment afforded to it varies significantly.83 In France, the 
                                                     
79 Conoco Inc. v. Inman Oil Company Inc. 774 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1985). 
80 ibid 908. 
81 See for example Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 3d 1988) wherein both 
Summers and Burton are cited together in a manner that suggests that their views are equate-able. 
82 Hugh Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 229 
83 Article 1134 of the French Civil Code and Section 242 of the German Civil Code (BGB). 
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principle has rarely been invoked to disallow contractual terms or to imply further 
terms into the contract. In the words of Professor Bridge: 
 
Good faith is enshrined in art. 1134 of the French Civil Code but its practical 
impact can be described as shallow: it has done nothing to disallow penalty 
clauses, it has not expanded the narrow categories of lesion and it has not 
been employed to give relief in what we would now call cases of commercial 
impossibility.84  
 
In German law on the other hand, the principle applies to all cases governed by the 
Civil Code and has the potential to override special provisions.85  
 
Professor Schlechtriem argues that the principle was introduced into German law to 
allow courts to ‘fill-in’ minor and major gaps in the legislation.86 Of course, no code 
can possibly aspire to address all the situations that may arise with in its scope of 
application and, as such, the creation of a tool to guide judges in the filling of gaps is 
not surprising.  
 
Interestingly, Professor Schlechtriem views the role of providing guidance in the 
interpretation of code provisions as a part of this gap filling function. In this regard, 
however, the principle operates as a tool for judges in the evolution of the law. 87 In 
such instances, not only does the principle operate to fill-in gaps in the law, but is 
also used to address new situations that may arise within the scope of the law’s 
application.88 Moreover, part of the gap filling function of the principle is to imply 
terms into the contract (in line with Professor Farnsworth’s stance on the application 
and meaning of good faith). In this sense, the principle is most often invoked to 
imply and implement obligations that are needed to complete the duties and 
                                                     
84 Michael G. Bridge, ‘Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?’ (1984) 9 
The Canadian Business Law Journal 385, 414-415. 
85 Schlechtriem (n 17). 
86 ibid page 6 
87 ibid p.13 
88 ibid. See also Werner F. Ebke and Bettina M. Steinhauer, ‘The Doctrine of Good Faith in German 
Contract Law’ in J. Beatson and Daniel Friedman, Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, Oxford 
(Clarendon Press1995) 171-190. 
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obligations in a given contract; although such obligations were neither agreed by the 
parties in their contract nor laid down in the applicable provisions of law.89  
 
It is extremely important to note here that the duties so implied, are not simply ones 
without which performance would become impossible or where there would be a 
frustration of contract. Rather, such implied duties include contractual duties of care. 
In other words, German courts have invoked the principle of good faith to imply the 
duty of care to protect the economic assets of parties and even to establish vicarious 
liability.  
 
 Of these functions attributed to the principle of good faith in German law, it seems 
that only the role of good faith, as a tool for interpretation (of the Convention as 
opposed to the underlying contract), is completely compatible with the dictates of 
Article 7. The ‘gap-filling’ function may also be compatible with Article 7 if ‘good 
faith’ is in fact one of the general principles upon which the Convention is based 
While the principle of good faith plays a central role in the context of German law, it 
must be noted that, even in the context of this legal system, there does not exist a 
concrete, unanimously accepted definition. Rather, the meaning of the principle is 
ascertained with reference to three distinct sources of law with in the German legal 
order.90 The first source from which the notion is ascribed meaning is the German 
Constitution.91 In the case of the Convention, however, there exists no comparable 
source. This is because the Convention sits in the international domain so is not 
subject to any overriding instrument of hard law. 
     
The second source used to ascribe a definition to the principle lies in the provisions 
of other legislative instruments, including the German Civil Code (BGB). The 
methodology adopted to derive meaning from these sources is exactly that prescribed 
by Article 7(2) with regards to the ascertainment of the general principles upon 
which the Convention is based. As such, in order to ascertain the meaning of good 
faith as contained in Section 242 of the BGB, a court must turn to the structure and 
substance of the provisions of the Code. It can then identify the methodology and 
                                                     
89 ibid page 14. 
90 Schlechtriem (n 17) 11-13. 
91 ibid page 9. 
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values used by the legislator to solve specific problems and the general principles 
upon which such a solution is based. These evaluations allow inferences of more 
general values and standards, which can be used to interpret the doctrine of good 
faith itself.  
 
It is however extremely important to note that while recourse may be made to any 
number of legislative instruments in order to identify the definition of good faith 
under national law, this has explicitly been rejected in the case of Article 7(2) of the 
Convention. Article 7(2) mandates gaps to be filled on the basis of the general 
principles upon which the Convention is based and as such allows recourse only to 
the provisions of the Convention itself.  
 
The final method of ascribing meaning to the notion of good faith in German law is 
by reference to ‘collective conviction’ or, in other words, by reference to that which 
would be considered a fair by a reasonable man.92 Since the community of the 
Convention is quite specific, i.e. that of international merchants, it might 
theoretically be possible to ascertain and express such community standards and, as 
such, apply this method to the ascertainment of the confines of the principle of good 
faith as contained in Article 7 (1) of the Convention itself.93 Such a step, however, 
has the potential of opening the doors for judicial abuse through personal bias. Since 
the homeward trend has been predominantly prevalent in the interpretation of the 
Convention by courts, the potential danger of such a methodology to evolve into a 
tool for the exercise of personal bias cannot be ignored.   
 
The drafters of the Convention fortunately have expressly governed such a 
methodology through the incorporation of Article 9 (2) into the Convention. By 
virtue of this article, the vague objective standard of fairness has been replaced by 
the use of (relatively) more concrete trade usages. Furthermore, even trade usages 
have been limited to those  
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which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in international 
trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of 
the type involved in the particular trade concerned94. 
 
 As such, the role of trade usages, especially with regards to their implications on a 
contract, have been severely restricted and resultantly precluding potential of using 
the standard of ‘fairness’ as judged by a reasonable man in ascertaining the meaning 
of good faith. 
 
The discussion above highlights the diversity with which national legal systems 
recognize the principle of good faith. While English law takes a piecemeal approach 
to reach the ends of ‘justice and fairness’, US commercial law recognizes the 
application of the principle of good faith in contractual performance. In the context 
of German law, a much broader function is played by the principle. Not only does it 
apply to the pre-contractual stage, judges enjoy a greater degree of discretion in 
identifying its definition in any given context. So while US commercial law limits 
good faith to the observance of “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in 
the trade”, under German law the judge may make recourse to a number of sources.   
    
2.5 Good Faith in the Convention 
 
 
2.5.1 Drafting History of the Convention  
 
The Working group during its first session in 1970 deliberated upon Article 7 of the 
ULIS which read “Questions concerning matters governed by the present Law which 
are not expressly settled therein shall be settled in conformity with the general 
principles on which the present Law is based.”95 While none of the proposals for 
amendment advanced during this stage were accepted the article was amended at the 
Second Session of the Working group whereby reference to ‘general principles’ was 
removed. The reasons for such an amendment lay in the concern of various delegates 
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that reference to ‘general principles’ was too vague to provide any meaningful 
guidance.96  
At the seventh session of the working group the following provision was adopted:  
 
1. In the course of the formation of the contract the parties must observe the 
principles of fair dealing and act in good faith. [Conduct violating these 
principles is devoid of legal protection.  
2. The exclusion of liability for damage caused intentionally or with gross 
negligence is void.  
3. In case a party violates the duties of care customary in the preparation and 
formation of a contract of sale, the other party may claim compensation for 
costs borne by it.97 
 
Professor Honnald comments that when this provision was initially discussed, the 
principle of good faith had a lot of support from delegates who believed that the 
principle had proved its utility in various national legal systems and would prove to 
be just as useful in the context of international law.98 Issues of uniform interpretation 
of the principle, it was thought, would be settled through judicial interpretation.  
Opponents of the inclusion of the principle, on the other hand, had concerns about 
the principle’s vague nature and were not convinced that judicial interpretation 
would be capable of providing a uniform interpretation. Moreover, there were 
concerns that national courts interpreting the principle would fall prey to the 
homeward trend and draw on their own legal and social traditions.99 
 
Concerns surrounding the vagueness of the draft article led to the deletion of the 
second and third sub-articles. It is interesting to note that the exemption clauses were 
opposed on the grounds that they did not reflect the reality of commercial 
transactions. It was argued that in international sale contracts, the inclusion of 
                                                     
96 UNCITRAL, Yearbook II (1971) 62. 
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provisions relating to good faith and fair dealing was supported by a majority of the representatives” 
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exemption clauses placed a cost on the party in whose favor the clause operated. In 
the words of Professor Honnold, in international sales contracts “exclusion of 
liability for the seller was frequently compensated by a lower price for the buyer.”100 
It therefore seems that the representatives were not willing to displace the power of 
the parties to a sales contract to negotiate and enter into contracts which they 
believed to be in their best interest.  
 
The Eighth Session of the Working Group therefore concluded with the adoption of 
an amended version of the first sub-article that read, “in the course of the formation 
of the contract the parties must observe the principles of fair dealing and act in good 
faith.”101 
 
While the records of the deliberations during the Eighth Session lend credence to the 
fact that the principle of good faith, which would operate to place substantive 
requirements on the parties to a sales contract, did garner majoritarian support, an 
analysis of the later sessions of the Working Group paints the opposite picture.  
At the Eleventh Session of the Working Group, the provision faced strong opposition 
from various quarters. Firstly, the common law world was extremely wary of the 
inclusion of the principle on the grounds of its definitional vagueness. One of the 
most supported arguments at the session was that the inclusion of the principle 
would not be useful since it was already implicit in the laws regulating business 
activity.102 
 
Further opposition was from the developing world. They feared that the term ‘fair 
dealing’ would be interpreted on the basis of the standards of international business 
practice, which at the time were not considered entirely fair by the developing 
nations. Furthermore, representatives questioned the value of an article that operated 
to place substantive requirements on the parties, without incorporating a penalty for 
its breach.   
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Supporters, now in minority, argued that the issue of penalty was not as significant 
as some delegates had argued it to be. They were of the view that the inclusion of the 
principle would operate to undermine discriminatory behavior and objectionable 
practice by the parties. Under such a regime, they argued, the court would be able to 
prescribe penalties for breach of the principle on a case-by-case basis thereby 
advancing the standard of behavior expected in international trade. 
 
By way of compromise, Draft Article 6 was formulated, which extended the 
application of the principle of good faith solely to the interpretation of the 
Convention.103  
 
At the 1980 Vienna Conference, in recognition of the limited role of the principle, 
i.e. to the interpretation and application of the Convention, it was argued that 
adjudicators should be provided guidance in the ascertainment of the entitlements of 
the parties. As such, the inclusion of a separate provision on the interpretation of 
contracts of sale was suggested.104 The proposal however failed to garner the 
requisite support on the grounds that such a construction of the principle would be 
“derogatory to the terms of the contract.”105  
 
 By this stage of the drafting process, all delegates recognized the fact that the under 
the draft, the principle had absolutely no role in filling in the gaps of the Convention. 
Take for instance the proposal of the delegate of Bulgaria, whereby gaps would be 
filled through the application of the law of the seller’s place of business. The 
delegate of Czechoslovakia recommended that the issue be settled in conformity 
with the rules of private international law. Interestingly, even the most vocal 
proponents of the principle did not recommend that its application be extended to 
what became Article 7(2). Rather they argued that the principle should play a role in 
the interpretation of the contract as opposed to the Convention itself.   Norway, for 
instance, argued for the extension of the application of the principle to the 
                                                     
103 At the time it was article 6 of the draft Convention. 
104 Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, and on Draft Provisions Concerning 
Implementation, Reservations and Other Final Clauses Prepared by the Secretary-General Document 
A/CONF.97/9 [Original: English] [21 February 1980] 
105 See the comment of the ICC in Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, and on Draft 
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interpretation of the contract of sale of goods106 while Italy argued for its application 
to formation, performance and interpretation of the contract.107 Both these proposals 
were rejected on the grounds that Article 7 reflected a hard won compromise and as 
such there was no need to reopen the same for debate.108     
 
An analysis of the travaux therefore revels that the inclusion of the principle of good 
faith in Article 7(1) was subject to the rejection of any role that the principle could 
play in either the interpretation of the contract or in filling the gaps of the 
Convention. As such, the application of the principle was limited only to the 
interpretation of the Convention. Various commentators and courts however have 
been able to broaden the role played by the principle by holding it to be one of the 
general principles on which the Convention is based under Article 7(2). This 
conclusion is surprising since such a role for the principle was rejected during the 
drafting of the article. Rather, it was thought that the principle could operate to play 
one of three potential roles. To use the words of the delegate of the Republic of 
Korea: 
 
 As far as the principle of the observance of good faith in international trade was 
concerned…three possible areas of application. The first area was the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Convention, the second (as 
in the Italian proposal) was the relationship between the parties to a contract of 
sale, and the third was the determination of the intent of such parties.109 
 
 
2.6 The application of the principle of Good faith in practice: an analysis of case 
law  
 
2.6.1 Good faith viewed solely as a guide to interpretation. 
                                                     
106 Honnold (n 98) Para 6; Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference 
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Various judicial decisions have limited the role of the good faith principle, as 
contained in Article 7(1), solely as a guide to interpretation. Even in this context, 
however, no case has been found which attempts to define exactly what the notion 
entails. This should not be taken to mean, that while recognizing the role the 
principle plays in the interpretation of the Convention, courts have been unable to 
achieve equitable results in the performance of that function due to the lack of a 
concrete definition of the principle. In fact, when faced with such a situation, certain 
courts have adopted an analogous position to the piecemeal solution adopted by 
English jurists in achieving equitable results.   
 
In the case titled of W v. R for instance, involved several sales contracts between a 
German seller and a Spanish buyer of industrial machinery produced in Germany.110 
Four years after the contracts had been concluded, the buyer initiated arbitration, 
claiming damages arising out of the sellers refusal to provide spare parts.  
The arbitrator while recognizing that German law requires sellers of technical 
equipment to have spare parts ready for delivery, stated that such an obligation could 
not be implied via recourse to the principle of good faith as contained in the 
Convention, since its application was limited to the interpretation of the Convention. 
While the tribunal did not venture into defining what good faith entailed in the 
context, it stated, “a prompt delivery of replacement spare parts had become normal 
practice as defined by Article 9(1) of the CISG.” The court therefore found, in 
accordance with Article 33(c) and 9(1) read with Article 7(2) of the CISG, that the 
seller was obliged to deliver the spare parts within a reasonable time.  
Two points emerge from an analysis of the judgement. Firstly, the court noted that 
Article 7(1) was not capable of imposing any substantive obligations on the parties, 
since its scope is limited to the interpretation of the Convention. Secondly, after this 
assertion, the court, faced with a gap in the Convention, turned to Article 7(2) and 
took a piecemeal approach to the principles upon which the Convention is based (in 
this case reference to Article 9(1) and 33(c)).        
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2.6.2 Good faith as imposing substantive requirements on the parties  
 
While the drafting history of the Convention reveals that good faith as a general 
requirement of the Convention was rejected,111 it must be recognized that when the 
principle of good faith is used as an aid in the interpretation of the Convention under 
Article 7(1), such an application would have an impact on the behavior of parties to a 
contract of international sale of goods.112 This is not to say that the principle of good 
faith would directly impose obligations upon the parties, but rather, it would do so 
indirectly. In other words, since the Convention, as a set of default rules, imposes 
certain rights and obligations on the parties, the interpretation of the instrument in 
accordance with the requirement of good faith would in turn require that such good 
faith requirements are conformed with. 113  
 
Take for instance the ruling in the Iron Molybdenum case which involved a contract 
for sale concluded between a German seller and an English buyer.114 Upon non 
delivery of goods, the buyer set an additional period of time for deliver which was 
not complied with. The buyer therefore, at the expiration of the extra time set for 
delivery, bought the goods from another seller and brought a claim for the difference 
between the price of substitute goods and the price under the contract. 
 
One of the issues before the court was the impact of the non-provision of notice of 
avoidance as required under Article 26 of the Convention. The court, while 
interpreting the Article, stated that the notice requirement is dispensed with in 
instances where the seller had refused to perform its obligation to deliver the goods 
“and that to insist on such a declaration would be contrary to the principle of good 
faith.”115  As such, the use of the principle in the interpretation of the Convention 
                                                     
111 Farnsworth emphasizes that this fact proves that the article should be read literally and as such 
does not impose any obligation to act in good faith upon the parties. See Farnsworth (n 13) 56. 
112 Professor Bridge while discussing this view states “parties derive their rights and duties from the 
contract in accordance with the CISG; The CISG is to be interpreted in accordance with good faith; 
therefore the parties rights and duties are subject to good faith”. Michael G. Bridge, The International 
Sale Of Goods: Law And Practice (Oxford University Press 2007) 59. 
113 Subject to the dictates of Article 12 of the Convention. 
114 Iron Molybdenum case, Appellate Court Hamburg, Germany, 28 February 1997 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970228g1.html# accessed: 20 June 2014 
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operates to motivate parties to conform to the requirement of good faith while 
performing their obligations. This motivation is simply the impact of the risk that a 
party acting in bad faith may not be able to hide behind a literal interpretation of the 
provisions of the Convention.  
 
As illustrated below, the court indeed reached the correct conclusion from an 
efficiency perspective. This is so, because insistence on the requirement of a notice, 
in instances where the seller would not gain any information that it does not already 
possess, would simply operate to increase transaction costs and would allow parties 
in certain instances to act in an opportunistic behavior.  
 
In any case, the ruling should not be confused to impose a general requirement of 
good faith on the parties to a contract of international sales of goods.  Nor should this 
be interpreted to mean that there is a requirement to interpret the contract between 
the parties in good faith as suggested by Professor Bonell.116 It is asserted that the 
distinction between the Convention and the contract being governed under it must be 
maintained, for ignoring the same flies in the face of the compromise solution that 
was adopted.117  
 
2.6.3 Good faith as a gap-filler 
  
As discussed above, various courts have interpreted the general principles upon 
which the Convention is based to include the principle of good faith. Take, for 
instance, the decision of the German provincial Court of Appeal in Clout case no. 
133.118 This case involved the sale of cars between a German seller and an Italian 
buyer. After the first delivery, the buyer requested subsequent deliveries be deferred 
as a result of exchange rate fluctuations. The seller, however, proceeded to demand 
payment of a bank guarantee that had been furnished by the buyer in favour of the 
seller. While the court ordered the seller to repay the guarantee to the buyer, it 
                                                     
116 Bonell (n 6). 
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dismissed the buyers claim for damages on the grounds that it had failed to declare 
the contract avoided at the time as required by Article 26.119 Furthermore, the court 
stated that “to allow the buyer to declare the contract void at the time of the trial, two 
and a half years after the event, would violate the principle of good faith in Article 
7(1) of the CISG.”120  
It is a pity that the court resorted to the vague principle of good faith in this instance. 
This is because, while Article 26 specifically requires the provision of a notice, it is 
silent as to the time limit within which the notice has to be provided. As a result, the 
court should have identified this gap and made reference to Article 7(2) and it should 
have been resolved on the basis of the general principles on which the Convention is 
based, in this case via reference to the underlying principle of Article 39, 43 and 
49(2). In particular, Article 49(2) specifically requires the buyer to avoid the contract 
within a reasonable time. Articles 39 and 43 similarly obligate the buyer to furnish a 
notice within a reasonable time. By way of analogy then, the court should have 
concluded that the Convention requires a uniform requirement regardless of the type 
of breach.  If such a route had been adopted, then the court could have based its 
decision on specific provisions rather than having to resort to the vague notion of 
good faith. 
A methodology that requires reference to specific articles of the Convention to 
ascertain the general principles, upon which it is based, creates limitations. It means 
that the discretion of judges is limited in the exercise of gap-filling relative to that 
which they enjoy by making reference to the principle of good faith in such an 
exercise. Such limiting of discretion, arguably, has two distinct advantages. First, it 
aids in the evolution of the Convention itself. In other word words, if courts must 
specifically mention the articles they are employing in deriving specific general 
principles, courts in future instances will have a clearer frame of reference to 
employ. Moreover, such judgments would encourage greater debate in the academic 
community vis-à-vis the merits of the conclusions reached.121 This would, in turn, 
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operate to complement and ensure the ‘international’ interpretation of the 
Convention as required by Article 7(1). 122 
Second, it provides a greater degree of certainty to parties’, vis-à-vis their rights and 
obligations, since they may refer to past judgments which provide a degree of 
reasoning.123 When such a methodology is adopted courts must provide some degree 
of reasoning for their conclusions, even if the same is limited solely to the 
identification of articles, for which the general principles have been derived. In 
future cases of similar nature, therefore, parties would have some degree of certainty 
as to the likely outcome of their dispute since they would be aware of previous 
reasoning. As demonstrated, in the case discussed in this sub-part, in instances where 
principle of good faith is employed, no discussion is necessary and consequently, the 
parties are not provided with any meaningful insights as to their respective rights and 
obligations in related disputes.124  
 
2.6.4 Good faith general requirement used to impose further obligation upon a 
party: 
 
Greater confusion is caused by the stance adopted by a few courts and academics, 
whereby the good faith requirement is used to impose further obligation upon a party 
or where the good faith requirement is imposed upon the interpretation and 
performance of contractual terms agreed between the parties. 
 
In the BRI Production "Bonaventure" v. Pan African Export case, a French 
manufacturer and seller of jeans and an American buyer concluded a contract of sale. 
The contract specifically stated that the jeans were only to be shipped to South 
America and Africa. Moreover, the seller had reputedly asked for proof of the 
destination of the jeans. Upon realizing that the goods had been shipped to Spain 
during the second delivery, the seller refused to make further deliveries. The court, 
finding in favour of the seller, awarded him damages amounting to 10,000 French 
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Francs for abuse of process, finding that the conduct of the buyer was “contrary to 
the principle of good faith in international trade laid down in Article 7 CISG, 
aggravated by the adoption of a judicial stand as plaintiff in the proceedings, 
constituted abuse of process.”125 
 The court therefore held that the requirement to act in good faith (a) extends to the 
performance of the contract (b) can result in the imposition of penalties not 
mentioned in the Convention when the requirement is not conformed with.126 As 
such, the interpretation of the notions applicability under Article 7(2) (i.e. resolution 
of gaps in the Convention), seems to have been imported into the language of Article 
7(1). The end result is that the confines of Article 7(1) are unjustly broadened to 
impose an obligation upon the parties to act in good faith in the performance of their 
obligations.  
Such a broad interpretation would inevitably result in subjecting the interpretation of 
the terms agreed between the parties to the test of good faith performance. In other 
words, while Article 6 expressly allows the parties to “exclude the application of this 
Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its 
provisions”, such a broad interpretation of the concept will translate into its 
applicability in the interpretation of the rights and obligations arising from 
contract.127 If such an application of the good faith principle is, in fact, justified, then 
this obligation can be extended to all possible cases - a result that was disapproved at 
the Vienna Conference.128 Professor Eorsi, however, does not seem to be opposed to 
such a reading of the application of the notion.129 
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2.7 The Recommended Approach 
 
Provided that the principle of good faith in international law is still in its incipient 
stage, coupled with the uncertainty surrounding its scope vis-à-vis the Convention, 
this paper argues that the best possible solution to this uncertainty, is to view the 
doctrine of good faith as an interpretative guide in cases of textual ambiguity. With 
regards to Article 7(2), general principles derived from the Convention should be 
viewed, at best, as particular manifestations of good faith [rejecting any general 
requirement of the same]. Flowing from this, is the conclusion that good faith cannot 
be used to imply any additional rights and obligations into the underlying contract. 
The Viennese arbitral award in the Rolled Metal Sheets case is an example of this 
stance.130 This case involved a contract for the sale of rolled metal sheets between an 
Austrian seller and a German buyer. The buyer commenced arbitral proceedings to 
recover damages for defects in the goods. The problem was that the buyer had not 
adhered to the contractual stipulations regarding the examination of the goods and 
the notice of non-conformity. The buyer had sent the notice to the seller six months 
after delivery, when he was contractually bound to do so immediately after delivery, 
or at the latest within two months from the date of delivery.  
The buyer argued that the seller was estopped from raising the defence of untimely 
notice. The arbitral tribunal recognised that the issue of estoppel was not expressly 
settled by the Convention and that the issue was closely related to the wider problem 
of the significance of the reference to good faith in Article 7(1) of the Convention. 
The tribunal, rather than attempting to define the principle, chose to make reference 
to specific articles, namely Article 16(2) (b) and Article 29(2) and concluded that the 
principle of estoppel was indeed one of the general principles upon which the 
Convention is based. 
Once again, the tribunal demonstrated that it is possible to arrive at equitable 
solutions without having to resort to a wider doctrine of good faith. The principle of 
estoppel, after all, is but one of the general principles of the Convention that is 
closely associated with the notion of good faith. In this context, the term ‘good faith’ 
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is used merely as a moral aspiration, not a legal doctrine.131 At most, it used as a 
term to describe the value that the doctrine of estoppel tries to promote.  
Regardless of the merits of such an approach, the majority of cases and 
commentators remain in favour of a more substantive role for good faith.  
 
2.7.1 Good Faith is too vague to provide meaningful guidance as a general 
principle 
 
In order for good faith to amount to a general principle upon which the Convention 
is based, it is essential to prove that it is manifested in a number of articles. Simple 
reference to the fact that Article 7(1) expressly contains the term, however, does not 
suffice in elevating it to a general principle of the Convention.132 In response to this 
assertion, various academics have embarked upon the task of evidencing the fact that 
the notion of good faith is indeed a general principle upon which the Convention is 
based by demonstrating that various provisions of the Convention implicitly impose 
an obligation to act in good faith.133 Professor Schlechtriem, for instance, argues that 
since several provisions of the Convention employ the standard of the ‘reasonable 
person’, good faith must be one of the general principles upon which the Convention 
is based.134  
 
Unfortunately, however, no explanation is given as to how the notion of good faith is 
equated with the standard of reasonableness. As has been demonstrated above, there 
is complete lack of agreement on the definition of the term. Even if it were assumed 
that good faith includes the standard of reasonableness, it (reasonableness) would 
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merely be one of the manifestations of the broader concept.135 Indeed, there are 
various other means employed in the Convention, apart from reasonableness, to 
achieve the goals of fairness and justice.136  
 
The objective here is to demonstrate the problems surrounding the method employed 
in deriving the principle of good faith as a general principle on which the Convention 
is based. If all articles, which intrinsically require parties to act in a manner that 
would ensure fairness and justice, are used to this end, then the notion becomes too 
general thereby depriving it of the requisite specificity of a legal doctrine.137 
Attempts to define a concrete definition, however, would fail in capturing the 
nuances of each rule collapsed under the banner of good faith. In the words of Disa 
Sim “it is far better to craft sensitive responses to particular problems through a 
piecemeal approach rather than resort to an amorphous doctrine of good faith with 
questionable content.”138  
 
In other words, for the purposes of Article 7(2), it is a wiser choice to identify the 
general principles upon which the Convention is based, without equating the same 
with good faith. In fact, since most such principles are extracted from specific 
articles, their utility depends upon whether the case at hand satisfies the test for their 
applicability rather than whether the parties had ascribed to some general standard of 
good faith. 
 
As such, rather than focusing on the vague notion of good faith, more specific 
principles such as the principle requiring the mitigation of damage caused as a result 
of breach by the other party should be developed.  Such an exercise would require 
the ascertainment of specific principles. Thereby, providing a somewhat concrete 
                                                     
135 The notion of good faith (as opposed to legal concept) seems to be synonymous with anything that 
leads to justice and fairness. In this sense, reasonableness is merely one of the many manifestations of 
the concept.    
136 For instance, it may be asserted that there is an underlying principle that the solution which 
preserves the contract should always be preferred in favour of another that would terminate the 
contract. This is based upon Article 19(2); 25; 26; 34; 37; 48; 49; 51(1); 64; 71 and 72.  
137 Such article would include but are not limited to; those that impose a standard of reasonableness 
such as 8 (2), 8 (3), 18, 34, 35, 37, 47-49, 60-65,77, 79(1), 85-88; those that require cooperation 
between the parties such as 19 (2), 25, 26, 34, 37, 64, 71, 72, 77 etc. 
138 Disa Sim (n 131).  
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definition to what constitutes the general principles on which the Convention is 
based and allowing adjudicators sufficient flexibility, which is essential for the 
evolution of the Convention. 
 
4.1 Good Faith as a guide for interpretation  
The travaux and the literal wording of Article 7(1) reveal that the only role to be 
played by the principle of good faith is in the interpretation of the Convention. Both 
the travaux and the Convention, however, have been unable to provide any 
meaningful guidance with regards to what exactly the notion of good faith entails in 
this context. Provided that the forum of adjudication in the case of the Convention 
are the national courts, the trend of adjudication on the interpretation of the 
principles vis-à-vis the Convention has been marred by judges drawing on their 
experience of the principle in domestic contexts, thereby producing contradictory 
answers. Similarly, scholars have not offered much help in shedding light on the 
subject, since they usually either seem to assume that the principle is self-defining or 
that case law will be able to develop the principle in the domain of international 
law.139 
 
Before embarking upon the identification of the appropriate definition of the 
principle of good faith as used in Article 7(1), it is necessary to analyse what the 
term ‘interpretation’ implies. Because of the challenges a broad definition is bound 
to face, especially on the grounds that a term cannot be attributed meanings that run 
contrary to what the drafters reasonably expected them to mean during and at the 
conclusion of the drafting stages,140 this paper shall adopt a narrow definition which 
may be stated to represent the common core. Such a narrow definition of ‘interpret’ 
                                                     
139 Keith Highet defines lex mercatoria as an autonomous system of transnational commercial law 
that is “capable of being applied by decision makers (judges or arbitrators) as a source of legal rules, 
in order to give content to decisions, in much the same way that these decision makers would apply a 
real legal system such as the lex fori or the lex loci arbitri”  Keith Highet, ‘The Enigma of the Lex 
Mercatoria’ in Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New 
Law Merchant (1998). See Isaak I. Dore and James E. DeFranco, ‘A Comparison of the Non-
Substantive Provisions of the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the 
Uniform Commercial Code’ (1982) 23 Harvard International Law Journal 49 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/dore.html> accessed: 19 June 2014. 
140 This is to say that since the Convention is simply a compromise document, member states would 
be alarmed to see terms interpreted in a manner that either run contrary to the hard won compromise, 
or breath meanings into them which were not anticipated and would have been opposed had the same 
been suggested during the drafting stages. 
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thus would simply be ‘to make clear’.141  As such, good faith is to apply solely to the 
interpretation of the Convention and its role should be limited to instances of textual 
ambiguity.142    
 
While the express words of the Article and the travaux seem to completely reject the 
validity of the application of the principle to the underlying contract, certain 
academics and tribunals have argued in favour of such an application.143 For 
instance, in one case, a Spanish court that held that the terms contained in the 
contract must conform to the requirement of good faith, “in that the content of a 
contract should be as anticipated by the parties, in accordance with the principle of 
reasonable expectation.”144 Apart from the invalidity of any application of the 
principle that would impose substantive requirements on the parties as demonstrated 
by the travaux,  Part 4 of this chapter shall argue that any such application of the 
principle should be rejected since it would produce in inefficient results, as far as the 
end users of the Convention are concerned. 
 
 Provided that the only acceptable use of the principle is in the resolution of textual 
ambiguity of the Convention, there is still the question of what the principle actually 
entails. Unlike the case for Article 7(2), however, Article 7(1) does not impose any 
limitation with regards to defining the principle solely through reference to the text 
of the Convention. As such, adjudicators are free to identify the content of the 
principle via reference to external sources, so long as they conform to the 
Convention’s international character. Unfortunately, even in the sphere of 
international law there does not exist a unanimously accepted definition of the 
principle. 
 
According to various academics and tribunals, the UNIDROIT principles provide the 
                                                     
141 Michael Agnes (ed), Webster's New World College Dictionary (4th edn, 1999) 747. 
142 Textual ambiguity as used here however, is not confined to instances where there are two possible 
interpretations of the Convention, but also covers instances where simply, clarity as to the dictates of 
a particular article is sought. Resultantly there is no question as to the extent of ambiguity that must 
be present for the principle to become applicable as a tool in the interpretation of the Convention. 
143 Academics in favor of such an interpretation include Franco Ferrari, ‘Uniform Interpretation of 
The 1980 Uniform Sales Law’ (1994-95) 24 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 
183; Eorsi (n 15) § 2.03; Bonell (n 7). 
144 CLOUT case No. 547 [Audiencia Provincial de Navarra, Spain, 22 September 2003]. See also 
CLOUT case No. 1039 [Audiencia Provincial de Navarra, Spain,  27 December 2007]. 
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best source in the domain of international law for the interpretation and 
supplementation of the rules of the Convention.145 This is based on the fact, that 
since the drafters of the Principles had access to the discussions held at UNCITRAL, 
they were able to identify provisions in the Convention that were ambiguous or 
inconsistent as a result of compromise. This allowed the drafters to make 
modifications whereby such ambiguities and inconsistencies were removed.146 
Moreover, the drafters of the principles were legal scholars, rather than country 
representatives; as such, there was no need for diplomatic solutions or crafty drafting 
to disguise the compromise between conflicting interests.147 Thus, the drafters of the 
principles were able to identify and incorporate the most egalitarian and efficient 
solutions to problems, rather than advocating for the interest of any particular 
country. The resulting text of the principles, therefore, represents a significant 
improvement to the rules on international sale of goods whereby the potential of 
contradictory interpretations is significantly curtailed. 
 
Given the potential of the Principles in aiding in the interpretation of the Convention, 
it seems to represent the natural choice to make reference to for the identification of 
the meaning of the term good faith. It should, however, be noted at this point that the 
Principles do not enjoy the status of a convention and are to be applied where the 
parties have opted for their application in their contract.148 Moreover, any attempt to 
derive the definition of the terms used in the Convention, through the use of the 
Principles, must ensure that the term, so defined, does not contradict the fabric of the 
remaining articles of the Convention. For example, a definition that operates to 
extend the application of the principle to the pre-contractual stage should be ignored 
since it is directly contradictory to the methodology adopted under the Convention. 
With this in mind, the next sub-section shall attempt to ascertain whether the 
Principles can aid in the identification of the definition of the principle of good faith.  
  
                                                     
145 See for example Alejandro Miguel Garro, ‘The Contribution of the UNIDROIT Principles to the 
Advancement of International Commercial Arbitration’ (1995) 3 Tulane Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 93. 
146 Michael Joachim Bonell, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice -- The Experience of the First 
Two Years’ (1997) Uniform Law Review 34-35 
147 ibid. 
148 Pilar Perales Viscasillas, ‘UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Sphere of 
Application and General Provisions’ (1996) 13 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 381. 
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2.7.2 The UNIDROIT principles and the Convention 
 
Unfortunately, like the Convention, the UNDROIT Principles do not define the 
principle of good faith. This, however, should not be taken to mean that the 
Principles are incapable of shedding any light on the subject.  The Principles contain 
various provisions that, although not defining the principle of good faith, do attempt 
to define the parameters of the principle’s application. It is asserted, that an analysis 
between the functions ascribed to the principle by the Convention and the Principles 
may aid in the identification of certain provisions that may assist in the framing of an 
appropriate definition. 
It must be noted at the onset, that unlike the Convention, the Principles extend the 
application of ‘good faith’ to the conduct of the parties.149 Furthermore, Article 4.8 
(2)(c) of the Principles states that regards is to be had to good faith and fair dealing 
in determining what terms are to be implied into a contract.150  
Similarly, the Principles extend the application of the principle of good faith to the 
pre-contractual stage and to the validity of the contract, both of which lie outside the 
scope of the Convention.  The only reference to the pre-contractual phase in the 
Convention is found in Article 16(2)(b) which states that an offer cannot be revoked 
“if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the 
offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.” The same text has been adopted in the 
Principles in Article 2.14 (b). The Principles, however, go a step further and 
establish a duty not to break off pre-contractual negotiations in bad faith.151 
Reference to bad faith in Article 2.15(2) of the Principles, coupled with an attempt in 
Article 2.1.15 (3) to define an aspect of the term, are rather interesting,152 The fact 
that the drafters choose to attempt to define the concept of good faith by reference to 
what constitutes bad faith (Summer’s excluder analysis) and through the concepts 
                                                     
149 Article 1.7(1) of the Principles states “Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair 
dealing in international trade”. 
150 For instance, a lot of ink has been spilled on the proposition that general duty to cooperate can be 
implied under the Convention, with proponents pointing towards similarities between certain articles 
of the Convention and article 5.1.3 of the Principles. See Bonnell at § 2.3.2.2.; Article 5.1.3 of the 
Principles states “Each party shall cooperate with the other party when such co-operation may 
reasonably be expected for the performance of that party’s obligations”. 
151 Art. 2.15 (2) UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010 (Principles) 
152 2.1.15(3) “It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or continue negotiations when 
intending not to reach an agreement with the other party”. 
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function in implying terms into the contract (Farnsworth’s ‘implied terms’ analysis) 
seems to point to the conclusion that they were well aware of the controversial 
debate on the principle and intentionally decide to draft the provision pertaining to it 
in vague terms.  
In any event, the reference by both instruments to the fact that a party should not be 
allowed to take advantage of acts and situations that are irreconcilable with his prior 
conduct, does garner support for the proposition that the prohibition of venire contra 
factum proprium is one of the elements of good faith.153 The enunciation, by the 
Principles, of the requirement to negotiate with a clear view to reach agreement 
under Article 2.1.15, however, is not supported by the text of the Convention. 
In the case of non-performance caused by a creditor, however, the Principles seem to 
provide substantial help in defining good faith. Both the Convention and the 
Principles state “a party may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform, to the 
extent that such failure was caused by the first party's act or omission.”154 The 
Principles, however, go a step further by adding “or by another event for which the 
first party bears the risk.”155 Both these provisions seem to be driven from the same 
source, i.e. no one should be allowed to profit from his unlawful or otherwise 
forbidden act. Since the underlying principle remains the same, the additional 
provision in the Principles can aid in the ‘good faith’ observant interpretation of the 
Convention. 
 
The discussion above, however, suffers from one fatal flaw. Since the Principles do 
not provide a definition of the term good faith, one is forced to resort to a similar 
methodology, as the one contained in Article 7(2), in order to ascertain the term’s 
meaning through analogy. While the use of such a methodology does not give rise to 
any substantial criticism, those engaged in such an exercise must justify why 
recourse to the provisions of the Convention itself is not adequate. In other words, 
reference to the provisions of other instruments would simply add to the uncertainty 
of the definition of the principle by simplifying a greater number of vague rules 
                                                     
153 Apart from under Article 16(2)(b), support for this proposition stems from the text Article 29(2) as 
well. The same has been reproduced in the Principles in 2.1.18. 
154 Article 80 of the Convention. 
155 Article 7.1.2 Principles (n 151) 
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under the banner of good faith. The problem, therefore, is that any definition derived 
from external sources would “spiral into the Charybdis of vacuous generality.”156 
 
It is asserted that unlike the case of Article 7(2) of the Convention, the definition 
ascribed to the principle of good faith in Article 7(1) need not encompass all the 
provisions of the Convention that reflect a duty of good faith. Rather, it is advisable 
to identify a narrow and concrete definition, which may be said to reflect the 
‘common core’, i.e. one that member states would at minimum agree upon. This is 
not to say that reference should be made to domestic law, for apart from being 
contrary to the text of the Convention, such a methodology is bound to fail in its 
objectives given the diversity of meanings ascribed by national laws.  Rather 
reference should be made to the provisions of the Convention itself, with the aim of 
ascertaining some concrete definition that reflects the standard of behaviour the 
Convention requires of the parties. The utility of such a definition, it is asserted, 
would outweigh that of a general definition, since the latter would in most instances 
undermine the goals of certainty and uniformity. In other words, while a concrete 
and narrow definition would face criticisms of under-inclusiveness, it would be more 
in line with the purported objectives of the Convention.  
 
 
2.7.3 Defining good faith from within 
 
Paul J. Powers, after analysing the underlying norm of each article of the 
Convention, defines good faith as: 
an expectation of each party to a contract that the other will … perform his 
duties under the contract in a manner that is acceptable to the trade 
community. The duty of good faith is an international doctrine that requires 
parties to an international transaction to act reasonably, as they would expect 
the other party to act. This definition is international in spirit and captures the 
best of domestic definitions around the world. Good faith is a lot like the 
golden rule: treat others as you wish to be treated. Performing contract duties 
                                                     
156 Summers (n 69) 206. 
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in a manner which is honest, fair, and reasonable will almost always be 
considered good faith performance. 157 
 
Since any article that advances the goals of fairness and justice may be said to play a 
role in the definition of the principle of good faith, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
comprehensively identify such articles. This assertion is based on the fact that the 
definition of the terms ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ is ambiguous. Indeed, a lot of ink has 
been spilled in the ascertainment of what theses notions actually entail.  The 
literature on this debate simply goes to show that what may be considered fair by 
one, might well be considered unfair by the other.  
Keeping this limitation in mind, this sub-section shall now attempt to identify the 
conduct that the Convention requires of the parties to the contract. Such an approach 
has two seminal advantages. Firstly, it tactfully avoids the pitfalls surrounding the 
definition of the notions of fairness and justice and, secondly, it provides 
adjudicators with a standard by which they may settle issues of textual ambiguity. 
 
2.8 The standard of conduct that the Convention requires of the parties to the 
contract 
 
2.8.1 Requirement of honest communication and co-operation 
 
The Commitment of honest communication and co-operation is identified from the 
following articles: 
 
Article 40 precludes the seller from relying on the fact that notice of non-conformity 
has not been given by the buyer in accordance with Articles 38 and 39, if the lack of 
conformity relates to facts of which the seller knew or could not have been unaware 
and which he did not disclose to the buyer.  
 
Articles 77, 85 to 88 impose on the parties’ obligations to take steps to preserve the 
goods and mitigate its loss. 
 
                                                     
157 Paul J. Powers, ‘Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ 18 Journal of Law and Commerce 333, 352. 
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Articles 32(3), 48(2) and 60(a) and 65, impose the duty to co-operate with the other 
party in so far as that party requires his co-operation to fulfil his part of the 
contractual bargain.  
 
Articles 19(2), 25, 26, 34, 37, 48, 49, 51(1), 64, 71 and 72A state that the contract 
should always be preferred in favor of another that would terminate the contract. 
 
2.8.2 Obligation not to act in a manner contrary to the other party’s reasonable 
expectation 
 
Article 16(2) (b), 21 (2), 16 (2) (b) and 29 (2), operate to bar parties from acting 
contrary to the reasonable expectations of the other. For example, a late acceptance 
which was sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had been normal it 
would have reached the offeror in due time, is considered valid.158 Similarly a party 
may not contradict a representation on which the other party has reasonably relied. 
 
2.8.3 Obligation to act in a reasonable manner even where acting otherwise 
might not be in contravention of the express wording of an article (the rule 
against creative compliance) 
 
Articles 8(2), 8(3), 18(2), 34, 37, 47-49, 63-65, 72(2), 73(2), 75, 85, 87, 88: are 
based on the principle that a party’s behavior is to be judges according to the 
standard of reasonableness in the absence of any specific regulation. 
 
Unfortunately, even this analysis suffers from the criticism of translating one general 
term into another. In other words, even though this analysis attempts to define the 
principle with reference to specific articles of the Convention, it does little more than 
inform adjudicators that the Convention is to be interpreted in a manner that 
promotes reasonableness and co-operation, which seem to be just as vague as other 
terms that have been employed to define good faith.159 
                                                     
158 Subject to the proviso that the offeror without delay “orally informs the offeree that he considers 
his offer as having lapsed or dispatches a notice to that effect.” 
159 Such terms include “fairness, fair conduct, reasonable standards of fair dealing, reasonableness, 
decent behaviour… and honesty in fact” Troy Keily, ‘Good Faith and the Vienna Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (1999) 3 Vindobona Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Arbitration 15, 17-18. 
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This is where the utility of the economic analysis of the law becomes apparent, i.e. 
by allowing the term to be defined in a relatively more concrete manner. It is 
asserted that the common core of all the articles, discussed above, lies in barring 
opportunistic behavior and reducing transaction costs.160 In other words, courts 
should strive to interpret the Convention in a manner that limits the possibility of 
parties acting opportunistically and reduces transaction costs. While there are various 
types of transaction costs, and opportunism can take a variety of forms, these two 
terms are far more concrete than those usually employed in legal analysis defining 
good faith. Moreover, since there two ‘objectives’ underlie almost all the article of 
the Convention , as evidenced by the travaux of individual articles, they are best 
suited to define the principle of good faith as contained in the Convention.161 
Another reason for employing these objectives in the interpretation of the 
Convention, is that apart from providing the parties with a greater degree of certainty 
as to the interpretative methodology contained in Article 7, they motivate parties not 
to derogate from the dictates of the Convention via agreement since they are assured 
that the Convention will be interpreted in line with the dictates of efficiency. 
 
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the concepts of opportunism and 
transaction costs are closely related, i.e. a reduction in the probability of opportunism 
will lead to a decrease in transaction costs. This shall be illustrated in the discussion 
below.  
 
Opportunism, for the purposes of this thesis, is defined as the policy of self-interest, 
whereby a party takes undue advantage of an asymmetry to change the ratio of return 
between the parties to its advantage, and to the detriment of the other.162 In the words 
of Oliver Williamson, it is the policy of “self-interest with guile.”163 A party acting 
opportunistically does not necessarily act in contravention of the literal interpretation 
                                                     
160 Good faith as the opposite of opportunism was first argued by Muris. See Timothy J. Muris, 
‘Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts’ (1980) Minnesota Law Review 65, 521. 
161 The following chapters, while discussing the tarvaux of individual articles that constitute their 
subject matter reach this conclusion. 
162 Ejan Mackaay, ‘Good Faith in Civil Law Systems: A Legal-Economic Analysis’ (2012) 18 Revista 
chilena de derecho privado 149, 162. 
163 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications’ (Macmillan 
USA 1983) 26. 
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of the provisions of the Convention but, rather, places self-interest before the 
interests of the other party when the opportunity arises.164 As such, creative 
compliance is but one aspect of opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, a party acting 
opportunistically would “capitalize on the mistakes of others: to utilize opportunities 
created by the errors, weaknesses or distractions of opponents to one's own 
advantage.”165 
 
In its most simplified form opportunism is simply an un-agreed transfer of wealth 
that is in contravention of the other parties’ reasonable expectations under the 
contract.166 In this sense, it also includes exploitation of an unspecified contingency 
by one party with the view of changing the division of gains from the contract in its 
favor. 
 
Opportunism left unchecked carries great costs. This means that the concept of 
opportunism and transaction costs are associated. Parties, when faced with the 
probability of opportunism, would attempt to specify as many contingencies in their 
contract as possible to combat the same. This would in turn drive up transaction 
costs. Moreover, the possibility of opportunism, if high, would operate to shrink the 
market by driving risk-averse parties out.167 These concerns led Judge Posner to 
argue that the possibility of opportunism carries with in social costs and in this sense 
it is welfare reducing,168  i.e. while opportunism operates to benefit the party acting 
in such a manner it harms merchants as a whole.169 The existence of a default rule, 
however, which operates to bar opportunism such as good faith interpretation, would 
operate to facilitate trust in the contracting environment, thereby, decreasing the 
motivation of parties to contract on a multitude of contingencies and thus lowering 
transaction costs.  
                                                     
164 ibid. 
165 Donald L. Luskin, ‘Newt's Bain Opportunism Is Mitt's Opportunity’ Wall Street Journal (17 
January 2012). 
166 Timothy J. Muris, ‘Opportunistic Behaviour and the Law of Contracts’ (1980) 65 Minnesota Law 
Review 521, 566. He states that, “opportunistic behaviour provides a ground upon which to separate 
good from bad faith” at 566. 
167 This is especially true in instances where the probability of opportunism is high and transaction 
costs of specification outweigh the return from the transaction to the innocent party. 
168 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law (8th edn, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 
2011) 9. 
169 Avinash K. Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance (Princeton 
University Press 2007) 1. 1  
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Mackay et al. argue that individuals do not base their decisions on the calculation of 
probabilities but rather base them on past instances.170 As a result, if opportunism is 
left unchecked, parties, especially risk-averse ones would automatically shift gears 
“into an over-protective mode.”171 Moreover, other parties in the market that become 
aware of such an incident would react in a similar manner. This means that 
opportunism left unchecked would operate to erode trust between merchants. The 
inclusion of a default rule, i.e. good faith, whereby default rules are interpreted in a 
manner that promotes good faith, would operate to minimize instances of 
opportunism and add efficiency to the market as a whole. This would mean that a 
party contemplating to act opportunistically would not be able to take cover under 
the literal interpretation of the provisions of the Convention. 
 
2.7 Should parties expressly incorporate the principle in their contracts?  
 
The interpretative methodology of Article 7, if interpreted in a manner that operates 
to bar opportunistic behaviour, would result in limitations on creative compliance of 
the provisions of the Convention. As discussed above, good faith, as contained 
Article 7, may only be used in the interpretation of the Convention and does not 
extend to the underlying contract. Consequently, Article 7 has absolutely no 
application to instances of creative compliance of the terms of the contract.  A way 
around this problem is for the parties to include a specific provision in their 
contracts, whereby they must conform to the requirement of good faith in 
performance. On the basis of the arguments discussed above, such a subjective 
requirement of good faith would operate to increase the ex-ante value of the 
contractual relationship.172  
 
As such, from an efficiency-based perspective, the application of a substantive 
requirement of good faith to the Convention or the underlying contract is 
                                                     
170 Ejan Mackaay and Violette Leblanc, ‘The Law and Economics of Good Faith in the Civil Law of 
Contract’ (2003) 14. 
171 Ibid. 
172 According to Posner “Good faith is a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take 
opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time of drafting, and 
which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties” Market Street Associates Limited 
Partnership and Williamorenstein v. Dale Frey, et al. 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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advantageous to the extent that it saves on the costs of contracting on every possible 
contingency and prevents transactional insecurity by providing a default rule that 
operates to prevent opportunistic behavior.173 
 
 It should, however, be noted that the potential of the principle in barring 
opportunistic behavior on the parties is inversely related to the probability that the 
court applying the principle will achieve the wrong result. The question, therefore, is 
whether courts and tribunals are able to correctly interpret the principle of good faith 
so as to achieve the ‘correct result’, i.e. one that does not allow for opportunistic 
behavior and maximizes the value of contractual exchanges. In other words, the 
possibility that courts, when called upon to resolve a dispute arising from a contract 
that incorporates the requirement of good faith, will not be able to reach the ‘correct 
answer’ and would operate to motivate parties to act opportunistically where an 
unspecified contingency arises.  This is especially true for cases where a party 
believes that the benefits of acting in an opportunistic manner would be higher than 
the costs of the judicial outcome.174  
 
Moreover, since good faith, as used in the contract, cannot be interpreted with 
reference to the general principles upon which the Convention is based, courts would 
have to inquire what the parties meant when they used the term; subsequently, good 
faith in this context would be a vague principle. 
 
Due to the vague nature of the principle as used in the contract, parties that choose to 
be governed by it would seldom be able to concretely identify their obligations and 
entitlements at the occurrence of a particular unspecified contingency. This is simply 
a result of the fact that what may be considered good faith performance by one party 
may not be considered so by the other. In such a case, it would be difficult to 
ascertain whether a party is indeed acting in an opportunistic manner.175 This leads to 
the conclusion that from the perspective of a tribunal called upon to resolve a dispute 
                                                     
173 Fischel for instance states, “the rationale for imposing a duty of good faith on lenders relates to the 
impossibility of drafting a contract covering every possible contingency.” At Fischel (n 1) 140. 
174 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, ‘Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the 
Law’ (1989) 5 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 99, 99-101. 
175 Since it could be extremely difficult to ascertain exactly what opportunism entails in the given 
circumstances. 
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arising from a contract governed by the Convention, the entitlements of the parties 
are far clearer when an express provision of the Convention or contract provides the 
same176, rather than when they are ascertained through the application of vague 
principles such as good faith.177  
 
According to Posner, the substantive requirement of good faith is efficient when the 
costs of negotiating contingencies are too high and the probability of such 
contingencies materializing is low.178 This analysis, however, is flawed, in that it 
does not account for the difference in risks parties bear when they opt for the 
inclusion of the good faith requirement in comparison to when the opt for 
specification in contract.179 This paper therefore asserts that this approach does not 
concretely prove the efficiency of the principle of good faith.  
 
It may therefore be concluded that the application of the principle of good faith as 
imposing substantive requirements on the parties is efficient only when the costs 
saved on negotiating each contingency outweighs the chances of, and the resultant 
cost of, judicial error. The question of whether the inclusion of a good faith 
requirement is efficient is therefore dependent upon the extent to which it operates to 
reduce Transaction Costs (TC). Here TC is equal to the aggregate cost that the 
parties incur as a result of specifying contingencies, plus the aggregate cost incurred 
as a result of the incompleteness of contract. The cost of specifying contingences 
includes the cost of identifying and negotiating on contingencies, coupled with the 
costs associated with drafting the contract. The aggregate cost of incompleteness, on 
the other hand, is simply a reflection of the costs of opportunism that parties bear as 
a result of the possibility of opportunistic behaviour of one party when a 
contingency, which has not been contracted upon, arises. Interestingly, while the cost 
of specifying contingencies increases with the number of contingencies negotiated 
                                                     
176 In a case of a complete contract, the possibility of opportunism does not arise. This is to say that 
where the contract is complete, the essential prerequisite for opportunism is missing. The risk in such 
a situation is that the other party may simply breach the contract. 
177 Where parties agree to govern their contract through the use of a substantive requirement of good 
faith however, the risk of opportunism subsists since the court may not be able to find the ‘correct 
answer’ as a result of the contract being indeterminate about the parties entitlements thereunder and 
the use of judicial discretion that may result in a redistribution of the parties entitlements. 
178 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law (6th edn, Aspen Publishers 2002). 
179 Specification of good faith in the contract attracts the risk that courts would not be able to reach the 
correct result. 
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and incorporated into the contract (hereinafter referred to as N), the cost of 
incompleteness, i.e. ‘opportunistic cost’ seems to decrease with N.  
 
From a law and economics perspective, the substantive application of the doctrine of 
good faith operates to make the contract more complete thereby reducing N.  This 
would lead to the conclusion that if the same number of contingencies have been 
incorporated into a contract, the inclusion of a subjective good faith requirement 
would operate to reduce TC relative to a situation where good faith has not been 
incorporated. This statement, however, suffers from a fatal flaw; it is premised on the 
fact that the principle of good faith is capable of substituting specification, which as 
discussed above, is not always true as a result of the possibility of judicial error in 
the ascertainment of the entitlements of the parties through the use of the principle.  
 
A greater problem that surfaces, when the principle of good faith is applied 
substantively, is that it may operate to reallocate the entitlements of the parties from 
what the contract states to what the court deems ‘in good faith’. In other words, a 
subjective requirement of good faith may operate to allow courts to ascertain 
whether the express terms of the contract conform to the requirement of the principle 
and mold the entitlements of the parties accordingly. This operates to displace the 
argument, made earlier, that the cost of incompleteness decreases with N, since the 
cost of incompleteness is only partially dependent upon the number of specified 
contingencies. Given that parties have the most information about their dealings, it is 
asserted that the parties are better able to define their respective entitlements than 
courts. In other words, the informational asymmetry between the parties and courts 
makes the former better suited to ascertain which interpretative methodology is 
likely to achieve the ‘correct result’, thereby increasing the value of their contractual 
relationship ex-ante. As such, where the substantive principle of good faith is 
applied, costs may increase even if the court specifies the same number of 
contingencies as the parties themselves would have specified had the principle not 
applied.      
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2.8 Conclusions: 
 
The adoption of a substantive good faith requirement promotes efficiency to the 
extent that it saves on transaction costs that the parties would have to bear as a result 
of negotiating on various contingencies. There is, however, an additional cost 
associated with such an interpretative regime, i.e. the cost of judicial error in 
identifying the ‘correct result’ through the application of a vague concept. Moreover, 
the application of a vague concept in the ascertainment of the entitlement of the 
parties is less preferable in efficiency terms, to contractual specification of 
entitlements. This is based on the fact that the later provides more certainty ex-ante.  
The substantive application of the principle of good faith is less preferable than a 
strict contractual interpretative regime, since the former allows courts to ascertain 
what good faith requires, regardless of whether the contingency under scrutiny is 
specified or otherwise. As such, under such an interpretative regime courts may err 
by disregarding, or reaching conclusions that contradict the entitlements expressly 
stated in the contract. 
 
Limiting the application of the principle of good faith to the interpretation of the 
Convention, in cases of textual ambiguity, restricts the costs that are incurred 
through the application of a substantive principle of good faith. Under such a 
methodology, courts and tribunals no longer have the power to displace the express 
terms of the contract or even judge them on the basis of whether they conform to the 
requirement of good faith. 
 
The role of good faith, as such, would be limited solely to ensuring that the 
Convention is not interpreted in a manner that allows for opportunistic behaviour.  
The resulting decrease in costs associated with judicial error, coupled with the 
economic advantages of certainty, would result in the labelling of such an approach 
as the more efficient one. 
 
Such a limited application and function of the principle of good faith carries with it 
the advantage that parties can ascertain the optimal level of specification, i.e. parties 
would specify contingencies to the extent that the marginal cost of specification 
equals the expected cost resulting from the incompleteness of the contract.  
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Moreover, interpretation of default rules in accordance with the principle of good 
faith, arguably, provides incentives to parties to act in a co-operative manner. From a 
law and economics perspective, co-operation is valuable since it results in an 
exchange of information, reductions in costs and increases the overall efficiency of 
the transaction.180 
 
It should be noted that traditional economic law theory questioned the utility of the 
principle of good faith on the grounds that they limit the rights of parties to enter into 
efficient exchanges on their own terms.181 Such a criticism, however, does not apply 
to default rules since the parties are free to negotiate whatever terms they see fit, and, 
it is only in the case of a gap in the contract that default rules come into play. 
 
 
                                                     
180 Duke, Arlen. "A Universal Duty of Good Faith: An Economic Perspective’ (2007)." Monash 
University Law Review 33: 182. At 186 
181 Frank H Stephen, The Economics of Law (Brighton: Iowa State University Press, 1988), 155 at 
page 156 
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Chapter 3 Battle of Forms 
 
“There should be no doubt that ‘chaos’ is an accurate characterization of the state of 
law in the ‘battle of the forms’ arena.”1 
 
Introduction 
 
Changes in mercantile practice as a result of the advent of mass production and 
marketing, coupled with the creation of large and in certain instances market-
dominating firms, have led to the prevalent use of standard forms in the context of 
sale of goods.2 The use of such forms is preferred because they provide significant 
advantages to both sellers and buyers of goods – for instance by reducing transaction 
costs.3  
 
While empirical evidence suggests that most contracts that suffer from conflicts 
between clauses contained in standardized forms are performed without incident,4 
they have been noted to “raise some of the trickiest doctrinal issues.”5 It is therefore 
                                                     
1 Caroline N. Brown, ‘Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A framework for making Uniform 
Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work’ (1991) 69 North Carolina Law Review 893, 902. 
2 Professor Burke notes that “almost ninety-nine percent of written contracts consist of standard 
forms.” John J. A. Burke, ‘Contracts as a Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach’, (2000) 24 Seton Hall 
Legislative Journal 285, 290; Daniel T. Ostas and Frank P. Darr, ‘Redrafting UCC section 2-207: An 
Economic Prescription for the Battle of the Forms’ (1995) 73  Denver University Law Review 403, 
405; W. David Slawson, ‘Standard Form Contracts and the Democratic Control of Lawmaking 
Power’ (1971) 84  Harvard Law Review 529; K. N. Llewellyn, ‘Reviewed Work: The Standardization 
of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law’ (1939) 52 Harvard Law Review 700. 
3 For a review on how the use of standard forms benefits the society as a whole see Friedrich Kessler, 
‘Contracts of Adhesion–Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia Law 
Review 629, 631-632; for a review on the advantages of cost reduction see Batya Goodman, ‘Honey I 
Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract’ (1999) 21 
Cardozo Law Review 319, 326. 
4 A study conducted by Professor Murray concludes that such contracts are performed without 
incident because: (A) as long as the transaction is proceeding in a manner considered appropriate by 
both parties, legal clauses do not come into play (B) when conflict does arise, parties try to resolve it 
in a cordial manner that does not harm the prospects of a future business relationship between them. 
As such, parties prefer to settle disputes through business tools rather than legal ones. J. E. Murray, 
‘The Deﬁnitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited’ (2000) 20 Journal of Law and Commerce 1. 
5 Jonathan Morgan, Great Debates in Contract Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 68; See for instance 
Oberlandesgericht Linz, Austria, 23 March 2005 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050323a3.html> 
accessed 28 December 2014;  Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 9 January 2002 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020109g1.html> accessed 28 December 2014; Amtsgericht Kehl, 
Germany, 6 October 1995 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951006g1.html> accessed 28 December 
2014. 
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hardly surprising that the issue of Battle of Forms (BOF) has been a subject of 
extensive debate amongst legal scholars around the world.  
 
Standard forms contain pre-printed terms, which are rarely discussed during the 
negotiation stage.6 Various commentators therefore question the extent to which the 
terms contained in such forms represent a “bargained for exchange.”7 Most 
commentators, however, cognizant of this fact, still argue for the enforcement of the 
terms contained in such forms.8 The argument rests on the assertion that parties 
should read and understand the terms of the contracts they conclude.9 As a result, it 
is argued that contract law rules should be designed in a manner that puts parties on 
notice that the standard forms they sign will govern the transaction. 
 
Moreover, certain empirical studies indicate that standard forms are generally 
designed in a manner that promotes the interests of both parties to the transaction.10 
This argument rests on the assumption that competition would drive businesses to 
draft their standard contracts in a competitive manner.11 For instance, since optimal 
risk allocation between the parties to contracts would seldom vary within the same 
industry, sellers of similar goods would draft and use similarly termed standard 
forms.12  
 
                                                     
6 See Morgan (n 5); Professor Rakoff noted back in 1983, “Virtually every scholar who has written 
about contracts of adhesion has accepted the truth of this assertion [that the contents of pre-printed 
forms are rarely discussed during negotiations], and the few empirical studies that have been done 
have agreed.” See Todd D. Rakoff, ‘Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction’ (1983) 96 
Harvard Law Review 1173, 1179. 
7 See generally Ulrich Magnus, ‘Incorporation of Standard Contract Terms under the CISG’ in 
Camilla Baasch Andersen and Ulrich G. Schroeter (eds), Sharing International Commercial Law 
across National Boundaries: Festschrift for Albert H. Kritzer on the Occasion of his Eightieth 
Birthday (Wildy, Simmonds and Hill 2008) 323. 
8 Robert A. Hillman and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski. ‘Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic 
Age’ (2002) 77  New York University Law Review 429, 438. 
9 ibid. 
10 George L. Priest, ‘A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty’, (1981) 90 The Yale Law Journal 
1297, 1307-14. 
11 ibid. While this article is in the context of consumer sales, the arguments apply equally to business-
to-business contracts. Indeed, the bargaining power that businesses possess leads to the inference that 
standard forms used in business-to-business settings would be more competitive than those used in 
consumer transactions. 
12 Slawson, for instance, reaches this conclusion with regards to warranties provided in the automobile 
industry. See Slawson (n 2). 
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If competition does operate to incentivise the use of standard contracts containing 
mutually beneficial terms, parties would seldom engage in renegotiation, since 
particularizing such terms to the individual sale would drastically increase 
transaction costs – thereby reducing the net joint returns from the transaction.13 
Schwart and Wilde therefore argue that market intervention should occur only in 
instances where information asymmetry or lack of competition results in standard 
forms being drafted in a non-mutually beneficial manner.14 
 
Empirical evidence, however, reveals that parties to a sales transaction seldom read 
standard forms.15 As a consequence, there is not much evidence to support the claim 
that parties would draft standard forms competitively out of fear of losing business 
opportunities to competitors. Meyerson, for instance, argues, “Drafters of form 
contracts [possess] the power to impose their will on unsuspecting and vulnerable 
[parties].”16 Even if parties do read standard forms, the majority of current domestic 
laws operate to motivate the formulation of self-serving terms. As shall be discussed 
below, national laws adopt either the Last Shot Rule (LSR), the Knock-Out Rule 
(KOR) or a hybrid of the two in cases where both parties to a transaction exchange 
their forms (BOF).  
 
In particular, the BOF scenario gives rise to three questions: 
(A) Has a contract come into existence where there is a conflict in the standard terms 
contained in the forms of the parties? 
(B) If (A) is answered in the affirmative, then what are the terms of the contract? 
(C) If (A) is answered in the negative, does performance create a contract? If so, on 
what terms? 
    
                                                     
13 Steven R. Salbu, ‘Evolving Contract as a Device for Flexible Coordination and Control’ (1997) 34 
American Business Law Journal 329, 376-78; Slawson (n 2) 531. 
14 Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, ‘Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The 
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests’ (1983) 69 Virginia Law Review 1387, 1389-91. 
15 Thomas J. McCarthy, ‘Ending the "Battle of the Forms;" a Symposium on the Revision of Section 
2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code’ (1994) 49 The Business Lawyer 1019, 1063; see also John 
E. Murray, ‘The Chaos of the “Battle of the Forms”: Solutions’ (1986) 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 
1307, 1373; See Brown (n 1). 
16 Michael I. Meyerson, ‘The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer 
Form Contracts’ (1993) 47 University of Miami Law Review 1263, 1272. 
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Since all three questions above are linked to the rules on the formation of contracts, 
these questions have traditionally been answered in view of the procedure of contract 
formation adopted by the relevant law. For instance, in legal regimes that adopt the 
traditional approach to contract formation – i.e. the terms of the offer and acceptance 
must correspond – an acceptance with different or additional terms is viewed as a 
counter offer.17 As such, a contract is only said to come into existence when the 
counter-offer is accepted..  
 
In contrast, regimes that recognize contract formation, even though the acceptance is 
not a mirror image of the offer, adopt a more flexible approach towards the BOF 
scenario. Since a contract is recognized in such cases, the question of what terms it 
entails cannot be answered by giving primacy to the standard terms of one party over 
the other.18  As a result, the question must be answered through the application of a 
methodology that knocks-out conflicting terms. 
  
Diverging opinions held by delegates belonging to common law and socialist 
countries on the one hand and civil law regimes and the United States on the other, 
vis-à-vis the method of contract formation, formed the basis of the majority of 
discussions on the treatment of standard terms during the drafting stages of the 
Convention.19 In particular, the delegates of the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, 
USSR and Poland advocated for the adoption of the traditional approach to contract 
formation, as reflected in their domestic legal systems. Delegates of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France and the United States on the other hand advocated for 
a more flexible approach, similar to the one adopted by their national legal regimes. 
 
A review of the travaux reveals that the delegates at the drafting stages of Article 19 
attempted to have their domestic methodology adopted by alluding to the inferior 
                                                     
17 Rick Rawlings, ‘The Battle of Forms’ (1979) 42 The Modern Law Review 715. 
18 Giving primacy of the terms of one party over the other would result in undermining party 
autonomy and the nature of private contracts as a bargain. 
19 UNCITRAL Yearbooks VIII (1977) and IX (1978) 
<https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1977-e/yb_1977_e.pdf> and 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1978-e/yb_1978_e.pdf accessed 29 November 
2015; United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official Records, 
Vienna, 10 March - 11 April 1980 [A/CONF.97/19] 
<https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-conf-97-19-ocred-e.pdf> accessed 29 
November 2015. 
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normative value of differing methodologies.20 As a result, in order to appreciate the 
issues faced during the drafting of Article 19, it is essential to recognize the 
tension(s) between the stances adopted by different legal traditions on the matter. 
Such recognition will provide an overview of the options available to the drafters for 
the settlement of the issue of BOF. To this end, this chapter will attempt to carry out 
an analysis of the methodology of contract formation and the treatment afforded to 
BOF scenarios under English, American, and German law. The chapter will then 
move on to identify the theoretical justifications provided by the delegates for the 
adoption of one methodology over others. Such an analysis shall provide a list of 
requirements that a methodology for the resolution of the issues raised by BOF 
scenarios must fulfil, in order to be acceptable under the Convention. To this end, the 
chapter will provide a detailed analysis of the travaux of the Convention on the issue 
of BOF. Equipped with the list of essential requirements of acceptability of a 
methodology to resolve BOF issues, the chapter will move on to examine the 
methodology adopted under Article 19 of the Convention. A checklist analysis will 
be conducted in order to examine the extent to which the current methodology 
addresses the concerns of the drafters. For this reason, the black letter law of Article 
19 will be examined. The chapter will then move on to analyse Opinion No. 13, the 
only opinion of the Advisory Council pertaining to the issue of BOF. Finally, the 
chapter will recommend an approach to the resolution of the BOF scenario which 
fulfils the objectives that the drafters of the Convention intended to achieve. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Comparative Analysis of Domestic Law Rules on BOF 
 
3.1.1 United Kingdom: 
                                                     
20 The only exception was the delegate of Australia, who opposed any divergence from the Last Shot 
Rule on the grounds that such a divergence would be contradictory to the stance adopted by 
Australian domestic law. Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary 
Records of Meetings of the First Committee, 10th meeting (Tuesday, 18 March 1980, 
(A/Conf.97/C1/L.60, L.61, L.87, L.91, L.92, L.97, L.98) 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting10.html> accessed 27 November 2014 
(Vienna Diplomatic Conference). 
105 
 
 
Academic discussion originating from England on the methodology to be adopted in 
the resolution of BOF issues is extremely sparse. This is surprising since the general 
rules of contract formation under English law have hardly changed since the 
nineteenth century,21 when these rules were developed in a context where most 
transactions were concluded face-to-face by the parties.22  
 
Under common law, a contract is said to come into existence when the terms of the 
offer are a mirror-image of those contained in the acceptance.23 Where the two 
deviate, a counter-offer is said to have been made.24 The corollary of this is that the 
original offer ceases to exist, as if it had been expressly rejected. 25 
 
In this context an acceptance is said to be valid if the party making the offer is 
expressly notified of it26 – or in the case of unilateral contracts, through conduct.27 It 
is in the latter case that issues of BOF may arise. Take, for instance, a situation 
where the buyer sends an order with its standard terms attached. On receipt of the 
order the seller ships the goods along with a delivery form purporting to incorporate 
its standard terms. The buyer then accepts delivery of the goods. In such a case, 
English law will attempt to identify which offer has been accepted without 
variation.28 Since the seller’s reply to the buyer’s offer was not a mirror image of the 
latter’s terms, it is viewed as a counter-offer.29 However, as the buyer accepted the 
goods without objection, the buyer is deemed to have accepted the counter offer 
                                                     
21 This is to say that the traditional rules of contract formation have not been displaced by new rules. 
Instead, a few exceptions have been created. For instance, it was held in Nicolene Ltd v 
Simmons [1953] 1 QB 543 that a meaningless term is to be ignored and terms that are implied by law 
will be allowed. Moreover, courts have distinguished between counter-offers and mere inquiries. See 
for example Stevenson Jacques & Co. v. McLean (1880) 5 QBD 346. 
22 Linda Mulcahy,and John Tillotson. Contract Law in Perspective (4th edn, Cavendish publishing 
2004) 165. 
23 Hyde v Wrench (1840) 49 ER 132 Chancery Division. It should be noted that for usual conditions to 
form part of the contract they must satisfy the test of reasonable notice or incorporation by signature. 
See L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394. 
24 A mere request for information has been held not to constitute a counter offer. See Stevenson (n 
21). 
25 Hyde (n 23). 
26 Joseph Chitty, Chitty on Contracts: General principles (Hugh Beale ed, Vol. 1, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2012).2-046. The mailbox rule is an exception to this.  
27 ibid 2-047. 
28 See for example British Road Services Ltd v Arthur V Crutchley & Co Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 811. 
29 Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corp Ltd [1977] EWCA Civ 9. 
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under English law.30 Such a methodology has been labelled as the Last Shot Rule 
(LSR), since the terms that constitute the contract are the ones contained in the 
standard terms of the party that “fired the last shot.”31 
 
It may therefore be concluded that English courts, when faced with situations where 
the parties have acted as if they had a validly concluded contract, even though the 
terms of the offer and acceptance do not correspond, attempt to ascertain which 
party’s terms control the transaction rather than concluding that the parties have not 
reached an agreement.32 It would, however, be incorrect to state that English courts 
will apply the LSR in all instances of BOF. 
 
 In Tekdata Interconnections Ltd v Amphenol Ltd,33 the buyer made an offer to 
purchase on its own terms. The seller responded by sending an acknowledgement 
containing its own terms and delivered the goods. When the dispute arose, both 
parties claimed that the contract had been concluded on their own terms. The court 
of first instance made reference to the judgment delivered by Lord Denning in 
Butler,34 where he stated that the traditional rules on contract formation did not 
represent the commercial world of today and argued that the “appropriate” resolution 
of such issues would require an analysis of the documents passing between the 
parties and their conduct so as to ascertain whether the parties had reached an 
                                                     
30 A relatively recent case from Scotland found otherwise. In this case, the original offer stated that its 
terms would prevail. Interestingly the court ruled that the contract had been concluded on those terms, 
even though a counter offer was subsequently made. Consequently, the outcome seems to resemble 
the First Shot Rule. See Specialist Insulation Ltd v Pro-Duct (Fife) Ltd [2012] CSOH 79. A later case 
from Scotland however clarified that Specialist institutions was decided on the facts and does not lay 
down a rule for general application. In particular, the court concluded that in Specialist institutions the 
counter-offer was never signed as required on the facts of that case. See Grafton Merchandising Gb 
Ltd t/a Buildbase v Sundial Properties (Gilmerton) Ltd  Edinburgh Sheriff Court 30 January 2013 
(unreported) http://www.obligations.law.ed.ac.uk/2013/07/09/two-recent-decisions-on-the-battle-of-
the-forms-i-e-conflicting-standard-conditions-of-contract/ accessed 2 January 2015.  
31 British Road Services (n 28); Henry D. Gabriel, ‘The Battle of the Forms: A Comparison of the 
United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code: 
The Common Law and the Uniform Commercial Code’ (1994) 49 The Business Lawyer 1053; 
Zambia Steel & Building Supplies v James Clark & Eaton Ltd [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 225. 
32 Unless the facts clearly demonstrate that there was no so-called meeting of the minds. 
33 Tekdata Interconnections Ltd v Amphenol Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1209.  
34 Butler (n 29). 
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agreement on all essential terms.35 On the basis of this reasoning, the court derogated 
from the LSR and held that the contract was concluded on the buyer’s terms.36 
 
On appeal to the Court of Appeal (CA), Longmore LJ held that the ruling of Lord 
Denning in Butler did not displace the traditional rules of contract formation, since 
the same was accepted by all other members of the court including Lord Denning 
himself.37 Longmore LJ did, however, state that there were limits to the application 
of the traditional analysis. In particular the traditional analysis was not applicable 
where “the documents passing between the parties and their conduct show that their 
common intention was that some other terms were intended to prevail.”38  
 
Dyson LJ, in his judgment, stated that while the LSR was arbitrary and favored the 
terms of the one who got the last say, it was necessary to the extent that it provided 
certainty to commercial relationships.39 He was therefore of the opinion that in 
“simple” BOF cases the traditional rules should be applied, whereas there might be 
instances where the court must ascertain the objective intention of the parties.40 The 
court, however, did not find the facts of the case as falling in the exception, and 
applied the traditional analysis.  
 
This judgment resultantly reinforced the application of the LSR in the UK. At the 
same time, it stated that it would not apply in instances where the circumstances 
clearly reveal that the parties intended their transaction to be governed by terms 
other than those contained in the form sent last in the series of communication 
leading to the conclusion of the contract. Philip Morgan opines that such an intention 
                                                     
35 Lord Denning had adopted this reasoning in the prior case of Gibson v Manchester City Council - 
CA [1978] 1 WLR 520. On appeal to the HL, Lord Diplock stated, “While there may be certain 
exceptional types of contract which do not fit into the normal analysis, a contract alleged to be 
concluded by a flow of correspondence is not one of these.” Lord Edmund-Davies considered the 
alternate approach suggested by Lord Denning and without rejecting it, held that it would operate to 
reach the same conclusion as that reached via the application of the traditional approach to contract 
formation. Gibson v Manchester City Council [1979] 1 WLR. 294. 
36 The court argued that the facts demonstrated that the parties had never intended the terms of the 
seller to apply. 
37 Tekdata Interconnection Ltd (n 33). 
38 ibid. [2010] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 357. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid. 
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“would be difficult to show in a Battle of Forms case, unless there is a clear course 
of dealings between the parties.”41 
 
As a result, the application of the traditional rules of contract formation continue to 
justify the application of the LSR in the UK. These rules, however, are displaced in 
instances where a contrary intention is found; which would usually be only found 
where the contract is concluded after a series of negotiations. 42   
 
3.1.2 United States 
 
“Perhaps more criticism has been levelled against Section 2-207 than any other 
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.”43 
 
Unlike UK law, the dictates of US law on the formation of contracts is based upon 
the assumption that parties to a sales contract generally do not read and understand 
the contents of the other’s standard forms.44 As a result, the dictates of US law on the 
issue do not allow parties to have the contract set aside on the basis of the 
incompatibility of standard forms. Rather, what is generally considered as a counter-
offer under English law is usually classified as an acceptance under US law.45 Such a 
result is achieved by separating the question of the formation of a contract from the 
issue of the ascertainment of its terms.  
 
It would be misleading to state that national law as opposed to international law has 
found a clear solution, or even a well-defined methodology in combating instances 
of BOF. Professor Williston’s treatise on contract law, for instance, while referring 
to the solution contained in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) states, “After 
                                                     
41 Phillip Morgan, ‘Battle of the Forms: Restating the Orthodox’ (2010) 69 The Cambridge Law 
Journal 230, 231. 
42 In such instances, the court must give consideration to the entire correspondence between the 
parties.  See Air Studios (Lyndhurst) Ltd v Lombard North Central PLC [2012] EWHC 3162 (QB), 
[2013] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 63. 
43 Ostas and Darr (n 2) 403. 
44 Thomas J. McCarthy, ‘In Ending the “Battle of the Forms”. A Symposium on the Revision of 
Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code – An Introduction: The Commercial Irrelevancy of 
the “Battle of the Forms” (1994) 49 The Business Lawyer 1019. This assumption however does not 
apply in contracts between merchants. See Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-207 (2). 
45 “[T]he current 2-207 creates a perverse incentive to carefully read and consider the fine print on 
each and every invoice or purchase order received.” Ostas and Darr (n 2) 413. 
109 
 
nearly 40 years of experience with the section, the only thing clear about the section 
is that it remains unclear . . . a section that raises as many questions as it answers.”46 
 
The question of contract formation where the acceptance or conformation contains 
additional terms to that of the offer is dealt with in Subsection 1 of Section 2-207 of 
the UCC. The subsection states:  
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation 
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though 
it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, 
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or 
different terms.47 
As such, the section operates to classify a reply that accepts the offer but contains 
additional or conflicting terms, as a valid acceptance of the terms of the offer. The 
only proviso to this rule is that the reply will be classified as a counter-offer where it 
expressly states that the acceptance is only operative on the additional or conflicting 
terms.48  As such, unlike the traditional approach to contract formation as adopted 
under UK law, US domestic law recognizes the existence of a contract where the 
offer and acceptance are not mirror images of one another. Moreover, unlike the 
LSR adopted under the common law system, the UCC seems to favour a First-Shot 
Rule (FSR), according to which the terms of the initial correspondence form the final 
contract – even though the acceptance to that correspondence contained different 
terms.49 
This is not to say that the traditional approach of classifying a reply that contains 
additional or different terms as a counter-offer has been completely done away with 
under the methodology adopted by the section. Rather Subsection 1 provides an 
                                                     
46 Samuel Williston, A Treatise On The Law Of Contracts (4th edn, 1990-date) 141-142. 
47 Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-207. 
48 ibid. The reply however, must also be a “definite” and “seasonable expression” of acceptance.  
49 However, acceptance of the offer will not be found when: (1) the acceptance is “expressly made 
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms” (2) the reply materially alters the terms of 
the acceptance and (3) the reply does not fulfil the requirements of S2-204 of the UCC i.e. show the 
intention to conclude the contract. 
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exception to the FSR and reverts to the traditional approach in cases where the 
acceptance expressly states that it is only operative on the terms contained therein.50  
It must be noted that under the regulatory scheme of the section, the corollary of the 
LSR, i.e. the idea that the party making the offer is the master of the offer, has also 
been circumscribed.51 This, it is asserted, leads to a situation where “oppression and 
unfair surprise”52 are no longer recognized as valid tools in contract formation.  
Subsection (2) of Section 2-207 moves on to specifically tackle the issue of 
additional terms. It states: 
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: 
(a) The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
(b) They materially alter it; or 
(c) Notification of objection to them has already been given or is given 
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.53 
This subsection operates to create a distinction between contracts where both parties 
are merchants and those where they are not. In the latter case, it is presumed that the 
parties do not read standard terms and conditions contained in the pre-printed forms 
but are rather simply concerned with more material terms of the contract54. The 
impact of this presumption on the drafting of Section 2-207 is clear; parties are not to 
be bound by the additional terms contained in the acceptance unless these terms are 
                                                     
50 The exception has been a subject of great debate amongst the legal scholars. In particular, problems 
arise where the language used in the acceptance is ambiguous vis-à-vis the conditionality of 
acceptance on its own terms. See for instance, Roto-lith Ltd v. F P Bartlett & Co 297 F.2d 497 (1st 
Cir. 1962). For criticisms of the ruling see Douglas G. Baird and Robert Weisberg, ‘Rules, Standards, 
and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207’ (1982) 68 Virginia Law Review 1217. 
51 The LSR is based upon the presumption that the offeror is the master of the offer, since an 
acceptance that materially differs from the terms of the offer is characterized as a counter-offer, 
capable of being accepted through express assent or conduct. 
52 John Edward Murray, ‘An Essay on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters Under the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (1988) 8 Journal of Law 
and Commerce.11.  
53 UCC, Section 2-207 (2).  
54 These essential terms, in the case of Section 2-207 are limited to an adequate description of the 
goods and their quantity. See Ostas and Darr (n 2). 
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brought to the attention of the other party and their acceptance is negotiated upon.55 
In the latter case, however, this presumption is displaced in favour of one which 
assumes that parties meticulously go through each element of the standard terms. 
While the reasons for the creation of this binary are outside the scope of this chapter, 
it is clear that the dictates of the UCC are based upon the principle that a party is not 
allowed to impose non-negotiated terms upon the other. However, as will be 
discussed below, this methodology does not translate into the fact that the intention 
of the parties is given paramount importance. 
Subsection 2 applies where the dictates of Subsection 1 have been fulfilled and a 
contract is recognized. As such, for Subsection 2 to be applicable it is necessary that 
the parties have agreed upon the essential terms of the contract, as categorized under 
the domestic law.  
Subsection (3) of Section 2-207 goes on to address situations of BOF where the 
contract has not been formed under Subsection 1. It reads:  
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is 
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties 
do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular 
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, 
together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other 
provisions of this Act.56 
As such, Subsection 3 operates to hold parties to an agreement which is evidenced 
by their conduct. In other words, courts will  hold parties to an agreement they have 
entered into, even if the written documents do not fulfil the requirements of contract 
formation. The UCC in such instances, mandates the application of the knock-out 
rule.57 The idea here is to incorporate all coinciding clauses of the respective forms 
into the final contract, since they are acceptable to both parties, and disregarding all 
                                                     
55 The term ‘negotiated,’ as used here, simply refers to the fact that both parties are aware of and 
agree to the applicability of these terms. 
56 See UCC, Section 2-207(3) 
57 ibid. 
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conflicting clauses.58 Gaps created by the knocking-out of terms are then to be filled 
by default rules of law. 
While the application of the methodology adopted under 2-207 seems rather 
straightforward, judicial experience has proved otherwise. In particular, the scope 
and the interrelationship between the dictates of Subsection 2 and 3 have given rise 
to a great deal of confusion.   
Subsection 2 provides that additional terms contained in the reply are to be classified 
as proposals for additions to the contract, which become part of the final contract 
between merchants subject to three exceptions. This raises the question as to whether 
conflicting terms are to be afforded the same treatment. That is to say, if conflicting 
terms are governed by Subsection 2, then they will be incorporated into the contract 
so long as they do not materially vary the terms of the offer and the offer does not 
expressly exclude additional terms.59 As such, if BOF scenarios fall within the scope 
of Subsection 2, mere silence on the part of the party making the offer is sufficient 
proof of assent. On the other hand, if the treatment afforded to additional terms is 
distinct from that which is to be afforded to conflicting terms, then the methodology 
of Subsection 1 will apply, whereby only the terms of the offer will dictate the 
contract. 
Unfortunately, the official commentary has provided further uncertainty to this 
debate by supporting both positions. Compare for instance official comment 3 with 
comment 6 on the section.60 Case law has adopted both situations, whereby different 
terms are either viewed as forming part of the contract as a result of being found to 
                                                     
58 See e.g. Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp. 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984); Southern Idaho Pipe & 
Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc. 567 P.2d 1246. 
59 Provided that the party making the offer does not object.  
60 UCC, Official Comments. Comment 3 states: “Whether or not additional or different terms will 
become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of Subsection (2). If they are such as 
materially to alter the original bargain, they will not be included unless expressly agreed to by the 
other party. If, however, there are terms which would not so change the bargain they will be 
incorporated unless notice of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable 
time.” Comment 6 states: “If no answer is received within a reasonable time after additional terms are 
proposed, it is both fair and commercially sound to assume that their inclusion has been assented to. 
Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict each party must be assumed to object 
to a clause of the other conflicting with one on the confirmation sent by himself. As a result the 
requirement that there be notice of objection which is found in Subsection (2) is satisfied and the 
conflicting terms do not become a part of the contract. The contract then consists of the terms 
originally expressly agreed to, terms on which the confirmations agree, and terms supplied by this 
Act, including Subsection (2).” 
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be regulated by Subsection 2, or different terms do not fall under the scope of the 
subsection. 
Interestingly, even Professors White and Summers, the authors of the most widely 
cited treatise on the UCC, disagree with one another on the preferred approach.61 
Professor White, relying on comment 6 of the official commentary, applies the 
knock-out rule contained in Subsection 3. Professor Summers on the other hand 
refers to the dictates of Subsection 1, concluding that the different terms in the 
acceptance are redundant and the contract is formed on the terms of the offer.62 
Such disagreement amongst academics and courts alike has led Professors Daniel T. 
Ostas and Darr to conclude: “Determining which rule will be followed, therefore, 
seems to depend more on the skill of the advocates and the identity of the judge than 
on the language of the UCC.”63 
In general, courts adopt three predominant approaches adopted by courts in the 
resolution of BOF scenario: namely, the LSR, the FSR and the KOR. Courts 
adopting the LSR usually adopt the stance that a reply to the offer which is not a 
mirror image of the offer constitutes counter offer.64 Courts adopting an 
interpretation of the article whereby the FSR is to be adopted in the BOF scenario, 
argue that since the UCC does not contain rules whereby an acceptance may operate 
to modify the terms of an offer, the differing terms contained in the acceptance do 
not form part of the contract.65 Finally, certain courts adopt the view that the 
existence of differing terms simply proves that agreement on those terms has not 
been reached between the parties; consequently, such terms should be replaced with 
default rules of the law.66 
 
 
                                                     
61 James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (5th edn, West Group 2000) 
62 See White and Summers (n 61) 34-35. 
63 Ostas and Darr (n 2) 406. 
64 See for example Roto-Lith. Ltd. (n 50). This case is cited by Professors White and Summers while 
identifying this approach. See White and Summers (n 61) 33. 
65 ibid 34. They cite Reaction Molding Technologies, v. General Elec. Co. 588 F. Supp. 1097 (Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania 1984) as an example of such an approach adopted by courts. 
66 ibid. citing Daitom (n 58) as an example of this approach.  
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3.1.3 German Law: 
 
German law, like the law of the UK, traditionally applied the LSR in the resolution 
of BOF scenarios. Section 150 (2) of the German Civil Code (BGB), states that a 
reply to an offer which contains additions or modifications is to be classified as a 
counter offer.67 On the basis of this section, German courts would attempt to 
ascertain whether either of the parties had unconditionally accepted the terms of the 
other in order to find a validly concluded contract. Professor Schlechtriem notes that 
a contract hardly ever failed as result of the application of the section.68 Rather, “the 
party that had last referred to its terms and conditions finally succeeded and the 
solution was accordingly named theory of the last word.”69 As such, until 1970, 
German courts would strictly apply the LSR in the resolution of BOF scenarios.70 
 
The first major departure from the LSR came in 1970 when the Bundesgerichtshof  
held that Section 154(1) only gave rise to a presumption which would be displaced 
where the parties had begun to perform the contract.71 The court further stated that 
the rule contained in Section 150(2) was subject to the requirements of good faith 
and fair dealing as mandated by Section 242 of the Code. As a result, a contract 
would be concluded where the parties intended to be bound by it,72 even though the 
acceptance did not match the terms of the offer.73 The question of what the content 
of the contract would be in such situations was to be answered by reference to the 
default rules of law.74 
                                                     
67 German Civil Code (BGB). 
68 Peter Schlechtriem, ‘Battle of the Forms in International Contract Law: Evaluation of Approaches 
in German Law, UNIDROIT Principles, European Principles, CISG; UCC approaches under 
consideration’ translation of ‘Kollidierende Geschäftsbedingungen im internationalen Vertragsrecht", 
in Karl-Heinz Thume (ed), Festschrift für Rolf Herber zum 70. Geburtstag, Newied: Luchterhand 
(1999) 36-49, with an updated reference to a January 9, 2002 ruling by the Supreme Court of 
Germany added thereto http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem5.html accessed 3 
January 2015. 
69 ibid 36. 
70 See for example Bundesgerichtshof (hereinafter referred to as ‘BGH’), BB 882, No. 1624 
71 ibid; the section states: “As long as the parties have not yet agreed on all points of a contract on 
which an agreement was required to be reached according to the declaration even of only one party, 
the contract is, in case of doubt, not entered into. An agreement on individual points is not legally 
binding even if they have been recorded.” 
72 Act on the Regulation of the Law of General Conditions of Contract 1976, Section 6(2); Such intent 
could be deduced from performance of the contract see for example BGH, 61 BGHZ 282.  
73 BGH, 61 BGHZ 282 
74 Unlike the KOR, the court held that the content of the contract was completely governed by the 
default rule of law. See e.g. OLG Hamm, BB, (1979) 701, 701. 
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The reason for the rejection of the LSR was premised upon the newly accepted view 
that in instances where one party had insisted that its terms would govern the 
contract, performance by that party would not amount to an acceptance of the other’s 
terms. Rather, in the view of German courts at the time, the dictates of good faith 
would operate in such instances to bar the parties from relying on the formalism of 
Section 150(2) of the BGB.75 Consequently, courts would hold that a contract had 
been concluded, the terms of which were provided by default rules. 
 
Thus, while the court wished to give value to the intention of the parties – i.e. finding 
the existence of a contract where the parties intended to be bound by it, even though 
the rules on offer and acceptance would reach the opposite conclusion – it was 
forced to imply default rules into the contract. Such a stance was problematic since 
default rules do not reflect the intention of the parties in every given case. The 
methodology of separating the rules on formation from those on content, however, 
had the advantage of paving the way for future refinement of the rules on BOF 
resolution.  
 
In 1980, the Court of Appeals in Cologne was called upon to decide the fate of a 
contract which was formed on the basis of diverging standard forms.76 The court 
made reference to Section 6(2) of the Act on the Regulation of the Law of General 
Conditions of Contract, which states that any term which does not effectively 
become part of the contract is to be replaced by the default rules of law, and argued 
that only those terms are to be replaced which have not effectively become part of 
the contract; all other terms are not to be so replaced. As such, this decision 
introduced the concept of the KOR in German law.77 In 1985, the BGH affirmed this 
stance and accepted the application of the KOR in instances where the parties have 
performed the contract and have explicitly stated that they only wish to contract on 
their own terms.78 In instances where such defensive clauses are not contained in the 
standard forms, German courts apply the LSR. 
                                                     
75 ibid. 
76 Oberlandesgericht, KÖln, BB, (1980) 1237, 1240. 
77 ibid. 
78 BGH, NJW 1838 (1839). 
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As a result, German law applies both the LSR and the KOR in the resolution of BOF 
scenarios. It should however be noted that since most standard forms used in 
Germany contain defensive clauses, courts are seldom faced with disputes that call 
for the application of the LSR. 
 
3.2 Analysis of the Travaux 
 
Discussions on the text of Article 19 [draft Article 13] began as early as September 
1977, when the Working Group established by the UNCITRAL began deliberations 
on Sub-Article 2 of the Draft Article.79 At the time, the Draft Article consisted of 
two sub-articles; the first constituted the traditional common law rules of contract 
formation, while the second allowed for a degree of flexibility in the application of 
the rule by stating, “A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but which 
contains additional or different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the 
offer constitutes an acceptance.”80 
At this stage of the deliberations, amendments were proposed for the deletion of 
Sub-Article 2 by socialist states, who viewed the dictates of the sub-article as doing 
nothing more than giving rise to uncertainty as to what amounts to a non-material 
alteration. Proponents of the proposed amendment, on the other hand, emphasized 
the importance of the rule that the parties must agree on all terms for the conclusion 
of a valid contract.81 The proposal, however, did not garner sufficient support and 
was rejected.82  
At the Eleventh Session of the UNCITRAL, held in spring 1978, the dictates of Sub-
Article 2 of Draft Article 13 came under attack once again. Delegates of socialist 
                                                     
79 Francois Vergne,, ‘The "Battle of the Forms" under the 1980 United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (1985) The American Journal of Comparative Law 233, 
235. 
80 Article 13 of the Draft Convention stated: “(1) A reply to an offer containing additions, limitations 
or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer. (2) However, a reply 
to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but which contains additional or different terms which 
do not materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance unless the offeror objects to the 
discrepancy without delay. If he does not so object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer 
with the modifications contained in the acceptance.” 
81  See Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the work of its Ninth 
Session (Geneva, 19-30 September 1977) A/CN9/142 at § 224. 
82 For a review of the deliberations of the Working Group on the 27th of September 1977, see Vergne 
(n 79) 235-236. 
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countries including Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the German Democratic 
Republic argued that the term “materially alter” as contained in Sub-Article 2 was 
inherently vague and would give rise to uncertainty.83 Moreover, they viewed the 
article as a whole insufficient in that it did not provide guidelines for the use of 
standard forms and the resolution of BOF scenarios. 
At the 199th meeting of the UNCITRAL, the delegate of the United States responded 
to these concerns by pointing towards “usual” mercantile practice, arguing, “it was 
quite a common occurrence for commercial transactions to go ahead without a 
formal conclusion of a contract by offer and acceptance.”84 
In order reach a commonly acceptable formulation of the article, a Working Group 
was set up.85 The Working Group, rather than amending the existing text of the 
article, sought to remedy disagreements by adding a third sub-article, which 
provided a list of what constituted material alterations.86 
The amendment was adopted and the Draft Article was renumbered as Draft Article 
17. It read:   
(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance containing 
additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and 
constitutes a counter-offer. 
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but 
which contains additional or different terms which do not materially alter the 
terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance unless the offeror objects to the 
discrepancy without undue delay. If he does not so object, the terms of the 
contract are the terms of the offer with the modification contained in the 
acceptance. 
                                                     
83 See Analytical compilation of comments by Governments and international organizations on the 
Draft Convention on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as adopted by the 
Working Group on the International Sale of Goods and on the draft of a uniform law for the 
unification of certain rules relating to validity of contracts for the international sale of goods prepared 
by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law A/CN.9/146/Add.1-4. 
84 Summary Record of the 199th Meeting of the UNCITRAL 9th Session UN Doc. A/CN9/SR 199. 
85 ibid. 
86 Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 20). 
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(3) Additional or different terms relating, inter alia, to the price, payment, 
quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one 
party's liability to the other or the settlement of disputes are considered to 
alter the terms of the offer materially, unless the offeree by virtue of the offer 
or the particular circumstances of the case has reason to believe they are 
acceptable to the offeror. 
Given the divergence of methodologies existing in domestic laws for the resolution 
of issues raised by BOF scenarios, it is unsurprising that the drafters were not able to 
unanimously accept any one given methodology for incorporation into the text of the 
Convention. Interestingly, the debate on Article 19 of the Convention was based 
upon disagreements amongst the delegates on the method of contract formation 
rather than the identification of a methodology for the resolution of issues raised by 
BOF scenarios. This, however, should not be interpreted to mean that the impact of 
the proposed methods of contract formation on potential BOF scenarios was 
completely ignored.87  
A trend that becomes apparent from an analysis of the travaux of the article, is that 
the delegates favored the adoption of legal principles contained in their own 
domestic law.88 With the exception of a few delegates, however, preference for 
domestic legal principles was not – or at least was not argued to be – based solely 
upon partiality to the relevant domestic law. Rather, as shall be explained below, 
delegates argued for the adoption of the principles contained in their respective 
domestic laws on considerations that may broadly be categorized into efficiency and 
                                                     
87 The issue of BOF was brought up for the first time by Bulgaria during the drafting stages. The 
delegate was of the opinion that the “Knock-Out Rule should be adopted in cases where ‘general 
conditions’ of parties are in conflict with one another.” Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference, Report of the First Committee (A/CONF.97/C. 1/L.87).  
88 For instance, as early as the tenth meeting of the First Committee, the delegate of the UK proposed 
the deletion of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the article, as a result of which the Convention would adopt the 
traditional rules of offer and acceptance, whereby any reply to an offer which derogates from its terms 
amounts to a counter-offer, regardless of materiality. This would bring the dictates of the Convention 
on the matter in line with the stance adopted by UK national law. Legislative History, 1980 Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference, Report of the First Committee (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.91); Legislative History, 
1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Report of the First Committee (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.61).  
 The proposal was rejected with 20 votes in favor and 22 against. The delegate of the US, however, 
took a stance more in line with US law and proposed that the list contained in Article 19(3) be 
considered non-exhaustive Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Report of the 
First Committee (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.97): “In paragraph (3), delete the words “inter alia” and 
substitute the words among other matters.”  
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utility concerns. Moreover, arguments for preferring one approach over another were 
rarely based upon the merits of a particular approach, but rather were made by 
demonstrating or alluding to the de-merits of alternative approaches. 
The delegate of the UK, for instance, argued for the adoption of the traditional rules 
of contract formation as contained in UK domestic law on the grounds that any other 
methodology would result in uncertainty as to whether a contract had actually been 
concluded.89 The delegate of Bulgaria similarly referred to Articles 18(1) and 19(1) 
to argue that the Convention established a “fundamental rule and a rational 
principle” – that is, “there could be no contract without agreement by the parties on 
all points.”90 Without referring to how the traditional rules of contract formation and 
resultantly the LSR would result in a complete meeting of the minds, the delegate 
went on to assert that the fundamental rule was almost nullified by the exceptions 
given in paragraphs 2 and 3 which circumscribed the application of the traditional 
rules and resultantly the LSR. Consequently, a contract could be concluded 
implicitly when there had been no agreement on the essential elements of sale as 
stated in the first sentence of paragraph 3.91 Such an approach, according to the 
delegate: 
…sacrificed the fundamental considerations of international trade relations 
namely certainty and security, to less important considerations, such as the 
flexibility of rules and equity in individual cases. It also jeopardized the 
interests of less experienced enterprises, which might not refuse an offer in 
good time.92  
Other delegates, on the other hand, were of the view that the realities of international 
trade did not require regulation that furthered the goals of certainty and security as 
much as they necessitated the existence of a regime that allowed flexibility. Article 
19(1) which incorporates the traditional rules of contract formation under English 
law, was not subjected to any debate and no amendments to it were proposed. As 
such, it was adopted without opposition. Disagreement existed, however, about the 
                                                     
89 Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary Records of Meetings of the, 
First Committee, 6th meeting, Friday, 14 March 1980 (A/CONF.97/8/Add. 3). 
90 Bulgaria (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.91). 
91 ibid.  
92 ibid. The delegate therefore proposed that paragraphs 2 and 3 should be deleted. 
120 
 
extent to which the following sub-articles should circumscribe those rules. 
The delegate of Finland, Mr. Sevon, said that he could not agree to the UK proposal 
–which wanted to see paragraphs 2 and 3 omitted from the text – since trade in his 
view largely took place in the manner described in those subsections.93  The delegate 
did not, however, specify as to what certainty and flexibility demanded in the current 
context. 
Strict application of the traditional rules of contract formation was further challenged 
on the grounds that in trade practice minor changes were often made to the offer and 
that contracts were nevertheless considered as having been concluded and were 
performed.94 The only effect that the deletion of the paragraphs circumscribing the 
traditional rules would have would be to make some contracts void, which would 
nonetheless be executed. Such an eventuality would result in undermining the intent 
of the parties, who via performance had clearly proved that they recognized the 
existence of a contract.95 Another objection to the incorporation of the traditional 
rules on contract formation came from the delegate of the United States. Professor 
Farnsworth was in favor of keeping the existing text of the article since the LSR 
would operate to motivate parties to act in an opportunistic manner.96 This assertion 
was based on the grounds that parties to a given contract could take refuge behind 
the so-called mirror-image rule, should one party no longer have an interest in 
performing the contract for reasons other than those hinging on material alterations; 
this could be, for example, in the event of a rise or drop in the price of the goods for 
which the contract was made.97  
The delegate of France similarly questioned the utility of the LSR on the grounds of 
its impact on cases of BOF. In particular, it was asserted that the application of LSR 
would operate to give primacy to international law over the intent of the parties. The 
delegate argued that merchants involved in international sale of goods seldom 
negotiated over general conditions relating to the issues of guarantee, liability and 
                                                     
93 Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 20). 
94 ibid. 
95 See comments of Mr. Maskow, delegate of the German Democratic Republic in Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference (n 20). 
96 ibid. The delegate of Norway agreed.  
97 ibid. 
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jurisdiction.98 Rather, they employed standard forms containing terms on these 
issues which were seldom in harmony. Regardless of such variation in the forms on 
these issues, the parties did however accept the existence of a contract once 
agreement was reached on price, quantity and quality. The delegate therefore argued 
that if the second and third paragraphs of the Draft Article were deleted, parties 
would be forced to set their general conditions aside which would operate to 
undermine party autonomy.99 
The delegate of Japan similarly questioned the utility of LSR in such cases.100 He 
stated that in practice performance was usually carried out following an exchange of 
standard forms which led to numerous additions. In his view, “the Convention could 
not oblige the parties to reply to all those additions individually,”101as such a stance 
would lead to a situation that would drastically increase transaction costs by 
requiring parties to individually agree to non-material terms. These concerns led the 
delegate of Denmark to assert that the strict application of the traditional rules of 
contract formation would increase uncertainties rather than remove them, since 
parties even after performance could potentially have the contract declared 
voidable.102  
As such, the debate on the article simply devolved to the question of the extent to 
which the traditional rules of contract formation be circumscribed in order to allow 
for flexibility. Since Article 19(3) attempted to provide a list of terms, variation of 
which would require adherence to the traditional rules of contract formation, debate 
simply revolved around the question of what the list should include. Delegates 
belonging to countries following the common law tradition generally wished for the 
list to be as detailed as possible, whereas those belonging to the civil law tradition 
would prefer a short – albeit non-exhaustive – list.103 
                                                     
98 Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Report of the First Committee 
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.60). 
99 Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 20). 
100 ibid. 
101 ibid.  
102 ibid. 
103 ibid. The delegates of France, Norway and the German Democratic Republic wished the list to be 
limited to the price, the quantity and the quality, which in their view constituted the particular terms 
of contracts and affected the very substances of the sale. Interestingly, the delegate of Finland agreed 
with the delegates belonging to common law jurisdictions, on this issue. 
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The application of the Knock-Out Rule was put to vote at this stage of drafting, on 
the basis of an amendment proposed by the delegate of Belgium.104 The delegate 
explained that the KOR is best suited to resolve issues raised by BOF scenarios since 
the commercial staffs of the parties are not legal experts, and therefore would 
negotiate on material terms of the contract – such as the price and the characteristics 
of the goods – while employing standard forms in a rather mechanical way. In such a 
case, the delegate believed that the conflicting clauses should be deemed not to form 
part of the contract.105 This proposal was however rejected on two grounds: (1) It 
was contrary to the rules of common law and consequently, common law countries 
were not willing to accept a rule for the resolution of BOF scenarios which would 
have an impact on the rules of contract formation contained in the first paragraph of 
the draft article106 and (2) certain delegates viewed the impact of the KOR to operate 
to undermine the rules of party autonomy as contained in Article 6 of the 
Convention.  
3.2.1 Considerations 
 
During the drafting stages of the article, various concerns were raised vis-à-vis what 
is considered an appropriate methodology of contract formation and, as a result, what 
is appropriate for the resolution of issues raised by BOF scenarios. These concerns 
can be summarized as follows: 
   
1) An agreement can only be said to be in existence when all essential terms 
have been negotiated. As a result, essential terms that have not been 
negotiated cannot be imposed upon a party simply on the grounds that they 
were contained in the other’s standard form. As such, an appropriate 
methodology for the resolution of issues raised by BOF scenarios must be 
one that fosters voluntary exchange by enforcing mutually understood 
agreements. 
                                                     
104 Belgium (n 87). 
105  ibid. 
106 See for example the comments of the delegate of Ireland at para. 90 and that of the delegate of the 
UK at para. 92 in Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 20). 
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2) An appropriate methodology is one that does not operate to increase 
transaction costs as a result of being disassociated from the realities of 
international trade. 
3) A methodology is appropriate only if it operates to minimize the incentive of 
parties to act in an opportunistic manner.  
 
3.3 Theoretical Framework of Analysis 
 
The economic approach to contract law is based upon the assumption that 
individuals are rational maximizers of welfare and as a result would only agree to a 
contract if they believe that doing so would make them better off.107 Since the parties 
have knowledge of the details of the transaction that are generally unavailable to the 
public, it is assumed that an exchange will make both parties better off so long as the 
terms of the same are negotiated. The existence of such knowledge leads to the 
conclusion that the parties, in comparison with courts, are better equipped to identify 
the optimal allocation of risks. As a result, various academics have argued that 
failure by courts to enforce standard terms of the parties would harm parties to a 
sales transaction.108 As such, one of the pillars of the economic approach to contract 
law is simply that contract law should foster voluntary exchange by enforcing 
negotiated agreements. It is in this sense that the economic approach satisfies the 
first consideration detailed above. 
A second tenet of the economic approach is that contract law should foster voluntary 
exchange by keeping transaction costs to a minimum. In other words, contract law 
should promote an efficient allocation of resources.  Based upon the Coase theorem, 
it is asserted that an efficient allocation of resources will result where an agreement 
has been bargained for, regardless of the initial assignment of rights, so long as 
transaction cost is kept at a minimum.109 It may therefore be stated that the economic 
                                                     
107 Eric A. Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?’ 
(2003) 112 The  Yale Law Journal 829; Richard A. Posner and Andrew M. Rosenfield, ‘Impossibility 
and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis’ (1977) 6 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 83; Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (Scott, Foresman, 1988). 
108 In the context of common law courts, see Karl N. Llewelyn, ‘Prausnitz: The Standardization of 
Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law’ (1939) 52 Harvard Law Review 700,704.  
109 Ronald Harry Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The Journal of Law and Economics. 
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function of contract law is to promote voluntary exchange by keeping transaction 
costs to a minimum. It is in this sense that the economic approach to contract law 
satisfies the second and third considerations detailed above. 
Applying these considerations to both the KOR and the LSR, it becomes apparent 
that neither satisfies the concerns listed above, and consequently neither is a suitable 
methodology to be incorporated into the Convention.   
3.3.1 LSR and Efficiency 
 
 3.3.1.1 Enforcing mutually understood agreements: 
 
The LSR does not enforce mutually understood agreements as is required by the first 
consideration detailed above; instead, it operates in certain instances to motivate the 
parties to act opportunistically. This assertion is based upon the argument that the 
LSR leads to the incorporation of terms that have not been negotiated by unjustly 
favoring the standard terms of the party last to make an offer.110 
 
Consequently, the LSR places the party that exchanges its standard terms first 
(usually the buyer) in a vulnerable position.111 In a typical BOF scenario, the buyer 
sends the purchase order along with its terms and the seller responds with acceptance 
along with its terms. In such instances, the fate of the contract is firmly in the hands 
of the seller. If the seller does not deliver the goods, there is no contract. As a result, 
the seller is allowed the opportunity to speculate to the detriment of the buyer. The 
buyer  cannot have the contract enforced. If – on the other hand – the seller does 
deliver the goods, the seller’s terms will prevail.  
 
3.3.1.2 Transaction costs 
 
While the LSR does provide certainty vis-à-vis the rules relating to contract 
formation and the identification of its terms, the same does not translate into a 
lowering of transaction costs. Various academics have, however, argued that there is 
                                                     
110 Brown (n 1) 902-03.  
111 Corneill A. Stephens, ‘On Ending the Battle of the Forms: Problems with Solutions’ (1992) 80 
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a direct correlation between formalism and predictability, which for the purposes of 
this chapter translates into the argument that the provision of a strict rule in favor of 
a flexible one reduces transaction costs.112 This argument flows from the fact that 
strict rules provide users a greater degree of certainty and predictability. As a result, 
transaction costs are saved to the extent that courts only need to identify the form last 
sent before the commencement of performance in order to ascertain the terms upon 
which the contract has been concluded.  
 
This argument, however, does not stand up in the case of the LSR. This is because 
the application of the rule does not provide the users with an economically efficient 
methodology through which they may achieve their desired expectations. Instead, it 
motivates them to have an extensive exchange simply because they know that the 
terms of the party which fired the last shot will control the transaction. Such a “ping 
pong effect” translates into increasing the volume of legal documents that flow 
between the parties, thereby increasing transaction costs, especially in instances 
where standard forms are vetted.113 In any case, the ping pong effect of the LSR does 
not promote economic efficiency to the extent that it gives greater importance to 
matters of form than to business realities. 
 
One controversial opinion, however, holds that empirical evidence suggests that the 
LSR promotes the most efficient outcome and does not motivate parties to draft its 
standard terms in a manner that maximizes its profits.114 This argument is based 
upon the assertion that market forces will operate to encourage parties to draft terms 
that advance the joint interests of the parties.115 In other words, parties would shy 
                                                     
112 Gregory M. Travalio, ‘Clearing the Air After the Battle: Reconciling Fairness and Efficiency in a 
Formal Approach to U.C.C. Section 2-207’ (1983) 33 Case Western Reserve Law Review 327, 364. 
113 While the majority of empirical evidence suggests that parties usually do not vet standard forms 
sent by the other, there is empirical evidence to suggest both that parties usually do not enter into an 
extensive exchange of documents (in order to preserve business relationships) and conversely, that 
sophisticated parties do indeed pay particular attention to the drafting of their standardized forms. 
Baird and Weisberg (n 50) 1252; the term “ping pong effect” in the context of the Convention was 
first used by Professor Viscasillas. See Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, ‘Battle of the Forms under 
the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Comparison 
with Section 2-207 UCC and the UNIDROIT Principles’ (1998) 10 Pace International Law Review 
97. 
114 Baird and Weisburg (n 50) 1253-60.   
115 For an opposing view, see Rakoff (n 6) 1225: “The fact that any given firm will seek to do 
business only on the basis of its own document(s) does not exclude the possibility that other firms will 
offer different mixes of form terms.” 
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away from prolonged exchange of forms, fearing the potential of losing a business 
opportunity albeit on the other party’s terms.116 Such fears, according to Professor 
Leff, would lead to a situation where businesses would draft comparable forms.117 
Professor Slawson similarly argues that even a small decline in sales as a result of 
non-beneficial terms in standard forms would motivate parties to draft their terms in 
a mutually beneficial manner.118 
 
Indeed, in competitive markets, businesses involved in the trade of goods would be 
motivated to draft their terms in a mutually beneficial manner for the same reasons 
that they would price their goods competitively.119 In other words, traders of goods 
would use mutually beneficial standard forms if omission to do so would result in a 
decline in sales.120 Consequently, traders of goods have a choice between a) 
identifying and distinguishing between parties who do read and are concerned with 
the content of standard forms and those who do not; and offering mutually beneficial 
terms to those parties that are concerned with the content of the forms while using 
self-serving terms with all others, or (b) drafting and using mutually beneficial 
standard terms with all contracting parties.  
 
It is argued that parties that are concerned with contents of standard forms are ones 
who are likely to be affected by those terms i.e. they are likely to face the 
contingency that is covered by the terms contained in the standard forms.121 Such 
parties would consequently reveal this information to the other party in hopes of 
having the standard form amended.122 This in itself is reason enough for traders to 
draft self-serving standard forms, as they know that rather than losing business as a 
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result of such terms, they would usually be requested to amend them in a minority of 
cases.123   
 
Moreover, if the number of parties who are concerned with the contents of standard 
forms is relatively low, then the benefits of providing the whole market with 
beneficial terms would be outweighed by the benefits of using self-serving terms.124 
In such instances, potential parties to international sale of goods would prefer to 
identify whether the content of standard forms are of specific importance to the 
other, rather than drafting and using mutually beneficial standard forms with all 
potential parties they might deal with.  
 
Such a stance will lead to a situation where parties who do not read standard forms 
will be subjected to terms that inefficiently impose risks. This is partly a result of the 
fact that parties involved in the sale of goods are seldom aware of the contents of 
their standard forms themselves. Rather, the duty of drafting standard forms is 
usually delegated to lawyers who draft terms with regards to the best interest of their 
clients.125 To use Professor Rakoff’s words, “The lawyer drafts to protect the client 
from every imaginable contingency. The real needs of the business are left behind; 
the standard applied is the latitude permitted by the law.”126 
 
It is concluded from the discussion above that even if the party receiving the 
standard terms decides to read them, there is little evidence that market forces would 
motivate the drafters to formulate terms that maximize mutual benefit.  Goldberg, for 
instance concludes that the Braid-Weisberg analysis is not a credible reflection of 
practice.127  He argues that parties may be motivated to draft standard terms in a 
manner which promotes mutual interest, in a legal regime which favors the LSR, 
only if a significant number of traders read and deliberate upon such terms. As stated 
above, since the cost benefit analysis of such deliberations would usually motivate 
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parties not to spend resources where the probability of a term coming into play is 
low, parties would seldom be motivated to draft terms that promote mutual interest. 
 
3.3.2 KOR and Efficiency 
 
While the LSR does not promote efficiency by encouraging voluntary exchange and 
enforcing mutually understood agreements, the KOR cures these defects. The KOR, 
by knocking out conflicting terms contained in the standard forms, does not allow 
the terms of one party to control the contract. It is in this sense that negotiation is 
encouraged.  
Moreover, the KOR does not suffer from concerns surrounding the increase in 
transaction costs as a result of the application of the LSR. Since the KOR replaces 
conflicting terms with the default rules of law, there is no incentive for parties to 
engage in a prolonged exchange of standard terms. A closer look, however, leads to 
the opposite conclusion. In a typical contact formation, in regimes that adopt the 
KOR, the offeree has two options. The offeree may either contract on the terms of 
the offeror or may reply using its own terms. In the former case, the terms of the 
offeror will govern the contract and as such the offeror will be motivated to draft its 
standard terms in a manner that maximize its own interests. The only disadvantage of 
doing so is that the other party may read the standard term and decide not to 
contract.128 On the other hand, if the offeree responds with its own terms then a 
contract will be established on the basis of non-conflicting terms, coupled with the 
application of default rules of law which would operate to fill in any gaps. Such an 
outcome would rarely maximize the interest of both parties, since in the words of 
Baird & Weisberg, “off the rack terms are rarely in the best interest of the parties, 
since they do not take into account the circumstances of each case.”129 In other 
words, since default rules are drafted for application to a wide range of transactions 
with differing circumstances, they are capable of achieving the goals of efficiency in 
certain transactions – but not in all.  
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Moreover, the application of the default rules of law may well translate into 
undermining the intent of the parties’ vis-à-vis the bargain they wished to strike.130 
Giesela Ruhl, for instance, provides the example of a situation where the parties 
exchanged forms both of which require notice of non-conformity of goods to be 
provided.131 Assume the two clauses contradict, i.e. one requires notice to be 
provided within one month whereas the other requires the notice to be provided 
within two months. In such an instance, the KOR would operate to replace the terms 
on notice of the parties with the default rules of law, which may allow a longer (or 
shorter) period for the provision of a notice – for example, three months. As such, 
the KOR would recognize a contract on terms that neither of the parties intended.132 
 
3.4 Goldberg’s Best Shot Rule  
 
Victor P. Goldberg, finding the existing methodologies inadequate in resolving 
issues raised by BOF scenarios, proposed a new solution called the Best Shot Rule 
(BSR).133 His basic inquiry was limited to the extent to which the current 
methodologies motivate parties to take the other party’s concerns into account and 
effectively contract out of default rules without losing the economic advantage of 
using standard forms.134 
 
In particular, Professor Goldberg found the approach adopted by certain domestic 
law rules, whereby both the formation and content of a contract were governed by 
the same rule, as inherently problematic.135 He argued that neither the LRS nor the 
KOR are capable of motivating parties to draft their standard terms in a manner that 
does not solely aim at maximizing their own interests.136 Moreover, he viewed both 
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as being incapable of giving primacy to the intention of the parties and limiting 
transaction costs. 
 
The BSR, while imperfect, he argues, is capable of limiting such undesirable 
outcomes, while motivating parties to draft terms that take the interests of the other 
party into account.137 His solution is based upon the final-offer arbitration 
mechanism. According to the BSR, when faced with diverging terms, the court 
should choose the one which it perceives to be fairer of the two. Fairness here is to 
be judged on the basis of the “golden rule,” namely, “Do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you.”138 As such, in cases of BOF, a court should view the 
standard forms exchanged in the current transaction with the standard forms used by 
the parties when they are acting in the opposite capacity – that is, compare the form 
of the seller in a particular transaction with the ones used by it when it is acting as a 
buyer. Such an analysis, he argues, would enable a court to determine what the 
parties’ consider to be fair.139 The court however is not allowed to import terms from 
the standard forms that the parties have used in another transactions. Rather, the 
court must choose one of the terms in conflict, albeit the one that is closest to what 
the parties consider to be fair.       
 
Professor Goldberg is quick to admit that “operationalizing fairness will not be 
easy.”140 Firstly, parties do not always act in both capacities and as such a court will 
be unable to apply the golden rule in various instances. Moreover, the exercise of 
ascertaining which term is the fairer of the two is bound to dramatically increase 
transaction costs. Simply put, since flexible standards incur higher transaction costs 
than strict ones, litigation costs under the BSR will be higher than that incurred 
through the application of either the LSR or the KOR.141 The goal of certainty is also 
undermined to the extent that neither of the parties may be sure which of the two 
conflicting terms governs their contract. 
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The degree to which the BSR takes the realities of international trade and the 
particular transaction into account is also questionable. This is because the 
methodology of ascertaining what a party may have considered as fair when it was 
acting in the other capacity (buyer/seller) may well result in a one size fits all 
approach. Of course the circumstances of each transaction are different and 
resultantly, that which may be considered fair in one transaction may yield the 
opposite result in another transaction. As such, the application of the golden rule in 
the ascertainment of fairness might well lead to absurd results.  
 
3.5 Article 19 of the Convention 
 
In light of the concerns of the drafters, coupled with the cost-benefit analysis of the 
KOR and LSR, this paper shall now turn to analyze the text of the Convention on the 
treatment of BOF scenarios.  
  
The methodology of contract formation as recognized by the Convention is 
contained in Article 19(1), which states: “A reply to an offer which purports to be an 
acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of 
the offer and constitutes a counter-offer.”142 Interestingly, this article was not a 
subject of debate during the drafting stages of the Convention and was adopted 
without any amendments.  
 
Since the rules on contract formation as contained in the Convention are largely 
similar to those recognized under English law, it is unsurprising that that the LSR 
has found its way into its text.143 This is not to say that the Convention specifically 
identifies the Last-Shot Rule as the appropriate methodology to be adopted in the 
resolution of BOF scenarios, but rather simply creates a distinction between 
acceptance and a counter offer. The corollary of this, as explained above, is the 
application of the LSR when the terms of the offer and acceptance do not 
correspond.  
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The remaining sub-parts of the article, however, qualify this requirement. Article 
19(2) states: 
 
However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains 
additional or different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the 
offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue delay, 
objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect. If he 
does not so object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with the 
modifications contained in the acceptance.144 
 
As such, the article distinguishes between material and non-material 
modifications/additions, and in the case of the latter, recognizes the existence of a 
contract even though the terms of the offer and acceptance do not match. In such 
instances the terms of the acceptance are incorporated into the contract, unless the 
offeror objects. 
  
Article 19(3) provides a non-exhaustive list of terms, variation of which would be 
considered to materially alter the terms of the offer. It reads: 
 
Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the price, 
payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent 
of one party’s liability to the other or the settlement of disputes are 
considered to alter the terms of the offer materially.145  
 
The impact of this article is to view virtually all terms that are modified in practice as 
material modifications.146 As such, Article 19(3) operates to place the fate of such 
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modifications and consequently the contents of the contract on the methodology 
adopted in Article 19(1) i.e. the LSR. It is on these grounds that most academics, 
before the delivery of Opinion No. 13 of the Advisory Council, favoured the 
application of the LSR in cases of BOF arising under the Convention.147  It would 
however be incorrect to assume that this stance was unanimously accepted by the 
legal community. Rather, literature on the BOF issue proposes a number of 
solutions, ranging from the adoption of the KOR; limitation of Article 19 to cases 
where the contract has not been performed;148 viewing inconsistent terms as a 
declaration by the parties of derogation from, and resultantly the inapplicability of 
Article 19;149 resolution of BOF issues through the application of the general 
principles upon which the Convention is based;150 and even recourse to the dictates 
of domestic law on the issue.151 
   
3.5.1 AC Opinion No. 13 
 
On the 20th of January 2013, the Advisory Council (AC) delivered an opinion on the 
requirements that standard terms must fulfill in order to form part of the contract and 
on the fate of standard forms when they are in conflict.152 The AC held that the 
issues raised by the use of standard terms are to be determined according to the 
dictates of the Convention thereby setting aside opinions which held that the 
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resolution of BOF scenarios falls outside the scope of the Convention. It made 
reference to Articles 8 and 9 and held that the Convention provides rules for the 
interpretation of the statements made by the party. These articles, coupled with Part 
2 of the Convention, which governs contract formation, were held to be sufficient for 
the resolution of disputes arising from the use of standard terms, including BOF 
scenarios. 
Interestingly, the Council referred to the dictates of Article 19 and concluded that the 
most appropriate methodology for the resolution of issues raised by BOF scenarios is 
the application of the KOR.153 The Council stated:  
Where both parties seek to incorporate standard terms and reach agreement 
except on those terms, a contract is concluded on the basis of the negotiated 
terms and of any standard terms which are common in substance unless one 
party clearly indicates in advance, or later on but without undue delay objects 
to the conclusion of the contract on that basis.154 
This conclusion of the Council is surprising since it seems to be in direct 
contradiction with the letter of Article 19.155 As explained above, Article 19 operates 
to classify a reply to an offer, which differs in terms, as a counter offer.156 As a result 
of this methodology, a bare reading of Article 19 suggests that the Convention 
favours the LSR in the resolution of BOF scenarios. The opinion of the AC on the 
other hand advocates the adoption of the KOR.157 Unfortunately, the AC does not 
specify how this conclusion follows from the dictates of Article 19. The opinion 
does however admit that a strict legal interpretation of Article 19 mandates the 
application of the LSR in cases of BOF. This, however, is viewed by the AC as a 
secondary concern to the more important concerns of certainty, fairness and 
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foreseeability.158     The AC refers to policy grounds that warrant such a result. 
The policy concerns taken into consideration by the AC may be summed up as 
follows: 
1) The intention of the parties must be given paramount importance, rather than 
displacing the same by incorporating a term which does not represent mutual 
intention. In the view of the AC, “the Knock-Out Rule has the advantage that 
it is in conformity with the intention of typical parties in international 
commercial relations.”159 
2) The realities of international trade must be taken into account. In the opinion 
of the AC, the application of the KOR leads to acceptable results in cross-
border trade situations.  
 
Interestingly the AC does not detail the source of these policy concerns and as such 
seems to be creating law rather than interpreting it.  
According to the methodology adopted throughout this thesis, the interpretation of 
the Convention in a manner that undermines rules extracted through a literal 
interpretation of the Convention, via the application of arbitrarily selected standards, 
is against the very fabric of the Convention.  Thus, while the AC does indeed reach a 
conclusion which seems to be relatively more in line with the concerns of the 
drafters, the same lacks legal legitimacy to the extent that it does not follow the 
appropriate standards for the interpretation of the Convention.  
This chapter concludes that the AC did indeed identify the correct methodology (i.e. 
the KOR) for the resolution of BOF scenarios under the Convention. Criticisms of 
the opinion as discussed above stem from the fact that the AC did not concretely 
specify how its conclusion abides by the interpretative methodology contained in 
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Article 7 of the Convention, or with Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention. This 
chapter shall therefore, in its conclusion, demonstrate how an application of these 
articles warrants the application of the KOR.  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
As detailed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the Convention must be interpreted first in 
line with the dictates of Article 7, and then recourse may be made to the rules 
contained in the Vienna Convention.160 Moreover, Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention states that in the interpretation of treaties, attention must be paid to the 
text, context and the object and purpose of the treaty.161 Moreover, Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention allows for recourse to supplementary means of interpretation 
(such as the travaux), when the interpretation derived following the dictates of 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention leaves the meaning ambiguous, obscure or 
leads to an absurd or unreasonable result.162 
 
Opinion No. 13 of the AC correctly identifies the fact that the application of the LSR 
in line with a textualist interpretation of the Article 19 “often leads to results which 
are random, casuistic, unfair and very difficult to foresee for the parties.”163 As a 
result, an interpretation derived from the travaux – which remedies such an 
unreasonable result – is allowed, by the Vienna Convention. The object and purpose 
of the Convention, on the other hand, illuminates the fact that it has to be interpreted 
in line with the Convention’s international character, and should be one that reduces 
transaction costs.  
 
The interplay between the textualist interpretation, which leads to the application of 
the LSR, and the contextualist interpretative methodology, which would not allow 
for the LSR as a result of its impact on transaction costs, leaves the meaning of 
Article 19 vis-à-vis the resolution BOF scenarios ambiguous. As such, reference can 
be made to the travaux for the identification of the proper methodology for the 
resolution of the BOF scenario.   
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As detailed in the section on travaux in this chapter, while the drafters were unable to 
agree on a methodology for the resolution of BOF scenarios, they clearly required 
that the resolution of the issue be in line with: a) the intention of the parties (party 
autonomy) b) the realities of international trade and c) barring the potential of 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
It is argued that the first requirement is best fulfilled if the terms of the contract are 
those that have expressly been agreed between the parties. In other words, the 
existence of conflicting terms simply raises the presumption that an agreement has 
not been reached on those terms. Since the KOR functions to exclude conflicting 
terms, it can be stated that the KOR operates to give primacy to the principle of party 
autonomy to this extent. 
 
Indeed, subjectively understood agreements best satisfy the requirement of party 
autonomy. The Convention adopts this stance in Article 8(1).164 Limitations in 
ascertaining the true intention of the parties however require an objective inquiry 
into the intent of the parties. As such, Article 8(2) states, “Statements made by and 
other conduct of a party is to be interpreted according to the understanding that a 
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the same 
circumstances.”165 Such an objective inquiry, in this context requires reference to: a) 
the terms of the standard forms and b) the past dealings between the parties, industry 
custom and trade practice as stipulated by Article 9 of the Convention.166 
 
Article 9(1) of the Convention states that parties are bound by “usage to which they 
have agreed and by any practices which they have established between 
themselves.”167 The application of such usage and practice should take precedence 
over the unexamined terms of the standard forms simply on the grounds that while 
the parties have agreed to such usage and practices, the same cannot be said of 
unexamined boiler plate clauses. Moreover, Article 9(2) of the Convention states that 
                                                     
164 Convention, Article 8(1).  
165 Convention, Article 8(2).  
166 Convention, Article 9.  
167 ibid.  
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the parties are bound by trade custom. It should, however, be noted that only those 
trade usage(s) are implied into the contract which the parties knew of (or should have 
known of), and is widely known to and used by parties to similar contracts in the 
particular trade. In the words of Professors Ostas and Darr, “Such shared customs 
and experiences facilitate communication and provide evidence of mutual, albeit 
tacit, understandings.”168 Indeed, by limiting usages that the parties are bound by, to 
those that they are aware of or should be aware of, Article 9 itself is based upon the 
principle of party autonomy. As such, it is argued that where the terms contained in 
the standard forms of the parties conflict with such custom and practices, the latter 
should be given preference over the former. In other words, as explained above, 
while it is difficult to infer a so-called meeting of the minds from the terms contained 
in standard forms, trade usages and practices implied by Article 9 are not subject to 
such a criticism. As a result, standard terms that are in conflict with such usage and 
practices should be knocked out of the contract in favour of the terms implied by 
Article 9. 
 
An objection to this approach could be that by giving primacy to implied terms 
(custom, practice) over express terms that are contained in the standard forms, the 
dictates of Article 6 are being undermined. Such a criticism however is bound to fail 
since Article 6 allows derogation by agreement or in other words operates to give 
primacy to those terms that have been agreed between the parties. Considerations of 
the realities of international trade however suggest that parties rarely read standard 
forms.169 As such, it is difficult to state that parties have agreed to derogate from 
such custom and practices as a result of a clause contained in the standard form of 
one of the parties. Indeed, allowing such derogation would operate to motivate 
parties to act in an opportunistic manner as one party could replace custom and 
practices established between themselves by including a clause to that effect in their 
form, while being well aware that the other would probably not notice the same. 
 
                                                     
168 Ostas and Darr (n 2) 412. 
169 The consideration of the realities of international trade is important since they provide insights into 
the object and purpose of the Convention; additionally, the travaux reveals that these realities formed 
one of the policy concerns during the drafting stages of Article 19. As such, a proper methodology for 
the resolution of BOF scenarios must give due regard to the realities of international trade. 
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Such an approach would therefore require of the parties, who wish to derogate from 
such custom and practices, to expressly stipulate the same in their contracts rather 
than in their standard forms.  This is in line with the following assertion of the AC: 
“Standard terms that are so surprising or unusual that a reasonable person of the 
same kind as the relevant party could not reasonably have expected such a term in 
the agreement, do not form part of the agreement.”170  
 
Indeed, a standard term that contradicts usage to which the parties have expressly 
agreed to and practices which they have established between themselves – along 
with widely known and observed trade usage – would be categorized as surprising 
and unexpected.  
 
Such an approach, however, does not view standard forms as providing no utility to 
the parties. Rather, commercial reality clearly demonstrates that parties, more often 
than not, make use of standard terms as a result of their impact on transaction costs. 
As discussed above, transaction costs are reduced as parties need not negotiate on 
terms that are not considered material by them, by including the same in their 
standard forms. Consequently, a rule such as the LSR, which operates to incentivise 
the reading of standard forms or to engage in a prolonged exchange of forms, would 
increase transaction costs. Moreover, parties usually delegate the responsibility of 
drafting such forms to their lawyers, while limiting the power of subordinates in the 
hierarchy of the firm to negotiate with potential parties on such terms.171 
Consequently, methodologies for the resolution of BOF scenarios should limit the 
inclusion of standard terms to those that are generally not considered by a reasonable 
person of the same kind as the relevant party as surprising or unreasonable. Allowing 
otherwise would require that subordinates in the hierarchy of the parties’ firms be 
empowered to negotiate on non-material terms. Such an approach would completely 
undermine the transaction cost-reducing rationale for the use of standard forms.172 
 
As such, the approach advocated for the resolution of the BOF scenario is one which 
operates to exclude all conflicting terms contained in the standard forms of the 
                                                     
170 AC Opinion (n 151). 
171 Ostas and Darr (n 2). 
172 ibid. 
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parties. Moreover, in order to curb the potential of opportunistic behavior on the part 
of the parties and to keep the utility of standard forms as a mechanism of reducing 
transaction costs intact, it is necessary that parties are not allowed to incorporate 
surprising or unusual terms in their standard forms. Gaps created in the contract 
should then be filled via reference to the terms implied by Article 9 of the 
Convention. Finally, reference should be made to the terms remaining in standard 
forms after conflicting terms have been knocked out. This methodology satisfies the 
requirements of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, as it takes the object 
and purpose of this Convention into account, and satisfies the concerns of the 
drafters detailed above (the travaux). Moreover, this recommended approach to the 
resolution of the issues raised by BOF scenarios remedies the unreasonableness of 
the methodology derived from a textualist interpretation of Article 19. 
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Chapter 4 Open Price terms 
 
A strict compliance with the classic contract law which demands rigidity in 
fixing the price term is a convenient trap-door through which the imprudent 
or unscrupulous obligor can escape, leaving the innocent obligee to bear not 
only the loss of expected benefits but also the burden of liability to sub-
purchasers.1 
 
Introduction 
       
The economic crisis of the 1930s, followed by the change in consumption habits 
witnessed in the 1950s, and the continuous transformations and innovations in 
technologies of production and distribution have all contributed to shifting the 
polarization of economic activity from production to distribution.2 This led to the 
multiplication of exclusive distribution contracts, franchise agreements and other 
long-term contracts for sale.  
 
Historically, the laws of states on the sale of goods were designed in light of the 
commercial framework prevailing at the time. For instance, Roman law on the sale of 
goods – which greatly influenced the laws of other European states – was designed in 
accordance with the requirements of petty shop keepers who did not make long-term 
commercial plans.3 As a result, these laws are unable to effectively and efficiently 
govern long-term contracts formed in a very different commercial context.4 For 
instance, in the case of discrete contracts, the price is easy to demine and set ex-ante. 
As a result, rules requiring certainty of the price for the formation of a valid contract 
                                                     
1 Harold J. Berman, ‘Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in International 
Trade’ (1963) 63 Columbia Law Review 1413, 1437. 
2 Frederick H. Miller and William D. Hawkland, Hawkland’s Uniform Commercial Code Series 
(Thomson & Reuters 2015). 
3 Various academics have labelled the requirement of price being fixed with reasonable certainty as an 
“ancient principle” of common law derived from the code promulgated by the Roman Emperor 
Justinian in the sixth century. Traditional common law would therefore find contracts with open price 
terms to be invalid on the grounds of failure to establish an essential element of sale with sufficient 
certainty. Douglas C. Berry, David M. Byers, and Daniel J. Oates ‘Open Price Agreements: Good 
Faith Pricing in the Franchise Relationship’ [2007] Franchise Law Journal 45. 
4 Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘Cases and Materials on Sales’ (Callaghan & Co 1930) 1. 
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do not pose any major issue in such transactions. In the case of long-term contracts, 
on the other hand, it may be too expensive or even impossible to concretely 
determine and agree on a price ex-ante. Such uncertainty may be attributed to the 
frequency of fluctuations in the price of the goods that constitute the subject matter 
of the contract, especially in instances where the goods are to be delivered at a date 
much later than when the contract is entered into.5 Traditional domestic laws were 
based upon a commercial framework that predated the prevalence of long-term 
contracts; because of this, these laws did not take such considerations into account. 
 
In order to remedy these inefficiencies, various new theoretical frameworks were 
constructed. In the early 1970s, for instance, Professor Macneil introduced a 
distinction between discrete and relational transactions.6 According to this 
distinction, a discrete contract is simply a contract of limited duration wherein the 
obligation of each party is defined. Such agreements, argued Professor Macneil, do 
not subject the sharing of risk and profits to external factors that are outside the 
control of the parties.7 Relational transactions on the other hand, represent long-term 
contracts wherein the rights and obligations of the parties are not easy to define. 
Consequently, risk-sharing and division of profits in such contracts are intentionally 
made subject to external factor such as, for instance, the market price of the goods.8 
 
                                                     
5 In such circumstances, the rules of traditional common law would prove to be too inflexible for the 
business needs of the contracting parties. See L. Vold, ‘Open Price Arrangements in the Sale of 
Goods’ (1930) 5 Temple Law Quarterly 208. 
6 Ian R. Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ (1973) 47 Southern California  Law Review 691;  
Ian R. Macneil, ‘A Primer of Contract Planning’ (1974) 48 Southern California  Law Review  627;  
Ian R. Macneil, ‘Contracts Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relationships under Classical, 
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 Northwestern University Law Review 854;  See 
also Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’ (1981) 67 Virginia 
Law Review 1089.  
7 Macneil 1978 (n 6).  
8 The distinction was hardly original. Rather, Toullier had already identified the difference between 
‘snap-shot’ agreements and ‘successive’ contracts in the context of French law as early as 1833. See 
Shael Herman, ‘The Contribution of Roman Law to the Jurisprudence of Antebellum Louisiana’ 
(1996) 56 Louisiana Law Review 257. For the purposes of this thesis, a fixed price term is defined as 
a complete term, applicable regardless of the state of the world. As a result, a fixed price term is not 
contingent upon any factor. Open price terms on the other hand are inherently incomplete terms. For 
instance a term stating that the price of the goods is to be calculated on the basis of the market price 
prevailing at the time of delivery is an open price term since it is inherently variable. Since open price 
terms are simply terms that are contingent upon a host of factors, and resultantly variable, they may 
take various forms. For instance, a price term setting a maximum and minimum price is open since 
the exact quantum of the price is not concretely defined. Other examples include price terms that state 
that the price is to be set: through agreement between the parties, in a reasonable manner, by reference 
to a particular index compiled by a third party, by the court etc. 
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Take, for instance, the example of a business format franchise, where the franchisor 
requires that the franchisee purchases goods from a particular (or set of) franchisor-
approved vendors. In such circumstances, the franchisee must purchase goods from 
such vendors for as long as the franchise agreement remains in effect, which may be 
decades after the agreement is entered into. In such a situation, the franchisee would 
wish to enter into a long-term contract with the vendors in order to ensure the supply 
of the requisite goods. The parties, however, would not always be able to agree on 
the price at which the goods would be sold in the future. Such a problem would 
easily be remedied through the use of open price terms, since these terms provide the 
parties with the requisite flexibility to adapt their contract to changing conditions, 
thereby decreasing the parties’ exposure to the risk of price fluctuations – while 
ensuring (albeit to a degree) that the required goods would be available for sale in the 
future.9 
The prevalence of such long-term contracts since the end of the nineteenth century 
requires commercial law to incorporate a degree of flexibility in the rules on contract 
formation. It is therefore unsurprising that various delegates present during the 
drafting of the Convention advocated for the adoption of rules on price terms that 
would operate to allow parties to enter into long-term contracts. The delegate of the 
Republic of Korea for instance argued during the Eighth Meeting of the First 
Committee, “In the case of long-term contracts in particular, some gaps were 
inevitable and although there might be some difficulties in filling them, it was better 
to retain a degree of flexibility.”10  
Opponents of the incorporation of such flexibility in the setting of the price on the 
other hand, argued that while the use of open price terms is highly prevalent in the 
context of commercial sales, they might operate to impose a price which was never 
intended by the parties.11 Take for example the comment of the delegate of the 
                                                     
9 William L. Prosser, ‘Open Price in Contracts for the Sale of Goods, (1932) 16 Minnesota Law 
Review 733, 734. 
10 Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary Records of Meetings of the 
First Committee, 8th Meeting, 17 March 1980 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting8.html> accessed: 11 May 2014 (Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference, 8th Meeting’). 
11 ibid. In essence, proponents of the recognition of such terms argued for their necessity in the 
current state of international commerce, while opponents advocated the need of objective certainty in 
the essential terms of contracts. 
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France that “while it was difficult to determine the price of such goods [raw 
materials] ex-ante, especially in the case of long-term contracts, it would be patently 
unfair on the weaker party to be subject to prices upon which it had no control.”12  
Thus, the delegate of France was simply concerned with the fact that without the 
requirement of a fixed price, one of the parties could well find itself in a position 
where it would have to agree to a price without having the opportunity to bargain.  
As such, the choice between the incorporation of fixed or open price terms is simply 
a balance between certainty on the one hand and flexibility on the other. Certainty 
has the advantage of providing parties clarity as to the parameters of their 
obligations. On the other hand, flexibility – as shall be elaborated below – has the 
advantages of efficient allocation of risks, reduction of transaction costs, and limiting 
the potential of opportunistic behavior.13   
 
The issue that forms the subject-matter of this chapter is whether the dictates of the 
Convention make provisions for effectively dealing with the issues surrounding the 
difficulty of ex-ante setting of the price in long-term contracts. It will be argued that 
the issue of whether the Convention should recognize contracts with open price 
terms was marred with disagreement during the drafting stages.14 The issue was 
finally resolved through a compromise solution, which entailed the incorporation of 
two separate articles that seemingly contradict one another. Consequently, one of the 
most problematic issues raised in the drafting of the Convention is the interplay 
between Articles 14 and 55.15 
 
This chapter attempts to analyze the utility of and the extent to which parties to a 
long-term contract can utilize open price terms in their contracts governed by the 
Convention. The first part of the chapter will analyze the utility of open price terms 
                                                     
12 ibid Para 82.  
13 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel and Robert E. Scott, ‘Contracting for Innovation: Vertical 
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration’ (2009) 109 Columbia Law Review 431, 435.  
14 As shall be explained later in this chapter, one of the weaknesses of the rules of the Convention 
from an efficiency perspective lies in the fact that Article 55, which recognizes open price terms 
(albeit to an extent), implies the price prevailing at the time of conclusion of the contract rather than 
the price prevailing at the time of delivery.  
15 Alejandro M. Garro, ‘Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (1989) 23 The International Lawyer 443, 
475. 
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to commercial parties, in comparison with fixed price terms. In particular, open price 
terms will be compared with fixed price terms on the basis of their impact upon: (a) 
the allocation of risk between the parties and (b) transaction costs. With regards to 
risk allocation, it shall be concluded that neither of the two mechanisms is capable of 
optimal risk allocation in all scenarios; rather, the ascertainment of which 
mechanism is to be preferred is dependent upon a large host of factors. It shall 
further be argued that the use of open price terms operate to decreases ex-ante 
transaction costs and motivates parties to renegotiate. The second part of this chapter 
will move on to analyze the fault lines between legal traditions that led to the 
compromise solution of incorporating seemingly inconsistent articles on the issue of 
the recognition of open price terms. It shall be argued that the evolution of 
mercantile practice has given rise to concerns over the formalist/prescriptive nature 
of domestic rules on the recognition of open price terms, and as a result, jurisdictions 
seem to be converging towards a framework that replaces formalism of rules with 
flexibility aimed towards enforcing the intention of the parties. Such convergence, 
however, has not been uniform, as will be demonstrated by a comparison between 
UK, US and French law on the issue. Equipped with this analysis, the chapter will 
proceed to evaluate the extent to which the Convention adopts a 
formalist/prescriptive approach towards the issue of open price terms. It shall be 
concluded that while the rules of the UK, US, France and the Convention recognize 
open price terms, they diverge on the issue of the recognition of agreements to agree 
and consequently, contracts that stipulate that the price is subject to renegotiation.   
 
4.1 Part 1: The Utility of Open Price Terms in Long Term Contracts 
 
4.1.1 Open Price or Fixed Price Terms? 
This section compares open price terms with fixed price terms on the basis of their 
impact on: (a) the allocation of risk between the parties and (b) transaction costs. It is 
argued that the mechanism that efficiently allocates risk and lowers transaction costs 
would be preferred by the parties to a sales contract.16 This section of the paper 
                                                     
16 While Professor Polinsky attributes the use of open price terms solely to risk allocation strategies, 
Professor Goldberg argues that risk allocation has little to do with the use of price terms. Instead he 
argues that price adjustment mechanisms and issues raised by their use are related to the framework of 
the relational exchange approach to contracts. See Victor P. Goldberg, ‘Price Adjustment in Long-
term Contracts’ [1985] Wisconsin Law Review 527, 528; See A. Mitchell Polinsky, ‘Fixed Price 
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therefore attempts to analyze the potential of each mechanism in achieving these 
goals.     
 
4.1.2 Advantages Related to the Efficient Allocation of Risk  
 
The question raised here is whether open price terms on the basis of spot price (price 
prevailing at the time of delivery) are more efficient in risk allocation than contracts 
with fixed price terms. For the purposes of this section the following scenario, 
framed by Polinsky, shall be utilized: 
 
In a contract for the sale of goods, the seller is also the manufacturer and is not 
certain of its production costs, like all other manufacturers in the industry. Moreover, 
for simplicity, consider that the supply curve is flat, so that the equilibrium price at 
the time of delivery is equal to the costs incurred by the seller. 
 
In such a case, the buyer would opt for a fixed price term so long as its’ valuation of 
the goods are certain.17  This is because a fixed price contract would provide the 
buyer with a certain profit, so long as the price so fixed reflects high valuation of the 
goods. As such, a fixed price contract insures the buyer against positive price 
fluctuations. In contrast, the use of open price terms in such a situation would, from 
the perspective of the buyer, simply give rise to uncertainty. 
 
The seller on the other hand would prefer an open price contract calling for price at 
the time of delivery (hereafter referred to as spot price).18 This is for the following 
reason: if the production costs of the seller are increasing, so will the supply curve, 
and as a result the equilibrium spot price will increase as well. In other words, since 
the seller’s cost of production is equivalent to the price in the spot market, an 
increase in costs is offset by a similar increase in spot price. The increase in spot 
price then acts as insurance for the seller against the uncertainty of production 
                                                     
Versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation’  (1987) 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 27, 41-43. 
17 See Polinsky (n 16). 
18 ibid. 
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costs.19 The use of a fixed price contract, on the other hand, would have the impact 
of shifting the entire risk of fluctuation in the production cost onto the seller. 
 
Since each party would opt for a different mechanism in the example above, the 
issue of which is more appropriate simply comes down to the ascertainment of which 
party is more risk averse. If, for instance, the seller is risk neutral while the buyer is 
risk averse, then attempts to impose an open price term on the buyer may well have a 
crowding out effect.  A similar conclusion follows for the seller if a fixed price term 
is incorporated into the contract.      
 
The above example, however, would seldom be a representation of the real world. 
This is because, in most industries, the equilibrium spot price is dependent upon a 
host of factors – including the fluctuations of industry supply and demand curves. 
The result, however, does not change in models that account for supply and demand 
curves with a gradient greater than zero.20 Professor Polinsky, in recognition of this 
fact, creates a model where both the seller’s and buyer’s valuations are unknown.21 
Moreover, the production cost is directly correlated with fluctuations in the supply 
curve and the buyer’s valuation is similarly directly and imperfectly correlated with 
the demand curve.22 
 
In such a case, an open price term continues to insure the seller against price 
fluctuations for the same reasons as in the example above.23 It should however be 
noted that, unlike the case in the example discussed above, such insurance is not 
perfect. This is simply a result of the fact that the production cost is no longer 
perfectly correlated with fluctuations in the supply curve. Consequently, the 
                                                     
19 ibid. 
20 In the example above, as a result of a flat supply curve, equilibrium spot price is equal to the costs 
incurred by the seller. 
21 ibid. The conclusions reached in the first scenario stand true for this one as well – i.e. from the 
perspective of the seller a fixed price contract acts as insurance against demand curve variations while 
a spot price contracts insures against uncertainty in production costs. Conclusions for the buyer are a 
mirror image of those for the seller discussed above. A fixed price contract acts as insurance against 
uncertainty in the variation of the supply curve whereas a spot price contract provides insurance 
against uncertainty in the valuation of the goods. 
22 In this scenario, the equilibrium spot price is naturally dependent upon fluctuations of both the 
demand and supply curves. 
23 ibid. See Polinsky (n 16). 
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insurance provided by an open price contract in such an instance might well fall 
short of the cost incurred by the seller in production.  
 
Even though an open price contract may go a long way in protecting the seller 
against unpredictable price fluctuations, it is questionable whether it is preferable to 
a fixed price contract from the perspective of a risk averse seller. As explained 
above, since spot price in this scenario is also a product of shifts in the demand 
curve, an additional element of uncertainty is added to the equation. The seller need 
not only protect itself from shifts in the supply curve but must also take fluctuations 
in the demand curve into account while pricing the contract.24 The use of a fixed 
price contract in such an instance would operate to protect the seller from 
fluctuations in the demand curve. 
  
From the perspective of the buyer, the results are the same.25 An open price contract 
(spot price) will protect a buyer from fluctuations in the price whereas a fixed price 
contract will insure the buyer against fluctuations in the supply curve. It therefore 
seems that neither a fixed price contract nor an open price contract can effectively 
provide the seller or the buyer efficient insurance against both supply and demand 
side risks. The question then is: which methodology is preferable, given that neither 
is perfect? 
 
The answer to this question, it is asserted, lies in the comparison of the utility, or 
disutility, of each mechanism in any given scenario. As such, a fixed price contract is 
to be preferred when the disutility of an open price contract exceeds that of a fixed 
price contract. The calculation of the utility of each mechanism is a product of a 
large host of factors; these include the degree to which the parties (individually) are 
risk averse, the degree of uncertainty in the potential fluctuations in both the supply 
and demand curves, and the gradient of both the supply and demand curves.  
  
4.1.3 The Economic Advantages of Cooperation 
 
                                                     
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. 
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Recent theories question the use of open price terms as a mechanism of risk sharing. 
They point towards the widespread use of open price contracts in long-term sales, 
even in cases where they operate to inefficiently distribute risk. 26 Data collected by 
Professor Mulherin, for instance, demonstrates that open price terms have been 
employed even in instances where the seller was a large risk neutral company.27 This 
goes against the observations made above, which would support the use of open 
price terms where the producer was risk averse so as to shift risk from this producer. 
Professor Goldberg therefore argues that the greatest motivation for the use of open 
price terms lies not in their potential of efficient risk-allocation, but rather in the 
potential benefits of increased co-operation.28  
 
Under a fixed price contract, the division of profits is established at the outset. 
Parties may, however, expend resources in ascertaining the possible fluctuations in 
the price of the goods ex-ante, with a view of capturing a larger share of the pie. 
Such activities would lead to an increase in transaction costs, thereby diminishing 
the joint return of the transaction. Moreover, parties would be motivated to expend 
more resources if it results in a greater degree of capture of the division of profits. As 
such, the greater the potential of capture resulting from fluctuations in price, the 
higher the potential transaction costs. Open price terms that allow for price 
adjustment, however, would diminish the value of special information, thereby 
lowering the incentive to collect such information and, consequently, decrease 
transaction costs.29 
 
4.1.4 Conclusions  
 
While commercial practice does not support the use of open price terms as a 
mechanism of risk sharing, it would be incorrect to state that open price terms cannot 
aid in the efficient allocation of risks. In fact, the use of open price terms can go a 
long way in distributing risks in accordance with the specific ‘type’ of each party, 
                                                     
26 See Mark P. Gergen, ‘The Use of Open Terms in Contract’ (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 997, 
1054. 
27  J. Harold Mulherin, ‘Complexity in Long-Term Contracts and Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual 
Provisions’ (1986) 2 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 105, 114-15. 
28 Goldberg (n 16). 
29 ibid. 
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and would operate to remedy certain concerns of risk averse parties while they are 
considering whether to conclude a long term contract. Provided that the relative 
utility of the two pricing mechanisms, in this regard, is a product of a host of factors, 
it is impossible to state that one is preferable to the other in all cases. It is similarly 
clear that, in various instances, the use of open price terms would indeed bring 
efficiency to commercial transactions.30 Moreover, the use of open price terms in the 
framework of long-term contracts incentivizes co-operation between the parties 
which leads to a decrease in transaction costs.   
 
In order to ascertain how the domestic laws of states have evolved to provide 
flexibility while retaining – albeit to a limited extent – the advantages of certainty, 
this chapter shall now analyze the laws of UK, US and France on the matter. These 
jurisdictions have been chosen for comparison due to the diversity of the stances 
adopted thereunder. Specifically, US law has evolved to provide the greatest degree 
of flexibility on price terms while French law has been extremely cautious in its 
evolution on the matter. UK law on the other hand seems to occupy the middle 
ground between these two extremes. 
             
4.2 Part 2 Open Price Terms in National Laws 
 
4.2.1 Recognition of open price terms in the law of the United States  
 
Up till the turn of the twentieth century, the primary source of commercial law in the 
US was common law rather than statutory law.31 During that period, US law did not 
recognize contracts with open price terms.32 For instance, in the seminal case of 
Lambert v Hays, it was specifically noted, “A contract for the sale of goods which is 
                                                     
30 For example, as discussed above, the use of fixed price terms can have a crowding out effect in 
certain instances, which can be remedied through the use of open price terms.   
31  Stewart Macaulay, ‘Long-term Continuing Relations: the American Experience Regulating 
Dealerships and Franchises’ in Christian Joerges (ed), Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and 
Comparative Approaches in Europe and the United States (Nomos 1991) 181. 
32 An exception to this rule is founded in the case of Acebal v Levy, whereby a contract with open 
price terms would be held to be valid if the goods had been delivered to the buyer. In such an instance 
the court would supply a reasonable price. See Acebal v Levy (1834) 10 Bing. 376, 3 LJCP 98. 
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silent as to the price fails for uncertainty.”33 The facts of certain cases, however, 
proved rather problematic for the application of this rule. For instance, in disputes 
concerning contracts for the sale of goods on open price terms, where the goods had 
been delivered and used, the possibility of restitution was severely limited.34 As 
such, courts would have to engage in the exercise of evaluating the price of the 
delivered goods, so as to place the parties in the position they would have been had 
the contract not been performed. This exercise would generally be focused on the 
ascertainment of the reasonable price of the goods. In doing so, courts would 
essentially be providing the term, the absence of which had formed the basis of their 
decision of finding the contract invalid.35   
 
The primary issue with this approach was that it did not take commercial realities 
into account. As explained above, commercial actors generally incorporate open 
price terms in their contracts since they operate to lower transaction costs and 
provide flexibility by allowing the evolution of their contractual relationship in light 
of changed circumstances. By limiting the use of such terms, however, common law 
in certain circumstances operated to undermine the intention of the parties in favor of 
formalism.   
 
As early as 1906, such concerns gave momentum to the efforts to amend US law so 
as to provide legal validity to contracts with open price terms.36 These efforts 
resulted in the promulgation of Section 9 and 10 of the Uniform Sales Act 1906.37 
                                                     
33 Lambert v. Hays 136 App. Div. 574 (New York App. Div. 1910). For an opposite conclusion prior 
to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘UCC’) see Hoadly v. 
M'Laine, (1834) 10 Bing. 482, 3 LJCP 162.  
34 Acebal (n 32). “Undoubtedly the law makes that inference where the contract is executed by the 
acceptance of the goods by the Defendants, in order to prevent the injustice of the Defendant taking 
the goods without paying for them ... But it may be questionable whether the same reason applied to a 
case where the contract is executory only, and where the goods are still in the possession, or under the 
control, of the seller.” Acebal (n 32). 
35 The obligation to pay a reasonable price under such circumstances was considered to be quasi-
contractual rather than in contract. See Prosser (n 9). 
36 An analysis of cases suggests that the rule prior to the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act 1906 
was the following: where the contract is silent as to the price and the contract has been executed, the 
buyer must pay a reasonable price. See for example James v. Muir (1876) 33 Mich. 223; Taft v. Travis 
(1883) 136 Mass. 95; Comstock v. Sanger (1898) 121 Cal. 641, 54 Pac. 101; Leist v. Dierssen (1906) 
4 Cal. App. 634, 88 Pac. 812; Stout v. Caruthersville Hardware Co. (1908) 131 Mo. App. 520, 110 S. 
W. 619; Smith v. State (1911) 9 Ga. App. 227, 70 S. E. 969. 
37  Uniform Sales Act 1906. It is interesting to note that these sections of the Uniform Sales law 
ostensibly mirror their counterparts in the SGA 1893. See Donald J. Smythe, ‘Why was the Uniform 
Sales Act Adopted in some States but not Others’ (2008) 5 
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The act does recognize contracts with open price terms under certain circumstances; 
however, two tenants of formalism are found to be incorporated into it, namely: A) 
the requirement that the contract be interpreted literally, and B) written terms 
outweigh unwritten expressions of agreement.38 The adoption of such formalism led 
judges, who had been trained in traditional common law, to interpret the section as “a 
mere declaration of the common law,” and consequently courts continued to hold 
agreements with open price terms as invalid.39 As such, there could be instances 
where the unwritten expressions of agreement showed a validly concluded agreement 
yet the court bound by the formalism of the act would be unable to enforce the 
legitimate expectations of the parties.  
 
In light of these findings, Professor Llewellyn believed that the issues surrounding 
open price contracting could be overcome if the law recognized the working rules 
established between commercial parties.40 In particular, the act suffered from two 
major flaws that had to be remedied before the law could effectively reflect and cater 
for commercial practise. Firstly, instead of being grounded in legal doctrine, the law 
had to be designed on the basis of a contextual approach. This was achieved by 
making the context the primary factor in the ascertainment, by courts, of what the 
agreement means.  
 
The second failing of the act was that its rules were too general; as a result, these 
rules were insensitive to certain circumstances that led parties to act contrary to the 
norm of risk allocation in commercial transactions, as they were based on a one size 
fits all approach. This was remedied by replacing the abstract general rules with 
those of the particular trade and industry. Consequently, US law has abandoned the 
approach of literal interpretation of open price contracts in favour of one that 
enforces such contracts on the basis of the facts as they are interpreted by the 
particular trading identity of the parties.41 
 
                                                     
<http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2008/smythe.pdf > accessed: 27 March 2014. 
38 Robert E. Scott, ‘The Rise and Fall of Article 2’ (2002) 62 Louisiana Law Review 1009, 13. 
39 Berry and others (n 3) 51. 
40 See Macaulay (n 31) 188. 
41 E. Allen Farnsworth, ‘Contracts’ (4th edn, Aspen Publishers 2004) 108. 
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As such, recognizing the limitations of the formalism contained in the act, the UCC 
was drafted with the intention to allow flexibility in the formation of contracts by 
substituting the bargain paradigm – that is, every essential term of the agreement 
must be settled for the court to be able to grant a remedy, with the intention of the 
parties to the contract.42  
 
Article 2-305 of the UCC implies a reasonable price at the time of delivery under 
three circumstances, namely: (a) the parties are silent as to price (b) the price is to be 
agreed between the parties and they fail in the same and (c) the price is to be set by a 
third party and it is not so set. Only the first of these is recognized by under the 
Uniform Sales Act, whereas the contract would be invalidated under the remaining 
two.43 Moreover, Sub-article 2 of Article 2-305 specifically recognizes agreements 
whereby one party is empowered to the set the price.44  
 
Such an approach, it is argued, places severe curbs on the potential of opportunistic 
behavior by one party. Take for instance scenario (c) detailed in the paragraph above. 
In such a case, the UCC will not allow a contract to be set aside simply because the 
price term empowered a third party to fix the price and it was not able to do so as a 
result of the fault of one of the parties. Rather, the UCC places limits on the potential 
of opportunistic behavior by providing that a reasonable price is to be charged in 
such circumstances. Surprisingly however, the UCC empowers the innocent party in 
such a circumstance to identify what is considered the reasonable price. Since such 
an approach would undoubtedly operate to motivate opportunism on the part of the 
innocent party i.e. to require a price that maximizes its return, the UCC has limited 
                                                     
42 UCC, Section 1-201(3) states, “The bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by 
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of 
performance as provided in this Act.” Comment 1 to Section 1-205 states, “The meaning of the 
agreement is to be determined by the language used by [the parties] and by their action, read and 
interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances.” In the words of 
Speidel, under the UCC “[I]f the seller and buyer agree to the future sale of described goods in a 
stated quantity and clearly state that they intend to contract, the bargain is enforceable even though no 
other terms have been agreed.” Anon, ‘UCC Section 2-305(1)(c): Open Price Terms and the Intention 
of the Parties in Sales Contracts’ (1967) 1 Valparaiso University Law Review 381, 398 citing 
Professor Richard Speidel, ‘Annual Convention of the Association of American Law Schools’ 
December 28, 1966. 
43 Hawkland believes that the approach adopted under the UCC to the recognition of open price terms 
ensures a “fairer and juster” result relative to a no-contract outcome. See William D. Hawkland, Sales 
and Bulk Sales (American Law Institute-American Bar Association, Committee on Continuing 
Professional Education, 1976) 74. 
44 UCC, Article 2-305 (2). 
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such discretion by imposing the obligation to act in good faith while ascertaining the 
reasonable price standard.45      
 
Even before the code was enacted, scholars began to raise concerns vis-à-vis the 
exact definition of the requirement of good faith as contained in this subsection.46 
Resulting disagreements on the exact definition of the principle have hampered the 
ability of commercial actors to use open price terms while contracting.47 Douglas et 
al. for instance, after analyzing a host of judgments on the issue, state, “The 
resulting, often circular, legal discourse is anything but instructive and has realized 
many of the worst fears of the UCC drafting committee.”48 
 
As mentioned above, absent a concretely defined principle of good faith, the utility 
of empowering one party to ascertain a reasonable price is greatly undermined. One 
potential way around this problem is to empower courts to identify the reasonable 
price. Such an approach, however, has its own shortcomings. Firstly, adjudication of 
disputes is costly and transaction costs operate to shrink the joint return of the parties 
under the contract.49 Secondly, in efficiency terms, leaving the determination of the 
price to the courts is efficient in cases where courts possess special knowledge and 
expertise that enable them to identify the price in a more cost efficient manner than 
the parties themselves. In such a case, expertise that would enable the courts to better 
ascertain the price would include the existence of cost effective mechanisms for the 
accumulation and analysis of price related information. It is, however, commonplace 
that “parties can determine appropriate performance together better and more 
cheaply than can courts.”50  
  
4.2.2 UK Law 
 
Prior to the promulgation of The Sale of Goods Act 1893 (SGA 1893), English 
                                                     
45 Berry and others (n 3) fn 20, 50. 
46  Hearing Before The Enlarged Editorial Board January 27-29, (1951) 6 Business Lawyer 164, 186. 
According to Berry and others, “Almost from its inception, the UCC’s open price provision has been 
misconstrued and misapplied.” See Berry and others (n 3) fn 20, 50. 
47 For instance, one of the factors in the assessment of the good faith criterion – namely commercial 
reasonability – is too vague a standard to provide any meaningful guidance. 
48  Berry and others (n 3) 49. 
49 Litigation costs are a part of transaction costs. 
50 Gergen (n 26) 1000. 
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courts did not recognize the validity of agreements with open price terms. Based on 
the principle of autonomy (freedom of contract) English law did not allow courts to 
make the agreement for the parties by implying terms where the parties had been 
unable to agree or were otherwise silent. English law, therefore, by giving primacy to 
the intention of the parties, imposed upon them the correlative responsibility to 
determine the content of their obligations.51   
 
This rule was subsequently relaxed in the case of Wilks v Davis, where the court held 
that it possessed the power to ascertain the price, which was originally agreed to be 
set by a valuator without specifically identifying its identity.52 It must be noted that 
the ruling of Wilks did not overturn the rule expounded in previous cases such as 
Darbey – it merely added to it. As such, before the enactment of the SGA 1893, 
English courts would not intervene to ascertain the price of an otherwise validly 
concluded contract unless the agreement could be read in a manner that empowered 
it to do so. Thus, an agreement that named third party evaluators empowered to 
ascertain the price would operate to bar the court from entering into such an 
exercise.53 In such a scenario, if the evaluators failed to ascertain the price, the court 
would be left with little choice but to find the agreement unenforceable.  
  
In 1893, with the promulgation of the new SGA, the stance adopted by English law 
on the recognition of contracts with open price terms was substantially altered.54 
                                                     
51 See Windeyer J. decision in the case Hall v Busst (1960) 104 CLR 206, wherein he discusses the 
outcome and ratio of cases concerning open price terms prior to the promulgation of the SGA. See 
also Darbey v Whitaker (1857) 4 Drewry 134. The ratio of the case was that equity would not decree 
specific performance in cases where one of the essential elements of the contract is still to be 
determined at the time of trial. 
52 Wilks v Davis (1817) 3 Mer 507. 
53 This result was well established in the case of sale of land. As early as 1807, Sir William Grant in 
Milnes v. Gery (1807) 14 Ves Jun 400 said: “Upon the principle, that a fixed price was an essential 
ingredient in a contract of sale, the ancient Roman lawyers doubted, whether an agreement, that did 
not settle the price, was at all binding. Justinian's Institutes and the Code state that doubt; and resolve 
it by declaring, that such an agreement should be valid and complete, when and if the party, to whom 
it was referred, should fix the price: otherwise it should be totally in-operative: ‘quasi nullo Pretio 
Statuto;’ and such clearly is the Law of England.” He added: “The case of an agreement to sell at a 
fair valuation is essentially different. . . . In that case no particular means of ascertaining the value are 
pointed out: there is nothing therefore, precluding the Court from adopting any means, adapted to that 
purpose.”  
54 The SGA was a product of a review by Chalmers of cases adjudicated during the nineteenth century 
and was promulgated to reflect, albeit to an extent, the realities of commercial practice. John 
Macleod, Consumer Sales Law: The Law relating to Consumer Sales and Financing of Goods 
(Routledge 2009) 4. 
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Between 1893 and 1979 various amendments were made to the act, and resultantly 
the SGA 1979 was drafted to consolidate these amendments. Interestingly, however, 
the rules on the validity of open price terms remain ostensibly identical. 
 
Section 8  
(1) The price in a contract of sale may be fixed by the contract, or may be 
left to be fixed in a manner agreed by the contract, or may be determined by 
the course of dealing between the parties.  
(2) Where the price is not determined as mentioned in Sub-section (1) above 
the buyer must pay a reasonable price.  
(3) What is a reasonable price is a question of fact dependent on the 
circumstances of each particular case.  
 
 
Section 9 
(1) Where there is an agreement to sell goods on the terms that the price is to 
be fixed by the valuation of a third party, and he cannot or does not make the 
valuation, the agreement is avoided; but if the goods or any part of them have 
been delivered to and appropriated by the buyer he must pay a reasonable 
price for them.  
(2) Where the third party is prevented from making the valuation by the fault 
of the seller or buyer, the party not at fault may maintain an action for 
damages against the party at fault. 
 
Even though the legal community has had over a hundred years of experience 
dealing with these sections, their interpretation is still a fountain of disagreement. 
Specifically, there is great confusion surrounding the question of whether the phrase 
“left to be fixed in a manner agreed by the contract” includes the possibility of the 
price to be agreed between the parties themselves. Notwithstanding this limitation of 
the act, the text of the provisions detailed above coupled with the evolution of their 
interpretation by courts clearly demonstrates the tendency of English law to come to 
the aid of the parties by endeavoring to give effect to formal agreements that the 
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parties clearly intended to have a legal effect.55 It should, however, be noted that 
courts will not fill in the gaps in the agreement where there is insufficient evidence 
of what the parties intended.56 Thus, English courts simply strive to ascertain, from 
the circumstances surrounding the contract, what the intention of the parties was. 
However, if the courts are unable to identify the same, for instance due to the 
obscurity of language used, courts will not make an agreement for the parties.57 
 Where the parties are silent as to the price 
 
The dictates of Sections 8(2) and (3) and quite clear on the issue and operate to 
imply a reasonable price as determined by the circumstances of each case. 
 
A third party is empowered to set the price  
 
The dictates of Section 9 recognize the validity of price terms that empower a third 
party to set the price. While such a position operates to enforce the intention of the 
parties, the second sentence of Section 9(1) does seem to favor formalism. This 
statement however should not be taken to mean that the section was drafted with the 
view of subjecting the intention of the parties to formalist requirements. 
Unfortunately, however, until 1982, courts did interpret the section in such a manner 
and would invalidate a contract in instances where the third party failed to set the 
price even though the parties clearly intended to be bound by the contract. In 1984, 
the House of Lords (HL) overturned previous case law on the issue.58 In the case of 
Sudbrook Trading Estate v Eggleton, the HL validated the existence of a contract 
that empowered a third party to ascertain the price. The third party had, however, 
failed to do so. The HL held that the correct approach to be adopted in such cases 
was for the court to ascertain whether the parties intended to be bound by a fair and 
reasonable price with the mechanism simply representing a means to this end; or 
whether the mechanism itself was essential in determining the price to be paid. The 
                                                     
55 Sudbrook Trading Estate v Eggleton [1983] AC 444 House of Lords. 
56 G Scammell and Nephew Ltd v HC & JG Ouston [1941] 1 AC 251. 
57 ibid. Viscount Simons, in his judgement, stated, “The phrase in dispute was so vaguely expressed 
that ...it requires further agreement to be reached between the parties before there could be a complete 
consensus ad idem.” Viscount Maugham stated, “No one could agree upon the true construction of the 
agreement, it was impossible to hold that a contract had been formed.”  
58 See Sudbrook Trading Estate (n 55). 
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court held that if the mechanism was simply a means of ensuring that a fair price was 
to be paid, then the intention of the parties should be enforced. This would be 
achieved if the court substituted the mechanism identified by the parties with its own 
mechanism whereby a fair and reasonable price may be ascertained.  On the other 
hand, if the agreed mechanism is found to be essential and it fails in setting the price, 
then according to the HL, courts should invalidate the agreement, for any other 
outcome would be tantamount to undermining the intention of the parties by 
imposing terms that they clearly did not intend to be bound by.59 
 
The pricing of the goods is entrusted to one of the parties 
 
In May & Butcher, Viscount Dunedin stated, “With regards to price it is a perfectly 
good contract to say that the price is to be settled by the buyer.”60 Thus, English law 
recognizes the validity of contract that empowers one party to set the price. Such a 
stance is in line with the autonomy-based theory of contract; indeed, if the parties 
intended to conclude a contract whilst empowering one of them to set the price, 
courts should implement such an intention. It should be noted, that when one party is 
entrusted to set the price, there is an underlying assumption that it would do so in a 
fair and reasonable manner. Indeed, the goal of commercial parties is to make profits 
and profits are undoubtedly based on price.61 It is therefore unlikely that parties 
would intend to be bound by agreements, the price term of which would operate to 
allow one party to act opportunistically and seize all the returns from the transaction. 
Consequently, the discretion of the party setting the price is never unfettered; it 
cannot exercise its discretion “dishonestly, for an improper purpose, capriciously, 
arbitrarily or in a way in which no reasonable party would do.”62 
 
The price is left to the future agreement between the parties 
 
According to the majority view, a contract cannot be concluded on the terms that 
                                                     
59 For an example of cases where the price mechanism was considered to be essential see Gillatt v Sky 
Television Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 103 and Infiniteland Ltd v Artisan Contracting Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 
758, [2005] All ER (D) 236. 
60 May & Butcher Ltd. v R [1934] 2 KB 17. 
61 See Llewellyn (n 4). 
62 Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (11th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 64.  
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certain essential elements are to be agreed between the parties at some future date.63 
In the case of May & Butcher, for instance, the court held that the inability of the 
parties to agree on the price at the conclusion of the contract could be equated with 
the inability of a third party to ascertain a price under Section 9 of the SGA, which 
leads to the invalidation of the contract.64  
 
Opponents of this view on the other hand argue that such a scenario is to be governed 
by Sub-section 2 of Section 8 rather than Sub-section 1. Thus, in such circumstances 
the buyer must pay a reasonable price, the ascertainment of which falls to courts and 
tribunals rather than the parties themselves. Indeed, invalidating agreements on the 
grounds that certain terms are left to future agreements in instances where the parties 
clearly intended to be bound by the agreement operates to undermine the autonomy-
based theory adopted by English courts for over a century.65 It is on these grounds 
that this part of the decision has been labelled as “commercially unsound” by various 
commentators.66  
 
Professor Bridge opines that Section 62(2) of the SGA limits the applicability of 
common law rules to the contracts of sale of goods to the extent that they are not in 
conflict with its provisions.67 However, since the common law rules on agreement to 
agree seem to conflict with the dictates of Section 8 of the SGA, according to 
professor Bridge, the same are not applicable to contracts that fall within its scope.68   
 
In the case of WN Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd, the House of Lords (HL) reached an 
opposite conclusion to the ruling of May & Butcher.69 The case concerned the sale of 
                                                     
63 See May (n 60); Courtney and Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Bros. (Hotels) Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 297. 
64 ibid. Lord Buckmaster, for a unanimous court, therefore held that a valid contract had not been 
executed. 
65 Provided that the mechanism of future agreement was simply a means of ascertaining the fair and 
reasonable price.  
66 Michael Howard, ‘Contracts Expressly Providing for Further Agreements’ (1977) 4 Otagao Law 
Review 14, 17. 
67 Michael Bridge, The Sale of Goods (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 32. 
68 ibid. 
69 WN Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd [1932] UKHL 2. The Court of Appeals (CA) however followed 
the ratio of May (n 60) and found the agreement void as essential terms of the contract were to be set 
through future agreement. 
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lumber of “fair specification” and contained an open price term.70 After the 
agreement was entered into, the market price of Russian softwood skyrocketed and 
the seller attempted to get out of the bargain by arguing that the agreement was void 
as a result of uncertainty of essential terms, which had yet to be agreed between the 
parties. Had the ruling of May & Butcher been applied, as it was in the Court of 
Appeals, the court would have had little choice but to find the contract void on the 
grounds of being an agreement to agree.  
 
Lord Wright, however, argued that businessmen and merchants “Record the most 
important agreements in crude and summary fashion; modes of expression sufficient 
and clear to them in the course of their business may appear to those unfamiliar with 
the business far from complete or precise.”71  
 
On these grounds, he argued that in such situations the intention of the parties to 
enter into and be bound by a contract should not be defeated, but rather courts should 
strive to interpret contracts “fairly and broadly” so as to preserve their subject 
matter.72  
 
According to Atiyah et al. the two cases can be read in a harmonious manner.73 They 
state that the ruling of May & Butcher, rather than laying a rule of general 
application on the fate of contracts with open price terms, simply reflects the court’s 
conclusion that the parties in the case had not reached a concluded agreement. If this 
argument is accepted, then the stance of English law on open price terms can be 
summarized as an acceptance of the validity of such contracts – so long as the 
circumstances reveal the intention of the parties to be bound by the agreement when 
it is concluded. 
 
                                                     
70 The price term read: “Whatever the conditions are, buyers shall obtain the goods on conditions and 
at prices which show to them a reduction of 5 per cent on the FOB value of the official price list at 
any time ruling during 1931.” 
71 WN Hillas (n 69). 
72 This rule was, however, qualified by the proviso that courts should not create contracts where there 
are none. 
73 Patrick Selim Atiyah, John Norman Adams, and Hector L. MacQueen, Sale of Goods (Pearson 
Education 2005) 31. 
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Such a conclusion, however, is far from reality – as is revealed by an analysis of 
judgments delivered after Hillas. In Courtney Ltd v Tolaini Bros, for instance, Lord 
Diplock specially stated that that Lord Wright's ruling in Hillas was bad law.74 Lord 
Denning argued: 
 
If the law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract (when there is 
a fundamental term yet to be agreed) it seems to me it cannot recognise 
a contract to negotiate. The reason is because it is too uncertain to have any 
binding force … a contract to negotiate, like a contract to enter into 
a contract, is not a contract known to the law… I think we must apply the 
general principle that where there is a fundamental matter left undecided and 
to be the subject of negotiation, there is no contract.75 
 
The decisions in May & Butcher, Hillas and Courtney demonstrate that English 
courts attempt to adopt an approach which tries to avoid the wanton destruction of 
agreements on the one hand and the imaginative creation of agreements on the other. 
As a result, a court will not substitute its own intent where the mechanism adopted 
by the parties fails, unless it can be shown that the mechanism so adopted was 
simply a means to an end rather than essential in its own right. Such a stance, it is 
argued, is firmly grounded in the autonomy-based theories of contracts, and can 
provide a degree of flexibility in contractual interpretation whereby opportunistic 
behaviour can be minimized.76 
 
4.2.3 French Law  
 
Historically, French commercial law was based upon the principle of party 
autonomy.77 The principle was based upon assumptions of equality between the 
                                                     
74  Lord Diplock stated: “Though an attractive theory, should in my view be regarded as bad law.” See 
Courtney (n 63), per Lord Diplock. 
75 See Courtney (n 63), per Lord Denning MR, 301-302. 
76  In Hillas (n 69), the seller attempted to have the contract declared invalid after the price of the 
wood had skyrocketed, where as in Foley the buyer attempted to take advantage of the missing price 
term so as to allow the buyer to purchase the fuel from elsewhere. In both these cases the breaching 
party was acting opportunistically. 
77 The principle of party autonomy in the context of French law is referred to as the “will theory of 
contract.” Rudolf  B. Schlesinger, Pierre G. Bonassis, and Cornell Law School, ‘Formation of 
Contracts - A Study of the Common Core of  the Legal Systems’ (Oceana Publications 1968) 244.  
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parties coupled with the expectation that competing interests would achieve a 
balanced agreement.78 As such, under traditional French law, contractual obligations 
derived their validity from the intention of the parties and courts did not possess the 
power to intervene and substitute or imply terms into the contract.79 Rather, the 
courts were merely servants of the parties whose mandate was limited to enforcing 
their common intent – “minister de la volonte des parties.” 
 
The rules on price terms under French law are contained in Articles 1591 and 1592 
of the Civil Code.80 Read together, these articles state demonstrate that the price 
must be determined by the parties, even though it is not necessary that the price is 
fixed.81 It is sufficient for the purposes of the formation of a contract that the price is 
determinable at the time the contract is concluded, without the intervention of a 
judge.82  As such, the existence and content of the terms of an agreement are to be 
ascertained on the basis of the will of the parties. As a result, pricing should be the 
product of negotiations between two parties, not one, and the court is empowered 
only to ascertain the intention of the parties and may not substitute the same with its 
own opinion.  
 
The developments in industrial capitalism witnessed at the end of the nineteenth 
century proved the assumptions upon which French contract law was based to be 
inaccurate.83 Indeed, the Roman rule contained in Article 1591, while reasonable in 
the commercial context of the times of the Roman Empire, seems out of place in the 
current commercial context. As one French commentator famously stated, the rule 
was designed for shop keepers who do not make long-term commercial plans.84 The 
                                                     
78 ibid. 
79 Artur Nassbaum, ‘Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-American Offer-and-Acceptance Doctrine’ 
(1936) 36 Columbia Law Review 920. 
80 Article 1591 of the French Civil Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘CC’) reads: “The price of the sale 
must be determined and designated by the parties.”  
81 Article 1591 adopts the Roman rule requiring certainty of the price term, which while suitable for 
Roman times, is not capable of regulating commercial relationships efficiently in the context of the 
twenty-first century. These concerns have led commentators to label the rule as an obsolete code 
provision. Edward A. Tomlinson, ‘Judicial Lawmaking in a Code Jurisdiction: A French Saga on 
Certainty of Price in Contract Law’ (1997) 58 Louisiana Law Review 101, 102. 
82 Cass. req., Jan. 7, 1925, D.H. 1925, 57; Friedrich Kessler and Edith Fine, ‘Culpa in Contrahendo, 
Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: a Comparative Study’ (1964) 77 Harvard  Law 
Review  401, 409.  
83 Equality between contracting parties, for instance, is rarely observable in the current commercial 
context.   
84 See Tomlinson (n 81).  
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principle of autonomy was therefore supplanted with legal principles – such as the 
duty to act in good faith – which, it was hoped, would operate to minimize the 
impact of the lack of equality between the parties and rule out “unfair agreements.” 85 
The incorporation of these principles has, however, had the impact of allowing 
judicial intervention (albeit constrained) in the ascertainment of the intention of the 
parties.86  
 
The parties are silent as to price 
 
This situation is probably the best example of when the principle of autonomy as 
contained in traditional French law is supplanted with the principle of good faith and 
fairness. In such instances – i.e. where the parties are completely silent as to price – 
the prima facie inference is that the parties have not reached an agreement on one of 
the essential elements of the sale and therefore there is no contract. French law, 
however, does not limit the ascertainment of the terms of the agreement solely to the 
written contract.87 Consequently, courts are empowered to ascertain, from the 
circumstances surrounding the agreement, what the parties intended. Thus, a judge 
may decide that the parties intended to imply the market price of the goods at the 
time of conclusion of the contract or at the time of delivery.88 As such, French law 
recognizes the validity of agreements that do not include a clause on price.  
 
The price is subject to future agreement between the parties 
 
The application of the principle of party autonomy as contained in French 
commercial law requires the parties to agree upon at least the essential terms of the 
                                                     
85 CC, Article 1134 (3) of the Civil Code states that contracts must be “performed in good faith.” This 
article did not receive any attention before the 1970s, leading commentators to state that the article 
“was in a state of deep sleep.” See Tomlinson (n 81) 113; Donald Harris and Denis Tallon (eds), 
Contract Law Today: Anglo-French Comparisons (Clarendon Press 1991). 
86  ibid. These developments have led various commentators to state that the law has moved from 
giving primacy to the autonomy of the will of the parties to giving primacy to the “autonomy of 
socialized will.”  
87 Harris and Tallon (n 85). 
88 Isabelle Corbisier , ‘The pricing in commercial contracts for sale of goods Comparative 
Reflections’ International Journal of Comparative Law 40 (1988) 767; Judicial intervention however 
is no longer limited by the sole considerations of the circumstances surrounding the agreement, but 
may take into account the dictates of commercial fairness and good faith. Thus, in this context, it is 
hard to determine the extent to which the judge is actually implying the true intention of the parties 
into the contract. 
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agreement for the existence of a validly concluded agreement.89  The existence of a 
clause which requires the parties to agree on the price at a later date is itself evidence 
that the parties have not been able to agree on one of the essential terms of the 
contract.90 Unlike the scenario discussed above, where the parties are completely 
silent as to price, the court cannot imply the market price of the goods into the 
agreement since there is no evidence that that is indeed what the parties intended.  
 
The price term makes reference to market price prevailing at a future date  
 
Since a price term that makes reference to the market price prevailing in a specified 
market at a designated date is determinable without the intervention of the courts, it 
is considered valid under French law.91 
 
 
 
The price is to be fixed by a third party 
 
Article 1592, read with Article 1134, allows parties to a contract for the sale of 
goods to empower a third party to establish the price of the goods.92 Article 1592, 
however, states that if the third party is unable to determine the price then there is no 
contract. This raises the following question: what will be the outcome of a case 
where one of the parties does not participate in the appointment of the third party or 
where it continuously postpones the appointment of the same? Various 
commentators have argued that such circumstances represent instances of bad faith 
performance in contravention of Article 1134 of the civil code.93 Proponents of this 
approach therefore asserted that courts should pass an order of specific performance 
in such scenarios. This was subsequently rejected by the Court of Cassation 
(Supreme Court of France) when it held that the court, when called upon to resolve 
such disputes can only award damages to the innocent party.94  The reason for the 
                                                     
89 Cass.  Corn., 24 March 1965, Bull. Civ III, No. 232 J.C.P. 65 II 14378.  
90 ibid. 
91 Cass. req., Feb. 5, 1934, 1934 Gaz. Pal., 2, 331; Cass. com., Feb. 17, 1931, D.P. 1931, 1, 
41, note Pierre Voirin. 
92 CC, Article 1592; Article 1134. 
93 Corbisier (n88). 
94 Cass. Civ, April 25, 1952, D., 52, 635. 
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adoption of such an approach is primarily based upon the aversion to judicial 
intervention in the context of French law.95 In other words, if a third party 
empowered to set the price failed to do so, courts would essentially be re-writing the 
contract by substituting a new mechanism for price determination – for instance, by 
implying a price into the contract themselves or empowering another third party to 
do so.96  
 
One party is empowered to set the price  
 
Before 1995, while ascertaining the validity of a price term that empowered one 
party to set the price, the first question courts would consider was the balance of the 
bargaining power between the parties.97 If the court found that the parties possessed 
equal bargaining power ex-ante, the court would move on to determine whether the 
power so provided is completely discretionary or whether the contract places 
objective limits on the exercise of such discretion.98 Such an approach was based 
upon the consideration of protecting the party which was placed in a weaker position 
as a result of the price term. Thus, a court would not validate a contract which 
provided unfettered discretion to one party in setting the price. Rather, such a price 
term would be validated if it was phrased in a manner whereby it was to conform to 
some objective standards not entirely within the control of the party setting the 
price.99  
 
The approach adopted by courts in instances where the parties did not possess equal 
bargaining power was much more restrictive. In such instances, the court did not 
consider whether the contract placed objective limits on the exercise of the power to 
set price, but rather with the possibility that one of the parties may use such power 
opportunistically in the drafting of the price term.100 It was considered immaterial 
whether the greater bargaining power had actually been used in an opportunistic 
                                                     
95 See CC, Article 1592. 
96 See the Pompistes de marque decisions of 1971. 
97 ibid. 
98 ibid. 
99 Thus a clause stating that the price charged would conform to the price charged by the seller to its 
most favoured buyer is considered objectively determinable, in that objectively ascertainable limits 
have been placed upon the discretion of the party in setting the price.  
100 See Pompistes de marque cases  Cass. ass. plin., Dec. 1, 1995, D. 1996, Jur. 13. 
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manner. Rather, the mere existence of imbalance in the bargaining power was 
considered sufficient for the invalidation of such agreements.101 
 
This approach, it is argued, would operate to drive small and medium firms out of 
business since such firms, as a result of their size, would not be able to enter into 
contracts with large firms that preferred to leave the price term open in such a 
manner. Secondly, this approach did not take the reality of the world of commerce 
into account, wherein contracts with open price terms that empower one party to set 
the price are frequently entered into and performed without dispute. Moreover, such 
an approach gives primacy to concerns of protection of the weaker party, over and 
above concerns of efficiency. Economic efficiency is undermined since a court 
would invalidate a contract due to the possibility of arbitrariness in setting of the 
price, even though no such arbitrariness is found in fact. Such an approach, it is 
argued, operates to allow parties to act opportunistically, since they may have a 
contract set aside whenever they find a better deal elsewhere. Various commentators 
therefore argued that rather than invalidating the contract, which seems to be 
overkill, courts should simply sanction opportunism in the setting of the price by the 
dominant party.102 
 
These concerns led courts in France to reconsider its interpretation of the Article 
1591. In particular, the court realized that its policy of invalidating price terms that 
left the determination of the price to one of the parties, based on concerns of 
protecting the weaker party, was doing more harm than good.103  
 
In 1995, the Court of Cassation, was called upon to adjudicate upon a set of four 
cases which concerned the use of open price terms in contracts for the sale of 
goods.104  In the seminal judgment delivered by the full court of twenty five judges, 
it was held that the dictates of Article 1591 were satisfied by a term which allowed 
                                                     
101 Corbisier (n 88) 
 
102 Louis Vogel, Plaidoyer pour un revirement: contre l'obligation de determination du prix dans les 
contrats de distribution (D. 1995), Chron. 155, at 162. 
103 Specifically, this approach operated to invalidate almost all long-term agreements for sale and 
distribution of goods. 
104 The lower court had nullified these contracts under the rationale of the Pompistes de marque cases  
(n 101) 
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one of the parties to set the price.105 Such a clause, according to the court, did indeed 
refer to a determinable price i.e. the seller’s quoted price. The court, however, as is 
customary for civil law courts, did not provide reasons or attempt to define the 
phrase determinable. The court proceeded to state that the only requirement imposed 
upon the party setting the price was that it had to do so in good faith.106 In essence, 
the court used the dictates of Article 1134 (and the requirement to act in good faith in 
particular) to take into account the needs and circumstances of contemporary 
commercial relationships while interpreting a code which was drafted at a time when 
environment of commercial transactions was very different.   
 
In a nutshell the provisions of the civil code were interpreted to require: 
1) A price term referring to the seller quoted price is valid. 107  
2) The party empowered to set the price must do so in good faith. 
3) If the requirements of point 2 above are not satisfied, then the innocent party 
may obtain damages or have the contract set aside. 
4) A price term which is completely silent as to price does not fail for 
uncertainty.  
 
Recourse to the provisions of Article 1134(3) – i.e. the requirement that parties act in 
good faith in setting the price – seems to represent a convergence towards the stance 
adopted under US law. In other words, the courts have abandoned the 
unconscionability approach in regulating the behaviour of the parties at the 
performance stage, in favour of using the concept of good faith to impose substantive 
obligations on the parties at both the formation and performance stage. According to 
Tomlinson, “These obligations are policy-based and, at the performance stage, 
require a party to inform, advise, and cooperate with the other party in achieving the 
expected benefits of the contract.”108 Such an approach makes sense from an 
efficiency perspective; sharing of information and other forms of co-operation 
severely curbs the possibility of opportunistic behaviour and operates to reduce 
transaction costs. Unfortunately, the potential of reaping these benefits is greatly 
                                                     
105 Vassall. D. 1996, Jur. at 18, J.C.P. 1996, 22565. 
106 French law therefore adopted a position similar to that of UCC Article 2-305(2) which reads, “A 
price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith.” 
107 See Vassall (n 105). 
108 Tomlinson (n 81) 140. 
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undermined by the fact that French law has been unable to define what constitutes 
good faith in the setting of price. This has led commentators to fill the gap, resulting 
in a multitude of proposed definitions, none of which has been unanimously 
accepted.  
 
4.3 The fault lines: an analysis of the Travaux préparatoires  
 
Article 12 (which became Article 14) of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law Draft (Draft Convention), and fell under Part 2 of the 
Convention, read:  
 
(1) A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific 
persons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates the 
intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance. A proposal is 
sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes 
or makes provision for determining the quantity and the price.109 
 
Article 12 of the Draft Convention requires an offer to be sufficiently definite, which 
includes the requirement to expressly or implicitly fix or make provisions for 
determining the price. As such, an offer which does not establish price, or a method 
to determine it, will fail due to uncertainty. A bare reading of Draft Article 12 
therefore suggests that the draft Convention did not recognize a contract that was 
completely silent as to price.110 The dictates of Draft Article 51 (became Article 55), 
which fell under Part 3 of the Convention, suggested otherwise however. 
 
Draft Article 51, which had been formulated and adopted after ten years of 
deliberations before Part 2 of the Convention was voted upon, read:  
 
                                                     
109 Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Draft Articles of the Convention 
submitted to the Plenary Conference by the First Committee, 4 April 1980, A/CONF.97/11/Add.1 and 
2 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/chronology/jdraft-04.html accessed: 25 March 2014 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Draft Articles’). 
110 While Draft Article 12 is concerned with the validity of an offer rather than of contract, most 
delegates present at the Eighth Meeting of the First Committee believed that a contract could only 
come into existence if made through an offer-acceptance formula, which required the offer to 
expressly or implicitly fix or make provisions for determining the price.  
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If a contract has been validly concluded but does not state the price or 
expressly or impliedly make provision for the determination of the price of 
the goods, the buyer must pay the price generally charged by the seller at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract. If no such price is ascertainable, the 
buyer must pay the price generally prevailing at the aforesaid time for such 
goods sold under comparable circumstances.111 
 
 
The existence of these seemingly contradictory articles can be attributed to the fault 
lines between the multitude of legal traditions present during the drafting stages of 
the Convention, on the issue of open price terms.  
 
At the turn of the century, the domestic laws of various jurisdictions, identifying the 
need to provide the business community with flexibility in the formation of their 
agreements had begun to recognize the validity of contracts of sale that provided the 
basic terms of the contract but left t he  price open for later determination.112 
Other jurisdictions however were wary of the recognition of such terms. Developing 
nations, whose imports comprised of manufactured goods while their exports were 
predominantly raw materials, were concerned that the use of open price terms would 
shift the risk of price increase between the time the contract was entered into and the 
time of delivery entirely upon them.113 As a result, the use of open price terms would 
operate to their disadvantage.114 The domestic laws of certain industrialized 
European economies similarly viewed contracts with open price terms with a 
                                                     
111 Draft Article 51of the 1978 Draft Convention. 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-51.html 
112 For instance, the UCC explicitly recognizes contracts with open price terms. See UCC, S 2-
305.
 
113 See S. K. Date-Bah, ‘Problems of the Unification of International Sales Law from the Standpoint 
of Developing Countries’ (1980) 7 Digest of Commercial Laws of the World 39, 47: “If a contract can 
be formed without an agreement on price, this would create the danger of buyers being landed, after 
vague negotiations, with sales contracts whose contract prices would be imposed by the courts: many 
such courts would be in the developed countries and could impose unreasonably high prices for 
manufactured goods. Such contract prices would tend to be the sellers’ prices and, as is well-known, 
while the prices of the raw materials exported by the developing countries are generally fixed in the 
commodity markets of the developed world, the prices of manufactured goods are usually determined 
by the manufacturers themselves;” Professor Schlechtriem similarly states, “Price transparency is a 
given at most for raw materials, i.e., for the products of the developing countries, but not for the 
industrial goods imported by these countries.” Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law: the UN-
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Manz 1986) 50. 
114 Ibid. 
170 
 
degree of hostility,115 especially in the case of exclusive dealing contracts and 
franchise contracts.116
 
 
Socialist countries were also averse to the concept of open price terms as a result of 
the fact that their contracts had to conform to the “predetermined macroeconomic 
government plan.”117 As a result, the domestic law of these states gave primacy to 
the security of the contract and foreseeability. For this reason, under the domestic 
law of socialist states at the time of drafting, open price contracts were considered 
invalid.118  
 
Deliberations on the issue of the extent to which the Convention should recognize 
open price terms were spread over four meetings of the First Committee. This part 
of the chapter shall highlight the concerns raised in each.  
 
 
4.3.1 Eighth Meeting of the First Committee 
 
At the Eighth Meeting of the First Committee, Article 12 of the Draft Convention 
came under review. The primary cause of controversy at the meeting was the 
requirement contained in the second sentence of Draft Article 12(1), which required 
that the price of the goods be fixed expressly or implicitly. The stance adopted by 
delegates on the issue can roughly be divided into three categories: a) those who 
advocated for complete flexibility and the rejection of the prescriptive formalism of 
the second sentence b) those who wished to retain the sentence for its value of listing 
examples of what constitutes a sufficiently definitive offer and c) those who argued 
for the retention of formalism as a result of aversion to flexibility on the matter. 
 
Complete flexibility: a rejection of formalism 
                                                     
115 Though for separate reasons. See, for example, the objection raised by the delegate of France 
during the Eighth Meeting of the First Committee, reproduced in Part 2 of this chapter. 
116 See for example Judgment of Dec. 13, 1982, Arrdt No. 1062, Cass. civ. Comm. 
117 See Garro (n 15).  
118 Rosett argues at 285, “The representatives of centrally planned, authoritarian economies [are not] 
likely to place great value on private autonomy, the right of parties to opt out of legal regimes by 
contract, or opportunities for informal, unwritten contracts.” Arthur Rosett, ‘Critical Reflections on 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (1984) 45 Ohio State 
Law Journal 265. 
171 
 
 
The delegates of UK, Austria, US, Norway and Finland were particularly concerned 
with the formalism contained in the article and submitted proposals for the deletion 
of its second sentence.119 
 
The delegate of the United Kingdom, Mr. Feltham, argued that if a state had ratified 
both Part II and III of the Convention, there would be a great deal of uncertainty 
regarding the fate of a contract that did not stipulate the price.120 He therefore opined 
that the apparent inconsistency between the two articles should be remedied by 
omitting the second sentence of Draft Article 12(1) from the final text of the article. 
Such omission, in his view, was necessary, since Article 51 clearly stipulated the 
methodology to be adopted in ascertaining the price where the contract did not 
expressly contain one.121 Retention of the sentence would therefore do nothing more 
than give rise to uncertainty regarding the interplay between the two articles.122   
 
The delegates of Ireland and the US similarly questioned the utility of the sentence. 
They stated that if the sentence was setting down a rule, then it was unsatisfactory, 
since it did not cater for various other factors that might be of similar importance 
such as the time of delivery, currency of payment etc.123  On the other hand, if the 
sentence was simply listing examples of factors that might give rise to a valid offer, 
then it was unnecessary for the purposes of the Convention.124 
 
                                                     
119 Both Finland and Norway were similarly concerned with the prescriptive nature of the article. 
They therefore submitted amendments whereby the second sentence would either be deleted, failing 
which the article would be redrafted in a manner that rendered the existence of a proposal completely 
dependent upon the intention of the parties. For the proposal of Norway see Para 71 and for the 
proposal of Finland see Para 78, Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 8). Proposed Amendments 
[Finland (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.29)] and [Norway (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.38)] can be found in Legislative 
History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference G. Report of the First Committee, A/CONF.97/11 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/1stcommittee/summaries29.html accessed: 25 March 2014 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Vienna Diplomatic Conference, G. Report’). 
120 Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 10) Para 68. 
121 ibid. 
122 Document A/CONF.97/C.1/L.36) in Vienna Diplomatic Conference, G. Report (n 119). The 
delegates of the Republic of Korea and Sweden supported the proposal of the delegated of the UK on 
the grounds that the realities of international trade required flexibility in terms, especially those on 
price. The delegate of Sweden stated, “Although in most cases prices were indicated, contracts were 
often concluded without any specification of prices, more attention being paid to other important 
conditions, such as, for example, speedy delivery in the case of inexpensive spare parts.” Paras 91. 
123 ibid Para 81. 
124 ibid. 
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The middle ground 
 
The delegate of Belgium was of the opinion that the existence of a contract should be 
objectively determinable, and consequently, the existence of the second sentence was 
crucial as it provided certain instances of when a proposal would amount to an 
offer.125 The delegate did not, however, view the sentence as prescribing a concrete 
methodology, derogation from which would render an offer invalid.126 Rather, 
Professor Dabin specifically stated that the utility of the second sentence lay in the 
fact that, rather than stipulating a rule, it simply listed examples of instances where 
an offer would be valid.127 Thus, in his view, the Convention did indeed allow for 
open price terms so long as the existence of the contract was “objectively 
determinable.”128 
 
Complete certainty: the need for formalism 
 
The delegates of Spain, Hungry and Greece, on the other hand, favored certainty and 
argued for the retention of the sentence.129 They argued that the existence of the 
elements listed in the sentence were necessary to determine the existence of an offer, 
without which it would be difficult or even impossible to determine whether a 
contract had indeed been concluded. They therefore argued for a formalist approach 
towards the ascertainment of whether a contract existed.130    
 
The delegate of France, however, supported the retention of the sentence on different 
grounds. Ghestin argued that rather than being a question of flexibility versus 
certainty, the article was required as a matter of procedural fairness. Giving the 
                                                     
125 See Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 10) Para. 72. 
126 The delegate of Egypt agreed with this interpretation. Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 10) Para 
70.  
127 ibid. “Finland, Norway and Sweden agreed with this interpretation and stated that the second 
sentence, as it stands, should be understood to give only an example of what is a definite offer but that 
it should not be understood to be a definition.” Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference, F. Analysis of Comments and Proposals by Governments and International Organizations 
on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, and on Draft Provisions 
Concerning Implementation, Reservations and Other Final Clauses Prepared by the Secretary-General 
Document, A/CONF.97/9, 21 February 1980 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/Fdraft.html accessed: 
25 March 2014 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Vienna Diplomatic Conference, F. Analysis’). 
128 ibid. 
129 See Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 10) Paras 74, 75, 79 and 80.  
130 ibid. 
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example of raw materials, he argued that while it was difficult to determine the price 
of such goods ex-ante, especially in the case of long-term contracts, it would be 
patently unfair on the weaker party to be subject to prices upon which it had no 
control.131 Thus the delegate of France was simply concerned that absent the 
requirement of a fixed price, one of the parties could well find itself in a position 
where it would have to agree to the price charged by the other, without having the 
opportunity to bargain.132  
 
The delegate of the USSR, as explained above, was concerned that the recognition of 
the validity of open price terms would operate to undermine the planned macro-
economic policies of his state. The delegate therefore argued for the deletion of the 
phrase “expressly or implicitly,” to rule out the possibility of an offer being 
recognized even though it did not explicitly identify the price.133  
 
The proposals to amend the article to either omit reference to the implicit fixing of 
price and those calling for a deletion of the second sentence were rejected.  
 
4.3.2 Eleventh Meeting of the First Committee 
 
At the Eleventh Meeting of the First Committee, the Working Group submitted two 
proposals whereby the dictates of the second sentence would be made more 
flexible.134 Both proposals had the same impact, which was to turn into mere 
examples the requirements listed for a proposal to be “sufficiently definite.”135 
Before the proposals were put to vote, the Chairman specifically noted the 
inconsistency between the two articles and supported the adoption of a proposal that 
                                                     
131 Interestingly, at the time of drafting French law policed open price terms with the view of 
“protecting the weaker party.” See Tomlinson (n 81).  
132 See Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 10) Para 82. 
133 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CONF.97/C.l/L.37): “In paragraph 1, delete the words ‘or 
implicitly’, or the words ‘expressly or implicitly’, in order to avoid complications that may arise in 
interpreting the idea of implicit fixing of the procedure for determining the quantity and the price, 
particularly in the light of the examples given in the Secretariat's commentary on Article 12 of the 
draft Convention [became CISG Article 14] (paragraphs 14 - 17).” 
134 Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary Records of Meetings of the 
First Committee, 11th Meeting, 18 March 1980, Para 47 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting11.html accessed: 26 March 2014 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 11th Meeting’). 
135 The two proposals did not garner the necessary support for their adoption. 
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would have the impact of remedying the apparent inconsistency between them, 
thereby allowing for the adoption of the Convention as a whole without concerns of 
inconsistency between, at least, the two articles.136       
 
The delegate of Ghana, however, did not see a contradiction between the dictates of 
the two articles. In his view, Article 12 simply stated that for a proposal to be 
considered an offer it must stipulate the price. Article 51, on the other hand, was 
concerned with the price to be implied in situations where a contract had been 
validly concluded in conformity with domestic laws that recognize contracts with 
open price terms.137 While such an interpretation would remedy the perceived 
inconsistency between the two articles, it was not discussed further, for reasons 
unknown.  
 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Twenty-fourth Meeting of the First Committee 
 
At the Twenty-fourth Meeting of the First Committee, the proposal to delete Article 
51 was brought to vote. The issue at this stage was the apparent contradiction 
between the provisions of Articles 12 and 51. The delegate of Ghana noted that the 
delegates had adopted varying and at times contradictory interpretations of the 
interplay between the two articles. Thus, while he favored the retention of the article, 
he was concerned that its current text would give rise to a great deal of confusion on 
the interplay between Articles 12 and 51, thereby placing obstacles in the adoption of 
the Convention by various states.138 
 
The delegate of Chile similarly noted that the existence of Article 12 in its current 
formulation would operate to deter various Latin American countries from ratifying 
the Convention, since their domestic laws recognized and the realities of 
                                                     
136 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 11th Meeting (n 134) Para 49. 
137 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 11th Meeting (n 134) Para 66 
138 Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary Records of Meetings of the 
First Committee, 24th Meeting, 26 March 1980, Para 27 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting24.html> accessed: 26 March 2014 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 24th Meeting’).  
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international trade required the use of open price terms. Thus, in his view, the 
existence of Article 51 in its current form would operate to motivate such countries 
to at least ratify Part III of the Convention, even though they might not ratify Part 
II.139 
 
The delegate of France submitted a proposal whereby Article 51 would be amended 
to bring it in line with the dictates of French law on the matter.140 According to this 
amendment, a contract that does not stipulate the price would be valid under the 
Convention if it provides guidelines for determining it.141 Like the stance adopted by 
French domestic law at the time, the amendment – if accepted – would outlaw 
instances of procedural unfairness while continuing to recognize certain types of 
open price terms, such as reference to an index or empowering a third party to set the 
price.142 This, in the view of the delegate, would serve the interest of those delegates 
who were concerned with the difficulty of setting a price in long-term contracts. 
Price terms empowering one party to set the price, or leaving the price to the future 
agreement between the parties, would however fail on the grounds of being 
indeterminable at the time the contract was concluded. This would resolve the 
concerns of certain delegates against the price not being determinable ex-ante.143  
 
The delegate of Australia however objected to the amendment proposed by France 
on the grounds that a search for a compromise solution should not come at the cost 
of jeopardizing the ability of the Convention to cater for the realities of trade. 
Specifically, he was concerned that the requirement of providing guidelines for 
determining the price did not conform to commercial practice. “In reality, many 
contracts contained no guidelines whatsoever for the price fixing procedure. He 
believed that Article 51 as originally drafted constituted a reasonable solution.”144 
 
Interestingly, the delegate of Ghana completely changed his view on the interplay 
between the two articles. Contrary to the interpretation adopted by him at the 
                                                     
139Ibid, Para 31. 
140  Ibid. (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.205) Para 43. 
141 Ibid. 
142 That is, the possibility of price being imposed upon one party by the other without the possibility 
of negotiations on its quantum. 
143 (n 138) Para 44. 
144 Ibid.Para 53. 
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Eleventh Meeting whereby he felt the articles could be read in a harmonious manner, 
the delegate stated that Article 51 was naturally “subordinate” to Article 12. This 
according to him was evidenced by the fact that Article 51 began with the statement, 
If a contract has been validly concluded. He was therefore of the opinion that Article 
51 would only be applicable in cases where a contracting state had not ratified or 
accepted Part II of the Convention.145  
 
4.3.4 Twenty-ninth Meeting of the First Committee 
 
At the Twenty-ninth Meeting of the First committee, an ad hoc Working Group, 
comprising the representatives of Argentina, France, Ghana, Pakistan, Sweden and 
the USSR was given the task of revising the text of Article 51 to make it more 
acceptable to the delegates. The proposal attempted to resolve the two major grounds 
for disagreement between delegates on the issue of the recognition of open price 
terms.146 The first concerned the relationship between Articles 12 and 51, which was 
resolved by retaining the opening phrase of Article 51 which states that the article is 
applicable only “where a contract has been validly concluded.”147  
 
The representative of Greece rightly pointed out that reference to a validly concluded 
contract was meant to cover validity under the national law, validity under the 
Convention and even validity under a combination of both. 
 
The second issue concerned the last sentence of the article, whereby the buyer would 
have to pay the price generally charged by the seller at the conclusion of the contract. 
Since the delegates of various jurisdictions (for example, France and the USSR) had 
raised serious concerns against providing one party a greater degree of control, 
relative to the other, in setting the price, the sentence had to be amended. This was 
achieved by replacing the sentence with one that referred to “the price generally 
charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract.”148It is unclear why the 
                                                     
145 Ibid. Para 54. 
146 Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary Records of Meetings of the 
First Committee, 29th Meeting, 31 March 1980, Para 45 (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.232) (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 29th Meeting’). 
147Ibid.  
148 Para 46. The joint proposal was adopted by 29 votes to 4. 
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Working Group chose this methodology over one referring to the price at the time of 
delivery. Certainly, if the parties wished to be bound by the price charged at the time 
the contract was concluded, they could have easily done so, as its quantum would be 
easily determinable. Moreover, such a methodology would not be efficient relative to 
one referring to the spot price at the time of delivery in the case of long-term 
contracts, which leave the price open simply because of uncertainty.    
 
The discussion above illuminates the fact that there was little, if any, clarity 
surrounding the interplay between the two articles even when they were finally 
adopted. While certain delegates believed Article 51 to be relevant when a state had 
not ratified Part II of the Convention, others did not see any apparent contradiction 
between the two since they viewed them to be concerned with completely different 
issues. Even though the proposal of the ad hoc Working Group was adopted, there is 
little evidence that all delegates agreed that the impact of the term “where a contract 
has validly been concluded” was to harmonize the dictates of the two articles.  
 
It is clear, however, that while all recognized that the realities of international trade 
had given rise to the need for flexibility in setting the price term, the question was 
simply whether the utility of such flexibility outweighed the utility of certainty. In 
other words, the issue was simply whether flexibility could be provided without 
undermining the advantages of certainty, which had historically been valued under 
the domestic laws of various jurisdictions.    
 
4.5 Open price terms under the Convention 
 
Parties to long-term contracts seldom conclude their contracts following a 
mechanical offer-acceptance formula. This gives rise to the question of whether the 
Convention, through the dictates of Part II – Article 14 in particular – only 
recognizes contracts formed through such a methodology.149 If the answer to the 
question is in the affirmative, then one may easily conclude that the dictates of the 
Convention do not represent or effectively complement commercial realities, and as 
                                                     
149 The travaux reveal that various delegates indeed wished for the Convention to limit recognition of 
contracts to those formed following the mechanical formula. See, for example, the comments made by 
the delegate of the USSR at the Eighth Meeting of the First Committee.  
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a result parties concluding contracts through a method other than the offer-
acceptance formula would be better off by expressly derogating from the application 
of the Convention.  Such an outcome would completely undermine the whole 
purpose of the unification exercise, namely to unify the law and provide a degree of 
certainty to the parties vis-à-vis their respective rights and obligations.  
 
In order to ascertain whether the Convention allows for the formation of contracts 
that do not follow the offer and acceptance mechanism it is first essential to 
understand the interplay between Article 4 and the rules on formation. The first 
sentence of Article 4 expressly notes that formation of contracts for sale fall within 
the scope of the Convention. Consequently, through the application of Article 7, the 
text of the Convention is the sole source of identifying the recognized methodologies 
of contract formation.    
 
Moreover, even though Article 4 differentiates between validity (which falls outside 
the scope of the Convention) and formation, there is one area of over-lap between the 
two i.e. a valid contract cannot be concluded unless the rules of formation as 
included in the Convention are satisfied. This overlap translates into the fact that, on 
issues of contract formation, validity is indeed part of the Convention. Validity here 
would include defenses to enforcement and the requirement of conforming to the 
mechanics of consent (as opposed to the validity of consent which is governed by the 
applicable law identified through the rules of PIL). 
 
Therefore, the question of whether contracts that do not conform to the offer and 
acceptance formula are recognized by the Convention must be answered through a 
review of the articles of the Convention itself. 
 
The Convention undeniably allows for the formation of contract through means other 
than the offer-acceptance formula; for instance, Article 18(3) provides that a contract 
may be concluded “by performing an act,” and Article 8(3) provides that statements 
(including terms of agreements) are to be construed in the light of “any 
subsequent conduct of the parties.” It therefore makes sense to state that Article 14 is 
concerned only with whether a communication should be construed as an offer and 
does not limit or have any implications on the validity of a contract of sale that does 
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not conform with the offer-acceptance mechanism. As such, parties who wish to 
enter into long-term contracts are not limited by the dictates of Article 14 on the 
methodology they may adopt; rather, Article 14 simply provides one of the methods 
of contract formation.   
 
The fact that the Convention is the sole source of rules of formation on contracts that 
are governed by it is not unanimously accepted. As shall be discussed below, certain 
commentators view the dictates of Article 14 to be a sine qua non for the formation 
of a valid contract; these commentators limit the application of Article 55 to 
instances where the member state has entered into a reservation vis-à-vis Part II of 
the Convention. Another view holds that since Article 4 expressly omits concerns of 
validity form the scope of the Convention, Article 55 is solely concerned with cases 
where the contract has been validly concluded through the application of domestic 
law identified through the rules of PIL. This chapter will now turn to analyze each of 
these views. 
 
Under the most restrictive view, Article 14 is given precedence over Article 55; 
as such, implicit or explicit stipulation of price is considered a sine qua non for 
the formation of a valid contract.150 Professor Farnsworth, for instance, contends 
that contracts with open price terms cannot be recognized under the Convention, 
since under Article 55, a price term may be implied “where a contract has been 
validly concluded” and under Article 14 a contract cannot be validly concluded 
without a sufficiently definite price term.151
  
 
Various courts have adopted this position while interpreting the interplay between 
Article 14 and 55. In one famous case, for instance, the court held that a contract 
for the sale of aircraft engines had not been validly concluded since it did not 
include the price for all the types of aircraft engines from which the buyer could 
                                                     
150 In one case concerning a contract with open price terms the court concluded: “It is 
necessary [for the application of Article 55] to assess whether a contract of sale has been 
concluded and whether it is valid.” Supreme Court, Czech Republic, 25 June 2008 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080625cz.html> accessed: 27 March 2014; see also, 
CLOUT case. No. 908 [Handelsgericht Zürich, Switzerland, 22 December 2005] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051222s1.html> accessed: 27 March 2014. 
151 E. Allan Farnsworth, ‘The Vienna Convention: History and Scope’ (1984) 18 The 
International Lawyer 17. 
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choose.152 As such, according to the court, the proposal for the sale of jet engines 
did not constitute an offer under the provisions of Article 14(1). Though the case 
was primarily decided on the basis of the provisions of Article 14,
 
the court did 
consider Article 55 in passing and stated that the price of the jet engines could not 
be determined on the basis of Article 55 since “jet engine systems have no market 
price.”153 However, it would have made no difference even if the jet engines had 
a market price. This is because the court’s reasoning, in line with the restrictive 
view, gave the provisions of Article 55 a secondary position in relation to the 
provisions of Article 14. The court resultantly decided the case on the basis of the 
requirements of a valid offer as contained in Article 14, and concluded that absent a 
sufficiently definite provision on price, no valid offer existed.154  
Professor Garro attempts to resolve this inconsistency by stating that Article 55 was 
incorporated to respond to the desire of the Scandinavian countries to accept Part III 
of the Convention without Part II, and to have a provision in Part III in case the price 
has not been determined.155 While prima facie this argument makes sense, it is 
neither in line with the interpretational methodology to be adopted under the 
Convention nor is it supported by the travaux.  
 
This is because, if Article 55 was incorporated only to apply where a member state 
has made reservations vis-à-vis Part II of the Convection, then the article would be 
rendered redundant in cases where Part II has been incorporated. Such a stance does 
not appreciate the fact that each article of the Convention has equal legitimacy and 
value. Nor does it recognize the fact that the primary proponents of the inclusion of 
Article 55 were the delegates of the United States, Belgium and Austria – none of 
whom have entered into a reservation vis-à-vis the application of Part II of the 
                                                     
152 CLOUT case No. 53 [Legfelsbb Biróság, Hungary, 25 September 1992] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920925h1.html> accessed: 27 March 2014 
153 ibid. The judgment of this case rested on the fact that the buyer had the option to choose which 
jet engines to buy even after the purported acceptance. The court was therefore of the opinion that 
this right to choose on behalf of the buyer translates into the fact that the buyer could not have 
conveyed a valid acceptance even if the term on price had been sufficiently definite. 
154 According to Flechtner (a proponent of the liberal view), the court ignored the 
autonomous character of the Convention and interpreted it through a domestic lens. He 
states, “The decision ignores the international character of the Convention by straining for 
an interpretation favorable to the party of the same nationality as the court.” Harry M. 
Flechtner, ‘The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on The 
Uniformity Principles in Art 7(1) of the UN Sales Convention,’ (1998) 17 Journal of Law 
and Commerce 187, 205. 
155 See Garro (n 15) 463. 
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Convention. Indeed, it would be quite surprising for a US-trained practitioner to 
learn that even after great efforts of the US delegate to have open price terms 
recognized under the Convention, the same is not applicable to the US itself.  
 
In any case, only certain Scandinavian states, totaling only 4 out of 83 contracting 
states, opted to enter into a reservation through the invocation of Article 92 of the 
Convention. There seems to be no evidence that this reservation was made as a result 
either of the apparent contradiction between Articles 14 and 55 or because these 
states were opposed to open price terms.156 In fact, the domestic law of these states 
expressly recognizes open price contracts. For instance the Swedish Act of 1905 on 
the Purchase of Goods states (Art. 5): “Where a contract purchase has been 
concluded without the price having been fixed, the buyer must pay what the seller 
demands unless it is deemed unreasonable.”157 
 
The limitations of the approaches that give precedence to Article 14 over 55 can be 
highlighted through the recognition of the fact that in various cases the contract is not 
concluded by a clear-cut exchange of offer and acceptance, but by a series of 
communications or by simply executing a contract of sale.158 If the rules contained in 
Article 14 are to be followed, then such contracts can never be validly concluded. 
Such a result has great implications on the world of trade; it would outlaw all forms 
of agreements unless they adhered to the mechanical rules of offer and acceptance, 
thereby creating a firm barrier in what has otherwise long been considered an 
appropriate method of contracting. The travaux in any case clearly reveal that the 
drafters were concerned with the possibility of such an interpretation and 
consequently, incorporated the term “where the contract has validly been concluded” 
at the beginning of Article 55. It is therefore asserted that the text of Article 55 is 
sufficient in itself to displace such an interpretation. 
 
                                                     
156 On the contrary, the travaux reveal that they actually supported the retention of Article 51 of the 
draft Convention and argued against the retention of the second sentence of the draft Article 12(1). 
157 John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention 
(3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 1999) 353-357.  
158 Loukas Mistelis, ‘Article 55 CISG: The Unknown Factor’ (2005) 25 Journal of Law and 
Commerce 285; See also, Gabuardi, Carlos A, ‘Open price terms in the CISG, the UCC and Mexican 
Commercial Law.’ Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) (2002). <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/gabuardi.html>. 
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According to another view, any issue hinging on the validity of a contract due to 
open price terms, must be resolved by recourse to domestic law, since Article 
4 excludes questions relating to the validity of contracts from the scope of the 
Convention. As such, proponents of this school of thought argue that before 
the provisions of Article 55 can be applied, it must be ascertained whether the 
law applicable by virtue of the choice-of-law rule recognizes contracts of sale that 
do not stipulate a fixed or determinable price.159 If the domestic law so identified 
recognizes the validity of contracts that do not contain a price term, then the court is 
to imply the price charged at the time of conclusion of the contract into the 
agreement, as required by Article 55.160 This view fails to appreciate the fact – as 
eloquently phrased by the delegate of Greece during the Twenty-ninth Meeting of the 
First Committee – that reference to a validly concluded contract in Article 55 was not 
confined to the question of validity under national law as identified through the 
application of the rules of PIL. Rather, “it was meant to cover validity under the 
national law,161 validity under the Convention,162 and even validity under a 
combination of both.”163 As such, reference to a validly concluded contract at the 
beginning of Article 55 includes contracts that have validly been concluded under the 
dictates of the Convention as well.  
 
According to the most liberal view, a contract which does not expressly or 
implicitly set price may nonetheless be valid on the basis of the subsidiary method 
of determining price set forth in Article 55. Professor Honnold adopts this position 
and argues that since the provision “impliedly [makes] reference to the price 
generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract, [a contract cannot 
be] declared void on the grounds of its failure to stipulate price.”164 Whereas Article 
                                                     
159 For instance, an arbitral tribunal stated, “Since, article 4 CISG, does not deal with the validity 
of the contract itself, its validity has to be determined according to the applicable national law.” 
International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the 
Russian Federation, Russian Federation, 30 May 2001 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010530r2.html> accessed: 27 March 2014. 
160 ibid. 
161 Which would include the concept of the validity of consent; defences to enforcement such as 
mistake and fraud; and the validity of substantive content of the agreement – for example, whether the 
subject matter of the agreement is illegal.  
162 For example, the dictates of Article 29. 
163 Vienna Diplomatic Conference (n 147) Para 57. 
164 He states: “[B]y virtue of these articles, when the parties have made no provision 
concerning the price their intent to conclude the contract must be clear, but the Convention 
does not deny effect to that intent.” See Honnold (n 157) 137. 
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14 (1) requires that the price be at least implicitly fixed, Article 55 indicates that a 
contract with open price terms is valid with an “implicit” price fixed by operation 
of law – i.e. the price “generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract.”165 In other words, once a contract is concluded, the validity of an offer 
becomes irrelevant (which constitutes the scope of Article 14(1)) irrespective of 
whether a provision was made for determining the price.166 Professor Honnold’s 
opinion seems to be the correct one, at least to the extent that it is conceivable 
and even plausible to reconcile the two provisions.167 The opinion, however, seems 
to suggest that a contract formed through the offer-acceptance formula may be valid 
even if the offer did not contain a provision on price. Such a conclusion is extremely 
surprising as it raises the following question: what is the utility of stipulating 
requirements for a proposal to amount to an offer in the chapter on formation of 
contracts, if a contract based on the offer-acceptance formula may be valid even 
though it does not fulfill the requirements contained in the article? In any case, such 
an interpretation completely undermines the hard-won compromise by states that 
advocated for formalism in the drafting of Article 14.
  
 
The following conclusions regarding the application of Articles 14 and 55 can be 
reached for the discussion above: 
 
1) Article 14 is only concerned with communications that purport to be offers 
and not with the validity of contracts formed through a methodology other 
than a mechanical offer-acceptance formula. 
2) The Convention recognizes that contracts can be made without following the 
two-step offer-acceptance formula. 
3) Article 55 operates when a contract has validly been concluded following a 
methodology other than the mechanical offer-acceptance formula. 
 
4.5.1 To what extent are open price terms recognized under the Convention? 
                                                     
165 Gyula Eörsi, ‘Comments on Article 14 CISG [Offer]’ in C. Massimo Bianca and Michael 
Joachim Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention 
(Giuffrè 1987) 139. 
166 Joseph P. Griffin and Michael R. Calabrese, ‘The New Rules for International Contracts’ 
(1988) 74 ABA Journal 62. 
167 Professor Honnold’s opinion is supported by various other scholars. See Schlechtriem (n 113). 
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4.5.2 Article 14 
 
As explained above, where a contract is formed through the offer-acceptance 
formula, the proposal – to be considered an offer – must establish the price either 
explicitly or implicitly, or make provisions for determining it. While there is no issue 
surrounding the interpretation of the term “explicitly,”168 there is disagreement on 
what implicit fixing of the price and provisions for determining it entail.  
 
4.5.3 Where the parties are silent as to price 
 
The dictates of Article 14 clearly state that a proposal for concluding a contract will 
not amount to an offer if it is completely silent as to price.169 As such, parties 
concluding a contract on the basis of the offer-acceptance formula must make some 
reference to the price to be charged. One tribunal has, however, found otherwise. In 
the Computer hardware devices case,170 a German seller brought a claim for 
payment of purchase price against a Swiss buyer. The contract between the two, the 
seller asserted, was formed following the acceptance of the offer sent by the buyer. 
The buyer argued that a contract had never come into existence since the proposal it 
sent did not contain any stipulation on price. The court rejected the buyer’s argument 
on the grounds that the circumstances clearly showed that the parties intended to be 
bound by the agreement.  
 
The reasoning of the court, though very brief, clearly shows that the court adopted an 
interpretation which was in line with the dictates of German domestic law on the 
matter.171 Unfortunately, however, the court following the concise, discussion-less 
nature of judgment drafting in civil law countries did not provide any reason for the 
adoption of such an approach.172 Interestingly, however, the court did state that any 
                                                     
168 A price is explicitly fixed when the contract stipulates a numerically concrete quantum. 
169 The only exception to this rule is where the parties have established a practise between themselves 
on the matter, or there exists a trade custom/usage on pricing. See CISG, Article 9. 
170 CLOUT case No. 330 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951205s1.html>. 
171 Handelsgericht St. Gallen, Switzerland, 5 December 1995 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951205s1.html> accessed: 28 March 2014.  
172 The only reasoning provided on the point is “Owing to the terms ‘order,’ ‘we order’ and ‘delivery 
due immediately,’ the recipient may have and must have assumed that, from the side of the orderer, an 
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seller would have interpreted the proposal in accordance with the requirements of the 
principle of good faith to constitute an offer. Such a ruling is surprising since, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Convention does not directly impose any substantive 
requirement of good faith on the parties in the interpretation of the underlying 
contract.  
 
4.5.4 One party is empowered to set the price 
 
Under the Convention, one party may not possess the power to unilaterally 
determine the price at a later stage. While there is no express provision to this effect, 
to allow this would be in complete contradiction with the general principles of the 
Convention. For instance, the underlying spirit of Articles 8, 9, 18, 19 and 29 rests 
on the principle that all terms must be agreed between the parties and no party shall 
have the power to impose any requirement on the other without the other party’s 
prior consent. 
 
However, this should not be interpreted to mean that the Convention imposes an 
absolute bar on the possibility of empowering one party to settle the price. Rather, 
the impact of the principle upon which these provisions are based, coupled with the 
dictates of Article 14, simply require that the mechanism for setting the price should 
be one that allows a neutral observer to determine the same. As such, the Convention 
would allow for a mechanism which empowers one of the parties to set the price, so 
long as the mechanism is one that requires the use of an objective standard while 
exercising the discretion. Take for instance the ruling of the Magnesium case, which 
involved a contract for the sale of magnesium on a provisional price, which was to 
be revised once the magnesium had been resold by the buyer.173 A bare reading of 
the price term, the court noted, seemed to suggest that the buyer was empowered to 
revise the price without limitation on the exercise of this discretion. Such a 
mechanism, as discussed above would operate to undermine the general principle 
                                                     
intention to be bound to the purchase of the plotters existed (cf. v. Caemmerer/Schlechtriem, para. 13 
on Art. 14 CISG); delivery took place and the invoice was sent within a few days.” 
173 ICC Court of Arbitration, Paris, 1995 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=240&step=FullText> and 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=240&step=Abstract> accessed: 28 March 
2014. 
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upon which Articles 14, 8, 9, 18, 19, 29 and 55 are based. The court however noted 
that that the circumstances surrounding the agreement revealed the fact that the 
parties had concluded the agreement on the basis of cordial relations that existed 
between them. Moreover, the provision on price simply demonstrated that the parties 
were relying on relational factors rather than legal ones in establishing the rights and 
obligations of each party. 
 
Noting the relational nature of the transaction, the court proceeded to ascertain 
whether the relationship between the parties would indicate an objective criterion to 
be followed while setting the price. In other words, the court applied the provisions 
of Articles 8 and 9 to determine whether the parties had established any practices 
between themselves or whether a custom on price existed in the trade concerned. The 
court argued that there was no ascertainable market price for magnesium and 
consequently, parties involved in the sale and purchase of the mineral would usually 
determine the price on the basis of a host of factors including “the cost of transport, 
the quality of the mineral, the quantities bought, the link between each of them 
which can result in linking clause establishing a relationship between the price of the 
finished product and the mineral.”174  The court ordered the buyer to pay a price 
which was based upon these factors.  
 
It is asserted that the court adopted the correct methodology in this case. In essence, 
it did not invalidate a contract, circumstances surrounding the formation and 
performance of which clearly reflected that the parties intended to be bound by it. 
Ratherm the court gave primacy to the intention of the parties by ascertaining 
whether an objective criterion could be identified from the circumstances which 
would operate to provide a degree of certainty as to price, as required by Article 14. 
The relational nature of the transaction then led to questions about whether the 
parties had established a practice between themselves or whether a custom existed 
which satisfied the dictates of the Convention. Since the existence of a practice or 
custom automatically raises the presumption that the parties have impliedly made 
reference to it, the court was able to identify the objective criteria to be used in 
setting the price from the intention of the parties, rather than making the contract for 
                                                     
174 ibid. 
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the parties – i.e. substituting a mechanism of its own choice in favor of the one 
adopted by the parties.    
 
This leads to the conclusion that Article 14 requires, at minimum, that the 
methodology for setting of price, in cases where a contract has been formed 
following the offer-acceptance formula, should be an objective one – i.e. based upon 
objectively identifiable standards. As such, empowering one party to determine the 
price is recognized under Article 14 as long as the exercise of such discretion is 
limited by factors outside the control of the parties. Thus, a clause that reads “the 
buyer will determine the price” will not be considered sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 14,175 whereas one that reads “the seller will determine the 
price on the basis of production costs, transportation costs and profit margins 
prevailing in the trade” will satisfy the requirements.   
 
 
     
4.5.5 When parties are silent upon price but there is either a trade practice or 
prior dealing between the parties with respect to price  
 
The discussion above clearly reveals that a price term that is based on an objectively 
ascertainable standard is considered valid under the dictates of Article 14. Since only 
those practices and usages are recognized that the parties have established between 
themselves and have agreed to respectively, there is no possibility of the imposition 
of a term that the parties have not agreed to.176 In other words, since such practices 
and usages provide objective guidelines, reference to them does make the price term 
determinable. As such, a price term referring to custom or practice is considered 
valid for the purposes of Article 14. In one case, it was held that the requirements of 
the article are met even if the proposal is silent as to price, so long as a custom or 
practice as to price exists.177 In Geneva Pharmaceuticals Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. 
Inc. the Federal District Court of New York determined that a custom of pricing 
                                                     
175 Provided that no usage or practise as defined in Article 9 can be identified. 
176 Article 9(2) further reads that parties are considered to have impliedly made reference to a usage 
which they knew of or should have known of and is widely recognized in the particular trade.  
177 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, United States, 21 August 2002 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020821u1.html> accessed: 28 March 2014. 
188 
 
existed within the pharmaceutical industry.178 This custom “implied, unwritten 
supply commitments … that were not embodied in legal documents.”179 Thus, within 
the pharmaceutical industry, there existed a custom that provided a pricing policy 
which was used by the court to provide a mechanism for price fixation. This case 
leads to the conclusion that where a custom of pricing exists, the same is 
automatically incorporated into the proposal if it is silent as to price. Such a 
conclusion seems to be correct in that it is in conformity with the dictates of Article 9 
which basically state that the parties are bound by known and observed customs and 
established practices. 
 
4.5.6 An agreement to agree on price 
 
Since Article 14 states that a proposal is sufficiently definite as to price if it makes 
provision for determining it, the question raised is what constitutes a valid provision. 
In other words, what extent of clarity should a provision for determining the price 
have in the identification of its quantum? For instance, must the provision be so clear 
that the parties at any time during performance may be able to concretely determine 
the price of the goods, or is it sufficient that the parties can concretely identify the 
price at the time of payment? 
 
With regards to the first scenario – i.e. where the parties are able to identify the price 
during performance – courts and academics agree that the dictates of Article 14 are 
satisfied. The second scenario, however, raises certain difficulties with regards to the 
parameters of such implicit fixing of the price. Certain courts have held that setting a 
minimum and maximum price range would satisfy the dictates of Article 14, even 
though the actual price would have to be agreed at a later date.180 Such a stance is 
surprising since parties can only concretely determine the price of the goods until it 
is fixed at a later date. Take for instance the case of Chinchilla pelts.181 In this case, 
the parties agreed to the shipment of chinchilla pelts without expressly agreeing on 
a specific price per pelt. Instead, the parties established a price range (between 35 to 
                                                     
178 ibid. 
179 ibid. 
180 CLOUT Case No. 106 [Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, 10 November 1994] 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/941110a3.html accessed: 28 March 2014. 
181  ibid. 
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65 German marks) for the pelts. The parties, however, made no provision for the 
method of agreeing on the price within the range. After shipment, the seller claimed 
50 German marks per pelt from the buyer and the buyer refused to pay the same on 
the grounds of the price being unreasonable for the quality of pelts delivered. Having 
found that pelts of middle quality were sold in the market at a price up to 60 German 
Marks, the court considered that a price of 50 German Marks per pelt was a 
reasonable one. On appeal, the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court of Austria) 
determined this range constituted a valid price.  
    
Other decisions go a step further than the Chinchilla pelts case by finding terms that 
subject the price to future agreement between the parties. In Société Fauba v. Société 
Fujitsu, for instance, the court found a validly concluded agreement even though the 
offer did not specify the price, on the grounds that the intention of the parties clearly 
demonstrated their intention to be bound by the agreement.182 The case concerned 
the sale of electronic components at a fixed price. The buyer subsequently requested 
reduction in the agreed price to reflect fluctuations in the market price of the goods, 
and the seller agreed. Though the contract referred to an objectively identifiable 
mechanism for the determination of the price, it was still subject to agreement 
between the parties. In other words, while the price was to be amended in light of the 
fluctuations in the market price of the goods, the price did not have to correspond to 
the market price of the goods. The court when called upon to determine whether a 
contract had been concluded, ruled that the agreement between the parties to 
renegotiate the price term did not invalidate the contract. The court however did not 
comment upon whether an offer which leaves the price term to be agreed between 
the parties at a later date would be sufficiently definite. Rather, the court simply 
stated that the mechanism whereby price was to be adjusted rendered the same 
determinable in the given circumstances without expressly stating which legal 
principle the court had relied upon in reaching this conclusion. 
 
                                                     
182 Published in French: [1996] UNILEX; Witz, Claude, Les premières applications jurisprudentielles 
du droit uniforme de la vente internationale - Convention des Nations Unies du 11 avril 1980, 
Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (L.G.D.J.), Collection Droit des Affaires, Paris 
(1995), 135. Reported on in English: [1996] UNILEX. 
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A completely different conclusion was however reached in the Telex case.183 This 
case concerned a telex communication sent by the seller indicating the nature of the 
goods and their quantity while being silent as to the exact price of the goods. It 
however did state that the price would be agreed ten days prior to the beginning of 
the New Year. The court concluded that this simply constituted an agreement to 
agree on the price on a later date but did not constitute a method for determining 
price. The tribunal noted that in this particular instance, Article 55 was not 
applicable since the parties had implicitly indicated the need to reach agreement on 
the price in future. 
 
A comparison of these cases reveals that courts will not validate contracts formed 
following the offer-acceptance methodology, the price term of which simply states 
that it is subject to future agreement between the parties. Instead, courts will attempt 
to ascertain whether such agreement has to be made on the basis of objectively 
identifiable factors that are outside the influence of the parties. If the answer is in the 
affirmative, then courts will validate the agreement. If, however, no such objective 
factors are identifiable, the dictates of Article 14 will not be satisfied; as a result, the 
contract would be invalidated. 
 
4.5.7 Article 55 
 
Article 55 applies when a contract is concluded using a mechanism other than an 
offer-acceptance formula. As such, in cases where a contract has been concluded 
following any other methodology of contract formation, but does not contain a price 
term, Article 55 operates to imply the price charged at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract. This raises the question of the utility of such a term. In other words, 
since the price prevailing at the time of the conclusion of the contract is usually 
easily determinable, why would the parties not include the same in their contract if 
they wished to be bound on those terms? Indeed the fact that the parties chose not to 
incorporate the same does lead to the inference that the parties did not wish to 
                                                     
183 CLOUT Case No. 139 [Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Russia, 3 March 1995] 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950303r1.html accessed: 28 March 2014. 
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contract on it, and the incomplete nature of the agreement gives rise to the inference 
that the parties were uncertain with regards to the future price of the goods.  
 
As discussed above, various domestic laws in such circumstances usually make 
reference to the price charged at the time of delivery. In the realm of the Convention, 
however, such an implication may translate into the imposition of a price on the 
parties that they never intended to be governed by.  
 
It is argued that referring to the price at the time of conclusion of contract provides 
greater advantages to the parties. Since parties can easily ascertain the price 
prevailing at the time of conclusion, they can easily ascertain whether they wish to 
contract on it or otherwise. If the answer is in the affirmative then they may save on 
the transaction cost of adding the price term into the contract as Article 55 would 
operate to imply the same.184 If, on the other hand, the article referred to the price 
prevailing at the time of delivery, parties would be motivated to expend resources to 
agree upon a mechanism that does not leave them at the mercy of potential price 
fluctuations. In other words, uncertainty and the higher costs associated with 
ascertaining the price prevailing at the time of delivery would increase transaction 
costs as a whole. In any case parties that do not draft lengthy contracts, relying 
instead on the relational nature of their transaction, may well be surprised to find that 
they are bound to pay a price the quantum of which they neither knew nor 
contemplated at the time of conclusion.  
 
In any case, it must be noted that Article 55 implies a term only when the contract, 
formed through a methodology other than the offer-acceptance formula, is 
completely silent as to price. Moreover there are no limitations other than the fact 
that no one party may be given unfettered discretion in setting the price,185 on the 
types of open price terms that can be incorporated into a contract formed in such a 
manner.  
 
                                                     
184 Such transaction costs will usually be negligible: given that the parties would have expended 
resources associated with ascertaining the price prevailing at conclusion of their contract, the only 
cost to be saved is the cost associated with drafting of the price term.  
185 This, as discussed above, implies the requirement that the price term be tied to objectively 
identifiable standards.  
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The discussion above should not be taken to mean that parties are bound by the 
dictates of Articles 14 and 55 whenever their sale is governed by the Convention as a 
result of the application of Article 1. Rather, the Convention simply provides a set of 
default rules which can be derogated from through express agreement. Consequently, 
parties may enter into a contract following an offer-acceptance methodology without 
making any reference to the price. Such an approach is possible through the principle 
of party autonomy contained in Article 6 of the Convention. In other words, parties 
may simply derogate from the application of the provisions of the Convention 
relating to price.186 
 
4.6 Conclusions: 
 
This chapter argues that the use of open price terms in various instances such as 
long-term contracts would increase the overall efficiency of the transaction. Indeed 
the use of open price terms is prevalent in the current commercial context. As such, 
if the Convention does not recognize the validity of contracts concluded on such 
terms, parties to contracts of international sales of goods would contract around its 
application. Such an outcome would undermine the objectives of the Convention 
since unification would merely become a theoretical achievement if parties 
consistently contract around the instrument.  
 
The discussion above, however, reveals that the two seemingly contradictory articles 
(Articles 14 and 55) can be read in a harmonious manner that allows for a 
contextualist interpretation of the Convention on the issue of the use of open price 
terms. As such, the Convention allows parties to make use of open price terms, and 
thereby takes commercial realities into account. There are however certain 
limitations to the use of such terms. For instance, in cases where the contract has 
been concluded following a mechanical offer-acceptance formula, the contract will 
fail due to uncertainty if the offer is completely silent as to price.187 Moreover, in 
such instances one party cannot be afforded unfettered discretion in setting the price; 
                                                     
186 CISG-AC Opinion No. 16, Exclusion of the CISG under Article 6, Rapporteur: Doctor Lisa 
Spagnolo, Monash University, Australia. Adopted by the CISG Advisory Council following its 19th 
meeting, in Pretoria, South Africa on 30 May 2014 
 
187 Provided that the dictates of Article 9 in such an instance do not imply a price into the contract. 
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rather, it is necessary that the mechanism for the setting of the price renders the same 
objectively determinable. In instances where the contract is concluded using a 
mechanism other than the offer-acceptance formula, and the contract is silent as to 
the price, Article 55 would imply the price charged at the time of conclusion of the 
contract.  
 
The methodologies contained in Article 14 and 55 represent a balance between 
flexibility and certainty. Commercial reality requires flexibility in the setting of 
price, at least in the context of long term contracts; at the same time, efficiency 
concerns – such as limiting the potential of opportunistic behavior – require that the 
parties are not allowed to strategically impose a price to their advantage on the other 
party, after the conclusion of the contract. As such, this chapter concludes that the 
methodology contained in the Convention on the issue of open price terms is indeed 
one that would further the ends of efficiency while allowing parties sufficient 
flexibility – as is required by the realities of international trade.  
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Chapter 5 The Notice Requirement 
 
“For the seller, failure of the buyer to give notice is perhaps the first line of defence; 
for the buyer, it can be a thunderbolt out of the sky.”1 
 
Introduction 
 
Article 35 of the Convention imposes on the seller the duty to “deliver goods which 
are of the quantity, quality and description required by the contract and which are 
contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract.”2 If the seller breaches 
this duty, the buyer is allowed to invoke the remedies provided under the 
Convention.  
 
By virtue of the strict approach to liability contained in Article 45 of the Convention, 
non-performance by the seller of any of his contractual obligations entitles the buyer 
to demand damages.3  For the invocation of other remedies, however, factors such as 
the severity of breach must be taken into account. For instance, the remedies of 
avoidance of contract under Article 49 require a “fundamental breach of contract.”4 
Other remedies available to the buyer include reduction of price5 and the provision to 
the seller of extra time to cure defects.6 
 
                                                     
1 Barkley Clark, ‘The First Line of Defence in Warranty Suits: Failure to Give Notice of Breach’, 
(1982) 15 Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal 105, 106. 
2 Convention, Article 35. For an analysis of what constitutes ‘lack of conformity’, see Franco Ferrari, 
‘Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial Application and Scholarly Writing’ (1995) 15 
Journal of Law and Commerce 101; Bianca in C. Massimo Bianca and Michael Joachim Bonell, 
Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (Giuffrè, 1987) 273.  
3 Convention, Article 45 states “(1) If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the 
contract or this Convention, the buyer may: (a) exercise the rights provided in Articles 46 to 52, (b) 
claim damages as provided in Articles 74 to 77; (2) The buyer is not deprived of any right he may 
have to claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies; (3) No period of grace may be 
granted to the seller by a court or arbitral tribunal when the buyer resorts to a remedy for breach of 
contract.” 
4 Convention, Article 49. 
5 Convention, Article 50.  
6 Convention, Article 48. 
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In this framework of remedies provided by the Convention, Article 39 operates to 
impose upon the buyer the requirement to provide a notice specifying the alleged 
non-conformity as a pre-requisite for the invocation of any remedy.7 
 
Unfortunately, there existed a wide array of views amongst the drafters of the 
Convention vis-à-vis the importance and preferred impact of the non-provision of a 
notice of non-conformity.8 Consequently, the text of the article was a result of a 
uneasy compromise.9 It is therefore hardly surprising that questions concerning the 
timeframe within which the notice is to be provided have constituted one of the most 
recurring issues that have been brought before courts for adjudication.10 
 
In order to properly appreciate the tensions prevalent during the drafting stages of 
Article 39, it is essential to understand the different approaches adopted by various 
legal regimes on the requirement, or lack thereof, of the notice specifying lack of 
conformity. The next section shall therefore provide a brief analysis of the 
requirement as it is contained in US, English, French and German Law. The reason 
for choosing these specific jurisdictions for analysis is twofold: 
1) Each of these jurisdictions adopts a different approach. These include the no 
notice requirement as contained in French law, while UK law holds an 
                                                     
7 The article reads: “(1) The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he 
does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable 
time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it. (2) In any event, the buyer loses the 
right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give the seller notice thereof at the 
latest within a period of two years from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to the 
buyer, unless this time-limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee.” 
8According to Professor Schlechtriem the article was “one of the Conference's most difficult 
problems”. See Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law: The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (Manz 1986) 70.  
9 Anselmo Martinez Canellas, ‘The Scope of Article 44 CISG’ (2005) 25 Journal of Law and 
Commerce 261, 263. 
10 See Ferrari (n 2) 99: “One of the most important issues of the CISG . . . appears to be . . . the notice 
to be given to the seller in case of non-conformity of the goods”; “This is hardly surprising since the 
around one-fifth of the cases arising from the predecessors of the Convention, namely ULIS, centered 
on this issue”. See Peter Birks (ed), The Frontiers of Liability (Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, 1994) 
43. The AC in opinion number 2 notes: “The provisions regarding the notice that should be given by 
the buyer to the seller of goods in case of their alleged lack of conformity to the contract were 
among the most disputed matters in the preparation of the CISG. The proper interpretation of those 
provisions is in turn one of the most controversial matters in its implementation since it involves both 
fact and law.” See CISG-AC Opinion no 2, Examination of the Goods and Notice of Non-
Conformity: Articles 38 and 39, 7 June 2004. Rapporteur: Professor Emeritus, Eric Bergsten, Pace 
University School of Law, New York (hereinafter referred to as ‘AC Opinion No. 2’). 
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intermediate position and  provides a right of inspection.11 In this case, 
failure to provide a notice specifying the non-conformity of the goods 
operates to bar only the right to reject the goods and avoid the contract. The 
right to claim damages, however, is retained. Article 2-607 of the UCC  
seems to be a mirror image of the rule contained in Article 39 of the 
Convention. German law on the other hand, imposes a requirement to 
provide a notice without hesitation, nonconformity with which operates to 
bar the invocation of any remedy by the buyer. 
2) Even though the compromise solution was partially attributed to concerns of 
developing countries vis-à-vis the impact of the notice requirement, it was 
not a product of the position adopted under their domestic law. These 
concerns will be highlighted in the section on the analysis of the travaux. 
5.1 Comparative Analysis of National Laws on the Notice Requirement 
  
5.1.1 English Law 
 
Section 34 of SGA 1893 provided that the buyer is not deemed to have accepted the 
goods, unless he or she has had a reasonable opportunity to examine them. Section 
35 however provided an exception to this rule. By virtue of this section, a buyer who 
did any act which gave the impression that the buyer had accepted the goods could 
not subsequently reject them even though the buyer had no reasonable opportunity of 
examining them.12Therefore, a buyer who resold the goods while they were in transit 
could potentially lose the right to examine them on delivery.13 The section was 
however amended by Section 4(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 which inserted 
the phrase “except where Section 34 of this act provides otherwise” in Sub-section 1 
of Article 35.14 The impact of this amendment was to solidify the right of the buyer 
to examine the goods by removing the presumption of acceptance in cases where he 
                                                     
11 It should be noted that while the buyer is provided the right to inspect the goods under English law, 
the same does not amount to an obligation to inspect as contained in Article 38 of the Convention. 
12 The section lays down three instances where the buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods: (a) 
when he informs the seller of acceptance (b) he does any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership 
of the goods or (c) after the lapse of a reasonable time he retains the goods without informing the 
seller of their rejection. Of these three instances, the second causes difficulty in the interplay between 
Section 34 and 35. See for example Hardy & Co v Hillerns & Fowler [1923] 2 K.B. 490; E.& S. 
Ruben v Faire Bros and Co. Ltd [1949] 1 All ER 215. 
13 See for example Hammer and Barrow v Coca-Cola and Others [1962] NZLR 723. 
14 Misrepresentation Act 1967, Section 4(2).  
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or she does any act in relation to the goods which is inconsistent with the ownership 
of the seller, without having a reasonable opportunity to examine them. 
 
Section 35 of the SGA 1979, adopts the same approach as its amended predecessor. 
Sub-section 2 of this section states, “Where goods are delivered to the buyer, and he 
has not previously examined them, he is not deemed to have accepted them… until 
he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them.”  
 
In cases where the examination reveals a defect in the goods the buyer should, by 
virtue of Sub-section 4 of Section 35, inform the seller of the non-conformity within 
a reasonable time. If the buyer does not provide a notice, he or she is deemed to have 
accepted the goods.  
 
It is interesting to note that Article 34 of the SGA 1979 states that the seller is bound 
to provide a reasonable opportunity to the buyer to examine the goods on request. As 
a result, English law does not place an obligation on the buyer to inspect the goods 
and provide a notice of non-conformity, but simply gives a right to the buyer to 
inspect them.15  The section however does not list any sanctions for non-compliance 
by the seller – that is,as a result of refusal to allow inspection on request. Case law 
however reveals that such non-compliance would be tantamount to destroying the 
lawfulness of the tender, so as to preclude the seller from arguing that the buyer had 
indeed accepted the same where the latter rejects them.16 
 
Sub-section 4 of Section 35 states, “The buyer is also deemed to have accepted the 
goods when after the lapse of a reasonable time he retains the goods without 
intimating to the seller that he has rejected them.”17 As such, if after the passing of a 
reasonable time after delivery, the buyer does not inform the seller of the non-
conformity, he or she is deemed to have accepted them in their current state.18 The 
                                                     
15 The subsection reads, “The buyer is also deemed to have accepted the goods when after the lapse of 
a reasonable time he retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he has rejected them.” 
16 Isherwood v Whitmore (1843) 11 M. W. 347 in Lorymer v. Smith (1822) 1 B&C1 wherein it was 
held that noncompliance with the dictates of Article 34 constitute a discharging breach.  
17 Section 35, Sale of Goods Act 1979 (hereinafter referred to as ‘SGA’). 
18 SGA, Section 59 states that the “question what is a reasonable time is a question of fact.” Professor 
Bridge notes, “The fact-based character of this head of acceptance has rendered it the most difficult of 
heads to apply in practice, through the paucity of reported disputes helped to persuade the law 
commissioner not to recommend statutory change, and in particular not to introduce fixed periods for 
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impact of acceptance is simply to bar the rights of the buyer to reject the goods and 
avoid the contract.19 The right to claim damages however is retained.20 The question 
of what constitutes reasonable time is a question of fact, to be decided on the basis of 
the circumstances of each case. 21  
 
5.1.2 German Law 
 
The requirement of the provision of a notice specifying the non-conformity of the 
goods has long been established in German law. Article 377 of the German 
Commercial Code (HGB), which applies where both parties to a sales contracts are 
merchants, states, “The purchaser…upon discovery of any defect must immediately 
(un-hesitantly) give notice thereof to the vendor.”22 If the non-conformity is obvious 
the time limit begins to run from the date of delivery, whereas if the nonconformity 
is hidden, the time limit commences from the date of its discovery.  In this context 
the term without hesitation – or “un-hesitantly” – is defined as “with no 
blameworthy hesitation.”23 If the notice is not soprovided, a presumption of 
acceptance of the goods is raised and, as a result, under the framework of German 
law the buyer loses the right to invoke any remedy otherwise available to him or her.  
 
The greatest difference in the approach adopted under German law, relative to those 
discussed in this section, lies in the interpretation of “reasonable time.”24  A review 
of case law reveals that German courts, more often than not, interpret the term “un-
                                                     
different classes of goods.” Michael Bridge, The Sale of Goods (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2009) 637. 
19 English law allows for the termination of a contract in two situations: 1) where the breach goes to 
the root of the contract and 2) a condition of their contract has been breached. See Bridge (n 18) 595-
596. It is essential to note that Section 11(4) of the SGA “points to an implied or express term 
permitting rejection of the goods after acceptance.” Bridge (n 18) 631. 
20 Ingeborg Schwenzer, Pascal Hachem, and Christopher Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law 
(Oxford University Press 2012) 423. 
21 SGA 1979, Section 59. Section 35 (6)(a) shows that time taken merely in requesting or agreeing to 
repairs and for carrying them out, is not to be counted. 
22 German Commercial Code, Article 377 
<http://www.archive.org/stream/germancommercial00germuoft/germancommercial00germuoft_djvu.t
xt>  
23 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB - Civil Code), Article § 121. Translation taken from  Camilla B. 
Andersen, ‘Reasonable Time in Article 39 (1) of the CISG-Is Article 39 (1) Truly a Uniform 
Provision?’ (1998) 10 Pace International Law Review 403. 
24 Andersen (n 23). 
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hesitantly” to require notice within three to five working days.25 Thus German law 
imposes a very strict requirement on buyers, i.e. they must inspect the goods and 
provide notice in a very short period of time or risk losing the right to rely on 
remedies provided under the HGB. 
 
5.1.3 US Law  
 
Under § 2-606 of the UCC, a buyer is not deemed to have accepted the goods unless 
he or she has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them.26 As such, American law, 
like English law, speaks in terms of right rather than obligation vis-à-vis inspection 
of the goods. Section 2-602 states that if the buyer wishes to reject the goods, he or 
she must do so within a reasonable time of the delivery of the tender. Read together 
these articles operate to bar the exercise of the buyer’s right of rejection in instances 
where the buyer does not provide a timely notice to the seller after inspection.  In 
other words, like the position adopted under English law, unless the buyer provides 
the seller a notice of non-conformity within a reasonable time, he or she is deemed to 
have accepted the goods and resultantly loses the right to avoid the contract.  
Once the goods have been accepted Section 2-607(3) (a) comes into play. The 
origins of this requirement in codified American law can be traced back to Section 
49 of the Uniform Sales Act 1906. 27 This section imposes upon the buyer the duty to 
notify the seller of any defects in the goods delivered within a reasonable time of 
their discovery.28 American courts, after taking the facts of each case into account, 
usually hold that a period of little over a month is reasonable.29 Failure to provide a 
notice of non-conformity within the reasonable period results in the loss of all 
                                                     
25 Ingeborg Schwenzer, ‘National Preconceptions that Endanger Uniformity’, (2007) 19 Pace 
International Law Review 103, 105. Camilla Baasch Andersen, after a review of German case law on 
the subject concludes, “In practice, this domestic time-frame is a flexible one which must be 
reasonable; however, this is usually stressed as reasonably brief, and notice periods of over two weeks 
will rarely be tolerated.” Andersen (n 23). 
26 The exception to this rule, like the stance adopted under the unamended version of SGA 1893, is 
when the buyer does anything that is inconsistent with the seller’s ownership of the goods.  
27 Samuel Williston was clearly inspired by section 377 of the German Commercial Code while 
drafting Section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act. It is interesting to note that while First Restatement of 
Contracts (of which Williston was a reporter) incorporated the notice requirement, the same was 
omitted from the Second Restatement of Contracts.  
28 The reasonable time period commences after the defects have been discovered or should have been 
discovered. 
29 James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (West Pub. Co. 1995) §§ 11-12 
at 419. This however is not the case for perishable goods where the reasonable time period is usually 
confined to a few days. Schwenzer (n 25).  
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remedies otherwise available under the UCC.30 In this regard the text of the UCC 
seems to be a mirror image of Article 39(1).  
 
5.1.4 French Law 
 
French law differs from the stance adopted by the legal regimes discussed above in 
that it does not impose an obligation, nor provides a right to inspect the goods and 
provide a notice of non-conformity.  
In 1978, the Court of Cassation held that the seller “has the duty to deliver an 
effective product appropriate for the users need.”31 Moreover Article 1184 of the 
French Civil Code (CC) specifically obliges the seller to deliver goods free from 
defects. This means that where the goods do not conform, the buyer may require 
specific performance, demand rescission and/or claim damages32 without having to 
provide a notice detailing the non-conformity complained of.33 The only limitation to 
the filing of such a claim is that the suit must be instituted within a year of 
delivery.34 
 
5.1.5 Conclusions  
 
While most legal systems require the provision of a notice, it would be incorrect to 
assert that legal systems are converging on the recognition of such a requirement. 
Moreover, legal systems that do require a notice, differ on the requirements of such 
notice. For instance, German law requires notice to be provided immediately or “un-
                                                     
30 In the cases of Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co. 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978) and 
Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976) for example, the court 
overturned verdicts in favor of the buyer on the basis of non-conformity with the notice requirement. 
It is important to note that while the section states that the buyer loses the right to rely on any remedy, 
remedies of rejection and revocation are governed by special notice rules. In any case, non-
compliance with these notice rules does operate to bar exercise of these remedies. 
31 Cass f 22 November 1978, JCP 1979 II. 19139. 
32 If the defect is one that renders the goods incapable of being used for their intended purpose, the 
buyer may claim a reduction of price or resolution of the contract. See Christian Campbell 
(ed), International Product Liability [2007] (Lulu. com 2007) 355. 
33 In cases of latent defects however French law imposes an obligation on the buyer to provide the 
seller with a notice of such defects within a short period from the moment he has discovered them or 
should have discovered them. See Article 1648 of the Code Civil (hereinafter referred to as ‘CC). 
Once the notice is provided the buyer may choose between entering into negotiations with the seller 
or may file a suit against him. The suit however must be filed within one year from the time the notice 
was sent. See CC, Article 1648 (2). 
34 CC, Article 1648 (2). 
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hesitantly” whereas American law requires the notice to be provided within a 
reasonable timeframe. In practice, these terms have been interpreted to imply very 
different timeframes. For example, German courts rarely hold a notice sent after the 
passing of two weeks to conform to the requirements of German law on the issue.35 
American courts on the other hand usually condone notice periods of little over a 
month.36    
 
There are further differences in the impact of such notices under domestic legal 
systems. For instance, while German and US law operate to bar the invocation of any 
remedy where the notice requirement is not fulfilled, English law only requires such 
a notice where the buyer wishes to avoid the contract.  
 
Given these differences in national approaches to the issue of notice of non-
conformity, the issue turned out to be “one of the Conference’s most difficult 
problems.”37 In order to properly appreciate the rule contained in Article 39, it is 
essential to analyze the relevant portion of travaux préparatoires. As has been 
asserted throughout this thesis, such an analysis is essential since it provides valuable 
insight into the intent of the drafters, and the general objectives the article intended 
to achieve. 
 
5.2 Analysis of the Travaux Préparatoires 
 
During the drafting stages of the Convention, a policy split vis-à-vis the impact of 
the requirement of a notice of non-conformity of goods surfaced between developed, 
Western states on the one hand and developing states on the other. As early as the 
Sixteenth Meeting of the First Committee, delegates belonging to developing states 
began to urge the exclusion of the requirement of provision of notice specifying non-
conformity, on the grounds that the impact of late or non-provision of such notice 
                                                     
35 Andersen (n 23). 
36 Schwenzer (n 25) 105. 
37 Schlechtriem (n 8).  
202 
 
would have a draconian effect38 – i.e. the buyer would lose the right to invoke any 
remedy under the Convention.39 
The predecessor of Article 39 of the Convention, that is Article 39 of ULIS, required 
buyers to provide a notice of non-conformity promptly upon the discovery of the 
defect or after it ought to have been discovered.40 This proved to be a very exacting 
standard in practice. This was particularly true for unsophisticated buyers of 
complicated goods, as is often the case in sale of goods contracts involving parties 
belonging to developing nations. Professor Date-Bah for instances stated,  
 
Apart from the slower pace of life [in developing countries], there is the 
problem that the examination of technologically sophisticated goods may not 
be capable of being done promptly at particular destinations because of the 
absence locally of people with the requisite skills to carry out such 
examination.41 
 
 Similarly, there were concerns that developing nations did not have the requisite 
infrastructure such as communication links which were essential for compliance with 
the dictates of the Draft Article.42 
 
                                                     
38 Mr. Date-Bah, the delegate of Ghana for instance stated, “His delegation wished to see Article 
37(1) [became CISG article 39(1)] deleted and the matter regulated by paragraph 2. The sanction 
contained in paragraph 1 was too draconian.” Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference, Summary Records of Meetings of the First Committee, 16th Meeting, Article 37 [became 
CISG Article 39] (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.111, L.125, L.124, L.137, L.131, L.75) (hereinafter referred to 
as ‘Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 16th Meeting’) 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting16.html> accessed: 23 March 2013.  
39 The article reads, “The buyer shall lose the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he 
has not given the seller notice thereof promptly after he has discovered the lack of conformity or 
ought to have discovered it. If a defect which could not have been revealed by the examination of the 
goods provided for in Article 38 is found later, the buyer may nonetheless rely on that defect, 
provided that he gives the seller notice thereof promptly after its discovery. In any event, the buyer 
shall lose the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he has not given notice thereof to the 
seller within a period of two years from the date on which the goods were handed over, unless the 
lack of conformity constituted a breach of a guarantee covering a longer period.” 
40 Article 39 of the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (1964) 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘ULIS’.  
41 Samuel Kofi Date-Bah, ‘The Convention on the International Sale of Goods from the Perspective of 
the Socialist Countries’ in La Vendita Internationale, La Convenzione Di Vienna Dell'11 Aprile 1980 
(A Giuffrè 1981) 29. 
42 Richard M. Birch III, ‘Article 44 of the UN Sales Convention (CISG): A Possible Divergence in 
Interpretation by Courts from the Original Intent of the Framers of the Compromise’ (2006) 4 Regent 
Journal of International Law 1, 3. 
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The circumstances prevailing in developing nations, therefore, were not conducive to 
such a rule. This however does not mean that delegates of developing countries were 
opposed to the requirement for the provision of a notice specifying lack of 
conformity but rather, they were concerned with the outcome if the notice was not 
provided promptly.43 Indeed, denial of all remedies where notice was not provided in 
a timely fashion was opposed so strongly that certain delegates were concerned that 
the provision would discourage developing countries from ratifying the Convention 
altogether.44 
 
It is therefore unsurprising that delegates belonging to developing states proposed a 
solution whereby the requirement of provision of notice is maintained but the impact 
of failure to furnish such a notice in a timely fashion be likened to cases of failure to 
mitigate loss.45 If accepted this proposal would operate to reduce the amount of 
damages recoverable without barring recovery altogether.46  
 
                                                     
43 For instance at the 16th  Session of the First Committee, Mr. Khoo the delegate of Singapore said, 
“Article 37 [became CISG Article 39] was one of the most controversial in the entire Convention. All 
would agree that the buyer should give notice of non-conformity, within a reasonable time, since 
otherwise the credibility of his claim might be questioned. The point on which the Committee was 
divided was what sanctions should be attached to failure to give notice in time. There was much to be 
said for the view that the sanction provided in the present text of the Convention was draconian.” See 
Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 16th Meeting (n 38).  
44 Mr. Waititu, the delegate of Kenya stated, for instance: “The very rigorous sanction to which a 
buyer might be subjected under the existing text might discourage many countries from accepting the 
Convention. The sanction in question was not commonly known, and he urged the Committee to 
consider carefully whether it should rightly be the intention of the Conference to impose it.” See 
Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 16th Meeting (n 38). 
45 The amendment proposed by Ghana read: “1. Delete Article 37 [became CISG Article 39], 
paragraph (1), and the words ‘In any event’ at the beginning of Article 37 [became CISG Article 39], 
paragraph (2) 2. Alternatively, Article 37 [became CISG Article 39] should be revised to read as 
follows: 
(1) The buyer must give notice to the seller specifying the nature of a lack of conformity within a 
reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it. 
(2) If the buyer fails to give the notice referred to in paragraph (1) above, such failure shall be 
regarded as a failure to mitigate loss and the party in breach may rely on Article 73 [became CISG 
Article 77] to reduce the damages payable by him. 
(3) [Same text as the present Article 37 [became CISG Article 39], paragraph 2.]” See Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference, 16th Meeting (n 38). 
46 Interestingly, quarters from which support and opposition of the proposal emanated shows the 
industrialized v. developing states divide on the matter. The representatives of Kenya, Pakistan, 
China, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, Mexico, Singapore, and Libya argued in support of the 
proposal. The representatives of the Netherlands, Korea, Switzerland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Austria, Australia, Japan, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain opposed it. For a 
well-documented account of the debates see Elizabeth Hayes Patterson, ‘United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Unification and the Tension Between Compromise 
and Domination’, (1986) 22 Stanford Journal of International Law 263, 290.  
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Delegates of developed nations however saw this proposal to be directly 
contradictory to the aims Article 39 was meant to achieve. Mr. Hjerner, the delegate 
of Sweden for instance stated that  
 
Reduction of damages was an unsatisfactory remedy, and was as hard on the 
seller as on the buyer. The main purpose of the rule was in fact to secure 
evidence in the case of dispute. If the seller were to establish the cause of the 
defects complained of, he would need to know of them at an early stage… 
Furthermore, the Ghanaian proposal overlooked the duty of the seller to 
repair goods47 or to deliver substitute goods.48  
 
Moreover, there were concerns that the retention of claims where notice of non-
conformity had not been provided within a timely fashion would operate to place the 
buyer in a position where he or she could act in an opportunistic manner. 49 That is to 
say, a buyer who discovers non-conformity would be motivated to observe the price 
of the goods and decide his course of action accordingly. It was therefore necessary, 
in the opinion of certain delegates, to retain the requirement for the notice to be 
provided as soon as possible in order to ensure that the transaction is completed soon 
after the seller has performed his obligations under the contract.50  
 
Certain delegates of industrialized states went as far as equating the requirement of 
notice as established usage in commercial circles.51 Delegates of developing states 
on the other hand, viewed the provision as nothing short of a trap for the relatively 
unsophisticated buyers in their country, and were resultantly not willing to accept a 
complete bar on the right to claim damages. Predictably, the issue emerged to be 
amongst the most debated, with arguments spread over three days with eight 
                                                     
47 While the Swedish delegate saw this as a duty, Article 48 clearly provides the seller a right to cure 
rather than obligating him to do so. 
48 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 16th Meeting (n 38). 
49 ibid Para 55.  
50 Various commentators argue that the notice requirement is also in the interest of the buyer. For 
instance, Professors Enderlein & Maskow argue that: “It is in the interest of the buyer himself to 
inform the seller because the latter can do nothing to cure the lack before he becomes aware of it.” 
Fritz Enderlein and Dietrich Maskow, ‘International Sales Law: United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Convention on the Limitation Period in the 
International Sale of Goods: Commentary’ (Oceana 1992) 159-160. 
51 ibid Para 65. See comment of Mr Herber, delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
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proposed amendments.52 After prolonged debate a compromise solution was 
adopted, whereby the requirement of the provision of a notice specifying non-
conformity was retained under Article 39. The requirement that the notice be 
provided promptly however was replaced with the term “within a reasonable time” to 
allow for flexibility.53 In particular, this amendment was in response to the concern 
of developing nations that buyers prevailing in those states would often need to 
procure expert foreign advice which seldom would be meet the  requirement of 
promptness. Moreover, Article 44 was inserted to allow a buyer to reduce the value 
of the defect from the price of the goods and claim damages54 provided he or she was 
able to furnish a “reasonable excuse” for failure to give the notice as required by 
Article 39.55   
 
The travaux therefore reveal the intended objectives of Article 39 as follows: 
  
1) Information-Related Concerns: To minimize instances of bad faith 
termination (opportunism), by allowing the seller to examine the goods and 
determine whether the non-conformity complained of actually existed or not. 
Moreover, the requirement that the notice be provided in a timely fashion 
aids in the proper determination of whether the defect complained of is a 
result of handling or use of the goods before or after liability of damage was 
transferred from the seller to the buyer. As such, information-related 
concerns simply require that the seller be provided the opportunity to collect 
evidence at an early stage.56 
 
2) Mitigation Through Cure: To ensure that other articles of the Convention 
can properly be applied, for instance a seller cannot repair or substitute the 
                                                     
52 See session 16, 17 and 18 of the Working Group. See also Alejandro M. Garro, ‘Reconciliation of 
Legal Traditions in the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.” (1989) 23 
The International Lawyer 443. 
53 ULIS, Article 39 used the term ‘promptly,’ thereby imposing a more stringent standard upon the 
buyer. 
54 Damage claims however cannot include claims for loss of profit under Article 44. 
55 Article 44 states, “Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 39 and paragraph (1) 
of Article 43, the buyer may reduce the price in accordance with Article 50 or claim damages, except 
for loss of profit, if he has a reasonable excuse for his failure to give the required notice.” 
56 See comment of Mr. Hjerner (Sweden) at Para 52 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 16th Meeting (n 
38). 
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goods in conformity with Article 46 unless he or she has been made aware of 
the lack of conformity.57  
 
5.3 Economic Analysis of the Objectives 
 
The primary impact of the notice requirement is to shift the costs of the seller’s 
breach on to the buyer, if the notice is not provided in a reasonable time. In 
economic terms such a shift of liability can be justified if: (a) it translates into 
decreasing the potential costs that the seller or commercial community as a whole 
would incur if such a notice requirement was not present and (b) the costs so saved 
outweigh the liability placed on the buyer. If such costs are not avoided then there is 
the possibility that parties would begin to view the Convention with a sense of 
distrust. This assertion is based on the findings of Professor Mermin that parties 
generally “expect default rules of law to be reasonable. When this expectation is not 
met, enforcement becomes difficult coupled with the “danger of spreading disrespect 
of the law.”58  
 
5.3.1 Mitigation and Cure 
 
“The most important reason for requiring notice is to enable the seller to make 
adjustments or replacements or to suggest opportunities for cure to the end of 
minimizing the buyer's loss and reducing the seller's own liability to the buyer.”59 
 
As the analysis of the travaux reveal, certain delegates were concerned that without 
notice of defects from the buyer, the seller would not be able to exercise the right to 
cure defects under Article 48. If cure by the seller operates to minimize the losses 
                                                     
57 Article 46 of the Convention states: (2) “If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer 
may require delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental 
breach of contract and a request for substitute goods is made either in conjunction with notice given 
under Article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter. (3) If the goods do not conform with the 
contract, the buyer may require the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless this is 
unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances. A request for repair must be made either in 
conjunction with notice given under Article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter.” 
58 Samuel Mermin, Law and the Legal System: An Introduction (2nd edn, Little, Brown 1982) 28-29.  
59 James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Handbook of the Law under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, (2nd edn, West Pub Co. 1980) § 10-11.  
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incurred by the buyer as a result of the breach,60 then provision of a notice which 
enables cure is economically efficient.61 In this regard, like the avoidable 
consequences doctrine, rules protecting the right of one party to minimize the loss, 
further the joint interest of the parties.62  
 
Moreover, there may be instances where the buyer attempts to get out of the contract 
on the basis of trivial defects, not because of any real dissatisfaction, but because 
there was a better deal available elsewhere.63 In such instances, the notice 
requirement operates to prevent opportunistic behavior on the part of the buyer and 
provides an opportunity to the seller to mitigate the loss through opportunity to cure.  
 
However, it is important to note that while rules on mitigation operate to bar 
recovery of the loss that could have been avoided by the buyer, the notice 
requirement operates to bar recovery in its entirety. Such an over-reaching impact is 
difficult to justify as efficient since the efficiency of such a rule can only be found 
where the prejudice to the seller resulting from non-provision of the notice 
outweighs the cost to the buyer. The rule, however, operates to maximize costs to the 
buyer by completely barring recovery, thereby limiting instances where prejudice to 
the seller would outweigh the costs to the buyer.64 The value of the notice rule as a 
default is therefore questionable in this regard.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
60 Timely/early cure can limit consequential losses where for instance the defective machine sold by 
the seller was to be used in the production process of the buyer. Other instances where cure would 
operate to minimize the buyers’ losses are where the buyer wishes to keep the goods and the seller is 
the lowest-cost provider of cure.  
61 Provided that the costs associated with the provision of notice are negligible, or in any case do not, 
coupled with the loss after mitigation to the buyer, exceed the economic advantages associated with 
the cure. 
62 In efficiency terms the joint interest of commercial parties is defined as the maximization of their 
joint return under the contract. 
63 For instance because of a drop in the market price of the goods Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. 
Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation’ (1983) 69 
Virginia Law Review 967, 997. 
64 For instance, cases where cure by the seller could not avoid certain consequential damages to the 
buyer, there seems little grounds, if any, to bar recovery of such consequential damages due to non-
provision of a timely notice.  
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5.3.2 Advantages Associated with Information 
 
Sellers suffer from an information disadvantage relative to the buyer about the 
condition of the goods that have been delivered. This is simply the result of the fact 
that once the goods have been delivered the seller no longer has access to them. As 
such, unless the buyer notifies the seller, the latter will not have sufficient evidence, 
if any, about the non-conformity complained of. In other words, notification by the 
buyer enables the seller to collect evidence before it is lost as a result of passage of 
time.65 An additional advantage of access to and verification of information about 
the nonconformity complained of reduces the possibility of the institution of 
completely frivolous or trumped-up suits by the buyer.66  
 
Moreover, since information is essential for future commercial planning, the 
exchange of information is economically valuable. For instance, awareness of 
potential liability would have an impact on the seller’s motivation to enter into 
further credit purchases. If the potential liability is high, a seller might not be able to 
pay for goods that it has purchased for resale after the delivery of the non-
conforming goods to the buyer. Information of the potential liability then would 
operate to aid the seller in saving costs associated with financial overextension.67 
 
5.3.3 Settlement 
 
According to Professor Clark, the notice requirement provides an additional 
economic advantage in the form of encouraging settlement.68 This argument makes 
sense to the extent that pre-litigation settlement carries less cost than litigation itself, 
thereby mitigating the impact on the joint return of the parties as a result of non-
                                                     
65 The impact of time on evidence collection was phrased by the Supreme Court of the US in 1974 
when it stated “evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” 
American Pipe and Constr. Co. v. Utah 414 U.S. 538 (1974) <http://openjurist.org/414/us/538> 
accessed 24 March 2013. 
66 Jerry J. Phillips, ‘Notice of Breach in Sales and Strict Tort Liability Law: Should There Be a 
Difference?’ (1972) 47 Indiana Law Journal 457, 466-468. 
67 Reitz, for instance, argues that earlier repose would operate to conserve the total wealth of society, 
“because situations of default and especially bankruptcy also may involve substantial losses for the 
creditors involved.” John C. Reitz, ‘Against Notice: A Proposal to Restrict the Notice of Claims Rule 
in UCC § 2-607(3)(a)’ 1988 (73) Cornell Law Review 534, 555. 
68 Clark (n 1) 110. 
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conformity.69 It must however be noted that the promotion of settlement justification 
assumes that the sooner the parties begin negotiating after the breach, the greater the 
chances of reaching a settlement. For if the chances of reaching an economically 
justifiable settlement are not dependent upon the time when the settlement begins 
there is little reason, in this regard, to impose a timely notice requirement on the 
buyer. 
 
There seems little proof that providing an early start date for settlement procedures 
would increase the likelihood of the parties actually reaching such a settlement.70 
Empirical studies on the other hand show that such an impact would be achieved if 
the law provided for an end date to the settlement procedure rather than a starting 
one.71 Professors Rubin and Brown argue that even in cases where the parties begin 
the settlement process well in advance of the deadline, settlement is usually reached 
close to the deadline.72 In other words, while an end date to the settlement procedure 
would demotivate parties to insist on their self-serving demands and aspirations, a 
starting date would not carry any such impact.  
 
Even if it is assumed that the notice requirement motivates parties to settle – instead 
of going through the channel of formal adjudication – there are concerns that it might 
operate to produce settlements that favor the party with greater bargaining power.73 
These concerns might de-incentivize the use of informal settlement procedures and 
motivate the innocent party to opt for formal adjudication, at least in instances where 
the innocent party is the one with relatively less bargaining power.74 Furthermore, 
the notice rule – due to the uncertainty of requirements such as the provision 
regarding reasonable time – would give rise to litigation rather than limit it.  
                                                     
69 ibid. 
70 Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Bert R. Brown, The Social Psychology Of Bargaining And Negotiation 
(Elsevier 2013) 120-24. 
71 ibid. 
72 ibid. 
73 See Owen M. Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1073.  
74 ibid. Such an argument, however, does not take into account that the party in breach, is 
automatically rendered the one with weaker bargaining power – at least in the realm of dispute 
resolution – since most default rules operate against it.  As a result, the concern should be phrased as 
the “possibility that informal settlement mechanisms might favor the innocent party,” which in itself 
does not seem to be unjustified. In any case the existence of a formal dispute mechanism would deter 
parties from negotiating a settlement that is patently unfair towards one party. In other words, 
reasonable commercial parties would be able to identify that insisting on a settlement that is unfair to 
the other would increase transaction costs for both since it would result in formal adjudication.    
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5.3.4 Repose 
  
Professors White and Summers claim that the notice requirement carries with it the 
advantage of repose.75 In the context of the Convention, repose is indeed one of the 
policy reasons for the incorporation of the notice requirement as is evidenced by the 
travaux and the existence of Article 14(2). The repose argument is based upon the 
assumption that the expectation that a claim will be barred after a certain period of 
time has positive impacts on social utility.76 According to Professor Fisher, the social 
utility function of repose lies in the fact that it “enhance(s) commercial intercourse 
by freeing individuals from the distraction and disruption of litigation.”77 It must be 
recognized that the economic value of the notice requirement rules vis-à-vis the 
repose argument lies not simply in the peace of mind provided to the seller, but in 
the planning process in commerce as a whole.78  
 
5.3.5 Conclusions 
 The notice requirement operates to prevent instances of opportunistic 
behavior on the part of the buyer and provides an opportunity to the seller to 
mitigate the loss through opportunity to cure. 
 The provision of a timely notice allows the seller to collect evidence while it 
is still available. Information of the potential liability is economically 
valuable since it aids the seller in saving costs associated with financial 
overextension.79 
 Notice requirement provides repose, which – like the advantage of 
information – enables sellers to make and focus on future commercial 
plans/transactions. 
 
                                                     
75 White and Summers (n 59) 422.  
76 In the words of Professors White and Summers, “There is some value in allowing sellers, at some 
point, to close his books on goods sold in the past and to move onto other things.” White and 
Summers (n 59) 344. 
77 Archibald Cox and John T. Dunlap, ‘Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations’ (1950) 63 
Harvard Law Review 1177, 1185.  
78 ibid. 
79 Reitz (n 67). 
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As indicated above, a rule which bars invocation of any remedy by the buyer is 
justified to the extent that the economic advantages accruing to the seller as a result 
of the rule outweigh the costs to the buyer. The efficiency-based justification of the 
cut-off rule contained in Article 39 is therefore dependent upon the extent to which 
the rule operates to minimize the joint costs of the parties. 
 
An analysis of the economic advantages of the rule (detailed above) clearly show 
that the seller faces potential loss which could be minimized or avoided altogether 
through the provision of a timely notice. It is similarly clear that the potential 
harm/loss to the seller would rarely, if ever, amount to the full amount of the buyers 
potentially barred claim.80 For instance, a seller loses the chance to cure the defect if 
it is not provided with a timely notice; however, it is hard to imagine instances where 
the harm to the seller as a result of the lost opportunity to cure would outweigh the 
full amount of the buyers claim.  
 
This leads to the conclusion that it would be preferable in economic terms and 
resultantly from the perspective of the parties, if the application of the rule on 
barring the invocation of remedies was limited to instances where the loss to the 
seller as a result of the non-provision of the notice outweighs the total amount of the 
buyers claim. Such an approach would however lead to a drastic increase in costs 
associated with litigation – i.e. additional costs associated with proving prejudice 
would be incurred. These litigation costs would in turn operate to shrink the joint 
return of the parties. Moreover, such a requirement would impose a further risk on 
the seller i.e. he or she may no longer be able to prove prejudice as a result of loss of 
evidence which would have been collectable had the notice been provided in a 
timely fashion. In the words of Reitz, “a rule that overprotects sellers by cutting off 
some valid claims for no reason may be better for both buyers and sellers than a 
more complex rule that creates more litigation and fails to protect sellers 
adequately.”81 
 
                                                     
80 Barring the buyer’s claim is justified in economic term if the potential loss to the seller as a result of 
the non-provision of the notice outweighs the total amount of the buyer’s claim, so long as the buyer 
has a prima facie case. 
81 Reitz (n 67) 579. 
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Thus while it cannot be stated that the notice rule would achieve the most 
economically efficient outcome in every instance, there certainly is economic value 
in the rule. Moreover, the rule as it is contained in the Convention is designed to 
allow for flexibility in cases where requirement of prompt notice would place too 
heavy a burden on the buyer, through the incorporation of the reasonable time 
standard. This standard, however, comes at the expense of clarity.82 
While such flexibility is essential in order to further the ends of justice and fairness, 
it is essential that the users of the Convention have a certain degree of certainty with 
regards to their obligations and potential liability in this regard. In other words, a 
buyer should be provided with some degree of guidance vis-à-vis how and when the 
obligation of notice is fulfilled. Unfortunately, as shall be discussed below, neither 
courts nor academics have provided any firm guidance as to the methodology to be 
adopted in the calculation of reasonable time. The water is further muddied by the 
incorrect application of other articles, such as Article 38, in the interpretation of the 
term. 
 
The Use of Article 38 in Ascertaining Reasonable Time 
 
Article 38 imposes a duty on the buyer to inspect the goods “within as short a period 
as is practicable in the circumstances.”83 Article 39 on the other hand states, “The 
buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give 
notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a 
reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it.” [Emphasis 
added] 
 
Since the notice has to be provided within a reasonable time after the non-conformity 
was discovered, Article 38 can play an instrumental role in determining when the 
reasonable time period is to commence. Various courts and tribunals however have 
used Article 38 beyond the ascertainment of when the reasonable time period should 
                                                     
82 In 2007, Ingeborg Schwenzer noted that 247 arbitral and court decisions concerned the 
interpretation of the phrase reasonable time. See Schwenzer (n 25) 111.  
83 It is important to note that there is disagreement with regards to what is meant by “within as short a 
period as is practicable in the circumstances.” For instance, Reishofer believes examination should be 
immediate; Pitz states that where there are no special circumstances, examination must be done within 
3-4 days of delivery; while Ferrari believes that examinations should simply be hurried. See Ferrari (n 
2). 
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commence; and have applied the provisions of the same in the determination of the 
length of the reasonable period.84 It is asserted that the two timeframes are 
completely separate and the determination of both depends on a different set of 
factors.  
This is not to ignore the fact that in certain instances the same factor might well be 
necessary in the determination of the two timeframes; for instance, the perishable 
nature of the goods would be an important factor in determining, firstly, when the 
defect ought to have been discovered, and secondly, what period is considered 
reasonable. 
 
This thesis is however of the view that the factors essential for the proper 
determination of the two timeframes are sometimes very different and the 
interrelationship of Articles 38 and 39 is not proper grounds for applying a factor 
useful in the determination of one to the exercise of determining the other.  
The view of Anna Veneziano serves as an example. Veneziano states that one of the 
factors to be taken into account in the determination of when the non-conformity 
ought to have been discovered and the length of the reasonable time standard is 
whether the defects are easily discoverable by the parties.85 While she correctly 
states that the factor is essential in order to determine when the buyer ought to have 
discovered the non-conformity, it is hard to see how it has any application in the 
ascertainment of the length of the reasonable time standard. As such, while the 
difficult discoverability of defects might push the start of the reasonable timeframe 
back or forward, it does not impact the length of the reasonable time period. 
 
 
                                                     
84 Take for instance the decision in CLOUT case No. 310 [Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Germany, 
12 March 1993] http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930312g1.html accessed: 12 April 2013. While 
ascertaining whether the seller had fulfilled the requirements of Article 39 the court stated, “[A] 
period for notification of twenty-five days is neither short nor reasonable in the sense of Arts. 38 and 
39 CISG.” This judgment seems to indicate that the court saw no difference between the timeframes 
of Articles 38 and 39. Moreover, in reaching its decision the court applied the factor of the date of 
delivery in measuring the length of the reasonable timeframe. For a similar ruling, see Rechtbank van 
Koophandel Kortrijk, Belgium, 16 December 1996 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961216b1.html> accessed: 23 March 2013, wherein the court 
stated, “A period of approximately two months after delivery was not reasonable, taking into account 
that the defects were easily noticeable.” 
85 Anna Veneziano, ‘Non-Conformity of Goods in International Sales: A Survey of Current Caselaw 
on CISG’ [1997] International Business Law Journal 39, 51. 
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5.4 Factor Essential for Determining Reasonable Time  
 
The travaux shed little light, if any, on what factors are to be taken into account in 
the determination of the length of reasonable time.86 Unfortunately, the travaux do 
not even provide any form of clarity as to whose interests the provision is meant to 
protect. An analysis of the legislative history of the provision seems to suggest that 
Article 39 was merely a restatement of the rule contained in its predecessor, the 
ULIS. The only difference between the two provisions seems to lie in the fact that 
the term “promptly” was replaced with the term within a reasonable time. Now since 
Article 39 of the ULIS was drafted with the aim of protecting the seller from 
allegations of non-conformity from the buyer which he or she could not protect 
themselves from; at first glance it would seem that the provision as incorporated in 
the Convention was meant, solely, to protect the interest of the seller. A closer 
analysis of the amendment however reveals that it was a product of concerns that the 
provision was too strict for the buyer and the amendment was introduced to allow a 
greater degree of flexibility to the buyer in the provision of the notice. 87 
 
It is argued that identification of the interest that the provision sought to protect is of 
importance in the ascertainment of how the term reasonable time is to be interpreted. 
For instance, if the provision is sought to protect the interests of the seller then it 
would logically follow that the timeframe within which notice so to be provided is to 
be reasonable according to the seller. The fact that the amendment to the ULIS 
version of Article 39 represented a flexible compromise in favor of the buyer, 
however, provides a counter balance to this consideration.88 Professor Andersen, in 
recognition of this issue, recommends that courts should attempt to ascertain the 
amount of time that would be considered reasonable by both the seller and buyer 
independently.89 She draws support from the stance adopted by Professor Honnold 
on the issue, where he states that courts should take a “wide range of factors into 
                                                     
86 Similarly, the secretariat commentary and the Convention are silent as to the provision of guidelines 
of what constitutes reasonable time.  
87 See for example Ferrari (n 2) “…the time requirement of the ULIS was shorter.” 
88 Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed), Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 608.   
89 Camilla Baasch Andersen, ‘The Duty to Examine Goods under the Uniform International Sales 
Law-An Analysis of Article 38 CSIG’ (2007) 18 European Business Law Review 797. 
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account” in the assessment of reasonable time,90 and argues that an assessment of the 
intention of both the seller would enable the adjudicator to reach a more subjective 
solution in individual cases.91    
 
While what the parties consider to be reasonable time is one of the factors essential 
for the determination of the timeframe under Article 39, it is only one of many. 
Neither academic commentary nor judicial decisions have however been able to 
concretely identify a comprehensive list of factors that must be taken into account in 
the determination of the length of the reasonable time frame.    
While this thesis recognizes the fact that Article 39 in its very nature is a 
compromise for flexibility, it is argued that the end users of the Convention should at 
least be provided with a framework that enables them to gauge what would be 
considered reasonable time to provide notice in. Similar concerns have led a group of 
academics to formulate a method of applying the term to a predetermined vantage 
point of a fixed period.92 
 
Professor Schwenzer, for instance, proposes the “informal adoption” of a period of 
one month as a vantage point in the consideration of what constitutes reasonable 
time within the meaning of Article 39.93 According to this proposition, the facts of 
each case are to determine whether there are any considerations that would operate 
to shorten or increase the one month period. For instance, in a case of sale of generic 
non-perishable goods, the nature of the goods might operate to increase the period 
over one month.94 Other factors – such as the buyer’s awareness of the seller 
operating under a deadline – would operate to shorten the period.95 A balance of the 
                                                     
90 See John Honnold and Harry M. Flechtner, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 
United Nations Convention (Kluwer Law International 2009) 281: “The determination of the 
‘reasonable period’ for notice following the time when the buyer discovers (or ought to have 
discovered) the non-conformity would be influenced by a wide range of factors.” 
91 Andersen (n 89). 
92 Such a stance is not alien to national legal systems. Under Italian law for instance, a period of 8 
days is provided for the provision of a notice. See Peter Schlechtriem (ed), Commentary on the UN 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (Oxford University Press 1998).  
93 Schwenzer (n 25) 105. She however noted that when the reporter on Article 39 stated that an 
analysis of case law on the provision shows a “cautious convergence in the direction of the noble 
month” at a conference held in 2005, participants belonging to the common law world raised sharp 
objections to such a predetermined period. Schwenzer (n 25) 103. 
94 See also CLOUT case No. 248 [Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Switzerland, 28 October 1998] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981028s1.html> accessed: 26 March 2013.  
95 Landgericht Köln, Germany, 11 November 1993 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/931111g1.html> accessed 25 March 2013. 
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impact on the timeframe of all such factors on the one month period should result in 
the identification of what constitutes reasonable time.96 
 
This one month vantage point approach has found favour with a few tribunals, 
especially German courts. For instance, in The Machine for producing hygienic 
tissues case , the court held that the since the defect was not easily discernible, the 
buyer should be provided a week to decide whether to hire an expert and a further 
two weeks should be provided for the expert to carry out its examination.97  Finally 
under the dictates of Article 39(1), the court concluded that a period of one month 
was reasonable for the buyer, after receiving the expert’s report, to notify the seller 
of the non-conformity.  
The court therefore distinguished the two timeframes and decided that considerations 
such as the nature of non-conformity and the consequential appointment of an expert 
affect the timeframe of when the seller ought to have discovered the non-conformity. 
The court however provided no reasoning for its adoption of the one month frame. 
By doing so, the court fell into the most obvious trap of what is known as the noble 
month – i.e. it did not specify or even enter into the exercise of identification of 
factors which may shorten or extend the one month period. 
While the vantage point approach has been recognized and adjudicated over in 
various cases in the last few years, there seems to be no agreement vis-à-vis the 
length or the approach to be adopted in the measurement of such presumptive 
periods. The effect is that a wide array of periods, ranging from as little as fourteen 
days after delivery to as much as a month after inspection,  have been held as suitable 
presumptive periods. 98 Unfortunately, judgements rarely provide any guidance as to 
                                                     
96 It is interesting to note that the period of one month proposed by Schwenzer is not an 
arbitrarily/randomly-identified period. Rather it is based upon a consideration of what is considered 
reasonable time within which notice of non-conformity is to be provided in various jurisdictions. By 
identifying such domestically accepted timeframes, she is able to find a balance in the period of one 
month. Professor Andersen suggests that since one month takes into account the precepts of domestic 
law, the compromise of recognizing it as reasonable time should not be too hard a pill to swallow for 
signatory states and would limit discrepancies in practice. There is however little support of this 
proposition in practice. Andersen (n 23). 
97 Clout case No. 319 [Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 3 November 1999] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991103g1.html> accessed: 25 March 2013.  
98 CLOUT case No. 167 [Oberlandesgericht München, Germany, 8 February 1995] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950208g2.html> accessed: 25 March 2013; CLOUT case No. 423 
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how the presumptive periods have been calculated or what factors are to impact 
them. Such a lack of explanation, has translated to form an impediment in the 
recognition of the Convention’s international character. In other words, reference to 
case law emanating from foreign jurisdictions is of little, if any, use when it fails to 
provide clear reasoning for its decisions.99 
 
This thesis is of the opinion that given the common law world’s aversion to such 
vantage points, there is not much hope for the development of any meaningful 
consensus on the length of the presumptive period. Moreover, even if such 
consensus were to develop, there is little evidence that any significant clarity would 
result from it. 
 
This is because the presumptive period is subject to a large host of factors that either 
increase or decrease this period. More often than not, such factors operate to render 
the presumptive period completely redundant; for instance, the perishable nature of 
goods would render any presumptive period of over a couple of weeks completely 
inapplicable.  
 
This thesis therefore argues that the best method of interpreting the article lies not in 
the hunt of the identification of some unanimously accepted vantage point, but is 
rather achieved through a proper identification of the factors that must be taken into 
account in the determination of the two time frames. 
 
Such an approach is cognizant of the fact that the very use of the term reasonable 
was intended to provide flexibility and as such, this approach does not claim to 
provide complete certainty vis-à-vis the definition of the term. Instead, it solely 
focuses on the identification of factors essential for the determination of the term, 
                                                     
[Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, 27 August 1999] http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990827a3.html 
accessed: 25 March 2013.  
99 Without providing any meaningful guidance about the rationale of their judgment, the following 
have been suggested as the reasonable time (presumptive) for giving notice: a few days after 
discovery of the lack of conformity: one week (following one week for examination under Article 38) 
CLOUT case No. 285 [Oberlandesgericht Koblenz, Germany, 11 September 1998] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980911g1.html> accessed: 26 March 2013; eight days following 
discovery 112; two weeks (following one week for examination) see CLOUT case No. 359 
[Oberlandesgericht Koblenz, Germany, 18 November 1999] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991118g1.html> accessed: 26 March 2013.  
218 
 
through an analysis of case law, scholarly writings and the legislative history of the 
Convention. 
The identification of such factors, it is argued, while not being able to provide a 
uniform scale which can be applied to fit almost every set of facts in the 
determination, does attempt to identify the weights used in the scale – which are the 
different factors in question.  
 
5.5 Recommended Approach to the Interpretation of Reasonable Time 
 
As explained above, one of the primary reasons for the incorporation of the notice 
requirement was to provide efficiency in instances where the goods did not conform 
to the contract. In the commercial world of today, time is a valuable commodity; 
wastage of time can result in diminishing the joint returns of the parties. On the other 
hand, restricting the notice period to a very short time frame would operate to place 
too heavy a burden on the buyer, who would then attempt to negotiate derogation 
from the terms of Article 39(1) through the express incorporation of a notice period 
in the contract. While such derogation is permitted by the Convention,  it undermines 
the goals of the Convention of providing uniformity. 100 In other words, an inefficient 
default would not be conducive to the objective of legal uniformity, since parties 
would be motivated to derogate from it through agreement.    
 
As argued above, while Articles 38 and 39 are interconnected, there is a difference 
between the inspection period and the reasonable time period. As such, it is asserted 
that the recognition of the differentiation between the two is an essential prerequisite 
for a proper application of the two articles. Any adjudicator charged with the duty of 
applying the said articles must therefore start by framing issues in the following 
terms: 
  
1) Have the parties derogated from the application of Article 39, by express 
agreement to a specific timeframe for notification? If yes, then by virtue 
of Article 6 the agreed timeframe will apply. It is extremely important to note 
that such agreement operates to exclude the application of Article 39, and as 
                                                     
100 See Convention, Article 6.  
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such considerations of reasonableness of the agreed timeframe are of 
absolutely no relevance. Unfortunately, at least one tribunal has erred by not 
recognizing this fact. In the Cow Hides case, the tribunal upheld the agreed 
notice timeframe since, in the view of the tribunal the notice period satisfied 
the requirements of Articles 38 and 39.101 Surely, even if it had not been 
considered reasonable by the tribunal, the agreed timeframe for notification 
would have had to be upheld in any event by way of Article 6 of the 
Convention which as explained above, allows parties to derogate from the 
Convention.102 
If the contract is silent as to the notice period, then the court should move on 
to framing issues 2 and 3 below. 
 
2) Upon which date was the non-conformity ought to have been discovered 
(unless the buyer had in fact discovered it sooner)?  
a) Practise or usage agreed between the parties: Since the Convention 
operates in a manner to give primacy to the agreement between the 
parties, it logically follows that the parties are bound to whatever practise 
they have agreed between themselves.103 Such practices, however, differ 
from express agreements which were the subject of issue 1 outlined 
above. This is because such practices are rarely expressly stipulated in the 
contract but can be ascertained from the conduct of the parties. Such 
conduct can then be used to gauge the intention of the parties’ vis-à-vis 
what they consider to be reasonable. For instance, in the Dyed Textiles 
case, the court interpreted the practice of the buyer to demand expedited 
delivery of the goods to constitute a practice which implies that the buyer 
would inspect the goods immediately upon delivery.104      
                                                     
101 CLOUT case No. 303 [International Court of Arbitration, ICC, 1 January 1994] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/947331i1.html> accessed: 28 March 2013. 
102 ibid. The only limit to such derogation is that it is subject to Article 12. 
103 Convention, Article 9. 
104 CLOUT case No. 634 [Landgericht Berlin, Germany, 21 March 2003] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030321g1.html> accessed: 28 March 2013. 
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b) The presence of a Trade Usage on inspection: Parties are bound by 
trade custom only so far as it can be proved that the parties had actual 
knowledge of the usage or ought to have knowledge of it.105 Moreover, 
the usage must be one that is widely known to, and regularly observed by, 
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade 
concerned.106 If such a custom exists on inspection, then the same will be 
implied into the agreement between the parties and resultantly, the 
dictates of Article 38 would become inapplicable. 
c) Inspection needs: The discoverability of the defects must be taken into 
account while ascertaining when the buyer ought to have discovered non-
conformity. Issues of such discoverability, it is asserted, are only relevant 
in the determination of this time frame and have no applicability in the 
determination of the notice period.  
The relationship between inspection needs and the determination of when 
the buyer should have discovered the non-conformity is easy to see and as 
such, facts such as the need of expert opinion, the nature of the goods 
(whether the goods are unique, complicated, and/or delivered in 
instalments) should operate to extend the inspection period.107 
d) Awareness on behalf of the seller of ‘special’ circumstances: The 
court must examine whether the seller had actual knowledge of some 
special circumstance that delayed inspection by the buyer. Such 
circumstances would include, for example, knowledge of the fact that the 
buyer is a retailer who simply sells goods packaged by the seller).  
e) Type of goods: Perishable goods and goods with an affinity to a 
particular season such as seasonal fruits would require immediate 
inspection whereas complex machinery would allow for inspection period 
to commence relatively later. 
                                                     
105 Convention, Article 9. 
106 ibid. 
107 See for instance CLOUT case No. 45 [ICC, France, 1 January 1989] 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/895713i1.html> accessed: 28 March 2013. 
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f) Nature of the buyer: Small inexperienced firms lacking expertise would 
generally require a longer period of time to discover defects than large 
experienced firms. 
While this list of factors for the determination of when the buyer ought to have 
inspected the goods is neither exclusive nor results in the identification of a specific 
answer that fits all cases, it is asserted that it provides adjudicators with some of the 
tools necessary in the ascertainment of the time of inspection independent of 
concerns of when notice should be given. 
Since the timeframe within which notice is to be provided commences when 
inspection is completed,108 only once the time at which the non-conformity was 
discovered or ought to have been discovered has been identified should the court 
proceed to identify the reasonable time within which notice is to be provided. 
3) What is the timeframe within which the buyer should have provided 
notice of non-conformity, after the date found in point 2 above? 
a)  of the Trade usage on notice requirement: as discussed above, any 
international trade usage which determines the timeframe is to be taken 
into account by virtue of Article 9(2).109  
b) Practices established between the parties: according to the dictates of 
Article 9(1), the parties are bound by any usage to which they have 
agreed and by any practices which they have established between 
themselves. As such, the court must enter into the investigation of any 
practice or usage established between the parties that may have an impact 
on the length of the term.110 An example of such practice is the speed of 
communication established by the parties. If the parties usually 
communicate quickly with one another, the seller will be entitled to 
                                                     
108 Or when the buyer ought to have discovered it. 
109 Rb Zwolle, Netherlands, 5 March 1997 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970305n1.html> 
accessed: 5 March 2013. 
110 CLOUT case No. 423 (n 98). 
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expect a speedier notice, and providing this will be required of the 
buyer.111  
 
c) Special nature of the goods: Perishable goods would require a prompt 
notice in the interest of the seller's loss adjustment. Similarly seasonal 
goods or goods with affinity to a particular season (such as fashion-
related clothing) would also require a shorter notice requirement.112 
Notice with respect to durable or non-seasonal goods, in contrast, could 
be subject to a longer notice period.113 It is essential to note that the 
obviousness of the defect or otherwise, has absolutely no application in 
the ascertainment of what constitutes reasonable time.114  
 
d) Buyers’ plans to process the goods:  Such acts would include further 
handling or processing of the goods by the buyer that might make it 
difficult to determine if the seller was responsible for a lack of 
conformity.115 Similar considerations would include the existence of 
delay in notice that results in depriving the seller of the opportunity to 
check the factual basis of the buyer's complaint and to offer repair or 
substitution.116 This head should be applied in conjunction with the one 
detailed directly below. 
                                                     
111 Franco Ferrari, Harry M. Flechtner, and Ronald A. Brand, The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and 
Beyond: Cases, Analysis and Unresolved Issues in the UN Sales Convention (Sellier European 
Publishers 2003). 
112 See, for instance, CLOUT case No. 828 [Gerechtshof 's-Hertogenbosch, Netherlands, 2 January 
2007] <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070102n1.html> accessed: 1 April 2013; CLOUT case No. 
723 [Oberlandesgericht Koblenz, Germany, 19 October 2006] 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061019g2.html accessed: 1 April 2013; CLOUT case No. 825 
[Oberlandesgericht Köln, Germany, 14 August 2006] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060814g1.html> accessed: 1 April 2013; Rechtbank van 
Koophandel Veurne, Belgium, 19 March 2003 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030319b1.html> 
accessed: 1 April 2013. 
113  District Court in Komarno, Slovakia, 24 February 2009 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090224k1.html accessed: 25 March 2013; Obergericht Zug, 
Switzerland, 19 December 2006 http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061219s1.html accessed: 25 March 
2013; Landgericht München, Germany, 27 February 2002 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020227g1.html> accessed: 25 March 2013; CLOUT case No. 167 
(n 98). 
114 Such factors are relevant in the ascertainment of when the timeframe commences, not the length of 
the timeframe itself. 
115  See CLOUT case No. 3 [Landgericht München, Germany, 3 July 1989] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/890703g1.html> accessed: 3 April 2013. 
116 Judicial Board of Szeged, Hungary, 5 December 2008 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/081205h1.html> accessed: 3 April 2013. 
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e) The buyer's duty to limit the seller's loss: Since one of the reasons for 
the formation of Article 39 was to protect the rights of the seller, it would 
seem essential for the court to take the impact of the notice requirement 
on the seller’s rights. As such, a buyer invoking the remedy of avoidance 
of contract should take into account the possibility of mitigation of loss 
by resale by the seller while calculating the length of the notice period. 
Similarly, awareness on the part of the buyer of some special obligation 
of the seller which might be breached due to a non-timely notice, such as 
where the seller was operating under a deadline, should operate to shorten 
the period. 
 
f) The nature of the remedy chosen: If the buyer chooses to avoid the 
contract the seller will need more time to take care of his or her goods, 
whereas a remedy of damages or price reduction places no such pressures 
on the seller.117 As such, the notice period in instances where the buyer 
wishes to claim damages while retaining the goods should be longer than 
in instances where he wishes to reject them.  
A proper appreciation of the approach outlined above should enable a court to 
discover the intent of what buyer and seller would consider reasonable in the 
circumstances. An equitable balance between the two should enable the court to then 
ascertain the length of the reasonable time frame. While such a method does not 
provide any substantial degree of uniformity, it does grant a degree of certainty to 
the end users of the Convention who would at least be aware of the factors that are to 
be used in the determination of the time period.    
 
5.6 Specifying the Nature of the Lack of Conformity 
The issue of the degree of specificity required for the fulfillment of the notice 
requirement has raised a great deal of disagreement between courts and scholars 
alike. While a majority of judgments on the issue favor an interpretation that requires 
                                                     
117 See for instance, CLOUT case No. 938 [Kantonsgericht Zug, Switzerland, 30 August 2007] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070830s1.html> accessed: 9 April 2013; [Monomeles Protodikio 
Thessalonikis, Greece, 2003] http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030001gr.html accessed: 9 April 2013. 
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a precise and detailed notice,118 certain commentators and tribunals have questioned 
the utility of such a stringent requirement.119   
Since the issue of what exactly the notice should constitute is to be answered in line 
with the functions the notice is supposed to serve,120 Honnold argues that a notice 
that merely specifies that the goods are defective would not allow for the 
achievement of the objectives of the notice requirement and as such would not fulfill 
the requirements of Article 39.121 He does, however, state that buyers should not be 
required to provide details of the non-conformity with a high degree of precision 
since, in this electronic age, the seller can inquire about details – if needed – on the 
receipt of the notice.122 In any case, a stringent requirement on specificity would be 
out of touch with commercial reality; as the travaux reveal, the parties in the 
situation may well be unsophisticated buyers dealing with complex machinery and, 
as such, incapable of providing the relevant information with a high degree of 
precision.  
This is not to say that a notice simply titled ‘non-conforming goods’ would fulfill the 
requirements of Article 39. Rather, what is required is that the buyer conveys all 
defects known to him or her to the seller.123 Indeed, according to the statement made 
                                                     
118 See for example Oberlandesgericht Linz, Austria, 1 June 2005 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050601a3.html> accessed: 10 April 2013, holding that the “notice 
must be precise”; Hof van Beroep Antwerpen, Belgium, 14 February 2002 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020214b1.html> accessed: 10 April 2013, holding that the notice 
should provide “a complete picture of the complaints”; Landgericht Saarbrücken, Germany, 2 July 
2002 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020702g1.html> accessed: 10 April 2013; Landgericht 
Marburg, Germany, 12 December 1995 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951212g1.html> accessed: 
10 April 2013, holding that the notice should allow the seller to determine the buyers’ complaints 
“without further investigation.”  
119 See John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention (Kluwer Law International 1999) 277-278; See CLOUT case No. 938 (n 117); AC 
Opinion No 2 (n 10). 
120 Ibid. While a host of purposes have been listed in the preceding part of this chapter, Honnold limits 
the same to providing “the seller an opportunity to obtain and preserve evidence of the condition of 
the goods and to cure the deficiency.” 
121 Ibid. Honnold argues that such a notice would fail since it simply states that there is a defect 
without specifying “the nature of the lack of conformity.” At page 278. 
122 Ibid. 277. 
123 This stance has been adopted in a few judgments. In Landgericht Bamberg, Germany, 23 October 
2006 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061023g1.html> accessed: 12 April 2013 for example the 
court stated, “Should any lack of clarity remain for the seller concerning the nature or extent of the 
non-conformity after a notice has been submitted, the seller can be expected to inquire of the buyer.” 
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by the delegate of Federal Republic of Germany during the 16th Meeting of the First 
Committee, this conclusion seemed quite obvious.124  
Case law, on the other hand, reveals a very different picture. This may partly be 
attributed to the fact that the law of Germanic countries, where the majority of the 
case law on the provision has been adjudicated, places a very stringent requirement 
upon the buyer vis-à-vis communication of non-conformity.125 Interestingly, this 
stringency has found its way in the German text of the Convention which states that 
the buyer must specify the defect with genau zu bezeichnen (i.e. with precision). 
Given this peculiarity in the German text of the Convention, it is difficult to ascertain 
the degree to which German courts are influenced by the dictates of German 
domestic law while interpreting the article.126 It is, however, clear that the imposition 
of such a stringent requirement upon buyers increases transaction costs – thereby 
undermining efficiency.  
An example is the Agricultural Machine Case decided by the LG Marburg, wherein 
it was held that a notice of non-conformity failed to conform with the requirements 
of Article 39 since it did not identify the serial number of the machine delivered or 
the date of its delivery. The machine however was the only one of its type purchased 
by the buyer from the seller and resultantly there could not have been any ambiguity 
surrounding which machine formed the subject matter of the notice. The court 
however stated that the “seller could not be required to search through sales ledgers 
to locate the documents for the machine in question.”127  
The rationale for requiring this degree of specificity is difficult to justify, when one 
weighs the prejudice to the buyer as a result of such a rule, against that of the seller 
in the absence of such a rule. This is so that the seller does not seem to lose any of 
the protections afforded to him by the notice requirement, as a result of the buyer’s 
lack of precision in detailing the non-conformity. For instance, since the seller can 
                                                     
124  Mr. Herber (Federal Republic of Germany) stated, “Under Article 37 [became CISG Article 39], 
the buyer would lose his claim – a very severe sanction – if he did not notify the buyer of any defects 
known to him. For that purpose he had, however, a reasonable period of time which could amount to 
as much as two years -- a long period in commercial terms.” See Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 16th 
Meeting (n 38) Para 62. 
125 That is the standard imposed upon the buyer by the ULIS. 
126 An exception to the homeward trend is found in the judgment of CLOUT case No. 319 (n 97). 
127 Landgericht Marburg, Germany, 12 December 1995 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951212g1.html> accessed: 15 April 2013. 
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inexpensively inquire into the details of the alleged non-conformity upon receipt of a 
notice that does not specify the same in detail,128 it cannot be argued that the seller’s 
ability to collect evidence or send the relevant experts for examination is prejudiced. 
Similarly, the seller’s ability to offer cure or potential recourse to the supplier is not 
diminished, so long as the notice is provided within a reasonable time. Even if such 
inquiry carries certain costs, they have to be higher than the potential loss to the 
buyer resulting from non-specificity in the notice,129 for the requirement of precision 
to be justifiable. Such a scenario, however, is hard to imagine in the context of the 
commercial world of today.  
An example is the judgment in the Facade Stones Case.130 This case involved the 
sale of stones between a German buyer and an Italian seller. After delivery, the buyer 
gave the seller a notice of non-conformity of goods under Article 39. In particular, 
the buyer alleged that: (a) goods were not labelled in the manner agreed between the 
parties; (b) the borings were not made or placed in the agreed manner; (c) that the 
sills and stones did not conform to the size agreed; and (d) the mounting glue was 
defective.131 In essence, the buyer had provided the seller with all the information he 
had about the non-conformity. On the basis of this information, the seller agreed to 
the claim of nonconformity of borings and reduced the purchase price.   
On action by the seller for the recovery of the (reduced) purchase price, the buyer 
counterclaimed for damages.132 In the opinion of the court, the buyer had failed to 
detail the non-conformity complained of with the required degree of specificity. The 
court argued, for example, that while the buyer stated that the stones did not conform 
to the agreed size it did not state the quantity of non-conforming stones.133 Similarly, 
with regards to the glue the court stated that while the buyer alleged that the glue 
used to mount the stones was defective, it failed to allege the exact quantity of stones 
treated with the defective glue.134 It is hard to see how the seller was prejudiced as a 
                                                     
128 Indeed, it would be more economically efficient to require the seller to check his ledgers or inquire 
in such a case, than to impose a bar on the remedies available to the buyer if he does not specify such 
details in the notice.   
129 That is, subject to Articles 40 and 44, the bar to invoke any remedy under the Convention.  
130 CLOUT case No. 364 [Landgericht Köln, Germany, 30 November 1999] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991130g1.html> accessed: 17 April 2015. 
131 ibid. 
132 ibid. 
133 ibid. 
134 ibid. 
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result of not being informed of the number of non-conforming stones so long as he 
was made aware that certain goods did not conform. If such information was indeed 
essential for the seller in deciding how to respond, for instance by offering cure, he 
could have, as stated above, simply inquired.   
In any case, a literal interpretation of the German text of the article cannot be 
adopted since it clearly diverges from all authenticated versions of the 
Convention.135 The fact that the German text of the treaty is not as authoritative as 
other texts is made clear by the fact that the Convention was authenticated in six 
languages which did not include German.136This fact was accepted by the Supreme 
Court of Switzerland in the Used Laundry Machine case. 137  
In this case, the Supreme Court of Switzerland, referred to the French and English 
texts and concluded that the requirements to be met by a notice are less strict than 
that which may be inferred from the German wording of Article 39(1). The court 
specifically referred to the term préciser de ce défaut (i.e. specifying the nature of 
the lack of conformity) as the requisite standard as opposed to specifying with 
precision. As such the court was of the opinion that  
In order to circumscribe the nature or type of the lack of conformity, it is 
sufficient if the buyer communicates that a machine or parts thereof are not 
functioning and indicates the appropriate symptoms. It is not necessary that 
he also elaborates the causes of the functional faults.138  
Surprisingly, the court’s ruling on the facts of the case was in direct contradiction to 
this finding. Thus while the court held that a description of the symptoms would 
suffice for the purposes of Article 39, it went on to conclude that the buyer must 
specifically mention each defect with a degree of specificity that goes beyond simply 
identifying the symptoms. 
                                                     
135 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 33. 
136 The Convention was authenticated in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. See 
Ulrich Magnus, Tracing Methodology in the CISG: Dogmatic Foundations CISG Methodology 
(Sellier European Law Publishers 2009). 
137 CLOUT case No. 885 [Bundesgericht, Switzerland, 13 November 2003] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031113s1.html> accessed: 17 April 2013  
138 The buyer indicated in its letter dated 5 September 1996 that the delivered machine was not usable, 
the “machine distillation system did not function” and “the delivered machine components did not 
function.” As such, the buyer stated the individual functional faults or missing parts, and demanded 
corrective measures. 
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Such an interpretation goes against Opinion Number 2 delivered by the Advisory 
Council, wherein the Council asserted that the requirement of specificity has to be 
interpreted in light of the circumstances of each case, and as such, simple statement 
of the symptoms of a defect may well satisfy the requirements of Article 39 in 
appropriate circumstances.139 Interestingly, such a stance had been adopted by the 
Bundesgerichtshof almost five years before the advisory opinion was delivered.140  
This reveals that even in the same jurisdiction, the requirement of specificity as 
contained in Article 39 has been interpreted inconsistently. Such divergence has 
created a great degree of uncertainty amongst both commentators and the end users 
of the Convention. For the consumers of the Convention, such uncertainty opens the 
doors to dire consequences i.e. a bar on claims. 
 
 
 
 
5.6.1 Recommended Approach to the Degree of Specificity Required 
 
The preceding discussion should not, however, be interpreted to mean that the same 
degree (or lack thereof) of precision should be required of all buyers, regardless of 
their individual characteristics or that of the goods concerned. In other words, 
requiring a higher degree of precision from an expert buyer, relative to an 
unsophisticated one, makes sense from an efficiency perspective. This is because 
expert buyers by their very nature are presumed to be able to examine the goods with 
relative efficiency – i.e. inexpensively.141 Even if this presumption fails, a secondary 
presumption – i.e. such buyers are expected to know details of the non-conformity 
with a higher degree of precision relative to inexperienced buyers – operates to place 
a higher standard on them.142  
                                                     
139 AC Opinion No 2 (n 10). 
140 CLOUT case No. 319 (n 97). In this case the court stated, “In case of defective technical 
equipment, a description of the symptoms should suffice in order to satisfy the requirements of 
Article 39(1) CISG. A specification of the reasons causing the defect is not required.” 
141 This is based upon the assumption that since the expert buyer has possession of the goods, he or 
she can examine or have them examined inexpensively relative to the seller who would have to hire 
examiners in a state other than his own.  
142 The fact that the buyer bears the burden of proving that he or she has fulfilled the requirements of 
Article 39 is unanimously accepted. Part of discharging this burden is proving that he or she had 
229 
 
Similarly, the nature of the goods has an impact on the degree of specificity required. 
For instance, uncomplicated goods do not require expert examination for the defects 
to be ascertained. As a result, any buyer can list the non-conformity in detail without 
incurring additional costs. In such a scenario, it would be unsound from an efficiency 
perspective\ if the seller was placed in a position where the seller would have to 
inquire the details of the non-conformity which the buyer is already aware of. In the 
case of complicated goods, on the other hand, it would be economically unsound to 
obligate buyers, especially if they are unsophisticated, to list the details of the 
alleged non-conformity with precision. As explained above, such a requirement 
would operate to minimize the joint return of the parties, since the costs to the buyer 
resulting from non-provision of such details would more often than not, if not 
always, outweigh the advantages to the seller. 
In conclusion, an interpretation of the specificity requirement of Article 39 that 
places too heavy a burden on the buyer, regardless of the buyer’s characteristics, 
should not be preferred. This is because it ignores the commercial reality which the 
Convention is meant to govern, to the extent that the identity and nature of the 
parties involved are not taken into account. This omission in analysis places 
obligations upon the parties which they are not well suited to fulfil. Thus, this thesis 
argues that buyers should only be obligated to inform the seller of all defects known 
to the buyer.143 This rule should be complemented with the assumptions that: (a) 
expert/skilled buyers are presumed to know details of the nonconformity with greater 
precision than unsophisticated ones, and (b) cases involving  generic goods require 
nonconformity to be specified with a greater degree of precision than technical ones.     
 
5.7 The Exception to the Rule of Article 39 
 
As discussed above, the impact of non-provision of a timely notice results in the 
deprivation of all remedies available to the buyer under the Convention. In order to 
limit this drastic consequence, certain delegates submitted proposals to amend the 
                                                     
fulfilled the requirement of specificity. In the context of the approach identified as the correct one in 
this chapter, carrying the burden would entail proving that the buyer has provided all relevant 
information possessed, which would in turn entail proving that the presumption has been met or 
providing rebuttal evidence which shows that the presumption does not hold in the context.      
143 A list of symptoms satisfies this requirement. 
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wording of Article 39 to make it less stringent. By way of compromise, Articles 40 
and 44 were introduced into the Convention. 
 
Article 40 states, “The seller is not entitled to rely on the provisions of Articles 38 
and 39 if the lack of conformity relates to facts of which he knew or could not have 
been unaware and which he did not disclose to the buyer.” As such the article 
operates to allow the buyer to retain all remedies available to him under the 
Convention. Such an approach is in conformity with the rationale underlying the 
requirement of timely provision of notice. Firstly, if the seller is aware of the non-
conformity then the information gathering rationale is not relevant, since there is no 
information asymmetry between the parties in such an instance. Moreover, the 
provision of a notice in such an instance will not provide any extra advantage that 
would enable the seller to cure the defect. For similar reasons, a notice will not 
enable repose on the part of the seller. In fact, where the seller is aware of the non-
conformity, the notice requirement will simply operate to increase transaction costs – 
for example, through costs incurred in drafting the notice itself. 
 
Moreover, if notice were to be required even in instances where the seller was aware 
of the non-conformity, the seller could act in bad faith at the expense of the buyer i.e. 
opportunistically. For instance, sellers would know that even when they sell 
defective products they have a defense to the buyer’s rejection of the goods. Here, 
the seller could use the threat of challenging the timeliness of notice, regardless of 
whether it has been provided in a timely fashion in the circumstances.    
 
As will be discussed in greater detail, while Article 40 is concerned with the bad 
faith (opportunistic behavior) of the seller, Article 44 is subject to the bona fide 
intentions of the buyer. Accordingly, Article 44 allows the buyer to retain the 
remedies of reduction of price and damages where the buyer can provide a 
reasonable excuse for failure to provide a timely notice. 
 
Due to the fact that both these articles incorporate vague terms, they have been the 
subject of dispute in a large number of cases. Courts however, have been unable to 
agree upon the basic elements of the two articles i.e. the idea of reasonable excuse, 
and the presumption that parties could not have been unaware. Unfortunately, the 
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legislative history of the articles is also not of much use in defining these vague 
terms. 
5.7.1 Interpretation of ‘could not have been unaware’ 
 
The most adjudicated upon issue – and indeed one that has given rise to the greatest 
degree of disagreement – within the realm of Article 40 is the standard of awareness 
required for its application.144  
 
One arbitration decision recognized the degree of disagreement that the term had 
generated and argued that a literal interpretation of the article would suggest that, in 
order to prevent the protections of Article 39 from becoming illusory, Article 40 
requires something more than a general awareness that goods manufactured by a 
seller “are not of the best quality or leave something to be desired.”145 It seems that 
while the tribunal saw no problem in finding the requirements of Article 40 to be met 
in cases of fraud, it could not view the application of the same in cases of gross 
negligence on the part of the seller.146 As such, the tribunal limited the application of 
the article to cases containing at least “deliberate negligence” as differentiated from 
“ordinary or gross negligence.”147 Professor Schwenzer seems to support such an 
interpretation of the article but lists guidelines in instances where knowledge can be 
presumed.148 
 
On the other hand, the court in The Cashmere Sweaters Case reached exactly the 
opposite conclusion. In this case, a German buyer, the defendant, ordered cashmere 
sweaters from an Italian seller, the plaintiff.149 The seller sued the buyer for the 
outstanding purchase price. The buyer sought set-off, claiming that the buyer had 
                                                     
144 Alejandro M. Garro, ‘The Buyer's Safety Valve under Article 40: What Is the Seller Supposed to 
Know and When’ (2005) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 253. 
145 CLOUT case No. 237 [Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Sweden, 5 
June 1998] <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980605s5.html> accessed: 17 April 2013. 
146 ibid. 
147 The tribunal concluded that the level of seller awareness of non-conformities that is required to 
trigger Article 40 is “conscious disregard of facts that meet the eyes and are of evident relevance to 
the non-conformity.” 
148 She lists: i) defective goods resold; ii) selling goods with defect that the seller should have been 
aware of on account of his duty to keep his product under observation; iii) defects discernible from 
superficial check or standard test if the seller is the manufacturer. Ingeborg Schwenzer in 
Schlechtriem (n 92) 323. 
149 CLOUT case No. 232 [Oberlandesgericht München, Germany, 11 March 1998] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980311g1.html> accessed: 17 April 2015. 
232 
 
notified the seller that the sweaters were defective. In ascertaining whether the 
requirements of Article 40 had been met, the court stated that Article 40 was 
applicable if the seller overlooked obvious defects in the goods that could have been 
detected through the exercise of ordinary care. 
 
The above two judgments reveal that there is a split between those who assert that 
the requirements of Article 40 are met if the seller’s ignorance is due to gross or even 
ordinary negligence, and those who would require something more, approaching 
deliberate negligence. Matters become more complicated when questions such as is 
the seller under a duty to investigate for the purposes of Article 40 arise. In other 
words, there is a split between those who argue that a seller is under no obligation to 
investigate for possible non-conformities, and those who assert that the seller must 
not ignore clues and may have a duty to examine the goods for lack of conformity in 
certain cases. Professor Schwenzer for instance goes beyond literal language of 
Article 40, suggesting that the seller has an obligation to examine the goods to 
ascertain their conformity.150 Other scholars have, however, taken a more flexible 
approach to the issue. Professor Huber, for instance, defines, “could not have been 
unaware” as “a little bit less than cunning and a little bit more than gross 
negligence.”151  
 
Lastly, the article is uncertain as to upon whom the burden of proving that the seller 
could not have been unaware rests. While there is no doubt that as a general rule of 
the Convention, the party benefiting from a claim must lift the burden of evidence to 
prove it, certain courts have found the burden to have shifted in certain 
circumstances. 152  
 
For instance, in a Dutch case concerning maggots in mozzarella, the Court allowed 
the buyer time to prove that the maggots were in the cheese at the time of shipment, 
and added in obiter dictum that if they succeeded the seller's knowledge would be 
                                                     
150 Ingeborg Schwenzer in Schlechtriem (n 92) 323. 
151 Huber, cited in Enderlein and Maskow (n 50) 164. 
152 CLOUT case No. 773 [Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 30 June 2004] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040630g1.html> accessed: 17 April 2013. 
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presumed.153 As such, the court was of the opinion that if the buyers are able to show 
that the obvious defect existed while the goods were still in the seller’s possession, 
then the burden of proof lies on the seller to prove that he did not know or could not 
have been aware. It may therefore be implied that the court viewed gross negligence 
on part of the seller to satisfy the requirements of Article 40. 
 
Partial reversal of the burden of proof due to a presumption of the seller's awareness 
under Article 40 is problematic since it is based upon the presumption that the 
provisions of Article 40 are met where the seller had been grossly negligent. Since 
questions of whether the existence of actual knowledge or opportunism is essential is 
still contested, it is almost impossible to gauge the legitimacy of the reversal of the 
burden of proof.  
 
While the travaux and the case law do not provide any meaningful guidance vis-à-vis 
the resolution of this issue, it is argued that the answer lies in the very wording of 
Article 40. This is simply recognition of the fact that the term “could not have been 
unaware” was chosen instead of terms more flexible in favor of the buyer such as 
“should have known.” While the latter would incorporate instances of negligence, 
the former clearly does not. Moreover, since the philosophy behind the incorporation 
of Article 40 was to punish instances of opportunism on part of the seller, it would 
logically follow that Article 40 should not apply where such opportunism cannot be 
proved. Moreover, such opportunism must be proved by the buyer on a balance of 
probabilities, and as such presumptions of opportunistic behavior are not sufficient 
to either satisfy the requirements of Article 40 or to shift the burden of proof on the 
seller.    
 
5.7.2 Article 44  
 
As discussed above, the delegates of developing states were concerned with the 
draconian effect of the failure to provide the required notice under Article 39. By 
way of compromise, Article 44 was drafted which allows the buyer to retain the 
                                                     
153 See CLOUT case No. 98 [Arrondissementrechtbank Roermond, Netherlands, 19 December 1991] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/911219n1.html> accessed: 17 April 2013. 
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remedies of price reduction and damages, except loss of profits, in cases where the 
buyer can provide a reasonable excuse for any failure to conform to the requirements 
of Article 39(1).154 
 
A lot of ink has been spilled in the ascertainment of what constitutes reasonable in 
this given context.155 This part of the paper however is concerned with the analysis 
of the utility of such a provision in the framework of Article 39 and 40. According to 
Professors Hurber and Schwenzer, the utility of this provision is found in instances 
where the buyer provides a notice but does not specify the nature of the non-
conformity with sufficient detail, or where the notice is provided slightly after the 
lapse of reasonable time.156 As explained above, concerns such as the size of the 
buyer’s business, the level of expertise of the buyer etc. are instrumental in the 
determination of the length of the reasonable time period contained in Article 39. As 
a result, in cases where the buyer has provided a notice and the same is found not to 
conform to the dictates of Article 39, it is difficult to see how the buyer could 
possibly avail the protection contained in Article 44 when it has provided the notice 
shortly after the end of the reasonable timeframe. In other words, since most 
considerations of what constitutes a reasonable excuse are already applied in the 
ascertainment of the reasonable time period, the possibility of the invocation of 
Article 44 and as a result its utility is questionable in cases where a notice has been 
provided but not in conformity with the dictates of Article 39.157  
 
The argument that Article 44 operates to protect the buyer in instances where it has 
provided a notice that does not list the non-conformity in sufficient detail is similarly 
unpersuasive. The utility of specifying the nature of the lack of conformity operates 
to aid the seller in sending and where required hiring the relevant specialist for 
examination of the alleged defect. Failing such specificity, the seller would 
                                                     
154 Article 44 has absolutely no impact on the requirements of Article 39(2), and as a result the 
remedies available to the buyer are restricted to the two-year timeframe. 
155 See, for example, Sanna Kuoppala, Examination of the Goods Under the CISG and the Finnish 
Sale of Goods Act (Turun yliopisto 2000); John C. Reitz, ‘A History of Cutoff Rules as a Form of 
Caveat Emptor: Part I-The 1980 UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods’ (1988) 36 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 437. 
156 Schwenzer/Hurber in Schlechtriem (n 92) Article 44. 
157 In the words of the AC: “[I]t may be questioned whether Article 44 added anything to the notice 
regime, since both Article 38 and Article 39 contain language that can fairly be interpreted to reach 
any result that Article 44 was intended to reach.” AC Opinion No. 2 (n 10). 
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potentially be disadvantaged since he or she would be exposed to a framework that 
may result in economic wastage to his or her detriment.158 Moreover, such specificity 
would enable the seller to substitute or repair the goods, where permitted by the 
circumstances. However, it would be wrong to conclude that absent such specificity 
in the notice, the seller would not be able to hire experts or cure the defects before 
the institution of legal proceedings. Rather, in this electronic age the seller can 
simply inquire details if required, on the receipt of the notice.159 Such inquiry would 
seldom carry high costs and resultantly seems to be preferable relative to a 
framework that obliges buyers to conform to a vague standard of specificity, failing 
which they lose the right to invoke certain remedies.  
 
In instances where the buyer has not provided a notice, the utility of Article 44 is 
similarly questionable. This is because Article 44 will only be invoked once the 
buyer has become aware of the non-conformity within two years of delivery. The 
question then is why the buyer would choose to invoke Article 44 rather than 
provide a notice under Article 39(1). Indeed, such a notice would be considered to be 
timely if the buyer has a reasonable excuse justifying the delay. 
 
Moreover, Article 44 does not preclude the duty to inspect the goods under Article 
38. As a result, omission to inspect the goods in a manner and time consistent with 
the circumstances of the case will bar the invocation of Article 44. In other words, if 
the buyer does inspect the goods in accordance with the requirements of Article 38 
and becomes aware of the defect there does not seem any reasonable reason why the 
buyer would not inform the seller of the same.160 
 
5.7.3 The Remedies Under Article 44 
 
Not allowing avoidance of contract where the buyer does have a reasonable excuse 
for non-compliance with the dictates of Article 39(1) makes sense from an efficiency 
                                                     
158 For instance, since the seller does not know the exact nature of the defect he or she might send the 
wrong experts for examination.  
159 Honnold (n 119) 277. 
160 Gabriel Moens argues that in such circumstances the buyer should not be allowed to invoke the 
provisions of Article 44 because he or she has “acted without the care required of a businessman.” 
This diminishes the reasonability of the excuse provided. Peter Gillies and Gabriël 
Moens, International Trade & Business Law & Policy (Routledge 1998) Section 3.3. 
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presepctive. Firstly, where the buyer avoids the contract, the goods are returned to 
the seller, who may find that he or she has lost the opportunity to dispose of them 
elsewhere as a result of passage of time.161 There are added concerns that the market 
price of the goods may have declined as a result of external factors – for example, 
newer innovations.162 Moreover, there is a possibility the seller would have lost 
claims of defects in the goods against the original manufacturer, and as such will not 
be able to pass the liability on to the original source.163 As a result, if the buyer is 
allowed to avoid the contract after the passage of considerable time after delivery,164 
the seller could potentially incur losses greater than that incurred by the buyer 
thereby decreasing the joint return from the sale. 
 
Similarly, there is economic value in not allowing claims for lost profits under 
Article 44. If the seller had been informed in a timely manner of the defects, the 
seller could have offered cure which would have saved consequential damages such 
as lost profits. The buyer should therefore not be allowed to avoid such losses since 
it is presumed that the seller was in a position to avoid the same if the seller had been 
made aware of the defects in a timely manner. On the other hand, the mitigation/cure 
rationale provides no grounds for protecting the seller from losses incurred as a 
result of non-conformity, which could not have been avoided through further acts of 
the seller.165 
 
Moreover, the utility of right of the buyer to reduce the price of the goods in such 
circumstances is questionable. Had the seller been offered the opportunity to cure the 
defects, the resultant loss to the buyer would have been less. It therefore seems that 
by invoking the remedy of price reduction under Article 44 read with Article 50, the 
buyer is relying on the a failure of the other party to perform, where the loss 
resulting from such failure was partially caused by the buyers’ omission of providing 
an opportunity to cure.166 In any case, such a remedy is subject to the rules of 
                                                     
161 This is especially true in the case of seasonal goods. 
162 Take for example the market for electronic goods which given the pace of innovations in 
technology is extremely volatile. 
163 This includes passing liability to the carrier for damages caused during transit. 
164 In any case less than two years. 
165 This statement is in line with the dictates of Article 77. 
166 Convention, Article 80. 
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mitigation contained in Article 77, and as a result the buyer can only reduce the price 
to the extent of damages incurred after mitigation.  
 
The provision of the right to claim damages other than lost profits however seems to 
be in line with the considerations underlying the framework of Articles 39, 40 and 
44. The objection to such recovery lies in the fact that the seller has lost the 
opportunity to collect rebuttal evidence. Thus, even though the onus of proving the 
quantum of loss rests on the buyer, the seller’s ability to defend him- or herself from 
trumped-up cases is severely undermined. The question then is whether the prejudice 
to the seller as a result of not being provided the remedy to collect evidence 
outweighs the advantages to the buyer of retention of right to claim damages other 
than loss of profits. Professor Reitz, for instance, argues that the loss of evidence 
rationale does not apply in a majority of commercial cases involving technical goods 
since buyers usually rely on impartial third party expert evidence.167 In any case, a 
review of case law on the article reveals that courts correctly begin with the 
assumption that the goods were not defective at the time of delivery.  
Moreover, courts tend to raise the presumption that the lesser the persuasive value of 
the reasonability of the delay, the greater the presumption that the buyer’s claim is 
unfounded. Taken together, such a methodology of the interpretation of the article 
seems to counter-balance the prejudice the seller faces due to his or her inability to 
collect evidence in a timely fashion.   
 
In any case, the article does undermine the possibility of repose. In the words of 
Professor Schlechtriem: 
Protection of the seller's interest in regarding the transaction as fully 
completed may put a considerable burden on the seller, particularly because 
‘reasonable excuse for his failure to give the required notice’ is indefinite and 
open to an interpretation favorable to the buyer. Certainly there is some 
danger that buyers may assert non-conformity for two years and, on the basis 
of Article 44, withhold remaining payments or take recourse against 
securities (suretyships or guarantees).168 
                                                     
167 Reitz (n 155) 441. 
168  Schlechtriem (n 8) 69-70. 
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Professor Huber argues that the only instance where Article 44 would provide some 
value to the parties is instances where an expert is hired to carry out the examination 
and fails to identify the lack of conformity. A differentiation is to be created between 
instances where both parties have agreed upon the nomination of a particular expert 
and where the buyer unilaterally nominates an expert. In the former case, it can be 
stated that since both parties had agreed that the inspection would be carried out by a 
neutral inspection body, the buyer cannot be stated to have taken on the liability of 
bearing the consequences of an incorrect examination alone and thus would have a 
reasonable excuse for the non-timely provision of the notice.169 It is however 
difficult to see why this reasoning cannot be applied to the calculation of reasonable 
time under Article 39. Indeed in such circumstances it cannot be said that the buyer 
ought to have discovered the defect in accordance with Article 38, at the time of 
inspection by the mutually nominated expert.170 As a result, the reasonable period 
would begin to run from the date that the non-conformity was actually discovered. 
As such, the utility of Article 44 in such circumstances seems doubtful.171 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
 
The interpretation of the articles concerning the requirement of the provision of a 
notice must give due regard to the realities of commercial transactions. Failing this, 
parties would be motivated to contract around the rules of the Convention on the 
matter. It is therefore argued that an appropriate interpretation of the dictates of 
Article 39 must take the circumstances of each case into account. Consequently, an 
interpretation of the specificity requirement of Article 39 that places too heavy a 
burden on the buyer, regardless of the buyer’s characteristics, should not be 
preferred. This is because, an approach requiring a high degree of specificity ignores 
the commercial reality which the Convention is meant to govern, to the extent that 
the identity and nature of the parties involved are not taken into account. This 
omission in analysis places obligations upon the parties which they are not well 
                                                     
169 This reasoning was adopted in Arbitral Award No. 9187 June 1999 ICC.  
170 This is simply a result of the fact that the buyer does not bear the liability of wrongful inspection. 
171 Sonja Kruisinga, (Non-) conformity in the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods: A Uniform Concept? (Vol. 46, Intersentia nv 2004) 122. 
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suited to fulfil. As such, buyers should only be obligated to inform the seller of all 
defects known to them.172 This rule should be complemented with the assumptions 
that: (a) expert/skilled buyers are presumed to know details of the nonconformity 
with greater precision than unsophisticated ones, and (b) cases involving  generic 
goods require nonconformity to be specified with a greater degree of precision than 
technical ones.     
Requiring a high degree of specificity regardless of the characteristics of the buyer, 
is difficult to justify, when one weighs the prejudice to the buyer as a result of such a 
rule, against that of the seller in the absence of such a rule. This is so that the seller 
does not seem to lose any of the protections afforded to him by the notice 
requirement, as a result of the buyer’s lack of precision in detailing the non-
conformity.  
In this context, it makes logical sense to limit the application of the dictates of 
Article 39, in instances where the seller knew or could not have been unaware of the 
lack of conformity of the goods.173 Indeed, where the seller is aware of the non-
conformity, the notice requirement will simply operate to increase transaction costs – 
for example, through costs incurred in drafting the notice itself. Moreover, if notice 
is to be required even in instances where the seller was aware of the non-conformity, 
the seller could act in bad faith at the expense of the buyer i.e. he or she would be 
motivated to act in an opportunistic manner. 
The dictates of Article 44 on the other hand are concerned with the bona fide 
intentions of the buyer. Accordingly, Article 44 allows the buyer to retain the 
remedies of reduction of price and damages where the buyer can provide a 
reasonable excuse for failure to provide a timely notice. It is argued that if the 
dictates of Article 39 are interpreted with due regard to the circumstances of the 
case, article 44 would add little to the framework of the requirement of notice. 
However, the article does provide a failsafe in instances where courts incorrectly 
interpret the requirements of Article 39. In any case, the articles analysed in this 
chapter, if interpreted appropriately, would go a long way in increasing the 
efficiency of the agreement.  
                                                     
172 A list of symptoms satisfies this requirement. 
173 Convention, Article 40. 
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Chapter 6 Rate of Interest under Article 78 
 
 
“[The] view that there is a true gap in the Convention within the meaning of Article 
7(2) so that the applicable interest rate should possibly be determined autonomously 
in conformity with the general principles underlying the Convention is to be 
preferred, not least because the immediate recourse to a particular domestic law may 
lead to results which are incompatible with the principle embodied in Art. 78 of the 
CISG, at least in the cases where the law in question expressly prohibits the payment 
of interest”1 
Introduction: 
 
The value of British sterling today is not the same as its value a year from now.2 This 
variation in the value of currency implies that the present value of money is itself an 
object of worth, and as such, a party that has unjustly been deprived of it must be 
compensated for its loss.3 One mechanism used by court to achieve this is the 
principle of interest.  Ideally therefore, interest should operate to place the parties in 
the same position as they would have been had the breaching party paid sums to the 
injured party as soon as they became payable.   
 
Michael Knoll, in his paper ‘A Primer on Prejudgment Interest’, argues that the basic 
objective of awarding interest can be summed under the headings of fairness and 
efficiency.4 Fairness, he argues simply requires that the injured party be 
compensated for the loss it has incurred as a result of delay in payment.5 Efficiency, 
as used by him, demands that the breaching party be incentivised to act in good 
                                                     
1 See CLOUT case No. 93 [Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen 
Wirtschaft - Wien, Austria, 15 June 1994] <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940615a3.html> 
accessed: 9 August 2014. 
2 The difference between the two values is called the discount rate, i.e. the rate of change of the value 
of a pound in a year. 
3 See Procter & Gamble Distributing Co. v. Sherman, 2 F.2d 165 (S.D. New York 1924). 
4 Michael S. Knoll, ‘A Primer on Prejudgment Interest’ (1996) 75 Texas Law Review 293. 
5 ibid 295-296. 
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faith.6 As in the commercial world, funds can only be borrowed on terms that require 
the payment of interest; the breaching party is unjustly enriched if it is only required 
to pay back the principal to the injured party. In such a scenario, interest operates to 
ensure that parties to a contract are not motivated to delay payment and take 
reasonable precautions.7 Moreover, the efficiency rationale also operates to motivate 
parties not abuse the judicial process by stretching out litigation on one pretext or the 
other. In other words, since delay in judgment would simply translate into the 
defendant having use of interest free funds, the breaching party would be 
incentivised to stretch out the litigation process, thereby benefiting at the expense of 
the injured party.8 As such, interest operates to de-incentivise parties from acting 
opportunistically and delaying payment of sums in arrears, 9 by obligating the debtor 
to completely compensate the creditor. Part 1 of this chapter will analyse the travaux 
of Article 78 in order to show that the objectives that the drafters of the article 
wished to achieve can, in part, be summed up into these categories. 
 
Predictably, an incorrect calculation of the Rate of Interest (ROI) does little in the 
achievements of the goals which led to the incorporation of the concept in the 
Convention. Under the Convention, the right to recover interest on sums that are in 
arrears is contained in Article 7810. Unfortunately the article is silent as to the 
methodology that is to be adopted in the ascertainment of the rate at which interest is 
to be charged.11 In the words of Professor Ziegel, the article is “more conspicuous 
for the questions it fails to answer than the questions it answers”.12The article reads 
“If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the other party is 
                                                     
6 ibid. The term efficiency/good faith as used by Knoll can be equated to barring opportunistic 
behaviour.  
7 See James A. Henderson Jr., ‘Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of 
Corporate Rationality’ (1983) 58 New York University Law Review 765.  
8 Of course, stretching out litigation would only be beneficial where the rate of interest generally 
charged to the breaching party on loans exceeds litigation costs.  
9 See Geoffrey P. Miller, ‘Issues in Civil Procedure: Advancing the Dialogue A Symposium: 
Comment: Some Thoughts on the Equilibrium Hypothesis’ (1989) 69 Boston University Law Review 
561. 
10 Article 78 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Convention’) reads: “If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum 
that is in arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on it, without prejudice to any claim for 
damages recoverable under article 74”.  
11 John Y. Gotanda, ‘When Recessions Create Windfalls: The Problems of Using Domestic Law to 
Fix Interest Rates under Article 78 CISG’ (2009) 13 The Vindobona Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Arbitration 229. 
12 Jacob S. Ziegel, ‘Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods’ (University of Toronto, July 1981) 149. 
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entitled to interest on it, without prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable 
under article 74.”13  
 
The lack of guidance as to the method of calculating the applicable ROI has resulted 
in the formation of various techniques to ascertain the same. Given the nature of 
commercial transactions, it seems necessary that the parties to a dispute should able 
to concretely identify their rights and obligations under the law; the same is not 
possible where the applicable law is the Convention. This fact is made clear by a 
review of the case law on article 78. 
 
 While most courts, particularly German and Swiss tribunals have applied the 
dictates of domestic law14; others, though a minority, have found the dictates of the 
Convention concrete enough in formulating the appropriate ROI.15  Proponents of 
both these approaches however, agree that the drafters were unable to agree upon a 
methodology for the ascertainment of the ROI, and as such there are difficulties in 
identifying the appropriate ROI via implication. 
 
This fact should however, not be interpreted to mean that the travaux do not provide 
any guidance on the matter16. On the contrary, this paper asserts that travaux provide 
a comprehensive list of guidelines that must be followed in the ascertainment of the 
appropriate ROI. Indeed, the Vienna Convention allows recourse to be made to the 
travaux, in instances where the application of the elements contained in Article 31 of 
that convention leave the meaning obscure.17  
 
Recourse to the travaux is of particular importance in the case of Article 78. This is 
so as, unlike various lacunae in the Convention, the issue of ROI was extensively 
                                                     
13 CISG, Article 78  
14 There are two generally cited reasons for this approach: 1) The calculation of the ROI has been left 
outside the scope of the Convention or 2) There are no concretely ascertainable general principles of 
the Convention capable of providing a methodology for the calculation of the interest rate. 
15 Francesco G. Mazzotta, ‘CISG Article 78: The Endless Disagreement Among the Commentators, 
Much Less Among the Courts’ in Pace International Law Review (ed), Review of the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 2003-2004. See also, Liu Chengwei, ‘Recovery 
of Interest’ [2003] Nordic Journal of Commercial Law of the University of Turku 1 
16 Professor Honnold is amongst those who believe that the travaux provide ‘little or no guidance’ on 
the issue.  John Honnold and Harry M. Flechtner, Uniform Law of International Sales (Kluwer Law 
International 2009) 603. 
17 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
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debated during the drafting stages of the Convention. As such, a great degree of 
guidance is contained in the travaux in the form of policy consideration behind the 
tabling of alternative approaches on the matter and the respective criticisms levied 
against the same.  
 
Moreover, this thesis maintains that a precondition to the achievement of the 
objectives of uniformity in this area of law is the recognition of foreign judgments 
by courts.18 While a review of the case law on the issue does reveal the creation of a 
trend of referring to, or at least recognising, the dictates of foreign decisions on the 
issues under review, it is argued that the true achievement of the goal of uniformity 
requires a step further i.e. wide ranging acceptance of a particular interpretation. 
While demands for such acceptance might well be a bit too idealistic, maybe even 
bordering on naivety, there can be no doubt that the achievement of that goal cannot 
occur so long as interpretations do not address criticisms that led to the rejection of 
various formulations during the drafting stages. The next part of this paper shall 
therefore attempt to highlight the guiding principles behind the respective criticisms 
levied upon the various formulations tabled during the drafting of Article 78.  
6.1 Part 1: Travaux of Article 78 
 
6.1.1 The Working Group (1974) 
 
The issue of interest arose at the Fifth Session of the Working Group in 1974.19 
Since the objective of the Working Group was to consider recommendations from 
states on existing texts to make them acceptable to a larger number of states or 
alternatively, ascertaining whether a new text would be necessary, an obvious 
starting point on the issue of interest was Article 83 of the ULIS. Article 83 read:  
Where the breach of contract consists of delay in the payment of the price, 
the seller shall in any event be entitled to interest on such sum as is in arrears 
at a rate equal to the official discount rate in the country where he has his 
                                                     
18 See Convention, Article 7 (1). 
19 Also John O. Honnold, Documentary History of the 1980 Uniform Law for International Sales: 
Studies, Deliberations and Decisions That Led to the 1980 United Nations Convention with 
Introductions and Explanations (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 1989) 175. 
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place of business or, if he has no place of business, his habitual residence, 
plus 1%.20  
 
Interestingly the Working Group adopted the article, which clearly stipulated a 
methodology for the calculation of the ROI, without any change at that session.21 In 
fact, the travaux reveal that once the fact that the Convention would govern interest 
was established, it seemed obvious to the drafters that the same would include a 
methodology to calculate the same. Moreover, as shall be detailed bellow, 
subsequent attempts to exclude such a methodology from the ambit of the article on 
interest were vehemently opposed. 
 
The Working Group at its Sixth Session made a substantial change to the text of 
Article 83 by importing the stipulation that the ROI shall in no case be lower than 
the Rate Applied to Unsecured Short Term Commercial Credit (RASCC) in the 
creditor’s country.22 The amendment was based on concerns of fairness i.e. the 
adoption of a methodology that calculates interest at the official discount rate would 
not adequately compensate a creditor who would have possibly been forced to 
borrow at higher rates applied to commercial credits as a result of delay in 
payment.23 Moreover, there were concerns relating to opportunism, I.e. the 
calculation of interest on the basis of official discount rate might enable a debtor to 
take advantage of the lower rate (relative to the RASCC) and delay payment.24  
 
It is essential to note that the concern that the methodology would result in 
incentivising delay in payment did not arise from objections against unjust 
enrichment of the buyer; but was rather phrased in terms of hindering the objective 
of complete compensation of the injured party. This is not to say that unjust 
enrichment was not a concern during this stage of drafting, but simply to point out 
                                                     
20 Article 83 of the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods 1964, 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘ULIS’). 
21 See Doc. A (9) V YB 44 A/CN.9/87.  
22 See Doc. A (11) VI YB 62 A/CN.9/100. Note Article 83 of the ULIS made reference to the 
payment of interest to the seller on payment of price in arrears.  
23 ibid. 
24 ibid. 
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that the same was a subordinate to the primary driving motivation of ensuring 
complete compensation.25  
 
6.1.2 Committee deliberations on the UNCITRAL “Sales” Draft (1977) 
 
Concerns surrounding unjust enrichment of the debtor under the methodology 
adopted by the ULIS properly surfaced during the Committee Deliberations on the 
Sales Draft.26  It was primarily on these grounds that certain proposals tabled during 
this stage were rejected. For instance the proposal that the place of calculation of 
ROI should be the debtors country was rejected by the committee on the basis that if 
the ROI prevailing at the debtor’s country was less than that prevailing in the 
creditors, then the debtor would be incentivised to delay payment since he would 
have use of funds at a lower cost than his own cost of capital.27 As such, any 
formulation of ascertainment of the ROI that potentially could unjustly enrich the 
debtor was not acceptable to the majority of the members of the Committee.28 
 
Moreover, the concern that the payment of interest at the RASCC in the creditor’s 
place of business may translate into a penalty on the debtor, was not afforded much 
attention.29 For illustrations let’s suppose that the debtors’ cost of capital is X 
whereas that of the creditor is Y.  If Y>X and the debtor is forced to pay interest at 
                                                     
25 For an account on how the drafters viewed the goal of unjust enrichment to be subordinate to that of 
complete compensation in the drafting of article 78 see Opinion Number 14 of the Advisory Council. 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 14, Interest under Article78 CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Doctor Yesim M. 
Atamer, Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey. Adopted unanimously by the CISG Advisory Council 
following its 18th meeting, in Beijing, China on 21 and 22 October 2013 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op14.html> accessed: 13 August 2014. 
26 See Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary Records of Meetings of 
the First Committee, 34th meeting, A/CONF.97/C.1/L.247 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting34.html> accessed: 13 August 2014 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th Meeting’); Legislative History, 1980 
Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary Records of Meetings of the First Committee, 37th meeting 
A/CONF.97/C.1/L.248/Add.2 and Add.3 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting37.html> accessed: 13 August 2014 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 37th Meeting’); Doc. C(4) O.R. 390. 
27 See for example the comment made by the delegate of Ghana at the 34th Meeting of the First 
Committee where he stated: “Alternative I in particular might lead the debtor to fail to pay the price or 
any other sum in arrears in order to have cheap credit.” (Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34 th 
Meeting) Para. 15; Honnold, (n 19) 353. 
28 The proposal whereby the place of calculation of the ROI would be the debtor’s country was 
rejected was rejected by 15 votes to 8. 
29 For instance where the rate of commercial credits at the debtor’s country is lower than that in the 
creditors state.  
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the rate of Y then the debtor is penalized since it could have borrowed the amount at 
the lower rate of X30. In other words, since restitution demands the payment at X, the 
debtor is penalized to the extent of (Y-X) when he is forced to pay interest at the rate 
of Y. It therefore transpires that from the very beginning, the provision on interest on 
sums in arrears was tailored to ensure that the claimant be fully compensated and the 
debtor is not unjustly enriched even if the same amounted to a penalty on the debtor. 
Various other concerns however, forced the Committee to omit the article from the 
1977 Sales Draft. These concerns can be summed up under the umbrella of 
‘terminological concerns’ and ‘public policy concerns’. 
 
6.1.2.1 Terminological concerns:  
 
The provision on interest, under deliberation at the Sessions of the Committee, made 
reference to the official discount rate and the RASCC. Various delegates observed 
that the former term lacked certainty since various countries did not have an official 
discount rate.31 This issue was of minor consequence, as the second part of the article 
calculating interest at RASCC would automatically become applicable since the 
creditors entitlement under the second part would be more than the interest payable 
in instances where the official discount rate did not exist. As such, no material issue 
would arise if the RASCC in the seller’s country could easily be calculated. Certain 
delegates however, pointed out that the RASCC was a variable rate, calculated upon 
the basis of the nature of sales and the parties involved. 32  
 
As such the variable nature of the RASCC led various delegates to assert that the use 
of the rate in formulating a methodology to calculate the ROI would generate 
uncertainty, and would seldom result in the complete compensation of the creditor. 
This thesis argues that the use of the RASCC in devising a methodology under 
article 78 is permissible since methodologies to calculate the same, with reasonable 
accuracy, have been devised by financial-economists for decades33. In response to 
                                                     
30 The term ‘penalized’ is used here to refer to any sums the debtor may be forced to pay over that 
which is demanded by restitution. 
31 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th Meeting (n 26). 
32 ibid. Considerations such as the credit history of the debtor and the quality of the collateral 
provided have a bearing on the rate at which short term commercial credit is extended.  
33 See for instance Robert C. Merton, ‘On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of 
Interest Rates’ (1974) 29 Journal of Finance 449. 
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the concern that the RASCC is based upon the characteristics of the parties, Part 2 
shall identify factors associated with characteristics of the parties that must be 
represented in the interest rate calculation and how the RASCC incorporates the 
same34. In order to put to rest the concerns surrounding the possibility that a variable 
rate might not adequately compensate the parties Part 3 of this thesis shall show how 
a short-term floating interest rate is preferable to a fixed one. 
 
6.1.2.2 Public Policy Concerns: 
 
It was noted that inclusion of a provision on interest may make it extremely difficult 
for certain states that either outlawed the charging of interest entirely or placed a cap 
on the amount of interest recoverable, to become signatories of the Convention.35 
Take for instance the case of Egypt, a signatory to the Convention.36 Under Egyptian 
national law, the charging of interest while allowed is severely circumscribed.37 
Under the Egyptian Civil Code, interest accrues incrementally at the rate of 4% civil 
suits and 5% on commercial suits. Moreover, the parties may agree to a ROI, but the 
same cannot exceed 7% or accrue to exceed the principal.38 
 
Given these concerns, the delegation of the United Kingdom proposed placing the 
issue of interest rate outside the scope of the Convention.39 Such a stance, it was 
thought, would enable states with public policy concern over the issue to adopt the 
Convention without demanding the right of reservation to the article under 
consideration.40 Moreover, adoption of the recommendation would bridge the gap 
                                                     
34 For instance, the likelihood that the debtor may default as a result of bankruptcy. 
35 See for example the comment of the Delegate of Egypt in 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34 th 
Meeting (n 26), Para 10. 
36 The Convention entered into effect in Egypt on the 1st of January 1988. 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html> accessed: 13 August 2014. 
37 See John Y. Gotanda, ‘Awarding Interest in International Arbitration’, (1996) 90 The American 
Journal of International Law 40, 47.  
38 Article 226 of The Civil Code of The Arab Republic Of Egypt 1949. 
39 The proposal read: “This Convention does not affect any right of the seller or buyer to recover 
interest on money”. (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.226) in 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th Meeting (n 
26), Para. 12. 
40 Mr. Nicholas, the British delegate, stated that the present text was unsatisfactory in that it required 
the seller to pay interest on refunds, but there was no corresponding obligation laid on the buyer who 
was late in paying the price. He noted that a solution would be to include a general provision for the 
recovery of interest on all sums in arrears, however previous experience convinced him that it would 
be unrealistic to hope to reach a generally acceptable text within the ambit of the Diplomatic 
Conference. Therefore, the only practical solution was to leave it to the applicable national law 
(Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th Meeting); Mr. Date-Bah, the Ghana delegate, stated that interest 
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between the stances adopted by the western and socialist states, by allowing recourse 
to domestic law through the application of the rules of Private International Law 
(PIL).  This recommendation however was rejected by a large number of delegates 
who believed that the omission of the subject from the Convention would act a 
barrier to the Conventions’ objective of uniformity.41 
 
Given the lack of consensus on any of the various proposals put forth during the 
Diplomatic Conference, the Committee attempted to formulate provision that 
essentially consolidated the dictates of the preceding proposals. The ad hoc Working 
Group charged with this task returned with three alternative texts.42 The first of these 
texts adopted a methodology that would calculate interest at the RASCC at the main 
domestic financial center of the party claiming payment.43 Like the previous 
proposals, this proposal was rejected on the grounds that the methodology could 
potentially allow a party to benefit by operating opportunistically.44 For instance a 
debtor could intentionally delay payment in order to benefit from the lower interest 
rate prevailing at the creditors’ country.   
 
Another concern surrounding the acceptance of the ROI prevailing in the creditor’s 
country was the fact that it did not always reflect the commercial reality of the 
agreement.  Mr Wagner, the delegate of the German Democratic Republic for 
instance stated that various developing and socialist countries pay for their imports 
from their foreign trade earnings.45 As such, a delay in payment would force such 
                                                     
should be paid, but the subject was too complicated to be encompassed by a single uniform rule. Not 
only did national policies and structures of interest differ, but commercial interest usually operated at 
several levels (Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th Meeting); Mr. Wagner, the German Democratic 
Republic delegate, stated that interest was a matter on which differences between economic systems 
were involved and it would be impossible to find an equitable solution (Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference, 34th Meeting). 
41 ibid. Mr. Hjerner, the Swedish delegate for instance, stated that the main difficulty with the United 
Kingdom proposal was that it would tend to lead to difficulties in regard to conflicting legislations.  
42 (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.247). 
43 Alternative 1 reads: “If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the other 
party is entitled to interest thereon at the rate for a short-term commercial credit or at another similar 
appropriate rate prevailing in the main domestic financial centre of the party claiming payment.” 
Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, G. Report of the First Committee [Outline 
of committee proceedings] Document A/CONF.97/11 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/1stcommittee/summaries78,84.html> accessed: 17 August 2014 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th Meeting). 
44 Alternative 1 was rejected by 22 votes to 17 (Vienna Diplomatic Conference). 
45 Mr Wagner, the delegate of the German Democratic Republic (Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th 
Meeting) Para 6. 
250 
 
countries to seek credit from international markets. Consequently, the application of 
the ROI prevailing in the country of the creditor would not result in the 
compensation of the creditor thereby violating the fairness criteria.46  
 
The second alternative put forth by the ad hoc Working Group read: 
If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the other 
party is entitled to interest thereon at the rate for a short-term commercial 
credit or at another similar appropriate rate prevailing in the main domestic 
financial center of the party in default, or, in case the other party’s actual 
credit costs are higher, at a rate corresponding thereto but not at a rate higher 
than the first said rate in his own country.47 
 
This proposal attempted to set aside the deficiencies of proposal one, by formulating 
a methodology of interest rate calculation that would bar a creditor whose place of 
business is in a western state from delaying payment in order to take advantage of 
the lower interest rate prevailing in his country. Moreover, the proviso to the 
proposal addressed the concerns of certain developed states i.e. they could 
potentially be undercompensated where their actual credit costs were higher than 
what was recoverable under the RASCC in the debtor’s country. This was achieved 
by allowing recovery up to the RASCC prevailing at the creditor’s country. As such 
this proposal attempted to address all fairness and efficiency related concerns that 
had led to the rejection of previous proposals. 
 
While this proposal received overwhelming support from socialist and developing 
states, western-industrialized states seemed to be skeptical of the methodology 
adopted under the proposal. 48 Opposition to the proposal was based upon the fact 
that even though the alternative allowed a creditor to recover interest at the rate at 
which he would theoretically be able to raise the sum in arrears from the domestic 
financial market; it did not represent the reality of financial markets.49 This is so as 
the prevailing rate of short-term commercial credits is applied for the most solvent 
                                                     
46 See Doc. C(4) O.R. 416 
47 See Doc. C(5) O.R. 138.  
48 Honnold, (n 19) at 636 
49 See the comment of Professor Ziegel the delegate of Canada, (Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th 
Meeting) Para 22. 
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borrower and as such, there could be various instances where the injured party’s 
actual credit costs were higher than what was represented by the RASCC. As a 
result, there could be instances where the RASCC would not adequately compensate 
the creditor.50 On the basis of this concern, this chapter argues that reference to the 
prime rate is only justified where the party whose cost of capital is being referred to 
can actually raise funds without security at that rate.51 In cases involving small 
corporations that cannot raise sums at the prime rate, one of two approaches may be 
adopted. First, reference can be made to the rate at which the party whose cost of 
capital is being referred to, can or is borrowing. Where this is not possible, the 
objective of compensation demands that the prime rate be adjusted to reflect the risk 
that creditor is subjected to52.  
 
Though the third alternative represented little more than a rewording of the 
methodology adopted in alternative 2, it did not garner much support. When the 
three alternatives were put to vote at the Conference the first and the third were 
rejected, while the second alternative was accepted with twenty in favour and 
fourteen against. 53 Though the outcome of the voting seems to suggest that the 
delegates had found a compromise solution capable of majority acceptance, it was 
decided that the article be sent to the Drafting Committee before being voted upon at 
the Plenary Conference. The task handed to the Drafting Committee was one of form 
rather than substance, i.e. the committee was only tasked with removing the use of 
technical language from the text of the article.54   
The Committee however went beyond the task it had been delegated with, and 
returned an article the text of which raised more ambiguity than the text that was 
handed to the Committee in the first place.55 Unsurprisingly, the text came under 
                                                     
50 ibid. 
51 The prime rate is the obvious proxy since there is little risk that the company will default. 
52 For a very good account on how the prime rate can be adjusted see Knoll (n 4) 
53 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th Meeting.  
54 ibid.  
55 U.N. Document A/CONF.97/11/Add.1 and 2 (April 4, 1980) quoted in Mazzotta (n 15). It reads: “If 
a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on 
it at the normal rate for a short-term commercial credit prevailing in the main financial centre in the 
State where the party in default has his place of business or, in the absence of such a rate, at another 
similar appropriate rate prevailing in that centre. (2) However, if the other party's actual credit costs 
are higher, he is entitled to interest on the sum in arrears at a rate corresponding to such credit costs, 
but not in excess of the rate defined in the preceding paragraph prevailing in the main financial centre 
in the State where he has his place of business.”  
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attack from various delegates, at the Conference’s Tenth Plenary Meeting, on 
grounds of it being vague and uncertain.56 
 
Given the difficulty of finding a methodology that would be acceptable to the 
delegates, the Working Group decided to recommend a provision based on the 
highest common factor. According to Mr Khoo, the Singapore delegate and 
Chairman of the Working Group on interest, the common factor in this case was the 
recognition of the fact that the Convention should at least contain a clear statement 
on the question of interest, even if the same is silent as to the methodology to 
calculate it.57  
 
The resulting article read “If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in 
arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on it, without prejudice to any claim for 
damages recoverable under article 74”.58 As such even though the drafters were 
unable to agree upon a methodology whereby interest rate could be determined, they 
agreed that the question of a party’s right to recover interest should remain within the 
scope of the Convention. The basic reason for this demand was to ensure that interest 
rate is not treated simply as a part of damages; the stance adopted by the domestic 
law of various delegates. As such, Article 78 should not be simplified to merely 
symbolize the fact that the drafters wished to make the question of a party’s 
entitlement to interest, one that is governed by the Convention. Rather, the method 
of recognition of this right sheds light on the fact that the drafters were in fact, 
setting in stone one of the elements of the calculation of the ROI. The ‘method’ here 
was the separation of the right of interest from the heading of damages whereby the 
right of interest was unaffected by defences based upon article 79 and became 
                                                     
56 Mr. Nicholas, the British delegate, stated that “the text was neither satisfactory nor applicable. Its 
authors had indicated that one of its main qualities was its great flexibility. As regarded flexibility, 
however, the text contained such ambiguities that it would inevitably give rise to controversies and 
disputes, and thus to divergent interpretations, depending on national 
legislations.” A/CONF.97/11/Add.2, p.13; A/CONF.97/L.16, L.17 and L.18; Mr. Lebedev, the Soviet 
delegate, stated that “the existing text was incompatible with the objective sought, namely to develop, 
in clear and precise terms, a formula for the calculation of interest. The wording, instead of settling 
the situation in a uniform and clear manner, introduced uncertainties under the guise of 
flexibility”. Ibid. Mr. Sam, the Ghana delegate, stated that “some of the expressions used such as 
main financial centre or interest at a rate corresponding to the actual credit costs required 
clarification”. Ibid. 
57 Alternative 2, U.N. Document A/CONF.97/C.1/L.247 Report Of The First Committee To The 
Plenary Conference (A/CONF.97/11/Add.2). 
58 Convention, Article 78  
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recoverable without proof of fault. As such, the drafters were able to ensure that 
recovery of interest would be immune to any framework that limited the same to 
considerations of proof, contributory negligence and delay.59 It is therefore asserted 
that while the Convention does not expressly set a mechanism whereby the ROI can 
concretely be ascertained, it is definitely not completely silent on the contours of 
such a mechanism.  
 
It is essential to note that while concerns that the creditor may be forced to raise 
capital at higher costs than the RASCC in the country where it has its place of 
business,60 as a result of the breach, were ‘in issue’ while the article was being 
debated, they ceased to be so. With over a quarter of a century with experimenting 
with the provisions of the Convention, the interplay between different articles of the 
Convention has become increasingly clear. So has the fact that the fabric that ties 
article 74, 75 and 76 with article 78 addresses these concerns.61  
 
In a nutshell, Article 78 allows for interest to be awarded “without prejudice to any 
claim for damages recoverable under article 74”. As such, if a party is able to meet 
the requirements for the claim of damages under Section 2 of the Convention, then 
any recognizable loss can be recovered.62 Thus if a party is forced to seek credit form 
international market, or raise funds at a higher rate than the debtors’ cost of capital as 
a result of delay in payment the ROI charged thereunder can be recovered under 
article 74. As such, this is not a matter of concern of the ROI under article 78.  
One possible criticism to this argument is the fact that since Article 78 recognizes the 
right of interest regardless of the defenses of article 79 or the requirements of article 
74, denying the right to claim interest at the rate charged upon the addition sums that 
                                                     
59 Since the judgement in Allen v Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Limited [1968] 2 QB 229 various 
common law courts have limited the claim of interest where there has been unjustifiable delay in 
claiming the same. A similar approach has been adopted in cases of contributory negligence. See 
Quorum AS v Shramm (2001) 19 Construction Law Journal 224 where the court stated “Delay should 
only be characterised as unreasonable for present purposes when, after making due allowance for the 
circumstances, it can be seen that the claimant has neglected or declined to pursue his claim for a 
significant period.” 
60 For example, in instances where the parties are forced to seek credit from international trade 
markets as a result of the delay in payment. 
61 For a discussion on the link between these Articles see n 25. 
62 For an account on the requirements under section 2 of the Convention see Jeffrey S. Sutton, 
‘Measuring Damages under the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods’ (1989) 50 Ohio State Law Journal 737. 
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had to be borrowed from international markets is tantamount to restricting the right 
to interest. This thesis however, maintains that no possible formulation of calculating 
the ROI that calls for the application of RASCC of foreign markets is possible 
without the precondition that the procurement of the same be proved. Allowing 
otherwise would equate to the provisions of the freedom of parties to unilaterally 
choose the rate at which to claim interest. That is to say that if a party does not have 
to prove loss caused as a result of having to borrow funds at a particular rate, it could 
potentially be motivated to act opportunistically by claiming the most favourable 
RASCC of foreign markets.63  Moreover, while Article 74 provides a mechanism to 
the injured party to claim any losses incurred, no such mechanism exists for a party 
that could wrongfully be forced to pay interest at the rate of the other party’s 
choosing.  
 
6.1.3 Conclusion: 
1. Proposed solutions revolved around the formation of a methodology that 
would primarily ensure that 
 The injured party is completely compensated while the debtor is not 
unjustly enriched. It should be noted that article 78 gives greater 
weight to compensation of the creditor than it gives to disgorgement 
of profits from the debtor. 
 The potential of opportunistic behaviour is restricted. 
2. The use of RASCC is devising a methodology under article 78 is permissible 
if the same can concretely be identified and does not deprive the claimant of 
complete compensation.   
3. The ROI should not over-compensate the injured party. 
6.2 Part 2 Case Law and scholarly opinion  
 
Various courts and commentators point towards the dictates of domestic law for the 
determination of the interest rate before attempting to identify whether there are any 
general principles upon which the Convention is based, that would be capable of 
                                                     
63 For instance this was one of the major grounds for the rejection of alternative 1 put forth by the Ad 
Hoc Working Group. 
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providing a methodology for the calculation of the ROI. Proponents of this approach 
base their argument on one of the following views: 
 
6.2.1 The issue of interest lies squarely outside the scope of the Convention: 
Various tribunals have applied the dictates of domestic law in the belief that the 
entire issue of ROI is not governed by the Convention64; as opposed to the majority 
view that the issue is governed by, though not expressly settled in the Convention.65 
Take for instance the case decided by of Landgericht [District Court] Aachen.66 Here 
the court stated: 
It has been argued that the interest rate must be determined by having 
recourse to the general principles of the CISG in order to achieve an 
internationally uniform regulation. Against this, it has been argued that a 
uniform solution could not be achieved at the conferences for the drafting of 
the CISG, as the different opinions about the interest obligation were 
irreconcilable… Preferable is the opinion that the interest rate is to be taken 
from the applicable national law supplementing the CISG, which in turn is to 
be determined in accordance with the conflict of laws rules of the forum 
State.67 
 
Given that the Travaux reveal that proposals tabled during the drafting stages 
whereby the ROI would expressly be placed outside the scope of the Convention 
were clearly rejected, it is extremely difficult to identify the justification for the 
adoption of such an approach. Unfortunately none of the decisions adopting this 
                                                     
64 For instance various decision apply the domestic law of the creditor without even recourse to the 
rules of PIL see for example, Clout case No. 4 [Landgericht Stuttgart, Germany, 31 August 1990] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/890831g1.html> accessed: 20 August 2014 and Clout case No. 6 
[Landgericht Frankfurt a.M., Germany, 16 September 1991] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910916g1.html> accessed: 20 August 2014> accessed: 20 August 
2014; See also, Christian Thiele, ‘Interest on Damages and Rate of Interest Under Article 78 of the 
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (1998) 2 Vindobona Journal of 
International Commercial Law and Arbitration 3. 
65 In such instances, courts have applied the dictates of the domestic law of the creditor as the law 
applicable, independently of whether the rules of private international law made that law applicable; 
see Bezirksgericht Arbon, Switzerland, 9 December 1994 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/941209s1.html> accessed: 20 August 2014; CLOUT case No. 6 (n 
64); CLOUT case No. 4 (n 64). 
66 Landgericht Aachen, Germany, 20 July 1995. 
67 ibid.  
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stance provide any justification in support of their view68. Take for instance the 
judgment of   Pretura circondariale di Parma that involved a contact for the sale of 
goods between a Swiss buyer and an Italian seller69. Two months after the agreed 
upon date for the dispatch of goods, the buyer sent a notice of cancellation of order 
and refund of price with interest to the seller on the grounds of non-performance by 
the latter. The court, finding in favour of the buyer, awarded him interest at the 
Italian statutory rate without reference to the dictates of the Convention on the issue. 
Ignorance of the dictates of the travaux, it seems, led the court to adopt the view that 
the issue was outside the scope of the Convention and as such, reference to national 
law was warranted70.  
 
Similarly, in another case concerning the sale of home appliances between a German 
seller and a Swiss buyer, a German court awarded interest without reference to any 
provision of the Convention even though the same was clearly applicable.71 
Following breach by the buyer, the seller claimed refund of price plus interest to be 
calculated at the rate of 13.5%. The buyer on the other hand counterclaimed for a 
reduction of price and interest to be calculated at a rate of 6%. The court awarded 
interest at 13.5%, without explaining why the rate claimed by the buyer had been 
adopted. It is however clear from the judgement that the court did not take the 
dictates of the Convention into account while validating the rate.72 
 
A review of case law reveals that unlike the cases discussed above, most tribunals 
adopting this stance tend to make reference to the domestic law of the creditor in the 
                                                     
68 For instance, see judgment in CLOUT case No. 6 (n 64). In this case the court held that: "The level 
of the interest rate has not been set forth in Art. 78 CISG. Consequently, the relevant obligor is to pay 
the interest rate which is due and payable pursuant to the relevant national substantive law of the 
creditor”.   
69 CLOUT case No. 90 [Pretura circondariale di Parma, Italy, 24 November 1989] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/891124i3.html> accessed: 28 August 2014 
70 Interestingly, the court completely ignored the dictates of article 84 as well by awarding interest 
from the date of avoidance of the contract.   
71 The applicability of the Convention to this dispute was accepted by the court. It was only on the 
question of interest rate calculation that the dictates of the Convention were entirely ignored. 
72 For similar rulings see judgment in CLOUT case No. 253 [Repubblica e Cantone del Ticino, La 
seconda Camera civile del Tribunale d’appello, Switzerland, 15 January 1998] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980115s1.html> accessed: 20 August 2014 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980115s1.html> accessed: 9 August 2014; CLOUT case No. 93 (n 
1); ICC Arbitration Case No. 9448 of July 1999 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/999448i1.html> 
accessed: 20 August 2014; CLOUT case No. 380 [Tribunale di Pavia, Italy, 29 December 1999] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991229i3.html> accessed: 20 August 
2014<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991229i3.html> accessed: 20 August 2014. 
257 
 
ascertainment of the applicable ROI.73 In the Judgment in CLOUT case No. 201 for 
instance, the court concluded that while the Convention governed the right of a party 
to claim interest, the issue of ROI had been left outside its scope. As such the court 
concluded, “In cases where, as brought forward by the seller, the buyer is in arrears 
with his obligation to pay the price, which should be the majority of all cases, the 
rate of interest is…to be determined by the law of the seller”.74  
 
If ROI is indeed a lacuna intra legem then reference to the rules of PIL in order to 
identify the applicable law is indeed in conformity with the appropriate methodology 
for the application of the rules of the Convention. However, even if ROI has been 
left outside the scope of the Convention, there is little justification, if any, for the 
application of the law of the creditors place of business unless it is identified by an 
applicable procedural rule on the matter.75 Courts adopting the approach of the 
application of the creditors domestic law however, more often than not, simply state 
that the ROI has been excluded from the scope of the Convention and as such 
reference must be made to the law of the creditor, without identifying the 
considerations which led to this conclusion.76 
 
Scholarly commentaries on the other hand have attempted to justify such a stance. 
Thiele for instance, highlights the fact that the proposal to set a fixed ROI in the 
article was rejected during deliberations. This he states may imply that the drafters 
wished to devolve the determination of ROI to domestic law.77  
The argument that the lack of agreement amongst the drafters implies that they 
intended the question to be resolved by reference to domestic law does make 
superficial sense. A deeper inquiry into the subject however reveals that, unlike 
various gaps in the Convention, the drafter were aware of this particular one and did 
indeed attempt to resolve it at multiple stages of the drafting process. As such, if the 
drafters indeed wished for the question to be lacuna intra legem, and as such 
                                                     
73 See for example the judgment in CLOUT case No. 201 [Richteramt Laufen des Kantons Berne, 
Switzerland, 7 May 1993] <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930507s1.html> accessed: 20 August 
2014. 
74 ibid. 
75  For instance, the law identified through the forum’s rule of PIL without reference to article 7(2).  
76 See n 68.  
77   Thiele n 64. He concludes that the legislative history does not decisively settle the debate.  
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resolved according to the dictates of national law, the could have expressly stated so; 
as they did for instance, on issues of validity.78 
In any case, aversion to a fixed rate of interest did not stem from the fact that the 
drafters preferred to devolve the determination of ROI to domestic law; but rather 
from the fact that a fixed rate of interest would not fulfil the objectives of either 
fairness or efficiency. Fairness would be undermined since a fixed rate would 
seldom reflect commercial reality, thereby hindering the goal of complete 
compensation and avoidance of unjust enrichment. Efficiency, on the other hand 
would be undermined since one party would definitely benefit from a lower interest 
rate than what is applicable to his own cost of capital. This would incentivise such a 
party to act opportunistically for example, by avoiding out of court settlement or 
delaying litigation.   
 
B) Though interest lies within the scope of the Convention, determination of the 
rate has been devolved to national law through the application of the rules of PIL: 
This is the most widely held opinion amongst both academics and legal practitioners, 
and has been labelled the ‘unanimous opinion’ in various places.79 In a nutshell, the 
argument is founded upon the belief that while the Convention governs the issue of 
ROI, it is silent with regards to the methodology of calculating the same. As such, 
the question must be answered by reference to the applicable law by virtue of the 
rules of PIL. Interestingly, courts adopting this approach refer to the dictates of 
article 7(2) to justify recourse to domestic law yet omit mention of the requirement 
of referring to the general principles upon which the Convention is based80 or simply 
state that there are no general principles that can be used to infer the appropriate 
                                                     
78 See n 25. 
79 In the words of one tribunal “There has been formed a unanimous opinion that the details of interest 
are governed by the national law applicable by ways of private international law” Gritli Ryfel, Die 
Schadensersatzhaftung des Verkäufers nach dem Wiener Übereinkommen über internationale 
Warenverträge vom 11. April 1980, Diss. Bern/Frankfurt/New York/Paris/Wien, 1992, S. 86; v. 
Caemmerer/Schlechtriem (Hrsg.), Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht, München 1990, Art. 
78 Para. 4 quoted in Volker Behr, ‘The Sales Convention in Europe: From Problems in Drafting to 
Problems in Practice’ (1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 263.  
80 See for instance case abstract of the judgment by Tribunal Cantonal Valais [Canton Appellate 
Court], Switzerland, 20 December 1994 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/941220s1.html>. In this 
case the court considered the interest rate to be a question governed, but not expressly settled, by 
CISG (Art. 7(2) CISG), but directly, without first reference to general principles underlying the CISG, 
applied the statutory rate of the State whose law would have been the governing law of the contract in 
the absence of CISG (Italy). 
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ROI.81 For instance, the Appellate Court of Switzerland held that while the ROI was 
governed by the Convention, it had not been expressly settled in it.82 In support of its 
methodology in identifying the appropriate rate, the court referred to the dictates of 
Article 7(2). Surprisingly however, the court applied the fixed statutory rate of 
interest of the state whose law would be applicable by virtue of the rules of PIL, 
without first reference to general principles upon which the Convention is based.83  
Moreover, while there is widespread agreement amongst at least European courts 
and scholars that the rules of PIL should determine the law which shall provide a 
methodology to calculate the interest rate; there is disagreement on the method of the 
use of PIL in determining the same.84 These diverging opinions can roughly be 
categorized into two classifications: 
 
6.2.1.1 Law applicable to contract:  
 
Academics and practitioners belonging to the first classification assert that since the 
issue of interest rate is part of the contract, the law applicable to the contract in 
absence of the Convention should be used to settle the issue.85 
                                                     
81 See judgment in ICC Arbitration Case No. 7565/1994 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=141&step=FullText> accessed: 20 August 
2014. Here the court stated: “According to Article 7.2 of the Convention, questions not expressly 
settled by it shall be determined either in accordance with the general principles on which it is 
grounded or by the law which shall be elected according to private international law.” Yet it went on 
to hold that “As the general principles do not settle the matter [...] and the parties have referred to the 
laws of Switzerland, it seems justified to refer to Article 73 of the Swiss Code of obligations whereby, 
in the absence of a determination of the rate of interest by agreement or law or usages, that rate shall 
be 5% per annum.” 
82 Tribunal Cantonal Valais [Canton Appellate Court], Switzerland, 20 December 1994 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/941220s1.html> accessed: 20 August 2014. 
83 ibid. 
84 Mazzotta (n 15). 
85 See for instance CLOUT case No. 5 [Landgericht Hamburg, Germany, 26 September 1990] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/900926g1.html> accessed: 23 August 2014 
; CLOUT case No. 1 [Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt a.M., Germany, 13 June 1991] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910613g1.html> accessed: 23 August 2014; CLOUT case No. 79 
[Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt a.M., Germany, 18 January 1994] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940118g1.html> accessed: 23 August 2014; CLOUT case No. 83 
[Oberlandesgericht München, Germany, 2 March 1994] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940302g1.html> accessed: 23 August 2014; CLOUT case No. 281 
[Oberlandesgericht Koblenz, Germany, 17 September 1993] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930917g1.html> accessed: 23 August 2014; CLOUT case No. 82 
[Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Germany, 10 February 
1994] <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940210g2.html> accessed: 23 August 2014have all held that 
the law applicable to the issue of interest is the law that governs the contract apart from the 
Convention itself. 
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It is interesting to note that according to the rules of PIL in Europe, the result of the 
application of this methodology usually results to the application of the law of the 
state of the seller. 
 This is because, where the contract is silent, expressly or through implication, as to 
the applicable law, rules of PIL generally point towards the law of the country to 
which the contract is most closely related.86 This is usually the law of the seller since 
in contracts of sale since the characteristic obligation is performed in the state of the 
seller. 
 
Unfortunately the fact that reference to the ROI set by the domestic law of the seller 
does not tackle many of the concerns that hindered the process of reaching an 
agreement on the methodology to calculate ROI during the drafting stages has not 
been considered by any of the proponents of this stance.   
 
6.2.1.2 Application of PIL regarding loans: 
 
The second approach on the other hand asserts that rather than referring to the law 
applicable to the contract, the issue of interest rate should be settled on the basis of 
applicable law, which has been ascertained independently.87 This argument is based 
upon the assertion that the claim of interest most closely resembles an involuntary 
                                                     
86 Article 4 (2) of the EEC Convention on Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations states: “Subject 
to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article, it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely 
connected with the country where the party who is to effect the performance which is characteristic of 
the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence, or, in the case of a 
body corporate or unincorporated, its central administration. However, if the contract is entered into 
in the course of that party's trade or profession, that country shall be the country in which the principal 
place of business is situated or, where under the terms of the contract the performance is to be 
effected through a place of business other than the principal place of business, the country in which 
that other place of business is situated.” An exception is contained in Article 4(3) which states: 
“Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely 
connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country 
shall apply” Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L 177/6 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:177:0006:0016:en:PDF accessed: 20 
August 2014. 
87 See Gert Reinhart, ‘Fälligkeitszinsen und UN-Kaufrecht’ in Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und 
Verfahrensrechts (Giesking 1991), 378 cited in Franco Ferrari, Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods: Applicability and Applications of the 1980 United Nations Convention (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2011) 250 
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loan thrust upon the creditor.88 Proponents of this stance therefore assert that the 
issue should be determined through the application of PIL regarding loans.89  
 
 
 
 
6.2.1.3 Law of the place of payment: 
 
A third approach adopted by tribunals is to make reference to the law of the place of 
payment. This view is based upon the belief that since the Convention does not 
govern the rate of interest the same has to be determined by reference to the law 
designated by the rules on conflicts of laws. Interestingly, at least two tribunals have 
identified the law so designated to be the law of the place of payment. Unfortunately 
neither of these two judgments provide any justification of how the law of the place 
of payment has been identified through the application of PIL. Take for instance the 
judgment delivered by the District Court Almelo.90 This case involved the sale of 
goods between a German seller and a Dutch buyer. The court applied the rules of 
PIL under Dutch national law91 and found the law of Germany to be applicable. 
Since Germany was a party to the Convention, the court referred to article 78 and 
found the buyer liable to pay interest on the sums in arrears. Interestingly, the court 
held that since the ROI is not determined by the Convention, the law of the country 
where the price was to be paid regulates it. This conclusion is surprising since the 
court did not refer to German law, which it had determined to be the applicable law 
by virtue of the rules of conflict of laws.  
 
In this case, the applicable law was identified through the application of the Rome 
Convention which states  
To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in 
accordance with Article 3, the contract shall be governed by the law of the 
                                                     
88 Behr (n 79). 
89 Ibid.  
90 Arrondissementsrechtbank Almelo, Netherlands, 9 August 1995 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=155&step=Abstract> accessed: 20 August 
2014. 
91 Which in this case was Art. 4 of the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations. 
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country with which it is most closely connected. Nevertheless, a severable 
part of the contract which has a closer connection with another country may 
by way of exception be governed by the law of that other country.92 
 
It may be inferred from this article that the court was of the opinion that the question 
of rate of interest was more ‘closely connected’ to the law of the place of payment 
than the law identified to be governing all other aspects of the sale contract. It must 
be understood that Article 4 of the Rome Convention is not concerned with concerns 
such as complete compensation of the injured party, or prevention of opportunistic 
behaviour, but was rather drafted to promote the ends of uniformity, predictability 
and certainty. Moreover, in the absence of express (or implied) choice of law, there 
are rarely (if ever) any justice-based grounds for preferring one law to the other.93  
As stated by Professor Stone, there seems to be “no intelligible perspective from 
which the importance of the various connections (such as the residences of parties, 
and the places of negotiation and performance) can rationally be assessed and 
compared”94. These concerns have led Simon Atrill and Jonathan Hill to assert that 
the correct construction of Article 4 remains unclear. 95 
 
As such, a court may at its discretion, find the right of interest to be most closely 
connected to any one domestic law from a list of laws which may become applicable 
as a result of one of the parties having its place of business in one state, the state 
where the contract was negotiated, the place of payment or even the currency of 
payment. Such a result, it is asserted would lead to a great degree of uncertainty and 
unpredictability as is demonstrated by the case discussed above.  
 
Fortunately, the Rome 1 regulation has remedied this situation.96 Rome I classifies 
contracts into eight categories, and lists the determinative connecting factors for each 
                                                     
92 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980. 
93 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (2nd edn, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2010) 290. 
94 ibid. 
95 Simon Atrill, ‘Choice of Law in Contract: The Missing Pieces of the Article 4 Jigsaw’ (2004) 53 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 549; Jonathan Hill, ‘Choice of Law in Contract 
under the Rome Convention: The Approach of the UK Courts’ (2004) 53 The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 325 
96 European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on 
the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations <(Rome II) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52003PC0427> accessed: 20 August 2014. 
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type of contract for the purposes of identifying the applicable law.97 In particular it 
specifies that in contracts of sale of goods the seller’s law governs. Moreover, it does 
not contain the second sentence of article 4(1) of the Rome Convention quoted above 
regarding severable parts of the contract. 
 
It is asserted that the purpose of creating a separate section on interest was to ensure 
that the same was not equated with damages. In particular, the drafters wanted to 
ensure that concerns relevant to the application of the articles on damages were not 
transplanted to that on interest. Moreover, as discussed above, claims based upon the 
fact that the creditor was forced to ‘cover’ the impacts of the breach by raising 
additional capital, fall in the domain of damages and not interest. This is so as the 
claim is not based upon inflation, or the risk of the debtors’ default due to 
bankruptcy while the sums are in arrears (concerns surrounding the computation of 
ROI), but rather on the ‘cost of substitution of funds’ that the creditor incurred.  
In order to properly understand the principle of interest, it is extremely important to 
recognize what is meant by the terms ‘compensation’ as used in this context. The 
term compensation simply requires that the parties are placed in the position they 
would have been had the breach never occurred. Thus compensation demands that 
apart from the principal, the creditor should receive the time value of the sums. As 
such compensation requires the debtor to pay the principal adjusted for inflation.  
 
Moreover, it must be understood that substitution of a riskless asset with a risky one, 
even if both are priced the same, will not completely compensate the creditor.98 As 
such, the creditor must be compensated for the additional risk that he incurs. This 
risk is represented by the risk that the debtor may default for instance as a result of 
bankruptcy. Since risk increases with time, the longer the sums are in arrears the 
higher the risk would be. The actual rate of increase of such risk is relatively easy to 
ascertain since courts are called upon to calculate the same ex-post.99   
 
                                                     
97 Nils Willem Vernooij, ‘Rome I: An Update on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in 
Europe’ (2009) 15 The Columbia Journal of European Law Online 71. 
98 Royce de R. Barondes, ‘Rejecting the Marie Antoinette Paradigm of Prejudgment Interest’ (2004) 
43 Brandeis Law Journal 1, 2. 
99 Tribunals called upon to calculate such risk can simply refer to the change in the debtors’ cost of 
borrowing during the period sums were in arrears. 
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In summary, the principle of interest simply requires that the creditor be paid the 
principal adjusted for inflation plus the risk that the debtor will default. As such, 
reference to the law of the seller is only warranted when it represents these elements. 
It is asserted that this would seldom be the case. Take for instance a scenario where 
the seller is the creditor. Here his cost of capital would reflect the risk that the buyer 
would default, since the institution advancing such capital would obviously price it 
on the basis of this factor. The risk that the creditor may default however is of 
absolutely no relevance for the calculation of the ROI and as such, reference to his 
cost of capital in such instances will not fulfil the objective of complete 
compensation. 
 
6.2.2 While the issue is a lacunae patere legem, reference is to be made to the 
Creditors cost of funds:  
 
While various decisions support the application of the creditor’s cost of funds, there 
is disagreement between proponents of this stance vis-à-vis whether the statutory 
ROI of the creditor’s state should be applied or whether reference should be made to 
the bank-lending rate or whether the creditors’ weighted average cost of capital 
should apply100.  Those applying the bank-lending rate usually do so on the grounds 
that the creditor would have received interest on sums due in that country, had the 
debtor paid on time.101 Such justification is surprising, given that the bank-lending 
rate does not usually reflect the amount of interest that the creditor would have been 
able to ‘earn’ had the debtor paid on time. Rather, granting interest at the bank-
lending rate seems to represent indemnification of the rate of interest the creditor 
could have incurred had he been forced to borrow funds as a result of non-payment 
of the debtor. Thus, such an approach can only be justified if the creditor did in fact 
borrow, for allowing otherwise could lead to the unjust enrichment of the creditor 
rather than his compensation.102 
 
                                                     
100 See for example Judgment by Rechtbank van koophandel, Hasselt, Belgium, 9 October 1996 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=264&step=Abstract> accessed: 20 August 
2014. 
101 See  Rechtbank van koophandel Hasselt, Belgium, 8 November 1995 UNILEX Database of 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=265&step=Abstract> accessed: 20 August 
2014. 
102 The bank rate is almost always higher than the interest recoverable under savings accounts.  
265 
 
These concerns have led certain academics to argue that ROI should be calculated at 
the creditor’s weighted average cost of capital103. Keir and Keir for instance, argue 
that the ROI should reflect the average cost of the creditors’ debt, preferred stock 
and common stock.104  
 
This chapter argues that the cost of creditors’ stock is of absolutely no relevance for 
the purposes of interest rate calculation. Keir and Keir on the other hand argue, that 
had the debtor paid on time, the creditor would have invested its proceeds in its own 
business. The loss that the creditor suffered as a result of delay of payment is 
therefore best reflected in the return that its business has generated since the sums 
became due. This argument is flawed on two grounds. First, Keir and Keir’s analysis 
is based upon a publicly traded company, which would obviously have access to 
capital markets. As long as the creditor can raise sums to replace the sums that are in 
arrears, the debtor cannot be said to have deprived it of any attractive opportunities. 
Of course, the debtor would be liable to reimburse the creditor for the difference 
between the cost of the substitute funds and the interest that the debtor is paying on 
the sums in arrears. Such reimbursement however, will fall under the realm of 
damages and not interest. 
 
Second, awarding interest on the basis of the cost of the creditors’ borrowing would 
undermine the objectives of fairness and efficiency. Take for instance a scenario, 
where the creditor either did not raise any funds as a result of the breach or there was 
no incremental increase in the creditor’s trend in borrowing during the prejudgment 
period. In such a circumstance, the cost of the creditor’s capital is of no relevance 
and awarding the same would potentially lead to the unjust enrichment of the 
creditor. These concerns have led Lanzillotti and Esquibel to argue that interest 
should be calculated on the basis of the creditor’s cost of borrowing only when the 
creditor was a net borrower during the prejudgment period.105 
 
                                                     
103 Robert F. Lanzillotti and Amanda K. Esquibel, ‘Measuring Damages in Commercial Litigation: 
Present Value of Lost Opportunities’ (1990) 5 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 125. 
104 John C. Keir and Robin C. Keir, ‘Opportunity Cost: A Measure of Prejudgment Interest’ (1983) 39 
The Business Lawyer 129, 147. 
105 Lanzillotti and Esquibel (n 103). 
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Even where the creditor had raised further capital, the cost of such capital reflects the 
risk that the new investors bear, as opposed to the harm caused to the creditor as a 
result of the delay. Such investors would seldom look towards the claim of sums in 
arrears in satisfaction of their claim, and as such, the cost of additional funds would 
reflect in part the risk of default of creditor raising the additional capital and 
additional risks. These additional risks are represented, in part, by the position the 
additional funds raised by the creditor take in its capital structure.106 It makes 
absolutely no sense for obligating the debtor to pay for these additional risks under 
the heading of interest; since doing so would be tantamount to obliging the debtor to 
pay for risks that are unrelated to the claim the creditor has against it I.e. risks that 
are transferred to the creditors new investors.  
 
In the converse scenario, where the creditor’s cost of capital is less than the debtor’s 
risk of default, the creditor is not being adequately compensated for the risks it bears 
if interest is calculated on its cost of capital. As such both the objectives of fairness 
and efficiency are undermined if reference is made to the creditors cost of capital in 
such instances. 
 
6.2.3 ROI should be calculated at the statutory rate prevailing at the creditor’s 
place of business:  
 
The Advisory Council (AC) in Opinion Number 14 titled ‘Interest under article 78’, 
stated that absent an agreement between the parties on the ROI to be charged on 
sums in arrears, the applicable ROI is that which would have been charged by the 
courts at the creditor’s place of business on a contract not governed by the 
Convention.107 The opinion expressly notes that while the applicable ROI is not 
contained in the Convention, the drafters did not exclude the issue from its scope.  
 
Moreover, it correctly identifies the fact that the primary objective of the Article 78 
is to compensate the creditor but limits compensation to providing the creditor the 
time value of the sums in arrears. As such, the opinion does not take into account the 
                                                     
106 The risk of repayment of a secured debt is lower than that of an unsecured one. 
107 See n 25. 
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additional risk of the debtor’s default which is borne by the creditor. Interestingly, 
the opinion states that “Choosing a specific interest rate which is thought to best 
compensate the losses of the creditor would be too far reaching a goal given the 
drafting history of the Convention. Therefore this Opinion only looks for the law 
which presumably is best applied to compensate the losses of the creditor.”108 
Resultantly while the Council notes that the objective of article 78 is to compensate 
the creditor, it settles for a methodology that, in its own view, would seldom achieve 
that goal.  
 
Moreover, the Opinion completely excludes disgorgement of profits from the 
objectives that Article 78 intended to achieve. Such a conclusion is surprising, given 
that limiting opportunistic behaviour on the part of the debtor was clearly an 
objective, though subsidiary, that the drafters had in mind during the drafting stages 
of article 78. In any case, the Opinion does note that there may be instances where 
the domestic law of the creditor’s place of business does not reflect the reality of 
market conditions, and advocates that the way around this is to claim damages under 
article 74. Such a stance is quite astonishing since the opinion begins by noting the 
reasons for the separation between the section on damages and interest, yet goes on 
to provide a solution that clearly ignores the same. In other words, it operates to limit 
the recovery of interest to solely that which is provided in the domestic law of the 
state where the creditor has its place of business, and subjects the residual amount 
necessary for the complete compensation of the creditor to the limits contained in the 
provision on damages. Resultantly the remaining amount under this methodology is 
subject to defenses such as those contained in Article 79. 
 
Furthermore, while the opinion recognizes the fact that the domestic law to be 
referred to in the ascertainment of the ROI may well over compensate the creditor, it 
simply classifies the same as a side-effect. This is surprising since various delegates 
throughout deliberations on the text of the article vehemently opposed any 
methodology that would operate to unjustly enrich the creditor.109  
                                                     
108 ibid. 
109  See for example the comment of the delegate of Czechoslovakia  “On the other hand, he should 
not be permitted to demand an excessive rate of interest”; Comment of the delegate of Sweden “when 
determining interest rates, to establish a realistic scale of rates that were neither excessive nor 
artificial” (Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th Meeting). 
268 
 
 
The opinion however does recognize the fact that the methodology advocated by it 
would lead to a situation where the creditor would not be able to claim any amount 
in the form of interest where the domestic law identified does not provide any rule 
for the recovery of the same. It is here that the greatest weakness of the advocated 
methodology for ROI calculation lies. That is to say, by subjecting the ROI to 
domestic law, the intent of the drafters, who clearly intended that the creditor be 
compensated, is undermined. Moreover this methodology seems to ignore the 
international nature of the Convention in its interpretation by subjecting its evolution 
to the dictates of domestic law. In the words of the Council “If the lawmaker in the 
country of the creditor does not react properly to the changes in the market, it cannot 
be the role of a tribunal to simply bypass these residual interest rules in order to find 
a more adequate interest rate for international disputes.”110 This thesis on the other 
hand argues that the purpose of the Convention was to displace “legal barriers in 
international trade and promote the development of international trade.”111 By 
placing the question of and the further development in the methodology for the 
calculation of the ROI in the hands of national legislatures, the opinion clearly 
undermines these goals. 
 
6.2.4 ROI should be ascertained through reference to the law of the residence of 
the debtor. 
 
Hans Stoll, the primary proponent of this argument, asserts that the basic 
requirement of the interest rate provision contained in the Convention is to ensure 
that the debtor is not allowed the advantage of working with the sum in arrears, 
rather than ensuring that the creditor is adequately compensated.112 The policy 
behind the chapter on damages on the other hand, he asserts, is to compensate the 
injured party; the drafters by separating interest from the same have clearly shown 
that such considerations are not applicable to article 78. Proponents of this stance 
                                                     
110 See n 25. 
111 Convention, Preamble.  
112 Hans Stoll, ‘Internationalprivatrechtliche Fragen bei der landesrechtlichen Ergänzung des 
Einheitlichen Kaufrechts’, in Andreas Heldrich, Dieter Heldrich, Hans Jurgen Sonnenberger 
(eds), Konflikt und Ordnung: Festschrift für Murad Ferid zum 70. Geburtstag (Beck, 1978) 509-10. 
For an analysis of Stolls argument see Behr (n 79) 290. 
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further contend that, apart from creating a completely distinct chapter on interest, the 
drafters reinforced this separation by expressly providing that a party is entitled to 
interest “without prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable under article 74”113. 
This argument acts as the foundation of the assertion that the difference between the 
scope and requirement of the provision on damages from that in the provision on 
interest simply means that the two are based on different policy concerns.114 This 
methodology however, it is asserted, fails to recognize the fact that concerns 
surrounding compensation of the creditor formed the fault line upon which most 
discussions during the drafting stages were based. While there is no doubt that the 
drafters were unable to concretely identify a methodology that would adequately 
compensate the creditor, the intention of the drafters would be completely 
undermined if the concern was completely omitted from ROI calculations. 
Regardless of these apparent shortcomings of this approach, it has been adopted by 
tribunals in at least seven cases.115 Interestingly, only one of these seven cases 
expressly identifies the general principle of restitution in justification of the adoption 
of the approach.116 The remaining six, on the other hand, justify reference to the 
domestic law of the debtor on the grounds that since the payment of sums in arrears 
is the obligation of the debtor; in cases involving the payment of interest, it is the 
debtor’s obligation that is under dispute. Part 3 of this paper asserts that this 
methodology, as opposed to the one adopted by Stoll, is in line with what was 
intended by the drafters since it adequately fulfils the objectives of both complete 
compensation and efficiency. 
                                                     
113 This line of argument is surprising since it recognizes the fact that the impact of separating interest 
from the chapter on damages was simply the provision of a guarantee that a party could claim interest 
without proof of fault. 
114 Footnote no.54. 
115 Court of Appeal of Eastern Finland, Finland, 27 March 
1997 <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=489&step=Abstract> accessed: 23 
August 2014; CLOUT case No. 1 (n 85); CLOUT case No. 634 [Landgericht Berlin, Germany, 21 
March 2003] accessed: 23 August 2014; CLOUT case No. 211 [Tribunal Cantonal de Vaud, 
Switzerland, 11 March 1996] <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960311s2.html> accessed: 23 August 
2014; CLOUT case No. 214 [Handelsgericht des Kantons Zürich, Switzerland, 5 February 1997] 
accessed: 23 August 2014; CLOUT case No. 85 [U.S. Federal District Court for the Northern District 
of New York, United States, 9 September 1994] 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960311s2.html> accessed: 23 August 2014. 
116 CLOUT case No. 211 (n 115). 
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Interestingly, one tribunal has labelled the ‘reference to the domestic law of the 
debtor approach’ as “an isolated deviating opinion”.117 In this judgment, the court 
expressly set out the limitations of the debtor approach, ranging from the lack of a 
‘general principle’ of restitution to the inability of the approach to ensure that all 
advantages arising from delay in payment are taken away from the debtor. 
Surprisingly, five of the seven judgments adopting the domestic law of the debtor 
approach were delivered after this judgment, yet none of the make reference to it or 
addresses the criticisms raised therein. This paper avoids such omission by 
discussing how all advantages arising from delay in payment are taken away from 
the debtor when he is forced to pay interest at his cost of funds calculated over a 
short-term floating rate, in Part 3. 
6.2.5 ROI should be ascertained through reference to the law of the currency of 
payment. 
 
During the drafting stages of the article, only a handful of delegates were in favour 
of setting a fixed rate of interest118. The majority of delegates on the other hand 
pointed towards the considerable movement of the money market, in support of their 
proposition that a fixed interest rate would seldom reflect commercial reality.119 
 
During the discussion on whether the Convention should incorporate a fixed or a 
flexible ROI, issues arose with regard to the considerable difference between the 
ROI determined by the market in western-industrialized states and the statutory rate 
of interest prevailing in socialist countries. The ROI in industrialized countries was 
relatively high; the same resulted from a high rate of inflation. This had the impact of 
                                                     
117 See CLOUT case No. 79 (n 85). The court stated “According to the isolated deviating opinion of 
Stoll the legal rate [of interest] has to be determined by the domestic sales law of the debtor. In this 
case . . . the court has to decide according to the prevailing legal opinion. Since the amount of interest 
intentionally is not prescribed in the Convention, the answer can only be taken from the rules of 
international private law. Absent any point of reference, no principle can be decisive, because the duty 
to pay interest was aimed at preventing the withholding of money from being advantageous to the 
debtor who still has the possibility to use or invest the funds as compared to payment. Furthermore, 
this argument is not persuasive, since it is not guaranteed that the domestic legal rate [of interest] fully 
compensates for . . . the advantage of non-payment and any other calculation of interest would erase 
the dividing line between interest and damages.” 
118 The delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance supported this approach. (Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference, 34th Meeting) at Para 9. 
119 See (Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th Meeting); (Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 37th 
Meeting). 
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characterising the currency as weak. As such, delegates belonging to states with 
relatively weak currencies were concerned that awarding interest at the lower rate set 
in countries with a strong currency would never amount to complete compensation 
of the creditor. They therefore demanded that interest should be determined 
according to the rate prevailing in the state of the creditor.120 In support of this 
proposition, it was asserted that the creditor might have to procure additional funds 
in his country, as a result of delay in payment. Socialist states and certain developing 
states however supported the opposite solution, on the grounds that while dealing 
with western states the currency of payment was usually that of a western state.121 
This meant that creditors belonging to these states would, while dealing with debtors 
with places of business in western states, have to procure additional funds from 
countries with high interest rates.122 
 
Unfortunately, tribunals applying the law of the country of currency of payment have 
been unable to agree on a methodology that leads to this conclusion. In essence, 
tribunals have applied three methodologies, each of which suffers from its own 
respective limitations. This paper shall now turn to briefly examine each. 
 
6.2.5.1 Via application of the rules of PIL as required by article 7(2) of the 
Convention: 
 
Proponents of this stance assert that while the issue of ROI lies within the scope of 
the Convention, no general principles upon which the Convention is based can be 
identified which are capable of shedding light on the rate of interest to be applied to 
disputes governed by the Convention. As such, they assert that the same is to be 
resolved according to the law identified through the rules of PIL. Interestingly, 
                                                     
120 See for example the comment of the delegate of Sweden (Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th 
Meeting). 
121 (Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 34th Meeting). 
122 See for example the comment of the Delegate of Czechoslovakia  (Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 
34th Meeting); André Corterier, ‘A New Approach to Solving the Problem of the Interest Rate Under 
Article 78 CISG’ (2000) 5 International Trade and Business Law Annual 33, 34 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/corterier.html> accessed: 25 August 2014; It should be 
noted that during the drafting stages of the Convention interest rate in various western countries was 
considerably high, and therefore would form the main determinant in ROI calculation. Since then, 
however, interest rates have greatly declined in those states and consequently these concerns are much 
less relevant in the commercial context of todays.    
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certain tribunals find the law applicable through the rules of PIL to be the law of the 
currency of payment. In justification of this conclusion tribunals make reference to 
abstract concepts such as fairness; yet do not specify how fairness has been found to 
be a guiding principle for the identification of the applicable law. Take for instance 
the judgment in Waste container case123. This case concerned a contract for sale of 
containers between a Hungarian seller and an Austrian buyer. The buyer claimed that 
the goods were not of acceptable quality and only paid a part of the purchase price. 
The seller brought an action for the payment of price and interest on sums in arrears. 
On the issue of interest the court was of the opinion that the Convention did not 
expressly govern the issue of ROI nor could the same be inferred from the general 
principles upon which the Convention is based. The court therefore concluded that 
ROI was a lacunae praeter legem that had to be resolved by reference to the rules of 
private international law. In ascertaining which law PIL made applicable, the court 
stated  
It is accepted as a problem that it is neither logical nor fair to apply rules of 
one State on a sum that is expressed in the currency of another State if the 
currency of one of the States is stable or the influence of inflation is minor 
and the currency of the other State continuously diminishes in value. Given 
these concerns, the issue has to be resolved in conformity with the rules of 
PIL, taking into consideration the State of the currency.  
 
Interestingly, even though the court based its reasoning on the fact that ROI should 
reflect the proper time value of money, the court went on to apply the statutory rate 
of interest prevailing in the country of currency of payment rather than a floating 
rate.124 
6.2.5.2 Where the law otherwise applicable to the contract and the payment of 
currency are the same: 
 
                                                     
123 CLOUT case No. 164 [Arbitration Court attached to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, Hungary, 5 December 1995] <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951205h1.html> accessed 
27 August 2014.  
124 In this case, under Austrian law; according to § 352 para.1 of the Austrian Commercial Code 
(UGB). 
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Certain tribunals have argued that since the Convention does not provide a ROI, the 
same has to be determined either by reference to the law otherwise applicable to the 
contract, or by the law of the State in which currency the price had to be paid.125 In 
instances where the law of the currency of payment establishes the same ROI as that 
contained in the law otherwise applicable to the contract of sale, courts have had no 
difficulty applying the same.  It is however interesting to note that courts applying 
this methodology do not provide any justification as to how the law of the currency 
of payment has been identified by the rules of PIL.126 Rather, courts adopting this 
stance justify it on the grounds that it is commercially reasonable i.e. the most logical 
solution from an economic point of view.127 Interestingly, the interplay between the 
law identified by application of the rules of PIL, and that of the law of the state of 
currency has never been ventured into by courts adopting this methodology. In other 
words, this methodology does not answer the question of which law is to prevail 
where the law otherwise applicable is different from the law of the state of currency.  
6.2.5.3 Reference to the UNIDROIT Principle or the LIBOR 
 
Certain courts have applied the law of the currency of payment without referring to 
the rules of PIL. In the identification of the ROI, certain courts adopting this stance 
have expressly referred to Article 7.4.9 (2)128 of the UNIDROIT Principles, without 
justifying how the same is applicable.129  
                                                     
125See Judgment in Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Arbitration 
Case, 23 January 1997 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/978611i1.html>; Case Abstract of the 
Judgment by Oberlandesgericht Rostock, Germany, 10 October 2001 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=906&step=Abstract> accessed: 25 August 
2014; See Judgment by Oberlandesgericht Rostock, Germany, 25 September 2002 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020925g1.html> accessed: 25 August 2014. 
126 ibid. 
127 See Judgment in Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Arbitration, 
26 March1993 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/936653i1.html> accessed: 25 August 2014. See also 
the ruling in Cour d’appel Paris, France, 6 April 1995 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950406f1.html>, where the present case was appealed. 
128 The article states: “The rate of interest shall be the average bank short-term lending rate to prime 
borrowers prevailing for the currency of payment at the place for payment, or where no such rate 
exists at that place, then the same rate in the State of the currency of payment. In the absence of such 
a rate at either place the rate of interest shall be the appropriate rate fixed by the law of the State of the 
currency of payment.” 
129 See Judgment in ICC Court of  Arbitration, Zurich, 1996 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=397&step=FullText> accessed: 26 August 
2014. 
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Other tribunals adopting the commercially reasonable approach have made reference 
to LIBOR where the payment of currency is the dollar and the parties belong to 
European states.130 Take for instance the ICC court of arbitration case no 8908 where 
the court stated,  
The Vienna Convention [CISG] lays down a general rule, in Article 78, that 
the liability for payment of a sum is subject to interest for late payment, but it 
does not lay down the criteria for calculating this interest. International case 
law presents a wide range of possibilities in this respect, but amongst the 
criteria adopted in various judgments, the more appropriate appears to be that 
of the rates generally applied in international trade for the contractual 
currency... In concrete terms, since the contractual currency is the dollar and 
the parties are European, the applicable rate is the 3-month LIBOR on the 
dollar, increased by one percentage point, with effect from the due date not 
respected up until full payment has been made.131   
 
Interestingly, tribunals adopting this stance have limited the application of LIBOR to 
disputes concerning European community nationals only. As, such, this approach 
does not provide any guidance in disputes concerning non-European signatories of 
the Convention. Moreover, even where the parties are European community 
nationals, this approach is no longer applicable. As aptly noted by André Corterier:  
This solution can no longer lead to satisfactory solutions for a large amount 
of contracts, however, once the European currency union takes effect. The 
same is true for contracts already made specifying ECU as currency. In such 
instances, the currency no longer leads to the law of a single state, whose 
legal interest rate might then be applied.132  
6.2.6 Trade usage and practise  
 
                                                     
130 See Case Abstract of the Judgment in Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce, ICC Arbitration, November 1996.  
131 See Judgment in ICC Court of Arbitration, Milan, December 1998 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=401&step=FullText> accessed: 26 August 
2014. 
132 Corterier (n 122) 38-39. 
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It is a well-established fact that before recourse may be had to the rules of PIL under 
Article 7(2) for the resolution of gaps praeter legem, one must first attempt to 
identify whether the parties have agreed to any usage133 or have agreed to a 
practices, which they have established between themselves.134 As such, if a court 
finds the existence of any such usage or practice vis-à-vis the applicable ROI, then 
the same is be given effect by the courts without venturing into the methodology 
prescribed by article 7(2)135.  
It must be noted that Article 9 adopts a narrow approach towards the usages and 
practices, which are recognized for the purpose of the contract. Firstly the parties 
must have agreed to the usage for it to be applicable. While the agreement can either 
be express or implied; implied usages, in order to be binding must fulfil a two prong 
test i.e. it must be one (a) “of which the parties knew or ought to have known” and 
(b) “which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, 
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.”136 As 
such, for a court to find a usage have to been impliedly agreed upon, it must satisfy 
both a subjective and objective test137. Moreover, the term ‘trade’ has to be 
interpreted narrowly as well, i.e. it should be restricted to a certain product, region or 
set of trading partners, in light of the facts of each case.138 
 
In various instances, tribunals have used the dictates of Article 9 in order to identify 
a usage that recognises a specific interest rate. In all such instances however, courts 
have ignored the requirements for a usage to amount to an implied agreement. Take 
for instance the case of Aguila Refractarios where the court stated that the prime rate 
constitutes “an accepted usage in international trade, even when it is not expressly 
                                                     
133 Under article 9(2), parties are bound by usages which they knew or ought to have known and 
which is, in international trade, widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the 
type involved in the particular trade concerned, even if the same had not been expressly agreed to by 
the parties. 
134 Behr (n 79) 290. 
135 Thiele n 64. 
136 Convention, Article 9.  
137 The subjective test is that the parties to the contract knew or ought to have known of the usage. 
The objective test is that the usage is widely known and regularly observed. 
138 Eric E. Bergsten,  ‘Basic Concepts of the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods’ in 
Peter Doralt (ed), Das UNCITRAL-Kaufrecht im Vergleich zum österreichischen Recht: Referate und 
Diskussionen des Symposiums in Baden bei Wien, 17-19 April 1983 (Manz 1985) 20-21. 
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agreed between the parties”.139 Interestingly the court did not specify which prime 
rate it was referring to, since the prime rate varies from country to country and in 
some cases, even amongst banks operating in the same legal jurisdiction.140  
Moreover the court did not attempt to identify whether the ‘prime rate’ was 
recognized in the ‘trade’ concerned. 
 
It is asserted that since prime rate simply reflects the rate at which banks lend to 
solvent companies, it is based upon the assumption that there is no risk of default. 
Since compensation in the realm of interest rate demands that the creditor be 
reimbursed for the risk he is made to bear, the ROI awarded to him must make 
provisions for the risk that the debtor may default. This is so as awarding interest 
without making provision for default will result in the undercompensating of 
creditors as a class. Individual creditors will be under compensated ex-ante since the 
risk of default will reduce the value of the judgment asset below that of the original 
claim. Individual debtors on the other hand would be unjustly enriched. As such 
application of the prime rate where the risk of debtors’ default is greater than zero, 
would undermine the objective of fairness.   
 
Fisher and Romaine propagate the use of a similar risk-free rate.141 They argue that 
interest should be charged at the cost of the federal governments’ cost of funds.142  
Their argument is based upon the assertion that since courts do not compensate 
litigants for risks of litigation; the risk that the debtor may default should be 
excluded from the scope of ROI calculation since the same is only a risk of litigation.  
This argument is however, flawed to the extent that it equates litigation risks with 
default risk. If such a broad definition is to be attributed to the term litigation risk, 
then intuitively speaking, the same would incorporate the risk of delay.143 This 
would then imply, that the creditor is entitled only to the principal since inflation is 
                                                     
139 Argentina 23 October 1991 National Commercial Court of First Instance, Buenos Aires (Aguila 
Refractarios / Conc. preventivo)  
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/911023a1.html> accessed: 3 September 2014. 
140 Loretta J. Mester and Anthony Saunders, ‘When does the Prime Rate Change?’ (1995) 19 Journal 
of Banking & Finance 743. 
141 Franklin M. Fisher and R. Craig Romaine, ‘Janis Joplin's Yearbook and the Theory of 
Damages’ (1990) 5 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 145. 
142 Since the authors are concerned with interest applied by the courts of the United States, they refer 
to the US Treasury bill rate. 
143 I.e. delay in payment as a result of the time it took to litigate. 
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simply a result of delay. As such, the reasoning adopted by Fisher and Romaine does 
not justify application of an interest free rate, but rather justifies a bar to 
compensation other than recovery of the principal.144  
 
Various tribunals have similarly erred by classifying London Inter Bank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR) as a ‘usage’ for the purposes of article 9145. For example in one 
arbitration award the tribunal stated “Taking into account the fact that the annual rate 
of 5% which the seller claims does not exceed the LIBOR rate usually applicable in 
international trade relations, the Tribunal found it possible to grant the seller's 
claim.”146 
 
The LIBOR represents the average interest rate, estimated by leading banks in 
London upon which they would be charged if they were to borrow funds from other 
banks. While various financial institutions set their own rates relative to the LIBOR, 
it cannot be stated that the LIBOR represents the rate prevailing in commercial 
transactions.147 Moreover as stated above the LIBOR, in order to classify as a usage, 
must pass the test of being regularly observed by parties to contracts in the particular 
trade; a conclusion that is hardly conceivable for contracts of international sale of 
goods. As such, even though the LIBOR may well provide a uniform and predictable 
solution to the problem of uncertainty surrounding the issue of ROI, holding the 
same to constitute a ‘usage’ would amount to a distortion of the dictates of Article 9. 
                                                     
144 For a detailed criticism of Fisher and Romaines’ arguments see Roman L. Weil, ‘Compensating 
the Plaintiff for Asynchronous Payments’ in Roman L. Weil, Michael Wagner and Peter B. Frank 
(eds), Litigation Services Handbook: The Role of the Financial Expert (3rd edn, John Wiley & Sons 
2003). 
145 See Judgment by Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Russia Federation, 27 July 1999 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990727r1.html> where “the Tribunal granted the claim of the 
[buyer] to recover annual interest on the granted sum of lost profit at the LIBOR rate plus 2% per 
annum, on the basis of Article 78 CISG and Article 395 of the Russian Federation Civil Code that 
refers to the rate of bank loan at the place of creditor”; See also Judgment in Court of Arbitration of 
the International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Arbitration, 26 March1993 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/936653i1.html> accessed: 3 September 2014. The judgment was 
party overruled in Cour d’appel Paris (n 127). 
146 See Judgment by Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Russia, 25 March 1998 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980325r1.html> accessed: 3 September 2014. 
147 See n 25 stating that “like the Libor or Euribor seem satisfactory, since the scope of application of 
these rates is simply too narrow: The London Interbank Offered Rate is defined for just five different 
currencies;[69] the Euro Interbank Offered Rate just for the Euro. Therefore these rates would not 
provide an interest rate that could be applied for every currency” at 3.33. 
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6.3 Part 3 The Approach in line with the objectives of fairness and efficiency. 
 
The issue of ROI can never truly be solved without proper appreciation of the 
objectives that the principle aims to achieve. As detailed above, the objective of 
providing the right to recover interest can be summarized under the categories of 
fairness and efficiency. Fairness in this context simply refers to requirement that the 
injured party be compensated for its loss. Efficiency on the other hand requires that 
the potential of parties to act in an opportunistic manner is curtailed. This is best 
achieved by requiring parties to take appropriate precautions when entering into 
contracts. Since non-payment of sums when they become due works for the benefit 
of prospective defendants, especially in legal regimes that have been unable to 
concretely develop a concrete right to claim interest, they are deterred from taking 
appropriate precautions.148 Prospective plaintiffs on the other hand, would be 
motivated to take too many precautions, leading to a rise in costs. The presence of 
well-developed rules on interest on the other hand, would ensure that both parties 
take adequate precautions to protect themselves. As such, the requirement of 
efficiency is met when the principle of interest operates to ensure that both parties to 
a contract take adequate precautions.  
 
Ignorance of these objectives has led commentators to approach the problem 
incorrectly. In other words, ignorance of the fact that the efficiency and fairness 
objectives concern both the injured party and the debtor has led commentators and 
courts alike to simplify resolution of the issue on the determination of whether the 
award is meant to compensate the creditor or punish the debtor.149 The problem with 
such an approach is that it begins with the assumption that the two goals are 
mutually exclusive. Those favouring the former view usually call for the adoption of 
the ROI that the creditor would be subject to had he borrowed the sum when they 
became in arrears. Whereas those supporting the view that the award of interest is to 
force the debtor to disgorge any profits it may have realized and to motivate it to take 
                                                     
148 Knoll (n 4) 296. See also Henderson (n 7) 775-776 where the author argues that the lack of award 
of prejudgment interest results in discouraging manufacturers for modifying defective products. 
149 Indeed while the travaux reveal that the goal of compensation of the creditor was the primary 
objective of Article 78, the delegates did view the goal of disgorgement of profits as a secondary 
objective. 
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appropriate precautions, argue for the adoption of the ROI that the defendant is 
subject to. 
 
This paper argues that in cases where the parties have access to capital markets, both 
goals are concurrently achieved by reference to the ROI applied to credits advanced 
to the debtor by institutions operating in his domestic capital market.150  
 
Disgorge unjust enrichment: The debtor’s decision of not paying sums that are in 
arrears simply implies that the debtor has elected to borrow the sums from the 
plaintiff.151Such a decision is beneficial to the defendant only if the ROI applied to 
these sums is less than its cost of borrowing. If however, the two are equal then the 
defendant is not enriched since he could have borrowed the sums from the capital 
market when they became due and paid the creditor off. Had this been the case, the 
debtor would be in exactly the same position that he would have been in had he paid 
the sums when they became due. As such, reference to the debtor’s borrowing rate 
ensures that the debtor is not unjustly enriched. 
 
Complete compensation:  As discussed above, every commercial activity carries 
with it a degree of risk, which must be borne by every participant attempting to make 
a profit.152 The risk that a participant may not be paid on time is but one such risk 
and the principle of interest is, among others, a mechanism that has been developed 
to minimize the impacts of this risk. The risk therefore is simply that the creditor 
may end up in a position resembling the advancement of a loan to the debtor. 
Consequently, it makes logical sense for the ROI to reflect the risk that the creditor 
undertakes by advancing a loan to the debtor; which is best represented by the rate at 
which the debtor borrows money in its usual course of business153.  
 
                                                     
150 This is based upon the assumption that the capital market accurately prices debt obligations. As 
such, ROI at the defendant’s cost of borrowing simply reflects the conversion of a debt into an 
accurately priced investment, even though the same might not be voluntary.  See Barondes (n 98) 8. 
151 The Coerced Loan Theory, see John K. Pearson, Dillon Jackson and Tim Nohr, ‘Ending the 
Judicial Snipe Hunt: The Search for the Cramdown Interest Rate’ (1996) 4 American Bankruptcy 
Institute Law Review 35. 
152 Knoll (n 4) 311. 
153 This is based upon the assumption that the capital market accurately prices debt obligations. As 
such, ROI at the defendant’s cost of borrowing simply reflects the conversion of a debt into an 
accurately priced investment, even though the same might not be voluntary.  See Barondes (n 98) 8. 
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Michael Knoll, the primary proponent of reference to the debtor’s cost of borrowing 
argues that reference to the creditor’s cost of borrowing does not achieve either of 
the two objectives upon which the principle of interest is based.154 Take for instance 
a scenario where the debtor’s cost of borrowing exceeds that of the creditor. In such 
a case, granting interest at the creditors cost of borrowing will not make appropriate 
provisions for the additional risk of default that the creditor was forced to bear.155 
This is simply a result of the fact that the creditor’s cost of borrowing is calculated, 
in part, on the probability of the creditor’s risk of default. As a result, if the creditor 
is entitled to interest at his own cost of borrowing, he will compensated for his own 
risk of default not that of the debtors. Such an outcome is counter-intuitive as the 
creditor’s risk of default is of no relevance vis-à-vis the risk he bears as a result of 
non-payment on sums when they become due. 
 
This raises the issue of which interest rate applicable to the debtor should be applied 
to the sums in arrears. Since debts have varying positions in the capital structure of a 
corporation, debts with different risks are subject to differing rates of interest.156 In 
essence, the higher a debt is on the capital structure of a firm, the higher the chances 
of it being paid and consequently, the lower the interest rate that it attracts. As such, 
the position that a debt occupies in the capital structure of a firm reflects the 
quantum, of risk that the same would not be paid. It therefore makes intuitive sense 
for the ROI to reflect the interest rate applicable to voluntary loans with the same 
default risks. Such a rate, it is asserted, can be identified by reference to the ROI that 
the debtor would/does pay on a voluntary loan occupying the same position in the 
capital structure of the firm. 
 
There is however one shortcoming of this approach. Legal jurisdictions differ in the 
treatment afforded to monetary legal judgments vis-à-vis their categorization in the 
capital structure.157 This divergence in classification by legal jurisdictions will lead 
to the identification of different indices of interest rate, i.e. jurisdictions classifying 
legal judgments as secured debt will make reference to the debtors cost of borrowing 
                                                     
154 Knoll (n 4) 296; Stoll (n 112). For an analysis of Stoll’s argument see Behr (n 79) 290. 
155 Moreover, since there is always the possibility that some debtors might actually default, creditors 
as a class would be undercompensated. 
156 Knoll (n 4) 311-317. 
157 ibid 314. 
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the same whereas jurisdictions classifying it is as unsecured debt will make reference 
to that index. 158 
 
Knoll provides two grounds upon which the debtor’s cost of borrowing is not a 
suitable point of reference for the formulation of ROI when the debtor is not a 
publically traded company where as the creditor is.159 The first argument is based on 
the scenario where the claim is relatively large in ratio to the wealth of the debtor.  In 
such circumstances, the creditor might be prevented from making further 
investments or that the cost of such investments might dramatically increase.160 
Resultantly, Knoll argues the creditor may be forced to change its consumption 
habits.  
 
The Coerced Loan Theory (CLT), is premised on the assumption that variations in 
the value of the sums in arrears is not dependent upon the characteristics of the 
plaintiff but rather on the risk and return of the forced investment. The CLT 
therefore points towards the debtor’s cost of borrowing on the assumption that the 
debtor values the return in the same manner as the market. Since the possibility that a 
creditor might be forced to change its consumption habits as a result of not being 
paid on time, is based upon the characteristics of the creditor, it has little impact on 
its valuation of return. The only situation where the creditor’s valuation of return 
might exceed that of the market is where the creditor has absolutely no means of 
raising further finances. This is so as, as long as the creditor has access to capital, it 
will be reimbursed for the difference between the debtors cost of borrowing and its 
own under Article 74 of the Convention.  
 
The second argument Knoll provides for the non-suitability of the debtor’s cost of 
borrowing is that unlike investors of a publicly traded company, the debtor is forced 
to hold an undiversified portfolio. Since systemic risk can be diversified though 
                                                     
158 The term index has been used here since highly leveraged companies usually have sub-categories 
within each secured, mezzanine and subordinated debts. Moreover, the interest rate of each sub-
category may vary significantly.  
159 Michael S. Knoll and Jeffrey M. Colon, ‘The Calculation of Prejudgment Interest’ (2005) 
University of Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 06-21, 31 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=732765> accessed 20 September 2015. 
160 Knoll (n 4) 311-317. 
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diversified portfolio, the market does not compensate the creditor for such a risk.161 
As such, the creditor in such circumstances is forced to bear a risk that is not 
reflected in the debtor’s cost of funds. While this would hold true if the creditor was 
being compensated on the basis of the debtor’s fixed cost of funds; the use of a 
floating interest rate alleviates all such problems. While it is impossible to calculate 
unsystematic risks ex-ante, and consequently a fixed ROI cannot reflect the same; 
ex-post it can be factored into the calculation of the ROI. In other words, the use of a 
floating rate ensures that the impacts of unsystematic risks will be factored into the 
‘return’ the creditor is entitled to.162  Therefore there does not seem to be any need 
for requiring a different methodology for calculating the ROI where the debtor is a 
publicly traded company or otherwise. 
 
The CLT has however attracted its share of criticisms.  Escher and Krueger for 
instance, find the theory inadequate in achieving the objectives upon which the 
principle of interest is based.163 Instead they propose an alternative theory which 
views the creditors claim to sums in arrears as a ‘forward contract’ which is said to 
be entered into at the time of breach.164 This contract simply entitles the creditor to 
recover the sums in arrears adjusted for inflation plus ‘implied financing costs’ or the 
cost of raising debt.165  Interestingly, the authors grant that in cases where there 
exists a risk of default, the same must be reflected in the difference between the 
quantum of sums in arrears and the judgment amount. Since the risk of default is 
simply the risk that the debtor may not be able to pay, the Cost of Carry model leads 
to the application of the defendants cost of borrowing. As such, in all cases where 
default risk exists, the Cost of Carry model supports rather than undercutting the 
coerced loan theory166. 
 
Similarly, Barondes in his article titled ‘Rejecting the Marie Antoinette Paradigm of 
Prejudgment Interest’ highlights what he considers to be the shortfalls of the CLT. 167  
                                                     
161 ibid 308-311. 
162 ibid 317-320. 
163 The model is called the ‘Cost of Carry Pricing Model’, see Susan Escher and Kurt Krueger, ‘The 
Cost of Carry and Prejudgment Interest’ (2003) 6 Litigation Economics Review 12. 
164 ibid. 
165 ibid. 
166 As such, it is only in instances where there is no default risk associated with the sums in arrears, 
that the cost of carry pricing model points towards the creditors cost of borrowing.  
167 Barondes (n 98). 
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Drawing from Meckling and Jensen’s theory on asset substitution in corporate 
finance, Barondes argues that since the CLT does not recognize the difference 
between a firm’s equity holders and creditors, application of the theory cannot lead 
to the restoration of both classes to the position they had been in before the 
occurrence of breach.168 This conclusion is based upon the fact that even if the 
judgment has the same present value as that of the unpaid sums when they ought to 
have been paid, the two have very different risk characteristics.  
 
Basing his arguments on the assertion that “A corporation ordinarily is managed for 
the benefit of the shareholders, not for the benefit of its creditors or the firm as a 
whole”169; Barondes uses two examples to show that by the replacement of a riskier 
asset with a relatively non-risky one, stockholders would gain more than what they 
are entitled to whereas, other stakeholders of the creditor would be 
undercompensated.170 It is extremely important to note that the degree with which 
the debtors of the firm (creditor) are undercompensated is equal to the unjust 
enrichment of it’s equity holders. As such, the creditor corporation as a whole is 
neither unjustly enriched nor undercompensated.  
 
6.4 Conclusions: 
 
A review of the drafting history of the Convention clearly reveals that the issue of 
interest lies within the scope of the Convention. Moreover, while Convention does 
not stipulate a methodology for the calculation of the ROI it does contain guidelines 
on the proper methodology for its calculation. First, the separation of the issue of 
recovery of interest from the provision on damages clearly reveals that that ROI 
calculation is not subject to defenses that limit the recovery of damages. Moreover, 
the travaux reveal that an appropriate ROI is one that completely compensates the 
creditor while barring the potential of opportunistic behaviour on the part of the 
debtor.  This chapter argues that the ROI which the creditor is entitled to must 
account for: a) the time value of money, b) the risk that the debtor might default. 
                                                     
168 ibid. 12 
169 Barondes (n 98) 15. 
170 ibid. 
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Since the risk of the debtor’s default is based upon the characteristics of the debtor, a 
fixed rate of interest would be unable to appropriately take such risk into account. 
Consequently, the ROI has to be flexible if the creditor is to be completely 
compensated.   
 
It is argued that sums in arrears should be equated with a loan that the creditor has 
been forced to extend to the creditor. As a result, this chapter argues that an 
appropriate ROI that the creditor is entitled to must be one that reflects the debtor’s 
cost of borrowing. A mechanism of ROI calculation which does not take default risk 
into account will result in the ex-ante under-compensation of creditors as a class 
while allowing debtors to be unjustly enriched. Since the ROI that the debtor pays 
upon sums raised through its domestic capital markets best reflects this risk, 
reference to the debtors borrowing costs is the correct point of reference.     
The application of such a rate, apart from achieving the objective of complete 
compensation of the creditor, fulfils the secondary objective of barring opportunistic 
behaviour, which the drafters had in mind during deliberations on the text of article 
78. It is argued that if reference is made to the debtor’s cost of borrowing as the 
correct ROI applicable under the Convention, then debtors as a class would lose the 
‘strategic’ incentive to delay payment. This is premised on the fact that since the 
debtor would be able to raise a similar amount on similar terms from his domestic 
financial markets, it would be unable to profit by strategically delaying payment of 
the sums in arrears.  
 
Such an approach has the additional advantage of not subjecting the issue of ROI 
calculation to the dictates of domestic law and is consequently in line with the 
international nature of the Convention. Moreover, such an approach is in line with 
commercial realities unlike the rules contained in various domestic statutes that do 
not reflect the actual rate of inflation or the risk of the debtors default. Finally, this 
approach, unlike those referring to domestic law statutes, does not bar recovery of 
interest in instances where the domestic law identified through the rules of PIL  do 
not make any provision for the recovery of interest.  
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Chapter 7: The Foreseeability Default in Article 74 
 
The economic analysis of law has both a positivist and normative role. The 
normative role of the economic analysis is to identify the value conflicts and 
ascertain how given social desires can be achieved most efficiently. The 
positivist role on the other hand is to explain the rules and reasoning of the 
law through the economic lens.1 
Articles 45(1)(b) and 61(1)(b) of the Convention provide the buyer and seller, 
respectively, with the right to claim damages arising from breach of contract by the 
other party.2 Article 74 to 77 then go on to provide methodologies for the calculation 
of the damages, which a party should receive once it is entitled to claim the same 
under Articles 45 and 61. It should be noted at the outset, the Convention clearly 
states that parties may recover damages where the other party “fails to perform any 
of his obligations under the contract.”3 As such, the right to claim damages under the 
Convention is not subject to ‘fault’. In other words, the Convention adopts a strict 
liability rule.4 
This, however, should not be taken to mean that the Convention allows for recovery 
of damages in all cases of breach without limitation. Rather, the Convention limits 
liability of failure to perform through the incorporation of rules on mitigation5, 
foreseeability6 and excuse.7 
Article 74 of the Convention states:  
                                                     
1 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis Of Law (7th edn, Wolters Kluwer for Aspen Publishers 2007) 
2 See Convention, Article 45(1) and 61(1). 
3 ibid. 
4 Various civil law countries on the other hand only allow recovery of damages if it can be proved that 
the respondent was at fault. As such it must be proved that the breach was willful, or a result of 
negligence. See e.g. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (hereinafter referred to as ‘BGB’), § 276; Article 1101 
of the Spanish Civil Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘SCC’); Article 401 of the Russian Civil Code 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘GKRF’). Analysis of Fault based liability vs. strict liability is outside the 
scope of this chapter and as such will not be highlighted in part 1 which highlights, in part, the 
differences between the methodology adopted under article 74 and that of national laws.  
5 See Convention, Article 77 
6 ibid Article 74  
7See ibid Article 79. Alastair Mullis, ‘Twenty-Five Years On – The United Kingdom, Damages and 
the Vienna Sales Convention’ (2007) 71 Rabels Zeitschrift fuer auslaendisches und internationales 
Privatrecht 35, 51. 
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Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the 
loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of 
the breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach 
foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought 
to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.8  
In a nutshell, the article limits recoverability of damages to that which the parties 
foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time the contract was concluded.  
Like every rule of the Convention, parties are free to derogate from the default rule 
on damages through agreement.9 Parties, however, would seldom contract out of 
these defaults due to ‘stickiness’, i.e. the difficulty of opting out of default rules 
excluding the issue of drafting costs.10 In any given transaction, request for deviation 
from a commonly used default rule raises suspicion on the part of the other party.11 
Such suspicion, more often than not, leads to a negative inference, i.e. the party 
asking for deviation has a trick up its sleeve. This leads the other party to ask for an 
economic benefit in return for deviation or, in certain cases, even motivates it to 
avoid contracting altogether.12 Such an eventuality, in turn, demotivates parties to 
request deviation from the default. The risk of stickiness, as such, requires that the 
default be the most efficient methodology in all cases, which given the diverse nature 
of disputes is hardly possible. This does not mean, however, that default rules on 
damages for breach are subsequently inefficient. In fact, such default rules are 
extremely advantageous if they operate to maximize social welfare of parties to sales 
                                                     
8 Convention, Article 74. 
9 Examples of instances where parties to sales contract governed by the Convention opted out of the 
default rules on damage recovery include Turku Court of Appeal, Finland,  12 April 2002 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020412f5.html>; Tribunal of  International Commercial Arbitration 
at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Russia,  27 July 1999 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990727r1.html>; Tribunal of  International Commercial Arbitration 
at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Russia, 23 November 1994 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/941123r1.html>. 
10 Building on the work of Professors Bernstine and Spier, Professors Ben-Shahar and Pottow (2006) 
argue that stickiness is a far more prevalent problem than appreciated.  They argue that deviation from 
the norm raises suspicion since it, amongst other factors, gives a negative signal about the demanding 
party’s treatment of relational norms i.e. it would probably not resolve disputes in a cooperative 
manner. Ben-Shahar, Omri and John A.E. Pottow, ‘On the Stickiness of Default Rules’ (2006) 33 
Florida State University Law Review 651, 662. 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid. 
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contract as a pool.13 That is to say that the existence of a particular default is 
beneficial, if the resulting reduction of transaction costs outweighs the cost of 
contracting around it for parties as a pool. 
This chapter is concerned with evaluating whether the foreseeability default 
contained in Article 74 can be interpreted in a manner that promotes social welfare 
of the parties to contracts of international sale of goods. In order to answer this, it is 
necessary to begin by identifying efficiency-based considerations that should guide 
the interpretation of the article, so as to minimize instances where parties would wish 
to contract around the default. These considerations would add to the predictability 
of the operation of damages provisions of the Convention from the perspective of its 
end users and aid courts in applying the same.  
Unfortunately, the principle of foreseeability did not attract much debate during the 
drafting stages of the article. This means that the travaux are not of much help in the 
identification of the philosophical underpinnings of the Principle of Foreseeability, 
which could provide the grounds for an efficiency based interpretative methodology. 
It is argued that the prevalence of this limit to recovery of consequential damages in 
national laws pre-empted discussion on the inclusion of the principle in the text of 
the Convention. As such, this chapter attempts to identify the philosophical 
underpinnings of the limit as it exists in national laws. This analysis is only 
concerned with the identification of philosophical underpinnings of the principle of 
foreseeability, as distinguished from its application under domestic law.  
Mindful of the fact that various tribunals have fallen prey to the homeward trend in 
the application of Article 74, the chapter briefly identifies certain fundamental 
differences between the application of the foreseeability requirement under national 
law and the Convention. Moreover, since it would be against the international nature 
of the Convention to transplant the philosophical underpinning of the principles of 
domestic law in the interpretation of the Convention, this chapter will attempt to 
identify the general principles upon which the provisions of the Convention that 
limit recovery of damages are based.  
                                                     
13 Social welfare is defined as the sum of participant utility excluding third part effects. George S. 
Geis, ‘Empirically Assessing Hadley v. Baxendale’ (2005) 33 Florida State University Law Review 
897, 912. 
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It concludes that the regardless of legal tradition, the foreseeability limit to damage 
recovery operates to motivate parties to exchange information and places liability 
upon the best risk-avoider. Equipped with the efficiency based considerations 
identified in Part 1 of this chapter, Part 2 shall attempt to ascertain whether the 
foreseeability default promotes social welfare of the parties as a pool over the 
alternative of full damages default. It will be concluded that while there are too many 
variables that determine which default promotes efficiency, the foreseeability default 
does seem to be preferable over the full damages default; at least in case of contacts 
for the sale of generic goods, which seem to be the subject matter of most cases 
arising under the Convention. While there is need for empirical analysis and the 
formulation of mathematical techniques to concretely ascertain whether a particular 
default would promote efficiency relative to other defaults, it is argued that the 
efficiency based considerations will greatly aid tribunals in interpreting Article 74 in 
a manner that does promote efficiency and advances harmonization.  
 
7.1 Part 1: The Philosophical Underpinnings of the Principle of Foreseeability 
 
7.1.1 Historical Evolution of the Principle of Foreseeability  
The incorporation of the principle of foreseeability did not attract much debate 
during the drafting stages of Article 74.14 In fact, the principle of foreseeability 
contained in Article 74 was ostensibly a reproduction of Article 82 of the ULIS.15 
The lack of debate, however, is not surprising, given that most legal systems 
incorporate the concept of foreseeability as a limit to damages.16 Jurisdictions that do 
                                                     
14 Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary Records of Meetings of the 
Plenary Meetings, 10th Plenary Meeting, 10 April 1980 (A/CONF.97/11/Add.2). Article 70 [which 
became Article 74] was adopted by 48 votes to none, with 2 abstentions. A total of two amendments 
were suggested to the text of Article 74, both of which were rejected. Of these, one was concerned 
with the foreseeability rule. The proposed amendment requested the second sentence of Article 74 be 
amended to read: “Such damages may not exceed the reasonable expectation of loss which the party 
in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light 
of the facts and matters which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the 
breach of contract.” Pakistan (U.N. Document A/CONF.97/C.1/L.235).   
15 ULIS, Article 82 states: “Where the contract is not avoided, damages for a breach of contract by 
one party shall consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party. 
Such damages shall not exceed the loss which the party in breach ought to have foreseen at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters which then were known or ought 
to have been known to him, as a possible consequence of the breach of the contract.” 
16 Lajos Vékás, ‘The Foreseeability Doctrine in Contractual Damage Cases’ (2002) 43 Acta Juridica 
Hungarica 145, 154 
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not make specific reference to foreseeability on the other hand, use concepts such as 
‘causality’ and ‘reliance’ to the same end.17  
Unfortunately, however, the lack of debate during the drafting stages of the article, 
coupled with the superficial similarities between Article 74 and the common law rule 
of Hadley v Baxendale has led various academics to equate them with one another.18 
Interestingly, most commentators that equate the two are trained in German law, 
which does not make specific reference to foreseeability as a limit on damages.19  
The argument that the rule of Article 74 is a compromise in favour of the common 
law world ignores the evolution of the principle of foreseeability as a limitation on 
damage recovery.20 The principle of foreseeability as limit to damages was first 
recognized by the Constitution of 531(AD) enacted by Justinian, where by damages 
were limited to ad duplum.21  Dumoulin argued that the limitation was based upon 
the fact that the injured party could only foresee such damages.22 This rule was 
subsequently adopted by the Napoleonic code, which influenced the current structure 
and content of the civil law regimes.23 Indeed, both the laws of the UK and the US 
also adopted the rule from these sources and, as such, it cannot be stated the rules 
limiting recovery of damages to foreseeability was ‘invented’ in Hadley v 
Baxendale.24  
                                                     
17 See for example BGB, Section 252 
18 Hadley v. Baxendale [1854] EWHC J70, 9 ExCh. 341, (1854) 156 ER 145; Professor Sutton for 
instance sates “the second sentence of article 74 closely resembles the common law foreseeability 
requirement derived from Hadley v Baxendale”. Jeffrey S. Sutton, ‘Measuring Damages Under the 
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods’ (1989) 50 Ohio State Law Journal 
737. Professor Farnsworth on the other hand is critical of approaches equating the rule of 
foreseeability contained in article 74 to the rule of Hadley v Baxandale. He states, “Any such formula 
is inevitably imprecise”. Allan E. Farnsworth, ‘Damages and Specific Relief’ (1979) 27 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 247. 
19 Herber for instance states that “the limitation to the foreseeable damages comes from Anglo-
American law.” Rolf Herber and Beate Czerwenka, Internationales Kaufrecht: Kommentar zu dem 
Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen vom 11. April 1980 über Verträge über den internationalen 
Warenkauf (CH Beck 2002) 333.  
20 Various courts have erred in this regard. For instance In Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp. the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the Convention requires damages to be limited by 
the “familiar principle of foreseeability established in Hadley v. Baxendale.” See Delchi Carrier 
S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp. 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995) 1029. 
21 Franco Ferrari, ‘Comparative Ruminations on the Foreseeability of Damages in Contract 
Law’ (1992) 53 Louisiana Law Review 1257.  
22 ibid. 
23 Such a rule is found in the legal systems of France, Belgium, Italy and Portugal.  
24 Certain American Judgments explicitly attribute the creation of the foreseeability limit to Pothier, 
who derived the same, in part, from interpretations of the constitution enacted by Justinian in 531 AD. 
See for example Manss-Owens Co. v. Owens & Son, 105 S.E. 543 (1921) and Sinclair Refining Co. v. 
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While the theoretical justifications to limits of consequential damages under 
domestic laws and the Convention do seem to be similar, there are fundamental 
differences in the way they are applied. 25 Moreover, even if these differences were 
not to exist, it would be against the nature of the Convention, as an international 
instrument, to interpret the same with reference to domestic concepts.26 Keeping this 
in mind, it is argued that while the contours of the principle vary according to 
jurisdiction, the philosophical justification of its existence seems to be uniform. This 
uniformity in domestic law vis-à-vis the justification of limiting consequential loss 
does explain why the drafters incorporated the principle without debate.27 This 
chapter identifies the philosophical underpinnings of the concept in UK, US and 
German law in order to appreciate the goals the foreseeability requirement attempts 
to achieve. In order to limit the homeward trend in the application of the article, 
differences between the principles as it exists in the Convention and domestic laws 
shall also be highlighted. 28 
 
7.1.2 UK Law: The Hadley Rule 
 
Hadley v. Baxendale divided damages into two types, namely those that arise 
naturally from the breach of contract and those that were in the contemplation of 
                                                     
Hamilton & Dotson, 164 Va. 203, 178 S.E. 777. It is therefore unsurprising that the court in Sinclair 
Refining Co. v. Hamilton & Dotson specifically stated that the foreseeability limit “is known as the 
rule in Hadley v. Baxendale and is sometimes spoken of as having originated in that case, though it is 
in reality an embodiment of civil law principles, and is substantially a paraphrasing of a rule on the 
subject as it had been stated at an earlier date in the Code Napoleon, by Pothier.” 
25 Excluding German law 
26 Convention, Article 7  
27 Djakhongir Saidov. The Law of Damages in the International Sale of Goods: The CISG and Other 
International Instruments (International Specialised Book Service 2008) 100 
28 Homeward trend here simply refers to the propensity of judges to interpret rules in a manner that 
they resemble rules contained in the domestic law of the forum. Troy Keily defines it as “the 
ethnocentric propensity to interpret an international convention such as the CISG in accordance with 
domestic principles and concepts.” Troy Keily, ‘Oklahoma outlaws foreign and international law: the 
impact on international trade law of America's emerging anti-foreign and international law contagion’ 
(2012) 16 Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration 43.  In the words of 
Professor Zeller the homeward trend refers to “temptation for judges and the parties settling disputes 
... to look at what is familiar especially as it appears to be so at first glance.” Bruno Zeller, 'The UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) - A Leap Forward Towards 
Unified International Sales Laws' (2000) 12 Pace International Law Review 79, 88 
‹http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/zeller3.html› 
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both parties when the contract was concluded (consequential damages).29 While 
damages arising in the usual course are routinely recoverable, recovery of 
consequential damages was made conditional upon the principle of foreseeability. 
Interestingly, the reason for doing so was purely instrumental in nature. The dicta of 
the judgment states that if a party is made liable for unforeseeable losses the other 
party would not have any incentive to share information and contract on such 
losses.30 As a result, the party in breach would not have the necessary information to 
take adequate precautions in order to reduce the possibility of breach and resulting 
damages ex-ante.31 As such, the principle in UK law operates to motivate parties to 
exchange information vis-à-vis the potential of loss, since it places liability on the 
basis of the existence of such knowledge at the time the contract was concluded.   
The Hadley rule, however, differs in certain seminal respects from the rule contained 
in Article 74 of the Convention. These differences can be summed up as follows: 
1) The Hadley rule speaks of ‘contemplated damages’, whereas, Article 74 is 
concerned with ‘foreseeable damages’. Since damages may be foreseeable 
events that are not in the contemplation of the parties, the Hadley rule is 
narrower than the rule contained in Article 74. Interestingly, the French Civil 
Code (CC), unlike the common law rule, explicitly makes reference to 
foreseeability rather than contemplation.32 It is in this sense, that the rule 
contained in Article 74 has more in common than the French legal system than 
the English one.  
2) The Hadley rule is concerned with damages that are a ‘probable result of the 
breach’ whereas Article 74 allows for recovery of damages that are a ‘possible 
consequence of the breach’ regardless of the probability of them materializing. 
As such, the rule of Article 74 is far broader than that contained in Hadley on 
this particular point. 
                                                     
29 Hadley (n 18). 
30 Bradley, J.: Hadley (n 18) 354. 
31As early as 1980, Goetz and Scott argued that the limitation placed on the recovery of damages by 
the rule of foreseeability operates to increase the efficiency of promissory activity by encouraging 
parties’ to exchange information between themselves. Such exchange of information is socially 
desirable since it enables the obligor to take the requisite level of precaution thereby reducing the 
possibility of breach and the resulting damages. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, ‘Enforcing 
Promises: An Examination Of The Basis Of Contract’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 1261, 1300; 
George S. Geis, ‘Empirically Assessing Hadley v. Baxendale’ (2005) 32 Florida State University Law 
Review  897, 907.  
32 Ibid. 
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3) Article 74 determines foreseeability with reference to the party in breach,33 
whereas, the Hadley rule requires the loss to be in contemplation of both parties. 
This divergence, however, is not material in practice.34 It must be noted that 
since the plaintiff will always be aware of his circumstances and dealings better 
than the defendant, it is always the knowledge of the breaching party that 
matters under Hadley.35 Moreover, Article 74 judges foreseeability on the basis 
of “facts, which he then knew or ought to have known.”36 This objective and 
subjective standard in relation to the party’s knowledge, it is argued, covers both 
kinds of knowledge established under Hadley, i.e. imputed and actual 
knowledge. As such, in practice, the position adopted by the Convention and 
UK law seems to be analogous on this point.37 
 
7.1.3 U.C.C and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
 
The principle of foreseeability as a limit to damages under US law is contained in the 
U.C.C and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. By virtue of Section 2-275(2)(a) 
of the U.C.C, the buyer’s right to recover consequential damages is limited to “any 
loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller 
at the time of contracting had reason to know.”38 Section 351(1) of the Restatement 
goes on to state that damages are not recoverable unless they were foreseeable by the 
party in breach at the time the contact was concluded.39 
                                                     
33 A similar stance is found in French law. See Article 1150 of the French Code Civil, cited in, Denis 
Tallon, ‘Damages, Exemption Clauses, and Penalties’ (1992) 40 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 675. 
34 The judgment in Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos for instance, was based upon an analyses of the 
foreseeability of the party on breach.  Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos [1966] 2 QB 695, 730. 
35 Corbin, cited in Arthur G. Murphey, Jr., ‘Consequential Damages in Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods and the Legacy of Hadley’ (1989) 23 Washington Journal of International Law & 
Economics 415. 
36 In the words of Knapp, “Foreseeability, as understood in Article 74, depends on the knowledge of 
facts and matters which enable the party concerned to foresee the results of the breach” Victor Knapp, 
‘Article 74’ in C. Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell (eds), Commentary on the 
International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (Giuffre 1987) 542. 
37 Djakhongir Saidov, ‘Methods of Limiting Damages under the Vienna Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods’ (2002) 14 Pace International Law Review 307. 
38 Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-275 (2) (a). 
39 Section 351 (1) reads “Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have 
reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made”. 
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According to Professors Ayres and Gertner, there are two basic reasons for 
incomplete contract namely: (1) transaction costs may inhibit detailed negotiations 
on events unlikely to materialize, and (2) a party may simply withhold information 
to increase its share of gains under the contract, even in cases where sharing the 
information would increase the total gain from contracting.40  The second reason for 
incomplete contracts, they argue, leads to the conclusion that default rules that limit 
damages to foreseeable events motivate parties to contract around the same, thereby, 
revealing information. Sharing information with the other party will maximize value, 
since it will be able prevent loss occasioned from such events more efficiently.41  
This argument supports Professor Posner and Professor Hause’s thesis that rules 
limiting damages, such as, the principle of foreseeability operate to place liability on 
the party that is the best risk-avoider.42 As such, a provision limiting damages to 
foreseeability simply equips the parties with the tools to identify which of them is 
most capable of economically avoiding the risk.43  
Since foreseeability is simply the identification of the party that can most 
economically avoid the risk, such a methodology incentivises taking appropriate 
precautions.  If the best cost avoider does not take the requisite precautions, it is 
efficient to deny him consequential damages. 
While the formula, adopted under US law, does seem to resemble that of Article 74, 
there are certain fundamental differences between them: 
1) US law uses a subjective standard while judging foreseeability. What is under 
review is whether the party in breach foresaw the loss or not.44 The Convention, on 
the other hand, incorporates both an objective and subjective test, i.e. damages are 
recoverable for loss which party in breach ‘foresaw’ or ‘ought to have foreseen’. 
                                                     
40 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps In Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory Of 
Default Rules." (1989) 99 The Yale Law Journal 87, 92-94 
41 Goetz and Robert (n31) 1300 
42 Both Hause and Posner were concerned with the rule in Hadley v Baxindale. Larry D. Hause, ‘An 
Economic Approach to Hadley v. Baxendale’ (1983) 62 Nebraska Law Review 157, 164. 
43 Quantum of damages are not limited by fault but rather are based entirely on the identification of 
the most efficient risk avoider. In other words, loss should be borne by the party who was best suited 
to avert the same. 
44 UCC refers to the loss resulting form needs that the ‘seller’ at the time of contracting ‘had reason to 
know’. The restatement limits loss to those that were ‘foreseeable by the party in breach’. 
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2) Like the Hadley rule, the Restatement makes reference to ‘probable result’ rather 
than ‘possible consequence’ as used by in the Convention. As such, the rule of 
Article 74 is broader than that contained in US law on this particular point. 
 
7.1.4 German Law 
 
German law does not incorporate the principle of foreseeability as a limit to claim 
damages.45 The law does, however, achieve similar goals as that of the Hadley rule 
through the incorporation of the rule of adequate causation. 46  
By virtue of BGB Section 252, the right to recover unrealized profits is limited to 
those that were probable.47 Probability here is to be judged according to the degree 
of measures and precautions taken. As such, the section operates to motivate parties 
that place a high value on performance to share information with the other, if they 
wish to protect their right to claim lost profits. Moreover, Section 254 of the BGB 
operates to limit damage claims in cases where the injured party failed to prevent or 
mitigate such loss as a result of negligence.48 For the purposes of this section, fault 
includes “an omission to call the attention of the debtor to the danger of unusually 
high damage which the debtor neither knew nor should have known, or in an 
omission to avert or mitigate the damage.”49 Taken together, these sections operate 
                                                     
45 This omission, has led various German scholars to conclude that the rule contained in the 
Convention is sourced from the common law rule of Hadley v Baxindale. It may however be argued 
that the principle of foreseeability does play a role in the application of BGB sec. 254 which states: 
(1) If any fault of the injured party has contributed to causing the damage, the obligation to 
compensate the injured party and the extent of the compensation to be made depends upon the 
circumstances, especially upon how far the injury has been caused predominantly by the one or the 
other party. 
(2) This applies also even if the fault of the injured party consisted only in an omission to call the 
attention of the debtor to the danger of unusually high damage which the debtor neither knew nor 
should have known, or in an omission to avert or mitigate the damage. 
46 Vekas, for instance, states “The solution offered by the BGB reaches similar goals to that of 
contemplation rule by following a different dogmatic path”. Vékás (n 16) 155. According to this rule, 
damages can be recovered so long as the obligor’s default rendered the type of damages incurred 
more probable. See G. H. Treitel, Remedies For Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Oxford 
University Press 1988) 162. 
47 The section reads: “The damage to be compensated for also comprises the lost profits. Those profits 
are considered lost that in the normal course of events or in the special circumstances, particularly due 
to the measures and precautions taken, could probably be expected.” 
48 BGB, Section 254; It should be noted that this section (liability reduction) is rarely applied in 
practice. See Vékás (n 16) 154. 
49 ibid. 
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to motivate the parties to a contract to exchange information so that they may take 
necessary precautions on the basis of the best risk-avoider.  
It is in this respect that German law operates to achieve the same results as that of 
English law, US law and the Convention. Take, for example, a scenario where the 
probability of a loss materializing is very low but the obiligee possesses certain 
information that the other party does not, such as, the fact that the quantum of 
damages resulting from breach would be extraordinarily high.50 In such a case the 
injured party would be motivated to furnish information that it possesses vis-à-vis 
such a loss to the other party. Failure to do so, would invoke Section 254 and 
damages would be limited accordingly. In other words, the fact that a party is aware 
of the probability of loss makes it the best risk-avoider and, as such, liability should 
fall upon him. If on the other hand, the party in breach is aware of the probability of 
such a loss then he is best placed to insure against it and, as such, the risk of such a 
loss materializing should fall on it.  
There is, however, one instance where the BGB does not operate to place liability of 
the best risk-avoider. In case nether of parties foresaw the loss the BGB places 
liability upon the party in breach, whereas consequential damages under Article 74 
are dependent upon them being foreseeable. The approach adopted by BGB in this 
scenario therefore ignores which party is the best risk-avoider, while the Convention 
attempts to place liability on the basis of such an ascertainment.  
Other points of divergence between the approaches adopted under Article 74 and that 
of the BGB, include the time at which foreseeability is to be judged. Since the BGB 
obliges parties to share information not only before the contract was concluded but 
also whenever the party became aware of it; it seems that the BGB might well be 
more effective in the prevention of loss, since parties are motivated to take 
precautions at all times of performance.51  
 
 
                                                     
50 That is to say that the quantum of damages surpasses that which would ordinarily be expected in 
such a scenario. 
51 Since it allows cover for loss that became foreseeable after the conclusion of the contract. 
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7.1.5 Convention 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, it would be incorrect to find general principles upon which 
the Convention is based by reference to domestic legal concepts. As such, this part of 
the chapter shall attempt to identify those general principles upon which the 
Convention is based in isolation from domestic law. 
According to Professor Schlechtriem, the foreseeability principle is based upon the 
general principle of allocation of risk in a reasonable manner.52 Allocation of risk in 
a reasonable manner here simply refers to a methodology that enables the parties to a 
contract to calculate their potential liability at the time of conclusion of the contract; 
thereby, enabling them to take adequate precautions and price the contract 
accordingly. Such precautions would, in turn, promote commercial activity in the 
sense that the foreseeability test protects parties from unexpected losses. Moreover, 
such an approach to allocation of risks promotes economic efficiency to the extent 
that it saves on transaction costs. This is so as parties to a sales contract need not 
contract on every contingency, thereby limiting expenditure.  
The risk allocation rationale of the foreseeability rule is made clear when the article 
is compared with the expectancy measure of damages.53 If, damage awards were 
based on the expectancy measure, the promisor would be encouraged to take optimal 
precautions whereas the promisee would be discouraged from taking any precautions 
ex-ante. Such a methodology would operate to place liability on the promisor, even 
in cases where he would not be the best risk-avoider. The foreseeability rule cures 
this defect by limiting awards to that which could have been foreseen by the party in 
breach. Such a limitation, it is argued, motivates parties to act in a value-maximizing 
manner by voluntarily exchanging information, which is crucial for the identification 
of the best risk-avoider. In other words, economic efficiency is maximized since the 
rule on foreseeability operates to motivate parties to exchange information of 
unexpected losses if they wish to be protected against the same, enabling the other to 
                                                     
52 Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law: The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (Manz 1986) 96. See also E. Allan Farnsworth, 'Legal Remedies for Breach of 
Contract' (1970) 70 Columbia Law Review 1145, 1208. 
53 Here expectancy measure is used as a measure that would place the injured party in the same 
position as it would have been in had the contract been performed, regardless of whether losses 
caused as a result of the breach were foreseeable or otherwise.  
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take adequate precautions. This would lead to a rational allocation of resources with 
the aim of reducing the probability or impact of breach.   
Apart from the rule on foreseeability, the policy of the Convention to place liability 
on the best risk-avoider is evident from the rules on mitigation of loss and 
contributory harm.54  While the Convention does not directly deal with the issue of 
contributory harm of the injured party, Article 80 does illuminate the general 
principle of contributory negligence as a limit to damage recovery. The article reads: 
“a party may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform, to the extent that 
such failure was caused by the first party's act or omission.”55 As such the article 
does not allow recovery of loss occasioned by the conduct of the promisee. The 
impact of this article is to place liability on the party best suited to avoid or minimize 
the impact of such loss. Of course, where loss is occasioned by the conduct of one 
party, it is the party best suited to avoid the loss. In other words, Article 80 of the 
Convention places liability on the party that can minimize loss in the most 
economically efficient manner, thereby, minimizing the loss caused to the sum of 
participant utility.  
Even in cases where harm is not caused by the acts of the non-breaching party; 
Article 77 limits the non-breaching party’s right to claim damages where it could 
have avoided the loss by taking mitigating measures.56 The article reads: 
A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are 
reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, 
resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in 
breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss 
should have been mitigated.57 
 It makes senses from an efficiency perspective, not to permit an increase in harm, 
which could have been reasonably mitigated. As such, Article 77 simply operates to 
place liability on the best risk-avoider.  
                                                     
54 Convention, Articles 80, 85 and 86. 
55 ibid Article 80. 
56 ibid Article 77. 
57 ibid. 
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The excuse doctrine contained in Article 79 of the Convention similarly operates to 
place liability on the best-risk avoider.58 By virtue of Article 79, a party loses its 
right to claim damages under the Convention where it is proved that non-
performance is occasioned due to an impediment beyond the control of the 
promisor.59 The rationale for this lies in the fact that, where the impediment is 
beyond the control of the promisor and is unforeseeable at the time the contract is 
concluded, it cannot be said to be the best risk-avoider and, as such, should not be 
held liable for resulting damages. On the other hand, if the promisor is the best risk-
avoider, regardless of the fact that the impediment is beyond its control, courts do 
not allow reliance on the excuse doctrine.60 This was illustrated in case titled 
Macromex S.r.l. v. Globex International Inc.61 After having entered into a contract 
for the sale of chicken parts to be delivered to a Romania buyer, a U.S. seller failed 
to tender half of the goods within the agreed date of performance. The breaching 
party contended that its non-performance was justified, as a result of the 
promulgation of a Romanian regulation that required certification of all chicken meat 
entering the country.62 When the seller, upon request of the buyer, refused to deliver 
the remaining goods to Georgia, the buyer initiated arbitration proceedings. The 
arbitrator recognized that the seller’s delay did not amount to fundamental breach 
under Article 25 CISG.63  
However, its non-performance could not be justified under Article 79 CISG, since 
the seller could have reasonably performed by delivering the goods to Georgia.64 
                                                     
58 Convention, Article 79. 
59 Initial contributions to the Economic theory of law vis-à-vis the defence of excuse were primarily 
concerned with the extent to which such doctrines promote efficient risk bearing. Posner and 
Rosenfield, for instance, argued that one of the central purposes of contract law is to reduce 
transaction costs. In their view, the law is best able to achieve this by providing default rules that 
achieve the most efficient outcome. In the realm of excuse doctrines, they argue that default rules are 
efficient when they assign risk to the superior risk bearer i.e. the party which is better able to prevent 
the risk from materializing or is better placed to mitigate the impact of the risk. This translates into the 
argument that a party should be excused from non-performance arising out of impossibility or 
impracticality, only where the other party is the superior risk bearer and not otherwise. Richard A. 
Posner and Andrew M. Rosenfield, ‘Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An 
Economic Analysis’ (1977) 6 The Journal of Legal Studies 83. 
60 See for instance Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 24 March 1999 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990324g1.html >. 
61 Macromex Srl. v. Globex International Inc, International Centre for Dispute Resolution of the 
American Arbitration Association, American Arbitration Association, 23 October 2007 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071023a5.html>  
62 ibid. 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid. 
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This case therefore gives credence to the assertion that the breaching party will not 
be able to avail itself of the defences under Article 79, even if the impediment was 
beyond its control, as long as the party could avoid the consequences of the 
impediment. 
 
7.1.6 Conclusion 
The positions adopted by national legal systems and the Convention, as analysed 
above, illuminate that the principle of foreseeability and its related concepts, for 
example, in German law, operate to achieve two related goals, regardless of the legal 
tradition where it is operating, namely: a) to motivate parties to disclose information, 
and b) to place liability on the party that is the best risk-avoider. In other words, 
parties have been provided with a reference point that allows them to ‘size up’ the 
risk of contracting ex-ante and base their business decisions accordingly.  
On the basis of these findings it is argued that the efficiency of any default cap on 
damages depends upon the degree to which it achieves the right balance between 
pooling and separation by motivating sharing of information through the 
minimization of communication costs.65 Such a balance between polling and 
separation is essential since it allows the parties to take the most efficient level of 
precautions, i.e. by placing liability on the best risk-avoider.66 Take, for instance, the 
model developed by Professors Bebchuk and Shavell that demonstrates how default 
rules limiting recovery of loss aid the promisor in taking the most efficient level of 
precaution.67 Since the promisor can only take the most efficient level of precautions 
when he is aware of the valuation placed by the buyers, an efficient default rule is 
one that illuminates the distribution of the ‘types’ of buyers in the most cost-efficient 
way.68 In other words, an efficient default is one which promotes inexpensive 
                                                     
65 Peter van Wijck, ‘Foreseeability’ in Gerrit De Geest (ed), Contract Law and Economics (Vol. 6, 
Edward Elgar Publishing 2011)  
66 An optimal level of precaution is essential since it would result in the optimal control of the entry 
and exist of low-valuation buyers. 
67  Lucian Ayre Bebchuk and Steven Shavell, ‘Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of 
Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale’ (1991) 7 The Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 284. 
68 The term ‘type’ is used here to distinguish between those buyers who place a high value on 
performance (high value promisees) and those that place a low value on performance (low value 
promisees).  
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sharing of information, which is best achieved by taking the ‘type’ of the parties into 
account.69 
Part 2 of this chapter shall attempt to analyse the extent to which the foreseeability 
rule achieves these goals in comparison with the alternative rule of full damages 
default. The aim of this part is to analyse whether the foreseeability default provides 
the best solution to the issue of recovery of consequential damages. 
 
7.2 Part 2. Does the foreseeability default foster the most efficiency?  
 
7.2.1 A comparison with the full damages default 
 
The promisor would only be able to take the optimal level of precaution if it 
possesses complete information about the distribution of promisees ‘type’. 
Ascertainment of the ‘type’ of the promisee, however, carries costs. As such, the 
question of which default advances efficiency is partly based upon the extent to 
which it leads to the ascertainment of the distribution of buyers in any given market, 
in the most cost efficient manner. 
In a regime that incorporates a full damages default, high value promisees would not 
reveal their type, since the expectation measure would compensate them entirely 
regardless of the level of precaution the promisor takes. Given the difficulty of 
ascertaining the distribution of types, a promisor would simply prefer to take an 
intermediate level of precaution. Such an outcome, however, would result in major 
inefficiencies, i.e. some low valuation buyers would be driven out of the market as a 
result of the cost of unnecessary precautions being factored into the contract. 
Moreover, many contracts with high value buyers would occur since their price 
would be subsidized as a result of the low valuation buyers that stay in the market.  
On the one hand, in regimes that limit damage recovery of consequential loss to 
foreseeability, high value promisees would be motivated to share information of their 
type, since the average level of damage recovery is intermediate. Such information, 
                                                     
69 A high value buyer is one who would incur a large loss in the event of breach where as low value 
buyers are those who would incur a small loss in case of breach. Bebchuk and Shavell (n 73). 
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in turn, would make loss foreseeable and the promisor would resultantly be liable for 
the same. The promisor would therefore take precautions to the extent that their 
marginal cost equals to the marginal gain of avoided loss. Moreover, once the high 
value promisees make their type known, the promisor can take the adequate level of 
precaution for low-value promisees also, who will generally be the ones who do not 
contract around the rule. This would result in the optimal level of precautions taken.  
On the other hand, in a regime with a full damages default, low-value promisees 
would be motivated to disclose information about their type. This is so as low value 
promisees would not wish to pay for the cost of intermediate or high level of 
precautions that would be factored into the price of the contract and would therefore 
wish to contract around the same. Since there are costs associated with contracting 
around the default, the most efficient way of ascertaining distribution of type is 
where only a minority contracts around it.70 This is when only a minority incurs 
costs as a result of deviation, the increase in transaction costs is, more often than not, 
less than the total benefit of increased precaution.71 
The discussion above leads to the conclusion that default rules limiting damage 
recovery to foreseeability might be preferable if the majority of buyers are low 
valuation buyers. In such a case, only a minority, i.e. the high valuation buyers, 
would engage in information sharing. As such, the default rule will operate to 
differentiate between high and low value buyers in a least costly manner, thereby 
equipping the promisor with the tools to take the optimal level of precaution in a cost 
effective manner.72  If, however, there are more high value promisees than low value 
ones then a full damages default is preferable for the same reasons. 
The discussion above illuminates the fact that the utility of the foreseeability 
requirement, in efficiency terms, is dependent upon (a) the transaction costs of 
sharing information, and (b) the distribution of buyers between low value and high 
value buyers.  
                                                     
70 Ian Ayres, ‘Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults’ (2005) 33 Florida State University 
Law Review 589, 617. 
71 ibid. 
72 Moreover, since only a minority of buyers would contract around such a rule, the transaction costs 
of such information sharing should be less than the benefits of increased precaution. It is in this sense 
that such a default rule would further the goals of efficiency by giving parties the incentive to avoid 
inefficient sharing of information. See Wijck (n 78) 228. 
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This should, however, not be taken to mean that the foreseeability default rule is only 
useful when majority of the buyers place a low value on performance. In fact, the 
foreseeability default can be preferable even in cases where the majority of buyers 
place a high value on performance, so long as it leads to a separating equilibrium, 
whereas, the full damages default would only lead to a pooling equilibrium.73 Of 
course, such a result is only possible where the full damages default does not 
motivate the minority, for whatever reason, to reveal its type by contracting around 
the default. In this scenario, the foreseeability default would be preferable in 
efficiency terms, to the extent that it leads to a separating equilibrium and it can be 
shown that the increase in transaction costs is less than the total benefit of increased 
precaution.74  
On the contrary, the foreseeability default will not be efficient when high value 
buyers run the risk of incurring transaction costs that are greater than the benefit to 
low value buyers. Moreover, if the transaction costs associated with contracting 
around the default is significantly greater for high valuation buyers, a complete 
liability default is preferable to foreseeability one. 
 
7.2.2 The optimal default and when to contract around it  
 
The discussion above reveals that there are whole host of factors that determine 
whether a particular default would achieve the goal of efficiency,75 including, but not 
limited to, the cost of revealing information, the characteristics of the parties 
involved (high-value vs. low value), the probability of incurring consequential 
damages in case of breach and bargaining power. 76 As such, the informational 
                                                     
73 A pooling equilibrium, in efficiency terms is less preferable than a separating equilibrium. See Geis 
(n 32). 
74 ibid 909-10. 
75 Richard Craswell for instance states: “We cannot decide which remedy is ‘best’ in any overall sense 
. . . unless we have some way of measuring the relevant effects, both good and bad, and then summing 
them to come up with a combined score for each of the possible remedies. But if we lack empirical 
data to measure the magnitudes of the various effects, any such sum will be difficult—or even 
impossible—to construct, so we will never know which remedy is truly the most efficient”. Richard 
Craswell, ‘In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory’ 
(2003) 112 The Yale Law Journal 903, 908. 
76 Posner for instance argues that these factors are too complex to determine. Buyer valuations in 
particular, he states, can hardly ever be concretely determined. Eric A. Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of 
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sharing and separation inducing effects of different defaults are dependent on a wide 
range of variables.  
The complexity of such an inquiry has led various academics to conclude that courts 
and legislatures would seldom be able to concretely ascertain which default would 
foster efficiency in any given market ex-ante.77  These concerns led Posner to 
conclude that “the economic approach does not explain the current system of 
contract law nor does it provide a solid basis for criticizing and reforming contract 
law.”78 
These concerns, it is argued, can be put to rest through empirical analysis, at least in 
the area of default rules. The ability of empirical analysis in the resolution of this 
issue is best demonstrated in a seminal paper by Gies published in 2005.79 Since 
there is a great dearth of empirical analysis in the legal field, Gies relied on 
willingness to pay data, collected in the field of marketing. This data enabled him to 
estimate the distribution of buyer valuations in three simple markets, i.e. for a can of 
Coca-Cola, a piece of pound cake and an ergonomic pen.80 Gies’ analysis concludes 
that the foreseeability default is preferable in efficiency terms to other methodologies 
of damage recovery,81 where the goods in question are daily goods rather than 
sophisticated ones. 
 
 
 
                                                     
Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?’ (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 829. Moreover, 
Adler argues that the question of which default rule would achieve a separating equilibrium is better 
answered by economists than law makers who seldom have expertise in such areas. He however, goes 
on to argue that while courts may lack the necessary information to determine which default to 
choose, the legislature with its greater investigative resources may be better able to carry out that 
function. Barry E. Adler, ‘The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale’ (1999) 51 Stanford Law 
Review 1547. See also Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, ‘Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults’ (1999) 
51 Stanford Law Review 1591, 1609.  
77 See Adler (n 81) 1582 and Ayres and Gertner (n 88) 1609. 
78 Posner (n 88) 837. 
79 See Geis (n 32); See also George S. Geis, ‘An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract 
Default Rules’ (2005) 80 Tulane Law Review 1109. 
80 Given the limitations of this thesis coupled with the dearth of empirical data, we accept the 
mathematical calculations of Gies. 
81 Gies was comparing the full damage default with the foreseeability default. 
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7.2.3 Foreseeability default: efficient rate of performance vs efficient rate of 
precaution 
 
The methodology adopted by the Convention on the limitation of damages operates 
to give precedence to the efficient rate of precaution over the efficient rate of 
performance. The impact of the adoption of such an approach is that, in certain 
cases, the methodology leads to instances of inefficient breach.   
According to the theory of efficient breach, if the gains to the seller of breaching the 
contract exceed the resulting loss occasioned to the buyer, then the seller should 
breach, since it would be the more efficient outcome.82 Default rules limiting 
damages claims to the foreseeability requirement, on the other hand, provide 
inefficient incentives to perform. 83 Since an obligor need only account for losses that 
were foreseeable at the time the contract was concluded, it may completely disregard 
losses occasioned from events that become foreseeable thereafter. As such, even if 
the obligor is the best risk-avoider he need not take any precautions vis-à-vis such 
risks. In such a case, a seller would perform the contract even where the losses 
incurred by the buyer as a result of breach are less than the benefits to the seller; 
even though breaching the contract would be the efficient outcome. The inverse 
stands true as well, i.e. the seller is motivated not to perform in cases where the loss 
occasioned to the buyer exceeds the benefits to the seller as a result of breach; as 
long as the loss in question was not foreseeable at the time of conclusion of the 
contract even though it might have become foreseeable during performance. Default 
rules limiting damages to foreseeability, therefore, operate to give greater importance 
to the efficient rate of precaution than to efficient rate of performance.84  
The Convention, then, in its attempt to find the right balance between the optimal 
efficiency in performance and the need of the obligors to be able to evaluate the 
pricing and benefits of the contract ex-ante, adopts a solution that is based upon the 
reduction of communication costs.  If the obligor is liable for losses that became 
                                                     
82 Nathan B. Oman, ‘Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract Damages’ (2007) 64 
Washington & Lee Law Review 829, 851-860 
83 ibid. 
84 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale’ (1992) 80 California Law 
Review 563, 599. 
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foreseeable after the contract was concluded, then the obligee would be motivated to 
withhold disclosure of possible, unusual consequences of breach till the conclusion 
of the contract, thereby ensuring that the pricing of the contract is not influenced by 
the same. The possibility of such an outcome, it is argued, would act as a barrier in 
the achievement of an economically efficient methodology of contract formation and 
recovery of damages, as it would operate to incentivise opportunistic behaviour.85 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
The discussion above illuminates the fact that the efficiency perspective highlighted 
in Chapter 1 of this thesis provides valuable insights into the function of the 
foreseeability requirement. These insights equip courts and parties alike with the 
tools required to ascertain the extent to which a particular default would be efficient 
in a given transaction. This degree of efficiency, then, allows parties to carry out an 
analysis of whether to stick with the default or to contract around it in a manner that 
maximizes the sum of participant utility. 
Unfortunately, however, such an analysis, being dependent upon a whole host of 
variables is difficult and, in certain instances, too costly to carry out from the 
perspective of courts. This, however, is a concern that can be put to rest through the 
development of and innovation in mathematical methodologies in the field coupled 
with the collection of empirical data. As such, this thesis is of the view that while a 
lot of development is still required in the area before the efficiency perspective can 
provide, in a cost efficient manner, concrete answers to when a particular default is 
relatively efficient, the importance and utility of such an approach cannot be ignored.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
85 Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of 
Contractual Obligation’ (1983) 69 Virginia Law Review 967, 987. 
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Conclusion 
 
If contracts were complete, there would be no-efficiency enhancing role that courts 
could play apart from enforcing the terms of the contract.86 This is a result of the fact 
that parties to a contract have a better understanding of their dealings relative to 
courts. This leads to the conclusion that, ceteris paribus, the parties would contract 
on terms that would operate to maximize their joint interest. In other words, 
contracts simply constitute an open ended institution which allows merchants to 
exchange resources to their mutual advantage.87 
 
A complete contract is defined as one that details all possible contingencies and 
prescribes the appropriate performance on the materialization of each contingency.88 
Moreover, these contingencies are not limited to exogenous variables such as the 
market price of the goods but include endogenous responses such as the possibility 
of opportunism on the part of one party.89  
 
The realities of international trade however, reveal that contracts for the sale of 
goods are seldom, if ever, complete. This however does not mean that incomplete 
contracts are inherently inefficient. Rather, in various instances, contracts are 
intentionally left incomplete on the basis of efficiency enhancing rationale.  For 
instance, drafting complete contracts carry costs such as those associated with 
collection of information, negotiating and drafting.90 In efficiency terms, such costs 
must be balanced with the benefits of compete contracting. This is to say that, where 
                                                     
86 Steven Shavell, ‘On the Writing and Interpretation of Contracts’ (2006) 22 Journal of Law, 
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87 Ejan Mackaay, ‘The Civil Law of Contract’ in Gerrit D. Gesst (ed), Contract Law and Economics 
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85 American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 432. 
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the materialization of a particular contingency is relatively improbable the costs of 
negotiating on the same would outweigh its advantages. 
 
Moreover, there are relational justifications for incomplete contracts. For instances 
parties may intentionally leave the contract incomplete in order to avoid contentious 
issues, prolonged negotiations on which, might destroy the agreement.91  Similarly, 
insistence on the part of one party to enter into prolonged negotiations might be 
taken by the other as an indication giving rise to the presumption that the party 
requesting such detailed negotiations is litigious.92 Such concerns might then lead 
parties to strategically leave the contract incomplete.  
 
Such incompleteness however is of little concern if the default rules of law can 
operate as efficient substitutes for complete contracting. Indeed, if default rules 
operate in such a manner, then the costs saved as a result of the incompleteness of 
contracts might well outweigh the costs of judicial implication of terms i.e. the 
interpretation and application of default rules of law. Consequently, parties would 
intentionally opt to leave their contract incomplete to the extent that such default 
rules are capable of substituting the efficiency provided by complete contracts. 
 
Since the Convention was formulated with the view of decreasing the costs 
associated with diverging national rules governing the sale of goods; it may be stated 
that the instrument is premised on the rationale of decreasing transaction costs by 
providing a unified statement of commercial law in the context of international sale 
of goods. The success of the Convention in this regard is therefore dependent upon 
the extent to which the default rules contained therein, promote efficient contracting. 
In other words, parties to contracts for the international sale of goods, as discussed 
above, would weigh the extent to which the rules contained in the Convention 
operate to further their collective interests while deciding whether to leave the 
contract incomplete or otherwise. 
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This thesis argues that the rules of the Convention, if interpreted properly, have the 
potential of increasing the efficiency of the agreement. This is partly a result of the 
fact that the Convention correctly identifies that the intention of the parties is the best 
source of filling in the gaps of the contact. Lacking divine insight however, it is 
impossible for courts to ascertain what exactly the intention of the parties was vis-à-
vis a particular contingency, when the contract is silent as to the same.93 As a result 
Article 9 of the Convention implies terms on the basis of practices that the parties 
have established between themselves and usage that they knew or should have been 
aware of. 94Similarly Article 8 of the Convention interprets the statements made by 
and the conduct of a party according to his or her intent, where the other party knew 
or could not have been unaware what that intent was. Failing this, such statements 
and conduct are to be interpreted in line with “the understanding that a reasonable 
person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the same 
circumstances.”95 
 
The implication of terms, especially through industry custom raises the presumption 
that the Convention adopts a contextualist approach to contractual gap filling. This 
statement is supported by the fact that the drafters of the Convention, at each stage of 
the drafting process, continuously made reference to the requirements of commercial 
realities. As a result of such concerns, the rules of the Convention have the potential 
to be interpreted in a manner that would operate to maximize the joint return of the 
parties for instance by lowering transaction costs, placing liability on the best-risk 
avoider and barring the potential of opportunistic behaviour. 
 
While flexibility in interpretation is indeed necessary for default rules to achieve the 
goals of efficiency when applied to the facts of each case; an equally essential 
requirement is that the users of the Convention be provided with a degree of 
certainty with regards to their rights and obligations under the default rules. The 
analysis of the travaux carried out in each chapter however, clearly demonstrates that 
the diversity of interest that sought recognition during the drafting stages of the 
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309 
 
Convention resulted in the need of diplomatic compromise.96 Consequently, it is not 
surprising that at certain occasions the only way to reach an agreement was through 
the incorporation of seemingly contradictory, ambiguous and uncertain formulations.  
 
This should not be interpreted to mean that the drafters were concerned only with 
reaching a final text, regardless of the instrument’s internal coherence and 
applicability to concrete cases. Rather, the UNCITRAL and its ad hoc Working 
Groups were concerned with finding a workable compromise between the 
participating states. It was only when a workable compromise could not be identified 
that “the drafters of the Convention chose a technical formulation based on the 
lowest common denominator.”97 
 
Such compromise solutions have led various commentators to argue that the 
resulting nature of the Convention as a formal statement of rules, comprising elastic 
terms and conflicting approaches, increases the likelihood rather than eliminating the 
possibility of diverging interpretation and application across legal traditions. This in 
turn, has been argued to undermine the goal of legal harmonization in international 
sale transaction. 98 
 
A fair analysis of the Convention’s usefulness as a vehicle for unification requires 
the weighing its advantages against its disadvantages. Thus the question to be asked 
is whether the Convention has been able to promote uniformity and certainty with 
regards to the law on international sale of goods – in other words, is a Convention 
that suffers for certain defects better than no Convention at all? 
 
The fact that a large number of countries from different legal, political and economic 
back grounds have ratified the Convention, coupled with the sheer volume of case 
law that has resulted on the provisions of the Convention, provides proof of the fact 
that unification, albeit to a  degree, has resulted in the law of international sale of 
goods. Furthermore, the process of unification by its very nature is a dynamic 
                                                     
96 With the exception of Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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procedure. As such, the Convention should be understood as an instrument that 
serves as a cornerstone to the dynamic process of legal harmonization. Seen in this 
light, it is hard to disagree with Professor Honnald when he characterizes the 
Convention as “a triumph of cooperative international work.”162 
 
This thesis, by identifying and analysing articles of the Convention which either 
seemingly contradict one another or leave issues unsettled concludes that the rules of 
the Convention can indeed be interpreted in a manner that promotes the goal of legal 
harmonization by promoting efficiency from the perspective of the parties to a 
contract for the sale of goods. In other words, the Convention by providing default 
rules that are capable of being interpreted in a manner that promotes efficiency of the 
transaction motivates parties not to derogate from its dictates. As a result, 
harmonization in practice is definitely not an unachievable goal. 
 
Indeed there are limitations to the achievement of the goals of harmonization, the 
greatest of which lies in the fact that there does not exist a hierarchal court structure 
in the interpretation of the Convention. This is particularly problematic given that the 
Convention, by its very nature, is not an instrument that can readily be amended. As 
such, courts must interpret the Convention in a manner that takes not only the current 
realities of, but in fact the evolution of, commercial practice into account. This 
should not be taken to mean that courts and tribunals are free to derogate from the 
interpretative and gap filling methodology contained in the Convention in the search 
of commercially reasonable standards. Rather, it simply means that courts should 
give due regard to judgments emanating from other jurisdictions. 
 
Indeed it would be incorrect to hold that foreign judgments are binding or that 
judgments delivered by a relatively higher court of one jurisdiction are binding on 
the lower courts of another. In fact all judgments delivered have persuasive authority 
rather than a binding character.99 As such, the value of a judgment from the 
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perspective of courts in one jurisdiction is not dependent upon the position a court 
occupies in the hierarchal structure of courts within another jurisdiction.   
 
The result of judgments carrying persuasive authority is simply that courts should 
give due regards to judgments delivered in other jurisdictions but are completely free 
to derogate from the same when there are reasonable grounds to do so. Such 
reasonable grounds however must be based on the interpretative methodology 
contained in the Convention or the dictates of its specific articles/ general principle 
rather than the personal preference of judges and arbitrators.  
Courts with final appellate authority, in domestic legal systems and regional 
institutions like the European Union, help to enforce uniform interpretation. The 
Convention, however, has neither a Supreme Court nor a well-established 
consultative body.100Instead, an unorganized community of interpreters including 
(but not limited to) national courts, UNCITRAL and arbitral tribunals contribute to 
the corpus of interpretive wisdom. C. B. Anderson amongst others has labeled this 
unorganized community of interpreters as ‘global jurisconsultorium’ – i.e. the 
meeting of minds across jurisdictions in the interpretation of international law.101 
 
Recognizing these limitations, this thesis recommends that when called upon to 
apply the provisions of the Convention in the resolution of disputes, courts should 
follow the following process of interpretation: 
1) Disregard the rules of domestic law on the issue, at least in cases where the 
Convention contains an express provision governing the dispute or where 
general principles upon which it is based can be identified for the resolution 
of the issue. 
2) Interpret the article in question with due regard to case law and scholarly 
opinion, regardless of the jurisdiction from which they emanate. 
                                                     
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991229i3.html> accessed: 13 August 2015; Professor Di Mattaeo 
disagrees and  advocates that judgments should have a binding character Larry A. DiMatteo, ‘The 
CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended Contractual Liability in International 
Business Dealings’ (1997) 22 Yale Journal of International Law 111. 
100 Joshua D. H. Karton, ‘Can the CISG Advisory Council Affect the Homeward Trend? (2009) 
13Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration71. 
101 Camilla B. Andersen, ‘The Uniform International Sales Law and the Global Jurisconsultorium’ 
(2005) 24 Journal of Law and Commerce 159, 159-160. 
312 
 
3) Give regard to the object and purpose of the article under examination, as is 
evident from the travaux. 
4) Apply the dictates of good faith, with the aim of invalidating an interpretation 
which allows for the potential of parties to act in an opportunistic manner. 
 
While the first two considerations operate to achieve the goals of uniformity in line 
with the international character of the Convention the last two would operate, albeit 
to a degree, to achieve the goal of efficiency by taking commercial realities into 
account. 
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